Do Targeted Assassinations Work?
A Multivariate Analysis of Israeli Counter-Terrorism Effectiveness during Al-Aqsa Uprising¹

By

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ABSTRACT

We assess the impact of Israeli targeted assassinations on rates of Palestinian violence from September 2000, the beginning of Al-Aqsa uprising, through June 2004. Literature concerning the relationship between repression and rebellion suggests four plausible effects of targeted assassinations on insurgents: deterrence, backlash, disruption, and incapacitation. Using differenced and lagged time-series analysis, we utilize multiple and logistic regression to evaluate the effect of targeted assassinations on Palestinian violence. We conclude that targeted assassinations have no significant impact on rates of Palestinian attacks. Targeted assassinations do not decrease rates of Palestinian violence, nor do they increase them, whether in the short or long-run. Targeted assassinations may be useful as a political tool to signal a state’s determination to punish terrorists and placate an angry public, but there is little evidence that they actually impact the course of an insurgency.
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On March 22, 2004, Israeli forces assassinated Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), as he was returning home from his dawn prayers at a Gaza mosque. On the night following the assassination, the Israeli daily *Yedioth Ahronoth* conducted a public opinion poll of Israelis to inquire about their views surrounding the assassination. The poll shows that while 60 percent of Israelis support the decision to kill Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, 81 percent expected a surge in retaliatory terrorism following the attack. This belief in the appropriateness of killing a radical leader despite the likelihood of an increase in violent attacks raises a number of puzzling questions: What effect, if any, do targeted assassinations have on cycles of violence? Do targeted assassinations contain, deter, and ultimately lessen rates of violence, or do they intensify anger and increase motivations to attack with more deadly force? Are targeted assassinations effective in combating insurgents and terrorists?

Assessing the impact of targeted assassinations on insurgencies is as difficult as it is important. Theoretically, there is little agreement regarding the logical consequences of repressive measures in general on the strategies and tactical repertoires of insurgent groups. Some observers contend that repression increases the cost of collective action as to make it unlikely (Hibbs 1973, Oberschall 1973, Oliver 1980, Hardin 1982). Others maintain that repression generates additional grievances that motivate further mobilization to punish an “unjust” adversary (Gamson et al. 1982, Goldstein 1983, and Olivier 1990, 1991). These two perspectives have largely been challenged on empirical grounds; there are many instances where repression both quells and provokes insurgency (Zimmermann 1980, 1983, Hoover and Kowalewski 1992, Lee et al. 2000, Davenport et al. 2005). Attempts to solve the repression-rebellion puzzle have led some scholars to investigate non-linear relationships between repression and rebellion, arguing that varying levels of repression – high, medium, or low – are likely to induce mass dissent or hinder it (Gurr 1968, 1970, Feierabend and Feierabend 1972, Snyder and Tilly 1972, Lichback and Gurr 1981, Muller 1985, Muller and Seligson 1987, Muller and Weede 1990). Others look to the timing of repression in the protest cycle (Snyder 1976, Tarrow 1989, Costain 1992, and Brocket 1995); its perceived illegitimacy in the context of preexisting networks that could generate micromobilization processes (White 1989, Opp and Roehl 1990, Rasler 1996); the political and institutional context under
which it is applied (Gupta et al. 1993); its targets (Mason and Krane 1989) and the consistency of its application in relation to accommodative strategies (Lichback 1987, Rasler 1996, Moore 1998, 2000; Ginkel and Smith 1999, Ferrara 2003); its impact on mobilization when combined with ethno-political grievances and group coherence (Gurr 1993, Gurr and Moore 1997); the ability of dissidents to adapt to it and unleash backlash mobilization (Francisco 1995, 1996, 2004, 2005); or a combination of these variables (Della Porta 1995, Hafez 2003).

With few exceptions (Gurr 1986, Khawaja 1993, Della Porta 1995, Koopmans 1997, Francisco 2005), much of this literature speaks of repression without specifying its different types (for example, mass arrests versus massacres, or exile versus targeted assassinations). Nonetheless, this literature provides the theoretical foundations for studying specific strategies of repression to quell insurgency and terrorism. We explore four plausible hypotheses about the effects of targeted assassinations on rates of Palestinian violence during the Al-Aqsa uprising that began in September 2000 and reached its peak in March 2002.

H₁ – Targeted assassinations serve as selective disincentives that raise the cost of militancy and deter militant organizations from planning more attacks, thus decreasing rates of Palestinian violence.

H₂ – Targeted assassinations enrage militants and produce a backlash effect, increasing levels of Palestinian violence.

H₃ – Targeted assassinations deprive militant organizations of valued commanders and force the remaining members to concentrate more on their personal security and less on recruiting and organizing attacks; the disruption effect diminishes the number and success rate of attacks over time.

H₄ – Targeted assassinations by themselves are insufficient predictors of increasing or diminishing Palestinian violence. However, when combined with major military incursions into rebellious towns, they jointly produce a diminishing capacity effect and decrease rates of Palestinian violence, because they target both the resource endowments and personnel of militant groups.
We investigate rates of Palestinian violence using a multivariate approach to evaluate the significance of targeted assassinations. We utilize multiple regression for data whose response variable(s) is continuous and binary logistic regression for cases where the response variable is binary. Our findings suggest that targeted assassinations have no significant impact on rates of Palestinian violence, even when time lags associated with possible reactive retaliations are taken into account. Contrary to some proponents of targeted assassinations, our analysis indicates that targeted assassinations do not decrease the rates of Palestinian violence, whether in the short-run or the long-run. However, contrary to some critics of targeted assassinations, our analysis shows that targeted assassinations do not increase the rates of Palestinian violence either, whether in the short-run or the long-run. This study does not address the political dimensions of targeted assassinations, especially their potential to signal one’s determination to fight back, demonstrate strength to placate an angry public, or as a means for retributive justice. It may well be that the political utility of targeted assassinations is more effective than its military one.

**BACKGROUND**

In September 2000, Palestinians embarked on an uprising, commonly referred to as *Al-Aqsa Intifada*. This uprising, their second in a little over a decade, came on the heels of a failed peace summit between Palestinians and Israelis and was intended to force Israelis out of the West Bank and Gaza. Unlike their first *intifada*, this uprising quickly turned into a militarized struggle between armed Palestinian factions and Israeli forces. Initially, Palestinian violence was characterized by random shootings at Israeli positions and settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. Toward the end of the second month of the uprising, Palestinian violence became more organized as factions associated with Yasser Arafat’s Fatah began to undertake guerrilla-like attacks on Israeli patrols and settlers, while the Islamist factions – Hamas and Islamic Jihad – began to organize suicide bombings inside Israel. As the cycle of violence deepened, secular Palestinian factions – Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and a new and somewhat shadowy group associated with Fatah, known as Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AMB) – began to carry out suicide bombings against Israeli civilians.
Many Israelis viewed Palestinian violence as another war against the Jewish state and, consequently, gave their support to the hard-line administration of Ariel Sharon. As suicide bombings persisted, Israel’s defense establishment was hard pressed to take measures to reduce the violence. Initially, the IDF engaged in a tit-for-tat retaliatory policy aimed at the Palestinian Authority. The latter was accused of inciting – or at least not preventing – violence despite its pledge to do so under the peace and security accords signed between 1993 and 1997. Israeli forces targeted Palestinian security agencies and police stations in pin-point attacks by air and sea. The Israelis also began to impose closures on the territories and restricted the movement of Palestinians from town to town. As violence worsened, Israel became more aggressive in its punishment of Palestinian militants. Targeted assassinations, mass arrests, home demolitions, and expulsions were often used to deter future attacks. In March 2002, following a suicide bombing campaign in which 79 people were killed, 555 were injured, the IDF mobilized its forces in a major takeover of Palestinian cities and towns in an offensive known as Operation Defensive Shield. Since this operation, the Israelis undertook many other incursions in an attempt to capture suspected terrorists and crush the infrastructure of Palestinian militancy.

One of the most controversial measures taken by Israeli forces has been the targeted assassination of Palestinian military commanders and political leaders. The use of assassinations is not unique to the Al-Aqsa uprising; Israel has a history of using this method against enemies that have perpetrated violence against its citizenry. Israel waged a campaign of assassinations in retaliation for the Munich Olympic massacre in 1972 by Palestinian terrorists associated with the Black September group (Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare 1994). Some of the more notable episodes of targeted assassinations in recent years has been the fatal shooting of Islamic Jihad leader Fathi Shikaki in Malta in October 1995; the detonation of a booby-trapped mobile phone that killed Hamas’s chief bomb maker Yahya Ayyash (the “Engineer”) in Gaza in January 1996; and the aborted assassination of Khaled Meshal, one of Hamas’s political leaders in Amman, in September 1997.

From November 2000 to June 2004, Israel conducted approximately 151 Targeted assassinations. The first assassination was of Hussein Abayyat, a Fatah commander killed on November 9, 2000. Since
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his liquidation, Israel engaged in some high-profile killings which included Dr. Thabet Thabet, head of Fatah in Tulkarem; Mustafa Zibri (Abu Ali Mustafa), political head of the PFLP; Mahmoud Muhammad Ahmed Shouley (Abu Hnoud), Hamas planner of suicide bombings; Salah Shehadeh, chief commander of Hamas’s military wing; Ismail Abu Shanab, one of Hamas’s top leaders in its political wing; and Dr. Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, the number one man in Hamas political hierarchy following the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Most of the targeted assassinations were conducted by air through the use of Apache helicopters or unmanned drone planes firing laser-guided missiles. Some assassinations relied on the use of jet fighter planes with heavy-load bombs. Other assassinations involved booby-trapping cars or phone booths, or installing land mines along the routes of suspected terrorists. Israelis have also used undercover “Arabized” agents to carry out assassinations from close up. To conduct such sensitive attacks in the heart of Palestinian cities and refugee camps, the IDF relies on an extensive network of local spies and collaborators who can provide just-in-time information on a moving target.

The decision to undertake a targeted killing begins with the Israeli intelligence services. They identify an individual as a major threat to Israel and prepare a detailed report on his past activities. The information is reviewed by IDF commanders and military lawyers and they jointly make a determination if a targeted assassination is warranted. Major General Giora Eiland (IDF) identifies a four-prong criterion to determine when targeted assassinations should be carried out. First, arresting the individual is a near impossibility. Second, the militant must be a high-value target because of his ability to inflict harm on Israelis. Third, the assassination is not likely to involve high civilian casualties. Fourth, the individual is in the process of planning or carrying out an operation; he is a “ticking bomb.” When an assassination is deemed necessary, a recommendation is made to the chief of staff, who takes up the matter with the Israeli cabinet to approve or disapprove. Additional approvals may be required by the minister of defense and the prime minister if civilian casualties are likely (David 2003, 117).

The debate within Israel over targeted assassinations revolves around four core arguments: legality and legitimacy of assassinations; consequences of assassinations on innocent bystanders; alternative means to fighting terror; and effectiveness of these measures in actually reducing violence
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(David 2003, Stein 2003, Luft 2003). Many of the claims proffered by proponents of targeted assassinations and their detractors are normative ones that are outside of the scope of our research. However, the debate on the effectiveness of targeted assassinations is an empirical one that can be evaluated through the use of statistical methods. In the following sections we attempt to determine if targeted assassinations are an effective means to combat violent insurgency.

**HYPOTHESES**

The literature on repression and rebellion suggest at least four plausible hypotheses concerning the effects of targeted assassinations on Palestinian violence: deterrence, backlash, disruption, and incapacitation. We explore each in turn.

**H1 – Targeted Assassinations are selective disincentives that produce a deterrent effect**

A number of studies point out that repression by authorities increases the contenders cost of collective action and serves as a selective disincentive to engage in high-risk activism (Oberschall 1973, Tilly 1978, Oliver 1980, Hardin 1982). Rational actors subject to a set of constraints will calculate costs and benefits of different courses of action and choose the means that are likely to maximize their expected utility, whether individual gains or public goods (Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley 1983, Mason 1984, Muller and Opp 1986). Cost-benefit calculations are shaped by the importance of the utility being maximized, the probability of group success, and the perceived importance of personal participation to achieving the overall goals of the group (Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989; Muller, Dietz, and Finkel 1991). To the extent repression decreases the likelihood of group success or diminishes the ability of individuals to truly make a difference, it will deter others from participating in high-risk activism. As Muller and Weede (1990: 646) explain, “Under a highly repressive regime it is likely that opportunities for collective action of any kind will be low, that the probability of success will be negligible, and that costs will be high. Rational actors who wish to contest policies of a government are likely to think better of it.”
Lichback (1987) gives nuance to this rationalist perspective by focusing on the consistency of repression in relation to accommodative strategies. He maintains that if repression against violent strategies is applied consistently and non-violent strategies are accommodated, militant groups will substitute violence for non-violent tactics to avoid the prohibitive costs of violent tactics and seek more efficient and effective means to achieve their aims. Put simply, a consistent repression policy that does not cede concessions to violent strategies only incurs costs to the dissident groups and fails to deliver any meaningful gains to their movement. As a result, violence will diminish over time as groups adapt to a more fruitful strategy. Adaptation may not be immediate due to a learning curve, but violence should decrease in due course.

In addition to consistency, Mason and Krane (1989) argue that the targets of repression matter. Targeting refers to the range of “subversives” encompassed under repressive measures. Do the repressing authorities target only leaders and core activists of the dissident movement, or do they also target supporters, sympathizers, and anyone suspected of involvement with rebellious groups? States that selectively target known militants for suppression and avoid indiscriminate application of repression are likely to reduce the likelihood of mobilization because ordinary people are not drawn into the conflict unwillingly and rank-and-file activists begin to question the ability of their leaders to deliver collective benefits. Selective repression against core militants signals to potential recruits that only “troublemakers” will be punished and, therefore, those who keep their distance will not become victims of repression. Indiscriminate repression, on the other hand, intensifies anger among the public and does not provide guarantees that non-violent activism will not be repressed. Under these circumstances, supporters and sympathizers may be inclined toward greater risk to mitigate their losses, seek security in militant groups, or inflict revenge.

In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the aforementioned literature would hypothesize that a consistent policy of targeted assassinations against known commanders of terrorist cells that recruit, organize, and dispatch attackers against Israeli targets raise the costs of violence and force potential militants to abandon the struggle or, at a minimum, substitute tactics. The expansion of the assassination policy to the
political leadership of terrorist groups sends a message that Israel will not accommodate or negotiate with radical groups, thus confirming the futility of violent strategies. Refusal to cede to the major demands of the militant groups – end to the occupation, relinquishing east Jerusalem, halt in settlement construction, and refugees’ right of return – while violence persists signals a commitment to not give in to terror. Finally, selectively targeting leaders and commanders of the groups responsible for anti-Israeli violence reduces the likelihood of drawing the broader public into the fray and impresses upon potential militants the futility of continuing with violent strategies.

$H_2$ – Targeted assassinations produce backlash, increasing violence

Studies by Francisco (1995 and 1996) posit the backlash hypothesis: preexisting and mobilized organizations facing extreme coercion will fight back with greater levels of violence. Backlash is defined as massive, swift, and expanding mobilization in response to harsh repression (Francisco 2005). Francisco (2004) argues that acts of severe repression can serve as focal points for backlash mobilization if (a) publicity transmits information of the repressive actions to the wider public; (b) there is continuity in leadership or new leadership arises; and (c) dissidents can offer adaptive strategies that reduce the risk of similar repression in the future. Under these circumstances, repression produces backlash, which is the opposite of what is intended.

In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the backlash hypothesis predicts that targeted assassinations will produce an escalation in violence. Targeted assassinations receive immediate and widespread publicity in local and international media, and often spark immediate condemnations and protests from the public. Following an attack, an enraged public gathers at the site of the assassination and within a day, thousands come out for a mass funeral that is covered by the media. Moreover, targeted assassinations rarely remove the entire leadership of militant groups in one fell swoop, thus satisfying Francisco’s condition of continuity in leadership. This leadership can take more personal precautions to minimize the risk of targeted assassinations in the future, thus enabling them to mobilize further attacks in retaliation for previous ones. Furthermore, preexisting and mobilized militant organizations facing targeted
assassinations are likely to frame targeted assassinations as treacherous and illegitimate acts that demand a commensurate retaliatory response. Tight-knit groups will seek to maintain the internal cohesion of their militant organizations by satisfying their cadres’ need to exhibit defiance in the face of oppression. As a result, targeted assassinations are likely to produce a surge in violence and foster conditions that permit for the future recruitment of terrorists.

\[H_3 – \text{Targeted assassinations produce a disruption effect and diminish violence over time}\]

Khawaja’s (1993) study of repression and Palestinian collective action in the West Bank and Gaza from 1976 to 1985 shows how certain types of repression have a direct impact on the ability of organizations to mobilize collective action. Curfews and home-to-home searches, he argues, disrupt coordination and communication networks, thus making it difficult for the militants to mobilize following rounds of repression. He further argues that medium levels of arrests increased the rate of collective action while mass arrests decreased the rate substantially. The latter is directly linked to disruption of organizational coordination. Khawaja (1993, 67) concludes that “In the absence of organizational mobilization and support, potential activists are more likely to keep their anger and grievance to themselves, fearing retributions by authorities.” Khawaja’s claims are anchored in the resource mobilization theory, which maintains that grievances alone are insufficient to produce rebellious collective action; groups require a modicum of material resources and organizational capabilities to organize and mobilize aggrieved people (Tilly et al. 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977). To the extent repression removes valuable movement resources or makes them difficult to acquire, it disrupts the ability of dissidents to mobilize collective action.

In the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the resource mobilization perspective implies that targeted assassinations may diminish the number and success rate of attacks in the long-run as militant groups suffer the loss of experienced cadres and commanders, and allocate precious resources to secure the remaining leadership. Thus, rather than spend their money, time, and effort on recruiting people, training them, and transporting them to carry out operations, terrorists spend their valued resources on
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securing safe houses for hiding, alternating vehicles and communication methods to avoid detection, and restructuring the cells that have been disrupted by assassinations. Moreover, taking out commanders that bear the cognitive load for organizing attacks reduces the quality of future terrorist operations. Bomb making, recruiting, and intelligence gathering skills are not acquired over night; liquidating persons central to the preparation and planning of operations is a real loss for terror groups and they take a long time to recover. The cumulative effect over time is to reduce levels of violence or, at a minimum, lower the quality and success rate of violent operations against Israeli targets.

H₄ – Targeted assassinations by themselves do not diminish levels of violence because of the substitution effect. However, when targeted assassinations are combined with military incursions, they jointly produce a diminishing capacity effect and lessen violence over time.

Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley (1983) and Enders and Sandler (1993, 2004) argue that governments that increase the costs of terrorism through repression, but fail to decrease the flow of resources available to terrorists, will ultimately not succeed in fighting terrorism because of the substitution effect. The latter occurs when terrorists shift from one terror activity (e.g. suicide bombings) to another (e.g. roadside bombs) because counter-terrorism policies have made the first activity more difficult to carry out (or increased its relative cost in relation to other terror activities). If the second activity (roadside bombs) can satisfy the same desired goals as the first activity (suicide bombings), and if counter-terrorism policies have not sought to increase the relative costs of carrying out the second activity, terrorists will substitute the first activity for the second. As long as counter-terrorism policies do not address the resource endowments of terror groups, terrorists will adapt to repression policies by substituting tactics to relatively less costly methods. This analysis supplements the resource mobilization theory presented in the third hypothesis by emphasizing the need to deny militant groups the ability to organize collective violence by depriving them of the prerequisite resources and organizational infrastructure for violence. A reduction in one violent tactic does not necessarily mean that the overall rate of violence has diminished.
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In the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the substitution effect suggests that targeted assassinations that remove valuable movement resources without impacting the overall resource endowment of terror groups will result in adaptation, whereby terrorists will alter their tactics to carry out more attacks in the long run. However, targeted assassinations combined with major military incursions that destroy Palestinian bomb-making factories, arrests suspected militants, and destroy weapon-smuggling tunnels not only deprive terror groups of their valuable commanders, they also deprive them of the ability to reconstitute terror cells and diminish their capacity to attack in the future.

**METHODOLOGY**

We compiled data on violent events between Palestinians and Israelis from September 29, 2000 to June 16, 2004. We culled the data from the quarterly chronologies published in *The Middle East Journal*, which draws from several news sources, including the Associated Press, BBC, New York Times, Washington Post, and many other reliable news services. In addition, we collected data from the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Herzlia, Israel, which keeps detailed records of violent events in the current Palestinian uprising. We also collected data from Lexus-Nexus searches using as our main sources *Ha’aretz* and *Jerusalem Post*, two daily Israeli papers that are published in English. Ancillary sources such as CNN or New York Times chronologies of suicide bombings in Israel, or Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs chronologies of Palestinian attacks were used to provide more information on specific events, not as independent sources of data. We gathered the following for our analysis:

- Palestinian violent attacks that materialized (successful attacks), including attack type and group(s) responsible for carrying it out. We defined Palestinian violent attacks as suicide bombings, non-suicide bombings, sporadic shootings, organized armed infiltrations, rocket attacks, and other forms of lethal violence.
- Palestinian attacks that were in progress but failed to materialize because Israeli forces prevented them (foiled attacks).
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- Number of Israelis killed and injured in Palestinian attacks.
- Israeli targeted assassinations that began in November 2000.
- Israeli military incursions that began in October 2000.
- Palestinians killed and injured in Israeli counter-terrorism operations.

We encountered two challenges while collecting this data. First, we occasionally found discrepancies in news reports as to the actual date or number of persons killed/injured in an attack. In those instances, we relied on Israeli sources because we assumed that they would have the most accurate information given their stake in and proximity to the conflict. Second, some events were difficult to categorize because of conflicting Palestinian and Israeli claims about what actually happened. For instance, some episodes deemed to be targeted assassinations by Palestinians are contested by Israelis as “workshop accidents” – i.e. militants blew themselves up while preparing an attack. When in doubt, we excluded these events from our database. As a result, our aggregate numbers are substantially lower than what Palestinian sources report. We recognize this limitation, but insist it is necessary to ensure the reliability of the data.

For all four hypotheses we use a multivariate approach as targeted assassinations constitute one piece of Israel’s overall repression strategy. This means that interactions between predictive factors as well as their possible isolated affects were taken into account. Following Box, Hunter and Hunter (1978, 496-497) we began by using multi-interval differencing of both factor and response variables in order to better stationarize the time-series for regression analysis. Along with differencing techniques, for every model type a weekly response variable lag was tested. The differencing and lag intervals ranged from weekly Lag₀ for real-time models to Lag₄ for the possibility of a four week lag period between Israeli repression and Palestinian reaction. We then looked for interactions and/or collinearity between our predictors. When an interaction was detected we included the interaction in our model as a factor in its own right. This inclusion, however, did not take the place of an independent testing of the variables. When factors were found to be collinear, one was removed from the model. When linear regression failed to produce a model with significant predictive power, polynomial models (including quadratic and cubic models) were used to attempt a better fit. Statistical significance was tested on a factor basis using the p-
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value for the factor with an alpha level at 0.05 and on a model basis using the model $R^2$ value. As will be shown below, many factors/models that were found to be statistically significant were determined to have no practical explanatory significance. Practical significance for statistically significant factors was determined by a calculation of the ratio of the sequential sum of squares over the total sum of squares. This ratio calculates the percentage of variation in the response variable explained by the factor. Only the models with the highest practical significance are shown at each time lag.

Throughout our investigation we found it necessary to include attacks foiled by Israel in the counts for Palestinian violence. Since we are assessing the ability of targeted assassinations to deter or provoke Palestinian violence, rates of foiled attacks are important to include because a failed attack due to Israeli interception speaks to the ability of Israel to foil, not deter, Palestinian violence. An increase in foiled attacks might substantiate the backlash theory, despite the appearance of calm.

**TESTING HYPOTHESIS 1**

$H_1$ assumes that repression against violent strategies is applied consistently. Figure 1 illustrates the consistency of repression by Israel over the time-period covered in our study.

[Insert Figure 1]

Out of the 191 weeks shown above, only in 15 weeks did Israel not retaliate against Palestinian attacks, which is less than 8% of the time. At each weekly lag period a similarly high percentage of retaliations occurred (see Table 1).

[Insert Table 1]

We conclude that Israel’s retaliation policy was consistent throughout the uprising, especially in light of the fact that no major concessions were granted to the Palestinians during this time period.

$H_1$ predicts that the attack success rate (given as the total number of successful attacks / the total number of attacks) for insurgent groups and the type of target affected by the Israeli repression will strongly predict levels of Palestinian violence. Our models for $H_1$ include the attack success rate and two repression variables intended to measure differing target types. The first repression variable is targeted
assassinations which are more heavily aimed at commanders while the second repression variable of major military incursions are less discriminate and more broadly affect insurgent organizations. Table 2 provides the most successfully predictive approach found by our study which is

\[
\text{Pal Violence} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Targeted Assassinations} + \beta_2 \text{Military Incursions} + \beta_3 \text{Attack Success Rate} + e
\]

The predictive power of this model is relatively low because it explains at best only 21% of the variation in Palestinian violence. Targeted assassinations were not found to be statistically significant. The variable having the highest practical significance is the attack success rate. However modeling it by itself and with other variables did not increase its predictive power beyond 16% at a 2-week lag. Interestingly, the attack success rate coefficient is negative, which is the opposite relationship predicted by H1. The latter predicts that as the attack success rate diminishes so does the level of Palestinian violence. Our analysis has found that as the attack success rate diminishes the rate of Palestinian violence actually increases and vice versa. Our analysis has not provided any justification for the relationships asserted by H1.

**TESTING HYPOTHESIS 2**

H2 asserts that to the extent that repressive action by Israel is viewed as extreme coercion by Palestinian groups, it will initiate immediate backlash. We use two methods to separate severe repression, which is more likely to give rise to calls for immediate retaliation, from mild or “normal” repression, which is less likely to produce demands for immediate retaliation. The first is by *aggregate numerical severity*. A repressive act by Israel is determined to be severe if an Israeli repressive act is performed when no Palestinian attack corresponds to it and/or if the ratio of Israeli measures to Palestinian attacks is > 3:1. Otherwise repression is considered “mild.” The 3:1 ratio rule has been determined by looking at the
distribution of the ratio of Israeli measures to Palestinian attacks during the 191 weeks and finding the point in the histogram presented below in Figure 2 where normalcy gives way to severity.

[Insert Figure 2]

The second method is by *victim numerical severity*. Even when a repressive act is not considered numerically severe in the sense calculated above, if an attack results in a high loss of life, the act is likely to be seen as extreme. This victim numerical severity also depends upon the number of Palestinian attacks over the same time period. If the number of victims suffered by a Palestinian group is very high, but the number of successful attacks carried out by the Palestinian group over this same time period is also very high then it is likely that repression will be seen as less severe than if fewer Palestinian attacks were occurring. Therefore, we normalize the numerical severity calculations by the number of Palestinian attacks over the same time period. A repressive act is thus considered to have caused a severe number of victims when the number of Palestinian victims killed or injured per one successful Palestinian attack over the same time period is > 40. This ratio rule has been determined through an examination of Figure 3 which shows the distribution of the ratio over the 191 weeks of our study.

[Insert Figure 3]

Severe verses mild conditions for the response variable of Palestinian attacks are calculated for clear conclusions about the relationship between factor severity and response severity. Because backlash includes backlash attempts as well as actual successful retaliations, attacks foiled by Israel are included in the response variable. Palestinian violence levels are considered severe when the ratio of Palestinian attacks to Israeli measures over the same time period is ≥ 3:1. Again, see the 191 week distribution of this ratio shown in Figure 4 for our dividing point.

[Insert Figure 4]

A binary logistic regression model is used to assess the predictive power of aggregate numerical severity and victim numerical severity on the severity of Palestinian violence. Table 3 provides the most successfully predictive approach, which is
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\[ G(\text{Severe Pal Violence}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Aggregate Numerical Severity} + \beta_2 \text{Victim Numerical Severity} \]

where \( G \) = Logit link function mapping the interval \((0,1)\) into the whole real line guaranteeing that the model will produce a predicted probability between 0 and 1.

[Insert Table 3]

The goodness-of-fit tests (Pearson, Deviance, and Hosmer-Lemeshow) have an alpha of 0.5 with the null hypothesis being an adequate fit. Thus, there is insufficient evidence for claiming that the models in table 3 do not fit the data adequately. The models lack significant predictive ability as the highest coefficient is just 0.45. Furthermore, p-values for regression factors show that movements in the severity of Palestinian violence cannot be predicted by movements in either aggregate numerical severity or victim numerical severity. In particular, targeted assassinations show no promise for either increasing or decreasing the levels of Palestinian violence. No “backlash” is verified by our findings.

**TESTING HYPOTHESIS 3**

H3 states that repressive measures which disrupt the workings of militant groups will decrease the long-run number and success rate of attacks. Repressive techniques that have a direct impact on the ability of insurgent groups to mobilize collective action will achieve long-term success against violence. Attacks become less frequent because militant groups must concern themselves more and more with internal security and less with training and organizing attacks. Attacks become less successful because repressive measures cause the “bench strength” of the militant organization to decrease as militants spend less time training, gathering intelligence and organizing attacks and more time protecting themselves.

Certain types of repression are in their nature disruptive. Targeted assassinations dramatically affect the human resources of an insurgent group and create an overall disruptive vacuum that takes time and effort on the part of the affected groups to fill. Military incursions also disrupt violent groups but in a more general way by immersing groups in a repressive environment. We include both targeted assassinations and military incursions in our model for the test of H1.
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Another way to determine whether repression is disruptive is by repression severity. As attack levels increase, less long-term planning can be performed, more time is spent on defensive maneuvers, and the overall number and quality of attacks may also decrease. Thus, we include a factor in our models measuring the severity of Palestinian attack frequencies. A frequency is considered severe when the number of targeted assassinations + military incursions ≥ 3 and mild otherwise. This number has been derived by looking at a histogram of this sum over the 191 weeks and finding the point in the histogram presented below in Figure 5 where normalcy gives way to severity.

[Insert Figure 5]

A descriptive look at the attack success rate over time during the time period under consideration may lead one to believe that repressive techniques by the Israelis are causing a long-run disruption of Palestinian groups and their ability to successfully attack Israel. Indeed, Israel’s ability to foil attacks has increased substantially. Figure 6 indicates that although variance is high, the success rate of Palestinian attacks has declined substantially over time. Is this decline related to targeted assassinations?

[Insert Figure 6]

Table 4 provides the most successfully predictive approach, which are

\[
\text{Pal Violence} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Targeted Assassinations} + \beta_2 \text{Military Incursions} + \beta_3 \text{Frequency Severity} + \epsilon
\]

AND

\[
\text{Attack Success Rate} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Targeted Assassinations} + \beta_2 \text{Military Incursions} + \beta_3 \text{Frequency Severity} + \epsilon
\]

[Insert Table 4]

The predictive power of this model is relatively low because it explains at best only 7% of the variation in Palestinian violence. Although targeted assassinations are found to be statistically significant they have little practical significance. Except in the very mild case of the Lag2 model, the factor variables are never significant for the prediction of the attack success rate, thus the decrease in successful attacks due to a
disruption by these factors finds no evidence here. The use of targeted assassinations to predict either
rates of Palestinian violence or attack success rates also receives little support from these results. We
suggest that looking at purely defensive measures such as intelligence collection, barrier building, and
increased security measures may shed more light on the decrease in the attack success rate. This
suggestion also relates to the results for H₄ and will be elaborated upon presently.

**TESTING HYPOTHESIS 4**

H₄ asserts that only repression that decreases the material and human resources of militant groups will
successfully diminish violence over time. Thus targeted assassinations by themselves cannot predict
increasing or diminishing Palestinian violence. However, H₄ asserts that when combined with major
military incursions into rebellious zones, targeted assassinations and incursions together decrease levels
of Palestinian violence, because they diminish the capacity of militant groups by targeting both their
resources and personnel. In March 2002, the sudden spike in the number of Israelis killed and injured by
Palestinian attacks caused the Israelis to change counterinsurgency methods. The chart in Figure 7 below
illustrates this dramatic increase in the number of Israelis killed or injured during March 2002.

[Insert Figure 7]

From late March 2002 onward, Israeli forces began coupling targeted assassinations with major military
incursions into rebellious Palestinian towns with the intent of striking at the resources, infrastructure and
personnel of militant groups. Although military incursions were used several times prior to March 2002,
they were often *ad hoc* responses to Palestinian violence. In March 2002, the tactic of military incursions
became more systematic.

H₄ predicts that the level of Palestinian violence decreases under a policy of combined targeted
assassinations and military incursions. Table 5 provides the most successfully predictive approaches
containing the variables targeted assassinations (TAs), military incursions (MI), or their interaction
(TA*MI).
Do Targeted Assassinations Work?

\[ \text{Pal Violence} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Targeted Assassinations} \times \text{Military Incursions} + e \]

AND

\[ \text{Pal Violence} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Targeted Assassinations} + \beta_2 \text{Military Incursions} + e \]

AND

\[ \text{Pal Violence} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Military Incursions} + e \]

Table 5 illustrates that neither targeted assassinations, military incursions, nor their interaction is a significant predictor of the movements in Palestinian violence. Although targeted assassinations, with their effect on human resources, and military incursions, with their effect on material resources, jointly satisfy the conditions for H4, the claim that such factors would strongly predict Palestinian violence finds no support from our analysis. The factors are seldom statistically significant and when they are significant the amount of the movement in Palestinian violence explained by the factors is minimal. Furthermore, regression coefficients for statistically significant factors have the opposite sign as that predicted by H4. H4 asserts, for instance, that as the input factor TAs*MI increases Palestinian violence decreases but our analysis shows that as TAs*MI increases so do Palestinian violence. Our analysis, therefore, offers no support for the relationships asserted in H4.

DISCUSSION

The preceding analysis does not substantiate the claim that Israeli targeted assassinations have an effect on the rate of Palestinian attacks. Targeted assassinations do not quell violence, but they do not increase violence either. As a counterinsurgency tactic, their utility is questioned by our findings. Targeted assassinations do not fare much better when combined with military incursions that seek to destroy the resources, personnel, and organizational infrastructure of militant groups.

Expectations of deterrence (H1) in response to targeted assassinations have been rejected outright by our analysis. Despite the targeted nature of Israeli assassinations and the consistency of their application to punish Palestinian militants without ceding any of their demands, violence did not decrease
in statistically significant way. Escalating costs of repression, it appears, have not served as selective disincentives for individual militants. Militants did not substitute violent tactics with non-violent ones following a consistent repression policy that did not reward militancy with concessions. Despite Israel’s persistent use of targeted assassinations and other measures to quell the violence, and despite Israel’s determined refusal to concede any of the demands of the Palestinians while violence is taking place, attacks continued virtually unabated. One is hard pressed to find a more consistent repression policy than the one applied by Israel toward militant Palestinian factions. Our findings also pose a challenge to the predication that targeted repression deters while indiscriminate repression provokes violence. Public support for suicide bombings against Israelis continued to increase as the insurgency developed. Three years into the insurgency, an October 2003 poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that 74.5 percent of Palestinians support suicide bombings. In the period covered by our analysis, September 2000 – June 2004, support for suicide bombings never went below 58.6, which was in June 2004.

Expectations of backlash (H2), which posit harsh repression will result in a massive, swift, and expanding mobilization, are also rejected in the case of targeted assassinations. All three of Francisco’s (2004) conditions necessary for backlash – information transmission, continuity in leadership, and adaptive strategies by dissidents – were present. Although Palestinians continued to send attackers against Israeli targets, the rate of attacks did not vary significantly with the application of targeted assassinations to suggest a massive, swift, or expanding campaign of violence. In other words, targeted assassinations did not increase Palestinian terrorism beyond its “natural rate.” This finding is consistent with the earlier study by Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare (1994) that found that retaliation against Palestinian terrorism has no long-term deterrent or escalation effect.

Expectations of disruption (H3) due to the elimination of organizational experience and valued cadres receive little support in our analysis. Targeted assassinations did indeed remove some of the most capable commanders available for planning and carrying out terrorist attacks, but by themselves they did not impact the number of attacks or the rate of successful attacks as our analysis indicates.
Expectations of diminishing capacity (H₄) implied in Sandler et al. (1983) and Enders and Sandler (1993, 2004) discussion of the need to target the resource endowments of terrorist groups (as opposed to simply increasing the costs of their tactics) is not confirmed, in that none of the predictors asserted in H₄ bear practical predictive significance to Palestinian violence levels.

What, then, explains the decline in the Palestinian attack success rate? Perhaps instead of our focus on offensive repressive strategies, an alternative explanation for this drop may be found in purely defensive measures such as target hardening through placement of security check points in the heart of Palestinian towns; the spread of police and military personnel in crowded public places vulnerable to attack; the building of the security barrier (wall of separation) that began in June 2002; closures of Palestinian towns; better human intelligence on terrorist cells; and growing public precautions against terrorist attacks. All these measures suggest a diminishing opportunity effect, whereby terrorists find it difficult to penetrate targets that were previously vulnerable to attack because of purely defensive measures. Targeted assassinations can do little to influence opportunities for violence, unless they target actual “ticking bombs” on their way to conduct an attack.

Our analysis raises doubts about the effectiveness of targeted assassinations as a tactic in the arsenal of counter-terrorism measures. Targeted assassinations may signal a determination to fight back the terrorists and exhibit commitment not to succumb to their demands. They may also placate an angry public demanding tough measures to stop the terrorists. Politically, it may not be feasible for governments to fight terrorism by purely defensive measures. Targeted assassinations, however, should not be presented as a proven solution to patterns of political violence and rebellion. While targeted assassinations do not necessarily cause an increase in rates of political violence, it may be more valuable to allocate resources toward investments in defensive technologies to detect and intercept terrorists, harden potential targets that could attract terrorists, expansion of police and security forces in major cities that could be targeted by terrorists in the future, and acquiring human intelligence on known and potential terrorists. Given the controversial nature of targeted assassinations, it may well be that political leaders can jettison this tactic without hindering their overall ability to fight terrorism.
Figure 1: Consistency of Repression by Israel, 2000 - 2004

- ▲ = Weekly number of Palestinian attacks
- ● = Weeks when Israel did not retaliate
Table 1: Israel’s Retaliation Rate Following Palestinian Attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># Weeks Lagged</th>
<th>% Weekly Response Rate by Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>91%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>93%</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Factors</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>TAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mil Incursions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attack Success Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>TAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mil Incursions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attack Success Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>TAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mil Incursions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attack Success Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>TAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mil Incursions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attack Success Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>TAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attack Success Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

α = 0.05, * where value is not applicable
Do Targeted Assassinations Work?

Figure 2: Israeli Measures / Pal Violence
Do Targeted Assassinations Work?

Figure 3: Pal Victims / Pal Violence
Figure 4: Binary Response for H2
Table 3: Binary Logistic Regression Models for Hypothesis 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weekly Lag</th>
<th>Severity Factors</th>
<th>Regression Coefficient</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Goodness-of-Fit Tests</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Numerical</td>
<td>-0.9989</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>Pearson 0.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>0.3073</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>Deviance 0.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.0697</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Hosmer-Lemeshow 0.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairs (%)’s</td>
<td>Model Predictive Ability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concordant</td>
<td>Discordant</td>
<td>Ties</td>
<td>Somers’ D</td>
<td>Goodman-Kruskal Gamma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.60%</td>
<td>17.30%</td>
<td>41.10%</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weekly Lag</th>
<th>Severity Factors</th>
<th>Regression Coefficient</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Goodness-of-Fit Tests</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>0.4977</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>Pearson 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>-20.0000</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>Deviance 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.5200</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Hosmer-Lemeshow 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairs (%)’s</td>
<td>Model Predictive Ability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concordant</td>
<td>Discordant</td>
<td>Ties</td>
<td>Somers’ D</td>
<td>Goodman-Kruskal Gamma</td>
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<tr>
<td>39.00%</td>
<td>17.10%</td>
<td>43.90%</td>
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<td>0.39</td>
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<tr>
<th>Weekly Lag</th>
<th>Severity Factors</th>
<th>Regression Coefficient</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Goodness-of-Fit Tests</th>
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<td>0.2010</td>
<td>0.701</td>
<td>Pearson 0.268</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>-0.5600</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td>Deviance 0.204</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.4305</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Hosmer-Lemeshow 0.778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairs (%)’s</td>
<td>Model Predictive Ability</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concordant</td>
<td>Discordant</td>
<td>Ties</td>
<td>Somers’ D</td>
<td>Goodman-Kruskal Gamma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.60%</td>
<td>23.40%</td>
<td>42.00%</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.19</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weekly Lag</th>
<th>Severity Factors</th>
<th>Regression Coefficient</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Goodness-of-Fit Tests</th>
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</thead>
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<td>0.055</td>
<td>Pearson 0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>-0.5960</td>
<td>0.577</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.9300</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>Hosmer-Lemeshow *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairs (%)’s</td>
<td>Model Predictive Ability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concordant</td>
<td>Discordant</td>
<td>Ties</td>
<td>Somers’ D</td>
<td>Goodman-Kruskal Gamma</td>
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<tr>
<td>44.10%</td>
<td>16.70%</td>
<td>39.20%</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.45</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Severity Factors</th>
<th>Regression Coefficient</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Goodness-of-Fit Tests</th>
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<td>0.697</td>
<td>Pearson 0.267</td>
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<td>Victim</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>Hosmer-Lemeshow 0.778</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Model Predictive Ability</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Discordant</td>
<td>Ties</td>
<td>Somers’ D</td>
<td>Goodman-Kruskal Gamma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.70%</td>
<td>23.30%</td>
<td>42.00%</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.20</td>
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α = 0.05 for p-value and Goodness-of-Fit tests, * where value is not applicable
Figure 5: Assassinations and Mil Incursions
Table 4: Regression Models for Hypothesis 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weekly Lag</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Regression Coefficient</th>
<th>ANOVA SeqSS/TotSS</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Model R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Palestinian Violence</td>
<td>TAAs 0.14448 *</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MIL Incursions 0.8288</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Severe/Mild Frequency -1.0209 *</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Attack Success Rate</td>
<td>Constant 2.0145 *</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Palestinian Violence</td>
<td>TAAs -0.3104 *</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MIL Incursions 0.0937 *</td>
<td>0.717</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Severe/Mild Frequency 0.2457 *</td>
<td>0.785</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Attack Success Rate</td>
<td>Constant 2.4979 *</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td>TAAs -0.09193 0.8%</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MIL Incursions 0.00041 *</td>
<td>0.992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Severe/Mild Frequency 0.2202 *</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Attack Success Rate</td>
<td>Constant 0.74131 *</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Palestinian Violence</td>
<td>TAAs 0.7126 0.5%</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MIL Incursions 0.8769 2.4%</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Severe/Mild Frequency -2.5011 4.1%</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Attack Success Rate</td>
<td>Constant 1.8689 *</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
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<td>TAAs 0.0149 *</td>
<td>0.959</td>
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<td>0.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MIL Incursions 0.2043 *</td>
<td>0.434</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Severe/Mild Frequency 0.1523 *</td>
<td>0.866</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Attack Success Rate</td>
<td>Constant 2.2874 *</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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$\alpha = 0.05$, * where value is not applicable
Figure 6: Attack Success Rate, November 2000 - June 2004
Figure 7: Israelis Killed or Injured, November 2000 - June 2004
Table 5: Regression Models for Hypothesis 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weekly Lag</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Regression Coefficient</th>
<th>ANOVA SeqSS/TotSS</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Model R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>TAs*MI</td>
<td>0.3005</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.2815</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>TAs*MI</td>
<td>-0.2047</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.4797</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>TAs*MI</td>
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<td>*</td>
<td>0.954</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.4161</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>TAs*MI</td>
<td>0.2623</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.3116</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>TAs*MI</td>
<td>0.3624</td>
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<td>0.017</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.2844</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \alpha = 0.05 \), * where value is not applicable
According to the Israeli General Security Services, in 2004 alone 365 militants were arrested before launching suicide attacks, 46 of whom were captured at the eleventh hour. That is an average of one thwarted attack per day. Source: Haim Shibi, "Toll of Blood: The Intifada in Numbers," Yedioth Ahronoth, January 5, 2005.

Attached is a chart from IDF web site on all successful and foiled attacks, not just suicide attacks. It shows that the total rate of attacks (both successful and foiled) has not declined from the start of the intifada to June 2004; as a matter of fact, they increased (albeit most have been foiled). It goes to reason that targeted assassinations should deter all forms of attack, not just suicide bombigs. After all, Israel retaliates for all forms of violence, not just suicide bombings.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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**Notes**

1. The datasets utilized by the authors in this article can be made available to any interested party through a written request to: [Insert Name, University, and Address after paper is accepted for publication].

