No.
472 3 Adar 5762 / 15 February 2002
THE WAY TO PEACE EMERGED AT MADRID:
A DECADE SINCE THE 1991 MADRID CONFERENCE
Eytan Bentsur
The Successes of Madrid / Preparing for Madrid / The Vision of a
Comprehensive Peace / In the Aftermath of the Gulf War / The Principles
of Madrid / A New Era of Normalization / Oslo Derails the Comprehensive
Track / A Code of Conduct for Negotiations
The Successes of Madrid
The October 1991
Madrid Peace Conference represented a breakthrough in relations between
the State of Israel and the Arab world. For the first time, Israel
engaged in direct, face-to-face negotiations with all its immediate
neighbors, and not just with Egypt, with whom Israel had signed a peace
treaty in 1979. These talks were between the political leaders of the
region, unlike the armistice discussions that Israel undertook in the
late 1940s and 1950s. Madrid also launched a multilateral process that
brought Israeli diplomats into contact with representatives of Arab
states from North Africa and the Persian Gulf.
The Madrid process
sought to take into account the aspirations of the parties, their
security requirements, their readiness for mutual reconciliation, and,
most of all, their reciprocal need to compromise. It also
institutionalized regular contact between Israel and the Arab states
that created bridges for eventual understandings in the future.
More importantly, it created the framework for direct
negotiations and, thereby, launched the Middle East peace process.
Such regular lines of communication were the best guarantee for
regional stability and the avoidance of miscalculation in the future.
Unfortunately, for now the successes of Madrid have been swept away by
the collapse of the Oslo process. But Madrid's careful approach should
be recalled and even re-established in the future, taking into account
the new conditions that have arisen in the Middle East.
Preparing for Madrid
The diplomatic
arena was active before the convening of the Madrid Conference but
yielded no concrete results. The main point of contention was over the
composition of the Palestinian delegation that would negotiate with
Israel, against the backdrop of the end of the first "intifada."
The diplomatic
discussions before Madrid focused on the content of procedure and the
procedure of content. Every procedural concession was viewed by both
sides to imply a concession in substance. Israel demanded exclusion
from the Palestinian delegation of PLO representatives, Arabs from east
Jerusalem, and Palestinian exiles. Jerusalem, Washington, and Cairo
dealt with this problem, and the argument extended to the Israeli
government, resulting in the Labor party leaving the coalition.
The U.S., for its
part -- particularly Secretary of State George Shultz by way of
interlocutors -- acted to remove from the PLO its tiger's stripes and
portray it as a body that no longer carried the weapon of terror to
advance the peace process. Indeed, it was during the final days of the
Reagan administration, in December 1988, that the U.S. formally opened
a dialogue with the PLO after Yasser Arafat announced his renunciation
of violence and accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
This happened while opinion was growing in Israel that the PLO was
losing its grip on the territories and a new local leadership was
emerging that was not dependent on the PLO and would be free of its
1964 covenant calling for Israel's elimination.
This pre-Madrid
diplomatic activity had trouble rising above the content of procedure.
Moreover, by May 1990, the U.S. was compelled to cut off its dialogue
with the PLO, after one of its constituent organizations, the
Iraqi-based Palestinian Liberation Front, launched an attack on Israeli
beaches from the sea.
The Vision of a Comprehensive Peace
All these efforts
were missing a vision -- and moved further and further away from a
vision -- of what might be beyond the procedural disputes: a
comprehensive peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians and
between Israel and the Arab states. In order to create momentum and
break the procedural deadlocks of the pre-Madrid period, a more
far-sighted approach was needed which had the full potential to bring
the entire Middle East to a gradual resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict and the creation of a stable peace.
After the outbreak
of the intifada in December 1987, it had become increasingly accepted
to define the Arab-Israel conflict as an Israeli-Palestinian dispute
alone. After all, most observers witnessed the drama of the Palestinian
clash with Israel on their televisions; network camera crews enjoyed
free access to Khan Yunis or Ramallah, but not to the pictures
that defined the wider Arab-Israel conflict: Iraqi missile
preparations, Syrian armored maneuvers, and Hizbullah training camps in
Lebanon. Diplomatic initiatives naturally followed this
Palestinian-centered definition of the Arab-Israeli conflict -- the
wider issues that constituted the real threats to Israel have
unfortunately been ignored.
A new initiative
to correct this diplomatic myopia came from papers that I prepared in
the Foreign Ministry during the period when David Levy served as its
minister. At his initiative, the Foreign Ministry developed ideas for
combining progress on the Palestinian track with recognition and
normalization in relations between Israel and the Arab states.
The essence of
this diplomatic approach was to develop a two-track peace process in
which progress on the Palestinian front would correspond to progress in
relations with the Arab states. The two-track process was supposed to
be wrapped in a third track -- the multilateral track -- whose basis
was a vision of regional development and finding solutions to major
problems (arms control, ecology, water, etc.) that accompany the path
to peace. The basic idea was to pursue a full regional peace in order
for Israel to avoid becoming bogged-down in the Palestinian track
alone, with no change in its relations with the Arab world.
In the Aftermath of the Gulf War
The full diplomatic
initiative was presented to Secretary of State James Baker and his
people by Foreign Minister Levy and myself in a series of conversations
that, in retrospect, became absorbed into American thinking. This
occurred before the Americans launched their own initiative. At the end
of the Gulf War, Baker skillfully used the momentum from the formation
of an international coalition that included Arab states to start up the
peace process on a new basis.
The status of the
U.S. after the Gulf War, now as the sole superpower, with determined
leadership in the person of Baker, brought a new opportunity to the
Middle East. The new global and regional historic setting for a
breakthrough was evident first and foremost in the decline and eventual
fall of the Soviet Union. This signaled the collapse of support for
radicalism in the region and rejectionism of the peace process. The
exhaustion of the peoples of the region from war, coupled with loss of
military and economic maneuvering room by the Arab states, brought
recognition that it was time for the peace process to set out on its
way. Baker requested from the beginning that the Gulf War coalition be
transformed into a peace coalition -- of which the Madrid Conference
was a natural product.
Baker advanced the
initiative through an intensive burst of shuttle diplomacy, aggressive
and systematic negotiations, grappling with doubts and resistance,
marshalling the few who supported this path in Israel, and with a
panoply of guarantees, formulations, and formulas. Slowly, the U.S.
created conditions for the convening of a conference designed to help
the sides reach a lasting peace through direct negotiations both
between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and the Arab
states. These tracks were based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242
and 338, and were in conjunction with multilateral negotiations
designed to promote regional development and solve regional problems.
The Principles of Madrid
At the opening of
the Madrid Conference on October 30, 1991, President George Bush set
forth the principles to advance the Madrid process:
-
Negotiations in the Madrid
framework were directed toward peace agreements; diplomatic, economic,
and cultural ties; and investment in development and tourism.
-
Peace will only be achieved
through direct negotiations based on give-and-take and territorial
compromise.
-
Peace cannot be imposed -- it can
only come from within the region.
-
The process will be two-tracked
and the multilateral element will follow.
-
The negotiations are supposed to
allow the Palestinian people to control their lives and destiny, and,
in parallel, ensure the security and recognition of Israel.
-
Peace must be based on fairness
toward Israel, giving Israel a chance to demonstrate its willingness to
establish relations with its Palestinian neighbors on the basis of
mutual respect and cooperation.
-
President Bush noted that the
U.S. would refrain from defining the meaning of a stable settlement in
the Middle East or final borders -- but that these borders must promote
security and fair diplomatic arrangements.
Prior to Madrid,
Israel carefully negotiated a "letter of assurances" from the United
States in order to protect its vital interests in any upcoming
negotiations. This careful component of pre-Madrid diplomacy was not
replicated by those who initiated the later Oslo path.
A New Era of Normalization
The Madrid Peace
Conference and the peace process it initiated -- which was conducted
with ups and downs until "Oslo" -- created a new reality in the Middle
East. In reality, a new light shined on the Middle East and for the
first time the region came closer to the definition of a "New Middle
East." "New" in this sense meant that the preoccupation with the
details of the Palestinian dilemma was replaced by negotiations between
Israel and Jordan, the Palestinians, and the Arab world generally in
the widest sense.
The multilateral
dimension created hope and a sense of achievable goals that could be
reached through determined effort. The region was bursting with hope
and ideas for giant projects for the benefit of all its peoples. The
dialogue between Israel -- and Israelis -- with representatives of all
Arab states accelerated and became commonplace.
The spirit of
normalization reigned over everything -- despite difficulties, despite
the tough diplomatic positions of our negotiating partners. Israelis
were received as desired guests in most Arab capitals. In addition,
Madrid strengthened Israel's international position beyond recognition.
Diplomatic relations were established or restored between Israel and
the Soviet Union, China, and India. Relations were established at
different levels of intimacy and cooperation with many Arab countries.
The vision of a comprehensive peace seemed to be approaching, even if
the road to it was long, gradual, not without setbacks, and fraught
with difficult negotiations.
Madrid's
participants knew from the beginning that even if the journey down this
road had begun, there were no shortcuts to peace. We knew that the
Madrid Conference was the starting point of a long road that, on the
horizon, would lead to the squaring of circles and the eventual
bridging of presently polarized positions in order to forge a
comprehensive peace.
Oslo Derails the Comprehensive
Track
The Oslo agreement,
to a great degree, returned the process to another track, one that
placed the Palestinian aspect at the forefront at the expense of the
general Arab-Israeli and multilateral tracks. With time, the momentum
of normalization that accompanied the Madrid process weakened and then
disappeared.
It was noteworthy
that, as Israeli negotiators continued to implement Oslo with the
September 1995 Interim Agreement, the 1997 Hebron Protocol, and the
1998 Wye Agreement, the U.S. and Israel failed to generate new parallel
breakthroughs between Israel and the Arab world. Israel did not open up
new offices in the Gulf region, for example, beyond Qatar and Oman, in
Kuwait, Bahrain, or in the UAE. Anti-Israel diplomatic activity
continued at the United Nations and in international organizations. The
multilateral initiatives begun at Madrid were undermined, withered, and
reached a stalemate.
The architects of
Oslo who led the negotiations at Camp David will no doubt be
intellectually honest enough to note that it would have been better to
insist on the spirit of normalization to create an atmosphere for
making peace, such as was employed in the Helsinki Final Act and other
well-known historic compromises.
A Code of Conduct for Negotiations
Today, as well,
those who want peace and are ready for territorial compromise will work
toward normalization, and economic, scientific, and medical
cooperation. They will also push for joint projects that promote
tolerance and mutual respect and that adopt an internationally
supervised behavioral code prohibiting incitement, and advancing a
peaceful settlement. They will also work to renew the multilateral
track in the Madrid framework.
In retrospect, one
of the shortcomings of the Oslo period was the absence of this sort of
a "code of conduct" or set of rules governing the negotiating process.
Clearly, it is unacceptable that violence be permitted to accompany any
negotiation process, whether direct violence or violence by proxy, like
Syria's use of Hizbullah. Moreover, it is unacceptable that Israel and
its neighbors decide to resolve their differences bilaterally,
while at the same time Arab states initiate resolutions in the UN
General Assembly that prejudge the outcome of those very same
negotiations. A code of conduct addressing these issues should be a
part of any negotiating process in the future.
The slow train
that started out from Madrid made sense. The peace process was
carefully structured. It allowed the parties to stop along the way to
verify whether its engine was operating correctly and to check the
worthiness of the tracks down the line. This train was exchanged for
the fast train of Oslo, that barreled ahead without sufficient
attention to blockages and broken tracks along the way. In my view, the
slow train was preferable and would more reliably have reached the
destination, while the fast train tended to careen off the tracks. At
present, the Oslo train has reached a dead-end. When the negotiations
continue, it behooves Israel to insist that many of the principles of
Madrid be revived, and to work to restore the atmosphere of great hope
that this process brought on its wings.
* * *
Eytan Bentsur is a former Director
General of the Foreign Ministry and is the author of Making Peace.
Today he is a special advisor to the American company Patco.
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