Second Part of Long-Hidden Crane-King Report Put Forth Definite Suggestions.

UP

Powers Warned of the Dangers of Selfish Division and Exploitation.

PLAN FOR SEPARATE ARMENIA

In Which by 1925 Armenians Themselves Would Control-A Separate Constantinopie.

By courtesy of the periodical, The Editor and Publisher, which has obtained from former President Wilson the long-withheld King-Crane report on conditions in the Near East, THE NEW YORK TIMES presents to its readers the latter half of that report. The first part was published in yesterday's Times. The report was prepared by Henry Churchill King, President of Oberlin College, and Charles R. Crane, members of the American Commission on Mandates in Turkey, appointed after the Peace Conference in Mr. Crane is a Chicago manufacturer and served as United States Minister to China from May, 1920, to June, 1921. The commission had in its survey of Syria the assistance of Dr. Albert II. Lybyer, Dr. George R. Montgomery and Captain William Yale, U. S. A., as advisers; of Captain Donald M. Brodie, U. S. A., as secretary and treasurer; of Dr. Sami Haddad, instructor in the School of Medicine of the Syrian Protestant College of Beirut, as physician and interpreter; of Laurence S. Moore as business manager and of Sergt. Major Paul O. Toren as stenographer. The advisers had all been previously connected as experts with the Peace Conference in Paris, and had been students of the special problems of the Near East.

TEXT OF THE REPORT. (Second Part.)

NON-ARABIC SPEAKING PORTIONS OF THE FORMER OTTOMAN

EMPIRE. The method of inquiry, in making our survey of the Asia Minor portion of our task, has necessarily differed from that followed in the study of Syrla. For our ultimate duty, according to our instructions, is "to form an opinion * * * of the divisions of territory and assignlikely to promote the order, peace and development" of the peoples concerned. Now we faced in Turkey a unique were in a region already virtually separated from the Turkish Empire, a region whose boundaries were in general clear, and a region recognized as under a temporary government. In such a territory it was entirely feasible to go from community to community to seek the desires an annual report in reference to the territory of the peoples concerning a mandate. None of these conditions held for Asia For in the case of the proposed State of Armenia, for example, the territory things: was not yet set off, nor its boundaries even approximately known: the Armenians were not largely present in any of the territory to be assigned; the wishes of the Armenians themselves as to mandate were already known; and the the rest of the population could not be taken primarily into account, since the establishment of the Armenian State would be in a sense penal for the Turkish people, and naturally to be accepted only as a necessity. If a Constantinopolitan State were to be set off, similar difficulties in getting the wishes of the people upon a mandate would be encountered. For the

so the choice of the present population. especially in such troublous times, would not be particularly significant; and the fact that a large element of the population belongs to the official class would make an unbiased opinion hardly possi-Even in the portions of Asia Minor sure to be left with the empire, an inquiry for choice of mandate, like that

primary interest in such a State is a

world interest, rather than a local one;

the population would be likely to shift

considerably with so new a policy, and

try, so that the mandate would be inev- complete and final liberation of the peoples ready reached, selfish division and ex- the part of the great majority of the try, so that modified and adjusted so long oppressed by the Turks and the esploitation in Turkey would also go far people or of their leaders, or to give strongly represented in the land." through agreement with the mandatary. An Analysis Borne Out by Facts. Moreover, even if an inquiry for choice of mandatary were feasible, it would be

are both manifest. In the case of an there is even less understanding there of the political situation; so that it was

felt that there would not be much gain from further inquiry in other parts of empire. In addition to the frequent reports by various investigators to which we already had access. commission to give up visits to various parts of the empire, in order not to de- flects honor on the two great allies from fer its report and so possibly delay ac- whom it originally came. tion by the Peace Conference. The Commissioners have had the less hesitancy name conference, in which all the Allies! hastening their report because it was have shared, reflected in the forming of believed that the essential facts upon the Commission on Mandates and emwhich recommendations must be based bodied in the instructions to the comwere already in hand.

Digging Hard for Difficult Data.

sion of the American experts, and had will be just so far vindicated. and with able authorities coming direct shut its eyes to the fact that vindication in the righteous settlement of the prob- er East has to be undertaken." from Turkey: to take full advantage of is greatly needed just now. For there lems of the Turkish Empire. all the general work done in the survey are set directly over against such a pro- No namby-pamby, sickly, sentimental tifled in its resolution, "more partic- stupid futility of the old method of in- establish the rule of a minority of Ar- menta.

problems and its incidental side-lights; ciple and in all honesty committed, the which must be set right. And there are and the terrible massacres of Armenians especially to see as many representative still active policies of the old diplomacy world relations and interests honestly to and others in recent years, the allied groups and individuals as possible in of secret freaties and understandings be recognized and permanently to be sat- and associated powers are agreed that Constantinople, and so to get reports on and of division of spoils among victors. isfied. For the sake of justice to Turkey Armenia * * * must be completely all phases of our inquiry, and from all The direct consequences of such selfish herself and to all her subject peoples; parts of Asia Minor, to supplement the and ultimately self-destructive policies for the sake of the honor of the Allies information so received with reports, for are to be seen in all the world today, and the renewed confidence of men in recent months, of the American Em- It is to be feared that some of the high- them; for the stemming of the tide of bassy and Consular offices (through the est aims of the Allies in the war have cynicism and selfish strife; for a fresh kind co-operation of Admiral Bristol and already been well nigh lost, because of and powerful demonstration of mora Commissioner Rayndal), and to supple- these policies creeping in, in all manner soundness in the race, the Allies should ment still further with reports of per- of "settlements." It concerns the peace recognize the grave danger of all selfish sonal investigations by American mis-conference to decide whether the same exploitation of Turkey and turn their sionaries knowing the country thor- fateful method is to be followed in backs on every last vestige of it. oughly, and by representatives of the Turkey. American Commission on Relief in the Near East, and of American business! In this way a large mass of valuable

material has been brought together and H. Lybyer, Dr. George R. Montgomery and Captain William Yale, U. S. who summarized their inferences from it, and reported on special phases of the common problem. To test our concluwas also sought from American and other leaders—many of them personally known by members of the commission. The report of the Commissioners is based on the whole of the resulting evidence. Our report falls naturally into five divisions: pertinent action already taken by the Peace Conference, dangers from a selfish division and exploitation of the Turkish Empire, considerations looking to a proper division of Turkey, resulting problems and recommendations.

the Peace Conference.

To begin with, the action creating the commission, of which the Commissioners now reporting make the American Section, was taken by the Council of Four. Our instructions were called: "Instrucportions of the Turkish Empire which are to be permanently separated from | course. taries of the League of Nations." That this is the deliberate purpose of the Council is further shown by the added statement: "It is expected that this will be done in accordance with the following resolutions, adopted by the

representatives of the United States,

Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan,

at a conference held at the Quai d'Orsay

an Jan. 30, 1919. The Resolutions. 1. Having regard to the record of the German Administration in the colonies formerly part of the German Empire, and to the menace which the possession by Germany of submarine bases in many parts of the world would necessarily constitute to the freedom and security of all nations, the allied and associated powers are agreed that in no circumstances should any of the German colonies be restored to Germany. 2. For similar reasons, and more particularly because of the historical misgovernment by the Turks of subject peoples and t terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the allied and associated powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia must be comother parts of the Turkish Empire. .8. The ailied and associated powers are agreed that advantage should be taken of the opportunity afforded by the necessity of disposing of these colonies and territories forbelonging to Germany and Turkey which are inhabited by peoples not yet able fect to this principle is that the tutelese of

5. The allied and associated powers are state of brigandage. must differ according to the stage of desituation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances, 8. They consider that certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empli as to mandates. In Syria we their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to

time as they are able to stand alone. principal consideration in the selection of the In every case of mandate, the mandator State shall render to the League of Nations committed to its charge.

Menaces and Sacred Trusts.

The resolutions clearly assert several

(1) That in settling the issues of the portion of the American people, as emfreedom and security of all nations" ment by the Turks of subject peoples a special reason for separation of terri tory, but "without prejudice to the setlement of other parts of the Turkish | of the gravest kind among the Allies well-being and development of subject peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League of Na-

ried out through the mandatory system. which the remaining resolutions care-For the Peace Conference had not de- of the following document, which was Turkey must have a mandatory power the United States on behalf of the Gov- dissension among the world's leaders done anything appreciable to set them over her, and consequently it was large- ernments of Great Britain and France": and deliberately inviting the moral right. Some small groups of Turks have tablishment of national Governments and to convince men of independent moral Administrations deriving their authority from judgment all over the world-including might not be repeated; though there is

are proceeding to liberate, and they have had the opportunity of watching in want and sufferings of the whole Turkagreed to recognize such Governments as France the stream of American officers ish population in ten years of war and soon as they are effectively established. So and soldiers and of able men enlisted disorder. tions upon the populations of those regions, diers, as they came and went, could their sole object is to insure, by their sup- fail to see among those men, as the and Administrations adopted by these regions of their own free will shall velopment of the country by encouraging the war have gone home disillusioned.

visions too long exploited by Turkish policy.

education; and to put an end to the di-

Taken as a whole, the action of mission, form a solid basis for the policy l to be adopted in Asia Minor. It is no tions among the best in all the Allies, contimental program; but it is just on can be changed only by some clear demthe one hand, and considerate on the can be changed only by some clear demportance proper solution of the problem of Tur-staggers under the load of misfortune (1) The reasons why it is necessary the one hand, and considerate on the can be changed only by some clear demportance proper solution of the problem of Tur-staggers under the load of misfortune (1) The reasons why it is necessary the one hand, and considerate on the can be changed only by some clear demportance proper solution of the problem of Tur-staggers under the load of misfortune (1) The reasons why it is necessary the one clear demportance proper solution of the problem of Tur-staggers under the load of misfortune (1) The reasons why it is necessary the one clear demportance proper solution of the problem of Tur-staggers under the load of misfortune (1) The reasons why it is necessary the one clear demportance proper solution of the problem of Tur-staggers under the load of misfortune (1) The reasons why it is necessary the one clear demportance proper solution of the problem of Tur-staggers under the load of misfortune (1) The reasons why it is necessary the one clear demportance proper solution of the problem of Tur-staggers under the load of misfortune (1) The reasons why it is necessary the problem of Tur-staggers under the load of misfortune (1) The reasons why it is necessary the problem of Tur-staggers under the load of misfortune (1) The reasons why it is necessary the problem of Tur-staggers under the load of misfortune (1) The reasons why it is necessary the problem of Tur-staggers under the load of misfortune (1) The reasons why it is necessary the problem of Tur-staggers under the load of misfortune (1) The reasons why it is necessary the problem of Tur-staggers under the load of misfortune (1) The reasons when the load In this situation the method for our the one hand, and considerate on the first of all, on our two months' study in and strongly and consistently to build en asserted high and unselfish aims of the belligerent nations—and, I may add, of situation has been inevitably one of ex-Paris of the Turkish problems, in the the foundations so prepared, essential Allies have been honestly carried out, neutral peoples also—should be enabled ceeding difficulty for Turkey. just co will be done to all the peoples That would come like an invigorating by knowledge of what has happened in course of which we used the reports and concerned, rankling wrongs will be set breeze out of the north, bringing new Asia Minor and Armenia, to exercise its other material of the Western Asia divi- right, and the purposes of the Allies faith in men and in the genuineness of judgment on the course proper to be fol-

II.—The Dangers of a Selfish Division

and Exploitation of the Turkish Empire, large parts of the former Turkish Em- divide Asia Minor, at least, at all? pire, involving millions of people, it is such a division there are at least the selfish and divisive national and in which she is placed ly challenge that drift at once.

1.—Pertinent Action Already Taken by meet. Under the pressure of immediate may recognize, too, that there has long to all elements of the population—to all fore the law. But are we not also to be necessity for some kind of action, many been in the Turkish Government a kind races and to all religions. If such a man-freed from Occidental domination? Was steps have been taken in good faith, of negative, indolent tolerance of other date were honestly carried out we should which have later proved temptations to peoples, that allowed them much of the certainly hope for a far better Govern- tions of the Allies in the war that no solfish advantage, and provocations to time to go in their own ways, though ment on modern lines. But under the nation, no "Kultur," however great jealousy and suspicion. The situation constantly despised, robbed, oppressed proposed mandatory system of the and fine it might be, was good enough too, has been most complex, by reason It may be granted, also, that the Turks League of Nations it is intended that the to blot out all others? of previous engagements and of count- have been successful in keeping, through mandate shall be for a limited period. less inter-relations of interest-private, long periods, widely scattered areas to- Even if that period were considerably gratefully to be recognized and seducomplexity has often made it honestly by the method of "divide and rule," of mandatary withdrew? It is impossible, Turkey, just because she has been. difficult to disentangle exactly the right leaving regional governments pretty to be sure, if the Turks still constituted through the ages, "bridge-land" and Turkey and put under the guidance of But, however the drift toward selfish Turkish revenues were obtained, and of slump back into many of its old evils, and high sense mediating-land as well Governments acting as mandataries exploitation of the Turkish Empire has using other races very largely as of- including oppression of other races very largely as of- including oppression of the Turkish Empire has using other races very largely as ofunder the League of Nations." The in- come about, there should be no mistake ficials. It is only fair, also, to remem- history of the Turks, unfortunately, teaching the nations how to combine government independently until they portation, trade and manufacture for exportant the league of Nations." The in- come about, there should be no mistake ficials. It is only fair, also, to remem- history of the Turks, unfortunately, the nations how to combine government independently until they portation, trade and manufacture for exportant the nations have been about, there should be no mistake ficials. It is only fair, also, to rememstructions then go on to say: "It is the about the fact or its dangers. It needs ber the very considerable amount purpose of the conference to separate to be said and heeded that Constanti- demoralization casued by the perpetual

from the Turkish Empire certain areas nople is once again a net of selfish, sus- intriguing of European powers in Turkcomprising, for example, Palestine, Sy- pictous, hateful intrigue, reaching out ish affairs. ria, the Arab countries to the east of over the whole empire, if not the world. Palestine and Syria. Mesopotamia, Ar- What will it mean if this policy is almenia. Cilicia and perhaps additional lowed to prevail? In definitely raising areas in Asia Minor, and to put their this question, the Commissioners are not development under the guidance of Gov- for an instant supposing that there is ernments which are to act as manda- any easy and inexpensive solution of the that the Government of the Turkish Turkish problem. The justest solution Empire has been for the most part a So far as concerns Asia Minor, this at best will not be wholly welcome to commits the conference to two courses Turkey, and will encounter her opposition. But in such a solution the Allies good laws. For that Government has could at least know that their sacrifices been characterized by incessant corruplicia, and perhaps additional areas in were being made for the establishment tion, plunder and bribery. It might al Asia Minor," and dealing with these of progressively righteous relations most be called a government of simple territories under the mandatory, not among men, not for sowing the seeds of exploitation. So that Ramsey, endless and bitter discord.

A Test of War Alms.

In seeking, then, a practical plan for Bribery is the universal rule." the righteous treatment of the Turkish Empire, the Allies should bear clearly in peasantry for Government officials. mind that their fidelity to their announced aims in the war is here pecu- the most ordinary and essential duties of liarly to be tested; and that, in the pro- a government in the empire as a whole. portion in which the division of the (3) And the treatment of the Turkish Empire by the Allies is made a subject races has been still worse than division of spoils by victors, and is pri- that of the Turks. For them nothing has marily determined by the selfish na- been secure-whether property. tional and corporate interests of the Al- wives or children. To all this have been lies, in just that proportion will grave added the horrible massacres of the Ar-(1) Such a division, in the first place, time, and somewhat similar deportations would have to be forced upon the peo- of the Greeks. Both races have proved ples concerned-not chosen by them. themselves abler, more industrious, en-Every separate occupation of territory terprising, and prosperous than the would be resented, and felt to be a Turks, and so have made themselves constant injustice. The feeling of the feared and hated, doubtless not Turkish people concerning the occupa- altogether without some provocation on tion of the Smyrna region by the Greeks their part in certain cases. And these vinced that such seizure of territory can and direct government action, in which be harmonized with the professed prin- the Turkish people themselves have been ciples of the Allies in the war. In such the foundations of truly cordial rela- And they have involved cruelties horrible

tions with the Turkish people. (2) In the second place, just because these occupations of territory have to be forced upon the Turks, a large number of troops would be required to establish and maintain each occupation. With the intolerable burdens which the war has evidence for few events in history has these territories the principles that the well- brought upon all the nations, and with been more carefully gathered, sifted and bling and development of such pooples form the insistent demands for the demobilito prove an increasingly serious situa- Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman an occupation looked upon as temporary doubt of the essential facts. It is 4. After careful study they are satisfied and for police purposes is no measure of to attempt to deny it or appreciably to the forces required to maintain an ag- mitigate its force. gressive and permanent seizure of territheir sorrow both in Macedonia in 1903- been admitted the substantial The solfishly divisive policy will go far toward turning Turkey into an armed camp and breeding a constant

Smyrna-A Prophetic Utterance. (3) It should not be forgotten, either in the third place, that this selfishly digion of Smyrna. Such retaliation, too. s likely to be visited not only upon the mmediate aggressors, but also upon the Christian populations generally. For selfish division and exploitation of terri tory may easily induce in the Turks the ttitude that, since the worst from outside is probably to come upon them any case, they may as well take the occasion to rid themselves entirely those whom they look upon as internal enemies. In that case, the Allies would have to share the guit of the Turks. (4) Such selfish exploitation of Turkey also would not only certainly call out the resentment of the most solic hatically not illustrating the ends for America came into the war, but would also tend to alienate the sentiment among all the Allies. eliminate from the cause of the Allies his weight of moral judgment would involve a loss of influence in the world -already greatly diminished-not lightly

the deliberate sowing of dissension hemselves, threatening the moral unity gree. Only moral blindness can deny l Suspicion and distrust are rife, and he meanest kind of intrigue against one for the hideous atrocities which have another has been seen in not a few been perpetrated upon that unhappy

" Moral Unity" of Allies Doubted. of the Allies is more than a fraction of facts to mind, but unfortunately there what it was in the war or in the early is only the slightest evidence that the days of the armistice. Now that is a Turkish Government or people as (0) Coupled with similar decisions al- ance or the fruits of repentance on Allies had become as selfish and ruthand assist the establishment of less as those of the Germans had been. That would carry with it its own fate- revolutionary activity on the part For example, no thoughtful man who of the widespread wretchedness and armistice went on, the spread, like a ing a righteous solution of the Turkish contagion, of depression and disillusionment as to the significance of the war wrongs are not to be passed over in which the two allied Governments aims because of the selfish wrangling silence, it is inevitable that any just greatly fearing, if not convinced, that the Allies had not been true to their asserted war aims, and have been consequently driven to an almost cynical view of the entire conflict-cynicism that made them feel like withdrawing all further American help, and henceforth washing their hands of the whole Euro-

Opportunity for Righteousness human ideals and endeavor. That oppor- lowed when, at the end of the present many conferences with experts there. And the peace conference should not junity is offered, in a peculiar degree, war, a political resettlment of the Near- of the world's history, and after the im-

pean imbroglio. This attitude has been

reflected in many other American citi-

zens who had been devoted supporters

of the allied cause. Now that is not a

good result for America, for the Allies

III. Consideration Looking to a Proper

Division of the Turkish Empire.

But if a selfishly exploiting division In considering recommendations con- of the Turkish Empire is not justified studied by all three advisers—Dr. Albert | cerning the future administration of it may be asked: Why is it necessary to imperative that the Peace Conference great reasons: first, the hideous_misgovernment and massacres of the Turkshould make clear to itself from the be- ish rule; and second, Turkey's utter insions, expert advice at all possible points ginning the serious dangers involved in adequacy to the strategic world position corporate policies into which the Allies I. In the first place, there cannot be have been drifting in their treatment of left out of account the hideous misgovthe Turkish Empire, and should square- ernment of Turkey for centuries, even for citizens of the Turkish race. No doubt this policy of selfish ex- (1) One may recognize fully the agreeploitation in Turkey is in its entirety able and attractive personal qualities of Much confusion has unavoidably pre- best liked, probably, of all the peoples of

> Turkish Rule a Wretched Fallure. (2) But while all this may be freely admitted, it must still be clearly seen wretched failure, in spite of generally judges the Turk leniently, feels obliged to say: "The Turk is not naturally a good officer or a good official. and fear on the part even of the Turkish fact it is hardly too much to say that Turkish history shows gross neglect menians, especially since Abdul-Hamil's too willing to share. They have not been

beyond descripition. The Bryce Report on Armenia. For it must not be forgotten that this thing was not done in a corner. The ordered. The Bryce report upon "The

tory, as the Turks themselves proved to torian, says of the report: "Nothing has "Nearly all of it comes from eye witnesses"; (2) "the main facts rest upon evidence coming from different and independent sources ": (3) " facts of the same, or of a very similar nature, occurring in different places, are deposed to by different and independent witnesses."-including Danish and German witlegges: (4) "the volume of this concurrent evidence from different quarters is large as to establish the main facts payond all question "; (5) " in particular is to be noted that many of the most shocking and horrible accounts are those for which there is the most abundant estimony from the most trustworthy leutral witnesses. None of these crueles rest on native evidence alone." "A recollection of previous massacres will show that such crimes are a part of a long settled and often repeated policy of Turkish rulers. The attempts made to find excuses for wholesale slaughter and for the remova of a whole people from its homes leaves no room for doubt as to the slaughter and the removal. The main facts are established by the confession of the criminais themselves. • • • The disproval of accusations which the Turks have put forward is as complete as the proof for the atrocities themselves. Mr. Moorefield Storey, ex-President of the American Bar Association. the natural verdict of one skilled in the weighing of evidence, when Hable as that upon which rests our mitted facts of history, and I think i establishes beyond all reasonable doubt

authorities practically to exterminate

the Armenians, and their responsibility

No Sign of Repentance. doubtless some excuse for the comparative indifference with which these massacres have been regarded by the Turks, because of a certain amount Armenians in some cases, and because Now, these crimes-black as anything in human history—cannot be simply forproblem. If the rankest conceivable contain that small measure of justice which it is now possible to render in

Armenian massacres of 1915-16 should the rulers of Turkey for the last two or facts are inevitably knit up with a quite truthfully of Turkey: "The land

severed from the Turkish Empire."

Separate Armenia Needed. That the formation of a separate Ar-

menian State is the deliberate intention

of the Peace Conference seems further

indicated in the later actions of the con-

ference concerning Armenia, like the

appointment of Colonel Haskell as High Commissioner in Armenia on behalf of the four great powers, and the appointment of Major Gen. Harbord by President Wilson to investigate conditions in Armenia. Many incidental things also indicate the general expectation on the part of the Allies that an Armenian State will be formed. (4) The great and primary reason for this decision by the Peace Conference is undoubtedly to be found in the Armenian massacres which have just been reviewed. But it might still be asked whether the situation created by the massacres could be met only by the formation of a separate Armenia. For such a separation, it must be admitted in- that gradual driving out of the "Orienvolves very difficult problems. Why, tal spirit" in Turkey? In one sense then, is it necessary to set off an Arnot the deliberate aim of any power. the Turks that commonly make them the menian State? . What are the reasons? must go. We are to be done with Ori-The only possible substitute for a sep- ental domination in Turkey, it may The demands upon the Allies the empire, and that almost uncon- arate Armenia is a general mandate by hoped when we get States which know and upon the peace conference have sciously turn most foreigners who stay one of the great powers over all Asia in their citizens no privileged and unbeen beyond human power wholly to long in the country into pro-Turks. One Minor, which should insure equal rights privileged classes, but only equals belargely to themselves so long as the the majority, that the State would not "debatable land," become in some rich

Armenians Earned Nationhood.

then, may be said to be because of the demonstrated unfitness of the Turks to rule over others, or even over themseek to excuse them; because practically naturally suggesting a repetition of the the Armenians, and implicit threatening nians have surely earned the right, by tion and in public service. is no adequate substitute for such a State. In the interests of the Armenians. Armenian State is to be urged.

Shall Turkey Hold the Bridge?

division of Turkey do not lie simply in rise to the possibilities of this strategic justly challenges her rule over any other people, but also in her utter unfitness she is placed. The very fact of her agetion of territory of critical significance to the world, constitutes her a ' to the freedom and security of all naions." and makes unusual restriction in her case necessary; for the greater good of the world and of her own subject League. petence to convert nature's gifts into But Turkey is simply not conceivably

build. * * * They destroyed the intelectual and moral institutions of a nation: they broke up and dissolved althe entire social fabric: they undermined every educating and civilizing influence in the land, and they brough imitive simplicity of nomadic life. There is hardly a social instituion in Asia Minor showing any degree of social constructiveness that is not an older Anatolian creation. Moslemized n outward form, and usually desecrated cance of the territory which she occu-First of all, in the words of an-"Turkey is before everything else a roadway—a bridge-land * * * No solution of the political problem furkey has been a highway of commerce and civilization between Europe converging into the Turkish territory

routes of the world. At any rate they has been a single unit with reference nnote the sites on which the most an cient civilization rose." Where Continents Join. By position, then. Turkey lies "at the whole have recognized or repudiated the fore on the main field of history," and crime of the Armenian massacres, or is "the site of convergence of the main The aim which France and Great Britain shipwreck of the world by their policies characterized these crimes aright, but meeting place of races which are generthere is almost nothing to show repent- ally associated with the three conti-Tatar and Semitic peoples therefore are ate Turkey's relation with the world ural routes which lead in and out of the different language, customs and civiliza- proposed. Assuming an optimistic amount country"; by the Mediterranean Sea, tion; that the people do not wish further of migration of other Armenians into, and 69,129. Total, 1,095,710. Aegean Sea, Turkish Straits and the connection with Turkey, but were rather of Turks and Kurds out of the land, the Black Sea. "the shores of which are greatly rejoiced to be freed forever from closely dotted with the terminals of the Turkish yoke; and that there is opgreat avenues from Northwestern Eu- portunity in the Arabic-speaking por-Central Asia * * * and by 'the rift at least two strong national States-Valley of Syria.' "Hence" the Eastern question is as old as the history of civilization on this particular spot of the inhabited world "-always" this momentous international problem of detertrol the Straits between Europe and Asia, who shall get toll from the enormous transit trade of the region." Now under the new conception of a powers who are to think of the wellbeing and development of peoples temporarily placed under their care as a posed to change this age-old Eastern oppression which often rises into hideous here a great and distinctly international cruelty? * * * Can any one still con- or world interest; to make definite protinue to hope that the evils of such a vision for this world interest, and vet Government are curable? Or does the not only with full justice to the Turkish evidence contained in this volume fur- people more immediately concerned, but nish most terrible and convincing proof to their greater advantage. For, except that it cannot longer be permitted to for a practically all-powerful nation, a State; the problem of the Greeks and rule over subjects of a different faith?" position like that of Turkey makes the of other minority races. Is it strange that he should be unable land inevitably a perpetual prey of warto shake off the conviction that these ring powers, so that Dominian could say A. The Problem of a Separate Armenia.

The "Debatable Land." Is it not high time, then, in this crisis ture of the State proposed in this reer East has to be undertaken."

measurable sacrifices of the great war, ings on any side.

Surely the Peace Conference was justification men should recognize the lit is not proposed in such a State to valuable in the light of conflicting state.

Empire, with its fundamentally similar which the peace conference is in prin- great and lasting wrongs in Turkey ernment by the Turks of subject peoples all strife, and face this age-long Eastern ples. That would inevitably seem to the Russians, and thus are in a problems and its incidental side-lights; (3) But because Turkey has been so at once excite resentment and unremitmarkedly a "bridge-land," it became ting opposition. Moreover, such an aralso "the debatable land"; so that rangement would be unfair to the Ar-Ramsey can say that at the present menians as well. For it would place day the central movement in Asia is, them from the start in a false and unwhat it always has been, a conflict be- tenable position. It would put them, tween the Eastern and Western spirit, too, under great temptation to abuse About 1070 most of Asia Minor be- of power. And it would be no fair came Oriental in language and in Gov- trial of a truly Armenian State. ernment." "For nearly eight centu- would of course, also make any manries the Oriental element reigned su- date mean little or nothing, if not preme in Asia Minor and swept far into make it entirely impossible. Europe. • • But step by step Asia But such a separated State should furhas been driven back, and in Asia Minor nish a definite area into which Arthe old struggle has recommenced." On the west coast of Asia Minor the surance that there they would never be area are reduced for the smaller land. The Greek element has increased enormous- put under the rule of the Turks. ly in strength while the Turkish element has grown weaker." The Oriental element "dies out in these parts by a slow but sure decay." "A revival of Orientalism" was planned and directed by Abdul-Hamid and by the later oung Turk movement. in the eastern part of Asia Minor the Oriental spirit is doomed." "Orientalism is ebbing and dying in the coun-

Ramsey's analysis is probably correct

and important. But is there not something far greater to be looked for than doubtless, that spirit is doomed Are there not priceless Oriental values. gives all too small reason to hope for the quietism of the East, and the pragmatism of the West; the religious dependence of the East, and the scientific mastery of natural forces of the West The reasons for a separate Armenia, the mental and spiritual fellowship of the East, and the mental and spiritual independence of the West?

Some Spiritual Values Left. selves; because of the adoption of re- As illustrative of the spiritual values peated massacres as a deliberate policy still resident in Islam, for example, may ginning. of State; because of almost complete be mentioned the remarkable and inspirlack of penitence for the massacres, or ing achievements of the Semussi sect. repudiation of the crime—they rather in establishing a vast State in a most nothing has been done by the Turks in barren, uncompromising land, and in of reparations to them—a condition not most backward and degenerated popusufficient proof that the two races can- upon. It rather affords ample warrant Armenia at all. can go and not have to live under Turk- to harass the Moslem world and to give to bear with a pretty long mandatory ish rule; because nothing less than that excuse for a Pan-Islamic movement, term, for the reasons already stated and could give to the Armenians any ade- they should also at once definitely and to give up all revolutionary committees; quate guarantee of safety, consequently, publicly renounce all further political that Aremnia should have territory nothing less will satisfy the conscience encroachments on that world and out- enough to insure a successful developof the world upon this point; because in line a clear policy of uplifting the Mos- ment, and that the peculiarly difficult this day of opportunity for small nations lems, already subject to their control, mandate for Armenia should not be the under the League of Nations, the Arme- by enlarged opportunities both in educa- only mandate given America in Turkey their sufferings, their endurance, their (4) With the vision of such larger for comment, except the last, which will is illustrative. They cannot be con- massacres have been due to deliberate loyalty to principles, their unbroken possible goals for this "bridge-land" come up for later consideration. spirit and ambition and their demon- and "debatable land" of the Eastern strated industry, ability and self-reli- Hemisphere, one approaches the problem nnce, to look forward to a national life of the control of Constantinople and the a case there is no possibility of laying crimes of the passion of the moment, of their own; because such a separate Straits in a different spirit. The situa-State would probably make more cer- tion is so unique, the relations so comtain decent treatment of Armenians in plex and far-reaching, the responsibilother parts of Turkey, and because there itles so heavy, and the possibilities so enthralling, that no one nation can be equal to the task-least of all a nation of the Turks and of the peace of the with Turkey's superlatively bad record world alike, the formation of a separate of misrule. No situation in the world demands so compellingly international rule—not only to put an end here to the

A. Constantinopolitan State.

opportunity, for the benefit of all

doubtedly be unwelcome to most Turks. that would solidify their tradition hostility been far more than merely external or Turkey herself to be delivered from this tainly an imperial rule by them over other She has acted rather as a intolerable responsibility, and to have people should not be thought of for the pres-As Ramsey-possibly midst of what has been, through centuries, a centre of boundless intrigue. has simply been to ruin, never to re- lead a much happier life in a state freed from outreaching imperialism, and at liberty to devote itself to the welfare of its own citizens.

Asia Minor to that of the former Turk- area, they will never be able to occupy and back a great part of the country to the ish Empire as a whole, other reasons for division of the Turkish Empire may be because of the critical signifi- revived jealousies of the powers. That danger is not to be lightly regarded.

Other Severances Necessary. on the one hand and Asia and Africa on Its interests—except those of good govseeking separate solutions for them. Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia, for ex-

ample, each has a kind of unity of its flight of Armenians from further east-a It was natural, therefore, that the area, in which they have over since been in and 282,000 Grecks; total population Peace Conference should have resolved a minority almost everywhere. Thee demand 2,007,000.] that Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Arabia should be completely severed strained interpretation of facts. from the Turkish Empire. The first three have already been dealt with in the preceding reports of this commission. It may be briefy pointed out here. however, that these areas are naturally cut off from Turkey because of their tions of the former Turkish Empire for Syria, including Palestine, and Mesopotamia, in accordance with the hones of the Peace Conference and the desires of the people themselves. Both Syria and Mesopotamia should be, of course. under mandataries for a time.

the continuance of a distinctly Turkish State, with guarantees of justice to all its constituent peoples. The resulting problems, now to be considered, therefore, naturally become: the problem of a separate Armenia: the problem of an international Constantinopolitan State: the problem of a continued Turkish

inquiry in Asia Minor has been to build, further dealings with Turkey, honestly large and impressive scale, the often writes, "that the public opinion of the Hemisphere has heaped upon it." The be set up have already been fully given. The be set up have already been fully given. The be set up have already been fully given. The be set up have already been fully given. The be set up have already been fully given. The be set up have already been fully given. The be set up have already been fully given. The be set up have already been fully given. The be set up have already been fully given. The be set up have already been fully given. The beat armenians could be restored and impressive scale, the often writes. (2) The conception of such a State. It is well to have in mind the exact nu- this area can be more easily accomplished port, in order to prevent misunderstand-

menians could go with the complete as-

should be also a region in which menians could gradually concentrate, and from which the Turkish population might tend increasingly to withdraw; though no compulsion should be put on All this necessitates a strong mandatory power. The State could not even war, gives promise of self-defensibility. A start without such help. This separated State reaching to the Mediterranean is a far State should be therefore a State defi- more difficult matter, with its long frontiers, nitely under the rule of a mandatory Government, organized on modern lines to do justice to all elements of the population; and a State from which the mandatary should not withdraw, until the Armenians constituted an actual majority of the entire population, or at least until the Turks were fewer than ment would be long delayed. And that wares fact should be definitely faced as inevitable. The conditions are such that there is no defensible alternative. (3) The term of the mandate is practically involved in the conception of the State which is forced upon us. It cannot be a short-term mandate, not because of any reluctance to withdraw on the part of the mandatary, but because constitute an actual majority. There is 7. All this is argued with the best interalso the added consideration of the natural need of considerable time for the amalgamation and consolidation of the amalgamation and consolidation of the illusory opportunity. They are in grauing Armenian people, as against some ten- danger of grasping at too much and losing dency to split up into fragments. The all mandate must be long enough, too, to If they establish themselves securely in the make the people thoroughly ready for more restricted area, and if Anatolia fall both self-government and self-protection, to develop as a well knit and successful

Estimates of the Population of an Desire for Us as Mandatary.

(4) An American Mandate Desired.—It seems universally recognized that the

None of these conditions, perhaps, cal

Extent of New Armenia. (6) The Extent and Boundaries of the

Armenian State.-The General Advisor, Dr. Lybyer, has expressed so exactly the conditions of the Commissioners concerning the extent and boundaries of the been made under disinterested control. Armenian State that his statement may well replace any other discussion of this 1. The Armenians should be provided with total 4,829,000; the Smaller Turkish Are selfish scramble and perpetual intrigue a definite territory and organized as soon as monia a Moslem population of 1,876,000 and of their ceasing to be a centre of world disturbance cannot be answered. 2. This area should be taken from both Turkish and Russian territory. The wars of the nineteenth century divided the proper

krinenian land between theset we empires. Turkish territory which takes into account losses by the mineracres of 1804-90. 1908-09 and 1915-16. These losses may be catimated at one million. 4. They should not be given an excessive were deported or who fled into Russia, and amount of Turkish territory, if their State a, The Turks, Kurds and other should not be left with a just grievance, since

and embitter them against the League of ! Nations or a mandatory power that they undertake to hold down and perhaps squeeze out a large majority, in order that a small and 1,592,000 in the Differential Area. minority may have time to multiply and fill with estimated losses in the whole are crity is actually not feasible; that is to way. if the Armenians are assigned too large an

oslem areas occupied by Turks and Arabs. geneous State with considerable population probably impossible of realization, and there- 000 with 881,000 (5%) of Moslems. 680 fore should not be planned for. It en- (35%) counters all the objections previously men- Greeks.

were in a small minority in such an area, 1920 and 1925 in the following manner: probably never exceeding 25 per cent. If per cent, of the Mosiems will leave. an they should be given the control, the ma- 800,000 Armenians will come from other fority populations would be injured, in viola- parts of Turkey and the world. ion of all "Wilsonian principles" and war is taken of natural increase, but this wou alms. With allowance for the estimated act against the percentage of the Armamillion who perished, and assuming that all nians, because they lost men in far greater these could have been gathered into the proportion than women, and because the ritory, the Armenians would still now num- are less numerous than the Moslems, particularly her only about one-third of the total popula- ularly when the larger area is considered. h There never was an Armenia which Armenians increased more rapidly than Mose ruled all this territory. The real Armenia, lems, because of differences in social aya as mans and records show, was a highland tems and military service; conditions will country which at one time reached the Cas- probably reduce these differences in the fu-Sea without reaching it, and which never process which scattered them over a large 3,009,000 Moslems, 1,101,000, Armenians for both areas is therefore an imperialistic

Why America Should Act. cent, of the population in the large area about 1890, for the Russian part Armenians still would constitute only about tion of a mandatory power would be exwhich would as future owners and rulers of the land, be much more obnoxious to taken of natural increase, which might make the majority than at present. to the United States. If the American peo- Armenia 850,000 Moslems, 1,000.000 Arnie should be induced to begin the process, menians, 50,000 Greeks, 100,000 others. and this should turn out to be fundamentally total 1.500,000, the same territory plu unjust, they would modify their intention. The chances are considerable that the large 000. Armenians 1,651,000, Greeks 282,000 Armenia would nover become an Armenian State at all, but a mixed State, composed minorities of Armenians, Turks, Kurds. security against external aggression without the support of a strong mandatory power. 8,047,000. This would disappoint both the Armenians. who could never control the Government. and the mandatory power, which could never 1925 the Armenians can be in a small mas 8. On the contrary, an Armenia reduced basis. They would constitute about twoto the Armenian highlands in both Turkey thirds of the population in the Russian Russia, with an outlet on the Black Sea, portion, and a little over one-third in the rould have a good chance of establishment continuance. The Turkish area which In an Armenia on the larger basis that

neers could overcome the physical obstacles Turkish portion. to internal and external communication. fully complain of such an area, because it is the historical Armenia, and because if the than from the larger land, inasmuch as a

Prospect of Majority Rule. b. The Armenians might become the mojority of the actual population within a few years, and with that in view, and with the smaller area, they could be given a larger share in the administration from the start. and trained more rapidly to self-government c. The duration of the mandate would be materially shortened, with a soldier ethnical foundation and a more compact area. The mandatary would need far fewer troops and would be put to much less expense. d. The doubts as to the possibility erecting an Armenian State in the large mandatory power could with a prospect of success keep in mind the giving of control to the Armenians, since they would after t time not be a minority, causing trouble by incessant pushing for special privileges of an economic and political nature, but a majority with a just right to a larger place. e. This land having secure frontiers, as was tried out thoroughly during the great

containing each a number of vulnerable spots, and its permanent difficulties of internal communication, due to the broken configuration of the land. Its very existence might moreover be regarded by the Turks on this basis would be ampler: all essential for food, fuel and shelter can be obtained the Armenians. This would necessarily locally, and surpluses are easily to be premean that full Armenian self-govern, duced which can be exchanged for other 1. In Turkish Armenia the Armenians were able to live and often to prosper, and rethey paid considerable taxes and were subject to frequent robbery. ii. In Russian Armenia the Armeniana have thriven greatly, under only moderately favorable conditions. ill. This area is crossed by commercial through Erzingan and Erzerum between Anas party, national and international. This gether and giving them a sort of unity, prolonged, what would happen when the Armenian State cannot be established through Trebizond toward the Persian Gulf in a brief period of time, however ar- This guarantees the importance of severa dent the desires of both the Armenians towns at nodal points, such as Kars. Erivan. and the mandatory power. For the Ar- Erzerum, Mush and Van, and suggests val-

> through an increasing use of Armenians State, there is no reason why the question n the government even from the be- should not be resumed later of connecting Cilicia with Armenia.

ests of the Armenians in mind, on the basis

of genuine friendliness toward them, and of

concern to give them a real and not all

Armenian State. The appended tables are the result of an

Armenians themselves desire an Amer effort to compare the population of Armethe way of repatriation of Armenians or uplifting, organizing and harmonizing a ican mandate. And this choice is ap- nian areas to two plans. That which the parently generally approved by Amer cludes a "Larger Turkish Armenia" was experiment of Turkish rule; because, on lation in the heart of Africa within a ica's allies. The Turks, too, though not worked out by the American Division of the contrary, there is evidence of in- comparatively few years, and under in- wishing any separate Armenian State, Western Asia at the Peace Conference, and feeling still existing against fluence purely Moslem. Such a State would probably favor an American man- can be examined more fully in the record of the conference. It represents probably of massacre; because there has been should not be needlessly encroached date for Armenia. If there must be an subject to minor alterations, the best possible arrangement on the basis of giving an not live peaceably and decently together, for expecting that under new demo- (5) The conditions upon which Amer Seas; the frontiers follow natural features outlet on both the Black and Mediterraneau have separate States; because of com- cratic processes and in due time the ica would be justified in taking the and the connection with Chicle is made at lete failure of the strong clauses of the Moslems will prove themselves able to mundate for Armenia may be said to narrow as practicable. The "Emailer reaty of 1878 to protect the Armenians; build up and manage their own States be: The genuine desire of the Ar Turkish Armenia" suggested in the ten ecause the most elementary justice in the Arabian and Anatolian ponin- menians; the cordial moral support of cuts off for Armenia in Turkey substantially suggests that there must be at least sulas. If the Entente powers are sin- the Allies in carrying out the mandate: that portion of the Armenian plateau which some region in Turkey where Armenians cere in their declarations not further willingness on the part of the Armenians was held by Russia in her period of advance during the great war. The phrase "Differential Area" was chosen to represent what is left after subtracting "Amalies Turkish Armenia" from "Larger Turkish Armenia,!' and extends from Mersina to Kharput and north to the Black Hea. A. Before 1914. This table is estimated from the statistics prepared by Drs. Masic and Westermann. Percentages are attached. The Moslems are not separated into ground: they include about 400,000 Laxes on the Black Sea coast between Trebisond and Ratum: about one half are Turks; most el the remainder are Kurds, some of whom are Shilte or Kizibash, and the remainder Bube nite. Dr. Magie's figures may under estimate the Armenians in some areas. Con

> [Table A gives the Larger Turkion Armenia a Moslem population of 8,078. 000 (71%), Armeniana 988,000 (214%), Greeka 289,000 (634%), othera 84,000 (%), Armenians 472.000 Greeks 153,000 (7%%), others 16,000 (1%). total 2.017.000: the Differential Area a Moslem population of 1.607.000 (73%) Armenians 461,000 (20%), Greeks 136.000 (6%), others 18,000 (1%), total 2 017.000.1

tainty will never be attained as to the number

bers of the different elements in Turkey

until a scientific ethnological survey has

Present Conditions. B. In 1920. It may be assumed that in

1920 order will be restored so that all survivors can return, of the Armenians who of the Turks and Kurds who fled from the races territory occupied or threatened by Russia. An estimate follows, in which it is guossed that in the "Smaller Turkish Armenia" 50 per cent, of the Armenians and Syrian Christians have perished, and 20 per cent. (the Greeks and Moslems. The Armenians & the "Differential Area" had not the same opportunity to escape into Russia, and it is guessed that 75 per cent. of those have per-

Table B gives a total population of 8.059.000 in Larger Turkish Armenia: 1,467,000 in Smaller Turkish Armenia

of Moslems (15,000, Armenians (582,00) the Greeks 57,000, others 17,000; total 12 efit of their entire losses in Turkey during the war. 1.000.000 may be added to the number bers of Armenians according to each plan-This of course has no relation to the practicability of establishing an Armenian dtake.

but it displays the justice, on the basis a majority, of assigning them the "Smalled This table gives the Larger Armenia (80¼%) Moslem; 551.000 A+ menians, and 232,000 Greeks and the Smaller Armenia a population of 1.547. Armenians and 122.000

1914 and before 1894 the Armenians either plan changes will take place between

600.000 Moslems (40%), 750,000 Armenians. 50.000 Greeks and 100.000 otherst total 1.500.000: Larger Turkish Armenia It remains to add Russian Armenia to the claim, based historically upon an over- Turkish areas considered. The assumption has been made that Russian Armenia wa continue in 1920, after the Turkish Armenians have gone home, a population of about end and one-half times as great as that colle

mated by Mr. Lynch in his "Armenia." p. 451. Ilis actual figures, as a Armenian plateau, are: Armenians, 519,256; Mostema, 450,580; Greeks, 47,703; others,

F. Complete Armenia in 1935. Finally it may be assumed between 1996 and 1925, 250,000 Armenians from the remainder of Russia and from other parts of a small addition to the Armenian percentage. [This table gives this result: Russian Larger Turkish Armenia Moslems 3,817. others 117.000, total 4.367.000. an Smaller Turkish Armenia. Moslems, 1.530.000 Armenians, 1.72.000

Greeks and 108.000 others: The whole calculation then shows a mos ority in an Armenia erected on the smaller

Turkish portion. the Russians held in 1917 may be taken ap- would not exceed 40 per cent. for the whell proximately as the Turkish portion of this area in 1925, and would then constitute about small Armenia." the present territory of two-thirds of the population in the Russian Russian Armenia as the remainder. Engi- portion, and not over one-fourth in the a. The Turks and Kurds could not right- 2. The Problem, of a Separate Com-

stantinopolitan State. (1) The Conception of such a fitatebrought into the land, the Armeni na would In facing the problem of a separate table). Mikration of Turks and Kurds from Constantinopolitan State there should be, first of all, a clear understanding of the nature of the State proposed. This estimate of Armenian losses by man- The definite plan for a League of Mac tions with its mandatory system.

should be noted, gives new beln in the

that the Constantinopolitan State, as a great international interest, League of Nations for the good of all even "national interests are often promoted better by international co-operation than by international competition." The State would be administered through a mandatary for the League—a mandatary appointed by the League, responsible to the League and removable at the will of the League, but held permanent except for cause: for it is plain that there should not be any unnecessary shifting in the administrative The mandatary, moreover, should a real mandatary for the League, a trustee for international interests. not a power using its position to advance

its own national interests. To this end the mandatary should be territorially and strategically disinterested.

Administration. The Constantinople State could administered by an international commission, like the notably successful commission on the Danube; but the problem here is more complex, and the single mandatary would seem to have some decided advantages over the commission plan. In the case of the Constantinopolitan State, for example, there would be actual government functions to be exercised, as there are not in the same sense in the control of traffic on the Danube. These could be better handled by a regularly organized Government. The mandatary, too, as directly controlled by the League of Nations, would be even more truly international than in international commission of the old kind. And practically, a single mandatary would naturally be better able to avoid friction, wrangling and divided counsels, and so to prevent exasperating and dangerous delays. It would also have more immediate power behind it. for Constantinople is a markedly cosmopolitan city, where the Turks are of the territory between the Enos-Midia line probably not even in the majority. This and the present Bulgarian frontier was more State should also have a reasonable than 147,000, or 42 per cent, of the whole. territory on either side of the Straits. All fortifications should be abolished. This international territory would, of course, be open to all people for any legitimate purposes. Like the District of Columbia in America, it would be a natural place for great educational and religious foundations, so that such The Greek population was, then, probably Moslem institutions could remain and not over 25 per cent. of the whole in 1914 be further built up. The Turkish popu- It is less at present, but changes during the lation, equally of course, would be free to stay. But Constantinople would not longer be the capital of Turkey. In the administration of the State, however, all possible consideration should be given to Moslem sentiment, and reasonable **practical** adjustments arranged. The Sultan might even conceivably continue to reside at Constantinople if that were desired under the conditions named.

Problem of the Stralts. (2) The Reasons for Such a State-What are the reasons which make the imperative, in the final settlement of this war?

much of by the Turks, points at least in this direction, when he writes: "The heights south of Mudania and Panderma as for. This is also furnished by the gen-Dardanelles should be permanently far as the boundary of the Sanjak of Bigha, eral adviser. opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under in- Mount Ida. ternational guarantees." It would seem that that end could be accomplished in no way so surely and so permanently as by an international State under the League of Nations. The need at least such internationalization is of Constantinople. manifest when it is remembered that tinuously since 1911. straits upon which it stands have occasioned the world more trouble. have cost humanity more in blood and suffering any other single spot upon the earth. Certainly during the last hundred years it has been the chief European centre of international unrest. From it and be at the outset about two millions, of whom about it have radiated continually in- about 60 per cent. would be Turks, 25 per ternational rivalries and hatreds and cent. Greeks and 10 per cent. Armenians It was the direct origin and The proportion of Turks would be likely in cause of a large number of the wars time to decrease and that of Greeks and fought in the nineteenth century. It is Western Europeans to increase, especially in not improbable that when Europe in her last ditch has fought the last battle of area. the great war we shall find that what we have again been fighting about is really Constantinople.' Now, this perpetual centre of intrigue and endless cause of trouble must be done away

(iii.) The close of this greatest of wars, with its many new adjustments, and particularly with the break-up of the old Turkish Empire, gives an unrivaled opportunity to clear up, in a permanent way, once and for all, this great plague-spot of the world. If this opportunity is now neglected, or grasped only in nerveless, vaciliating and selfish **fashion, we shall have again the ol** intolerable situation. We are con**fronted** by a great challenge. counsels should not prevail. As Woolf **puts** it: "Constantinople is the test of the great war's result. If it can be. and is, given to any one State, it means the rule of the world by war: if * * * it be administered by all for all. Constantinople means the rule of the world by peace."

A Source of Future Wars.

and strategic a world-centre is also too approximately ten millions, of whom to choose out of any list of leading nations a nation less fitted for this world task than she. She has completely forfeited any claim to such a responsibility. seen, it would be to the distinct advan-

tage of Turkey's own new democratic government to be definitely withdrawn from this centre of intrigue. Thoughtful Turkish leaders already realize the evils which have come from this in- League of Nations, and so shifting from their State from such a seat of infection. At the same time, the Turks remaining within the boundaries of the international State, under a competent mandatary, would certainly have the best government they have ever had. (vi.) The situation, furthermore, cantionally and through an international State. And the League of Nations and the mandatory system, as planned by for the Turks themselves: to guarantee the Peace Conference, would seem to the rights of all minorities, racial or resuggest both a new and stable method ligious; to deliver Turkey from the defor establishing and administering such moralization of incessant intrigue from a State, and a method growing directly outside; to secure, without selfish exout of the Covenant of the League of ploitation by the mandatary or any Until such an international other outside power. Turkey's economi State is definitely established there will development and economic independence be endless intrigues on the part of vari- for there is not the slightest doubt that ous powers to possess or control the she has been living far below her ma-Straits. So long as a State as weak terial possibilities: in line with the allied as Turkey has any kind of hold upon settlement with Germany, to disband this critically significant territory, in- the most of the Turkish Army and do trigues will be encouraged. The Greeks, away with all military conscription, defor example, have already declared their pending upon a well organized gendarambition to have Constantinople in merie for the larger police duties of their hands, and are conducting a cam- the State-all this for the better good paign of propaganda to that end. That of the common people and to break the of what may be expected power of intriguing imperialists to go on until a thorough-going and permanent solution of the problem of national system of universal education the Straits is adopted, in an interna- that should lift her entire people; to chasized that the reason for the estab- to make of Turkey a State of high order ishment of an international Constan-

tinopolitan State is not to humiliate before the law and of full religious Turkey or any Moslem interest: but simply to face squarely and honestly a situation which is a constant menace both to the peace of Turkey and to the peace of the world: and, deceiving ourselves no longer with vain makeshifts. to determine upon the only fundamental No such fundamental readjustment can be made, doubtless, without some disturbance and sacrifice: but can be counted certain that all reated interests—economic, political, social and religious—will in the end gain from a permanent solution of this vex-

Question of Size.

ing world question.

(3) Extent and Boundaries-The discussion of the extent and boundaries of ~ clearly the elements of that problem. anticipating a completer study on the mandater ground by the special Boundaries Commission later recommended.

cannot remain satisfied with the ownership levents in the past that most of any one power, should be permanently 2. Inasmuch as the Sea of Marmora 18 hazardous experiments with new, igsmall, and in a sense may be regarded as simply an enlargement of the Straits, a minimum boundary must include not only the whole of both sides of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, but also the entire shore of the Sea of Marmora. The American experts in international law at Parls pro- the country has only the choice between an that serious complications might coupled with foreign occupation and the loss arise if an independent State should reach these waters at any point. Constantinople is also the place where not like to discuss any settlement which imrailways make the crossing between Europe plies a theoretical restriction of sovereignty; and Western Asia; arrangements for the (3) a minority of supporters of an English stations and yards of these need to be taken solution. On account of the ready access by water and rail, the economic support of the city need to be provided for completely does not within the boundaries of the State, except as regards the water supply. It would convenient, of course, to have room for dair; and vegetable farming, in view of the trouble

out privilege or favor, there is no need

The European Side.

adjust the boundary to racial groups.

of 1915, subject to minor modifications.

map, but the question of disposing of

kept out of her rightful lands in Macedonia

number of Turks has been increased.

of Greeks, but a fair exchange of population

Turkish will become a majority of the popu-

The Asiatic Side.

ward to the ridge between Isnik and Yeni

nelles it must all go with the Straits.

What the Report Gives Turkey.

separated Constantinopolitan State.

treated territories won in war.

response to a just and imperative world

whether racial or religious. This would

mination for some of the smaller racial

groups it may be also necessary to al-

Turkish State.—It seems to be generally

have felt obliged to require one.

This general statement, indeed, may be

Turkey should have a mandate: to se-

out oppression, bribery or corruption,

steadily into self-government; in a word

on a modern basis of equal rights to al

a State not purely (though predominant-

whose government all representatively

Reasons for a Mandate.

earlier section of the report-especially

clared that Turkey must herself have a

mandate, and because a free expression

was not allowed--it has been very diffi-

should seek a mandate, in any sense of

cult to get clearly decisive evidence of

lv) Turkish in race and in control.

racial stocks were contained and

Mandate—Forty reasons given in

Reasons for a Mandate for the ties.

least local autonomy

run east of the river to Ak Sofu

portion reaching at least 60 per cent

with Constantinople.

cannot be justified.

the American majority, he calls atten-Constantinople several months ago by the delegates of fifty-three different Turkish fore he present for a Macedonian system 5. Inasmuch as the population has always chief supporters of the American mandate, kept down only by more military effort and been greatly mixed—a condition which wil are represented in the Congress, it may al- to assume. undoubtedly continue, and since it may be

As giving an idea of the strength of

Turkish public opinion concerning

mandate for Turkey:

assumed that the League of Nations wil educated classes in general. The National velop a special Greek area in Asia Minor? provide for the security of all elements with League, containing about forty of the most The maximum that would seem to be advisrespected citizens and Senators, is also for able at the present would be that a strong the American mandate. This means at the mandatory power should be entrusted with same time the majority of the Senate. The a single mandate for all Anatolia and should "Nationalist" Party in Anatolia in general take special pains to protect Greeks and 6. On the European side it is better, all things considered, to leave with Constanti- The professors of different Facultis of the with the possibility of a limited locally nople the present remnant of Turkey in Europe, accepting the Turco-Bulgarian frontier the papers with large circulations are taking circumstances justify. Constantinople area needs no more land than the same view of things. This state of things is very surprising, because there is, instructions of the commission do not Midia line, as shown on the accompanying for the English mandate; on the other hand the Americans do not make any propaganda. remainder of "Turkish Thrace" is so acute

More Reasons for America. that the best solution is to leave this also Another journalist gave detailed cori. The area was ceded to the Balkan allies roborative evidence looking in the same early in 1913 and assigned to Bulgaria, but it was recovered by Turkey after the second Balkan war. If Bulgaria continues to be had been carrying on a campaign she has some ground for claiming Turkish his Constantinople paper Thrace as a region for the settlement of refugees. As regards Turkish and Bulgarian Thrace, there has been a consideable excome from men of all parties. ii. Greece has claimed the territory, but statistics submitted by the Greeks do not escommission when the question of mantimate that before 1912 the Greek population date was taken up, have generally favored an American mandate. A delegation representing the intellectual leaders among the women, including Their own statements show that a large proportion of this number migrated between Presidents of educational institutions 1912 and the World War. They do not state and of national and provincial educathe reciprocal fact that an approximately tional associations, were especially emequal number of Turks migrated from terriphatic in declaring for an American tory acquired by Greece in 1913 and settled mandate. The general judgment of the here, so that there was not a mere expulsion most trustworthy observers whom commission was able to consult firmed these results. The delegates of Smyrna, and representing 1,800,000 peo-World War should hardly be taken into achave declared for an American The claim of Greece to this area! The congress at Sivas, held on the 20th of August, probably the for several centuries, and have a great num On the basis of population, Turkish Thrace was really Turkish in 1914, the pro- most representative recent gathering of the Turkish people, is expected by iv. There is no prospect that, without vio- those in closest touch with the move- plished under one power. lent changes, any other element than the ment for which it stands to declare for lation within a considerable time. In case On the whole, it is highly probable this should ultimately happen, in suchas vay that a large majority of the Turkish as to make alterations of boundaries desirable, the League of Nations could transfer a

people wishing a mandate at all would favor the American mandate. portion of Thrace out of the Constantinople Anatolia. (4) Territorial Conditions in Anatolia.— 7. On the Asiatic side, the frontier begin-To complete the survey of the problems involved in a reconstitution of the Turkish State in Anatolia, a general discussion, in brief summary, of territorial Dagh, cross to Geuk Dagh, pass southwestupon various subject races-seems called Shehir, and proceed westward along the which it might follow to the sea south of i. The line between the Black Sea and Ismid is located east of the Sakaria, includin order to facilitate engineering problems of drainage and provide an area suitable for (this word being limited to those persons trigue. dairy farming within the reach and control the Straits have been closed almost con- Turks, because it has no relation to the de- tions of this remaining area, by Kurds for nated. ill. The Troad Peninsula, while predomi- is advisable, in the opinion of the com- further. nantly Turkish, constitutes such a separate physical area that it cannot well be divided. Therefore, for the defense of the Darda-8. The total population of this area would Constantinople and the smaller cities of the of autonomy can be allowed them under III. The Problem of a Turkish State.—

close mandatory rule, with the object of necessity, in bare justice to the Armea larger-self-governing union. It is possible to shift most of the comparatively small ing about a million and a half people nearly portunities for settlement on Greek all Kurds. Full security must needs be pro- for which there is no parallel for Turkey is thus called upon to vided for the Syrian, Chaldean and Nes- Armenians. The general situation of surrender her sovereignty over certain torian Christians who dwell in the area. Greeks, too, in diminished numbers modest portions of Asia Minor, but in no way treated as her own conquerors torian Christians who provide for all of much less desperate than that the Sunnite Kurds in Turkey, and the Kizil- Armenians. Moreover, the Greeks General Extent.—But in pursu- hash group lies almost wholly to the west. more widely scattered in small conquest, if the principles of national of the power which cares for Mesopotamia desirable. guard the rights of all minorities. tact at the west. About one-half of tho give to Turkey a comparatively very area asked for by the Greeks of "Pontus" large area—larger than France—having should be included in the Armenian State, a population one-fourth of France-of in order to give it access to the sea. 'The 000.000 Turks) and 1.500.000 Greeks. This should assure to the new Turkey an amopportunity of development. In This would seem to be too small a minority interests of a reasonable self-deterfor fully by general laws, enforced in each case by the mandatory power until such low their transfer, if they so choose, to Syria or Mesopotamia, or to grant them time as the States are ready for 'self-gov-

recognized by the Turkish people themselves that the surest and speedlest Armenians and Syrians, in each case by a spite of the violent antagonisms of reminority which did not exceed 25 per cent. cent years, Ramsay may well be right road out of their present evil conditions is by way of a mandate under the trigue, and might well welcome—even an imperialistic state to a democratic in 1914. Reasons are stated above for not one. And from every point of view that giving it to the former. It is unimportant appears desirable. Indeed, it seems im- to Syria as an outlet, since that area has races supplement each other. possible to expect any satisfactory many ports. But it is very valuable to the change in the Government of Turkey by any other method. And if the Turks areas both at the northeast and the north. had not themselves suggested a manda- It should not be separated, economically from Anatolia at present, and if at any future tary the Peace Conference might well said to include the specific reasons why of its ports by the interior regions of Anatolia from Kaisariyeh to Konia. The region between Cilicia and Armenia cure genuinely good government, witharea should be separated from Anatolia. them: to put beneath all Turkish life a VI. Smyrna and the West. The problem of the west coast is a difficult one, not betrain the various peoples of the State Smyrna and certain coastal Kazas is the liberty. This would inevitably result in and the complete proof that it is in majority there awaits an impartial census. If any cosmopolitan State in which various ingness of the majority of the population in annexed to Greece, or to have Greece as a mandatary, the question has been answered by the circumstances of the occupation. (This (3) Turkey's Desire for an American has confirmed the fact of the atrocities.) The since the Peace Conference had not de-

whether the Balkan State of modern Greece

The Greek army and all authority of the

Greek Government ought to be withdrawn

Should an area in Western Asia Minor be

That a nation so long independent til the Greek power is wholly removed. In the

dary be traced, the population within it lare ready to submit themselves to some would be so markedly Moslem (about three regular schooling instead of making any to one) that the area could have no special Greek character. norant leaders." And he thus sums up If, on the other hand, a more or less bitrary line be drawn further west. would not constitute a good barrier for de-The following divisions can be noticed: fense against smuggles or brigand bands. Any line drawn now would be re (1) The large majority which realizes that garded, more or less, as an economic bar-American mandate and an eternal chaos, cutting off Smyrna and other coast cities from some of the trade with the inof national unity; (2) a minority which does terior, to mutual disadvantage. Greek Houes in the West.

sons already fully given.

Anatolia at present

ready fully given.

ready fully given.

eral mandate for Turkey.

and

dilicia should not be separated

for the continued Turkish State, in line

with the apparent wishes of the major-

lty of the Turkish people: the major

erms of the mandate to be defined by

the Peace Conference or the League of

Nations, and further adjustments to be

Turkey. The reasons for the mandate

stated, no independent territory be set

off for the Greeks: though local auton-

omy be granted to that portion of the

Sanjak of Smyrna which has a decided

majority of Greeks, but under the gen-

on boundaries in Asia Minor be appoint-

ed to study on the ground and to ex-

actly define the boundaries of the States

tions, and the precise limits of any lo-

autonomous area in Smyrna.

Turkish State would require the study

definition of the northern

connection with Mesopotamia,

Single Mandate for Asia Minor.

whole of Asia Minor (not assigned

general mandate have been

given and need not be repeated here.

In this, both the Armenians and the Al

Nevertheless, America cannot wisely

most difficult of all: because it would

cause the State would have to build

the impatience of the Armenians. An

not be determined. It conterns the

the different States in Asia Minor are

to entirely different powers, with dif-

Why America Should Take It.

The American mandate for Armenia

(2) America is also the most natural

power to take the mandate for the inter

best met by America. Now the full

cannot be secured, unless the rest of

for such a State, practically embodying

The mandate for the Constantinopoli-

(3) It is to be added that America is

also the most natural power for the

mandate over the new Turkish State,

because the Turkish people want her,

and generally trust her, as the evidence

previously given indicates; and because

America is peculiarly prepared to meet

the needs of the Turkish people in this

crisis in their history, as the reasons to

be given for a general American man-

new Turkish State, then, calis also for

general mandate over all Asia Minor.

in Asia Minor would seem then to be

to combine all three mandates in a com-

posite mandate, which would be pu

in the hands of America as the single

The general reasons for a single man-

datary for all Asia Minor, already

given, are not to be lightly regarded

Further Reasons.

with colonial responsibilities, which

The desired American mandate for the

The best solution for mandates

tan State also calls for a general man-

the same great principles.

date will later bring out.

supervisory mandate.

Minor is made a fit environment

thus, calls for a general mandate over

be well nigh insuperable.

Asia Minor as well.

with the clear understanding that

rights of the Syrian. Chaldean,

definition of the boundaries of

its necessary scope have been al

That, for the reasons already

That a commission or commissions

in the first three recommenda-

arranged between the mandatary

2. The similar formation.

(4) Neither Greeks nor Turks in Western Asia Minor would believe anything except is the intention of the League of tion to "The elements which make Nations to permit Greece later to annex territory set off, and perhaps to extend her The National Congress, a body formed in holdings further. The elements would theresocieties and organizations, is one of the sustained brigand warfare, which could be As all the Turkish intellectual organizations expenditure than any mandatory power cares most be considered as representative of the Shall any measures be taken then to de-

is in favor of the American mandate. Turks alike and preserve order in the West. do most of the lawyers, teachers, tech- a future spearated Greek area could then be nicians and merchants. At present most of left in abeyance, to be brought up again it VII. A Mandate for Anatolia. on the one hand, a very active propaganda rectly mention the assignment by the League of Nations of a mandatory nation to assist the Turks, many of the Turks themselves have suggested such a plan, and some presented urgent requests for America as the mandatory power. The need of supervision over finance, public works, education, internal order, and all the processes of govdirection. For example, he said that he ernment is hardly less for the Turks, despite their centuries of political experience, than for the Armenians. Syrians and Mesopothree tamians. It is in fact impossible to discern any other method of setting Western Asia in order. The Turks if left to themselves in that this campaign had called out only a condition of poverty, ignorance and genchange of population since 1915, so that few two letters of protest, while, to the eral exhaustion, with a feeling that they Bulgarians remain in the area, while the contrary, many words of approval had had been unjustly treated and then abanwar, would necessitate some such solution as is now suggested, but under conditions

less favorable to success. Advantages of a Mandatary. nople: While it is desirable that Armenia Anatolia and Constantinople should be placed separated Administrations, it is also desiraa congress held a few months ago at ble that the three mandates should be held (1) Those areas have been held together mandate, together with its inclusive ber of close ties of all sorts, the delicate adjustment of which can be best accom-(2) Unity of economic control, with simiilar commercial laws, coinage, weights and measures, and language of business is advantageous to all concerned. (3) Problems of repatriation and exchange of populations can be arranged more justly and promptly under one mandatary. (4) The adjustment of the public debt will

(5) The building of railroads and the improvement of routes of travel can be better (6) Police control and suppression of brigandage will be far simpler. On the contrary, the holding of the three areas by separate powers permits the taking of refuge (7) Unity is urged by many well-informed foreigners, looking from various points of view. Many of these favor not merely a circumstances; and because the mansingle mandatory power but a single man-I. After setting off definitely from the date. Practically all the benefits can be Turkish Empire as it was in 1914 all the obtained by the first plan that could be Arabic-speaking areas, Armenia, and the obtained by the second, and many serious Constantinopolitan State, there remains a difficulties can be avoided, such as arise large mass of territory in which the great- from persecution of Armenians, interference est single element of population is Turkish with navigation and complications of in- world that this Armenian State should whose mother-tongue is Turkish and who (8) Friction which might arise between not be needlessly handicapped profess the Mohammedan religion). Claims three mandataries, and which might conceiv- In the second place, the problems Brusa would better be left to the have been advanced toward setting off por- ably lead to a great war, could be elimifense of the Straits, because the local popu- "Kurdistan;" by Greeks for "Pontus,"— (9) The transition would be more easily (ii.) Woolf hardly overstates the need lation is predominantly Turkish and because an area along the Black Sea coast from acceptable by the Turkish people than if two of drastic action in this matter when he the Turks are sentimentally attached to this Sinope to Batum; by Syrians for Cilicia: or three powers should take control of the says: 'Constantinople and the narrow as the first Ottoman capital. To take from by Italians for Adalia and the whole south- three areas. The fact that the mandatary them all three capitals. Constantinople, west; and by Greeks for Smyrna and the would probably establish a central control in Adrianople and Brusa, would be very severe, west. The only one of these portions that Constantinople would aid the transition still satisfactory conditions in one State mission, actually to handle separately at In the foregoing discussion of terri- also.

pressing problems of the Greeks. IV .- The Problem of the Greeks. divide between the Euphrates and the Tigris have suffered much in deportations by e Turks, but there have been no such extensive massacres of the Greeks as of the Armenians. The Greeks, too, in the adjacent Greek islands, have a possible congenial refuge within former Turkish territory, such as the Armenians do not have. The Greeks also have, in territories recently acquired by Greece. ance of this different spirit shown in The area contemplated looks more to the through Turkey than the Armenians. south than the west and lies wholly along The drastic remedy of establishing a be truly applied to the Turkish people, taries. It would seem better, therefore, un-Anatolia, the bulk of Asia Minor re- less the population itself strongly prefers arated from Turkey seems, therefore, maining, with ample outlets to the sea, the other plan, to place it under the control both less possible and very much less should be less and less possible and very much less under such conditions as may sacredly than to connect it with Armenia across the (2) The results of the Greek occupamountains at the north, or with Anatolia, tion of Smyrna do not seem to indicate with which it would have only narrow con- that the Greeks of Turkey should now be given rule over others or be granted autonomy in a territory strictly confined to a district in which they were some 8,000,000 are Moslems (about 7,- remainder is needed by Anatolia for the same in a decided majority would seem the There were approximately 200,000 most that could be recommended (3) The ability of the Greeks is not tors make it the more probable that they could continue to hold their own within

the Turkish State. Indeed, the special ernment with adequate protection of minori- gifts of the Greeks generally make them particularly successful as colonists. The probability is that they would lose on the whole, rather than gain, in being Cilicia is claimed by both completely set off from Turkey. will united make a happier country than (4) There is to be added that the apparent purpose of the Turks to ask for mandate, and of the Peace Conference They give solid grounds for a composite

to appoint such a mandate, gives promise of a new Turkey, in which the rights the Greeks would be fully guarded at least for the terms of the mandate. trial certainly should be made by The further direct reasons for making the Greeks of life in the Turkish State America that single mandatary under the new conditions, before furtherof appeal to it—all combine to give itself suggests a special obligation here treatment and equality of opportunity, if there are any-lie necessarily in some at least during the term of the mandate. Special fitness of America for the parwhole people into capacity for self-gov-Adalia and the Southwest. Italy's claim ernment. The help of a national system of education too. would do much to asthat the abuses of the old time in certain dominant national convicwould not return; and the term of the tions of America; in a certain idealistic mandate yould naturally continue until international faith; in her record in there was good promise of Turkey's these international relations: and in the success as a modern State. Even after indications of her duty at this critical the mandate had expired the League of point in human history. All of these Nations could still act, upon necessity, considerations concern the Turkish to prevent all gross invasions of the vuation rights of minorities. In the light of all these considerations the Syrian and Turkish peoples recogwould seem best not to set off any nizing that at the foundation of the independent Greek territory for the common life of America were to be present, in the belief that in the long found run the better good both of the Greeks tions. They saw that she had a pasand of the Turks is to be found in their sion for peace and for the possibil

union in one cosmopolitan State. V. Recommendations. pertinent action already taken by the from a selfish division and exploitation into any situation simply to dominate fulfilled. Turkey: of considerations looking to a proper division of Turkey, and nuchlems naturally resulting. For the recommendations are built directly on foundations already laid by the Peace fish exploitation and division of Turkey. to a democracy. They believed, there-

except high up in the hills. If such a boun- date, and the conditions upon which phasis with respect for the values of ica's help in the difficult situation in preserve them in the old environment a mandate might be taken by another people. They knew, too, that Turkey; and, especially, that all plans there is no need of displacing the proswith a high religious idealism, America for cutting up Turkey, for the benefit ent population, for with the afforeof an Armenian State, completely separated from Turkey, as defined in the State in governmental administration. for the highest good both of religion and preceding section of the report. for reaof the State, and was thus especially fitted to render help to a State like It is consequently recommended that Turkey at so peculiarly critical a point in her transition from an imperialistic mandatary, of an International Con-land with complete religious liberty. stantinopolitan State, completely sepa-Belief in Our Faith. rated from Turkey, as defined in the preceding section, also for reasons al

In the second place, with these mastering convictions, the Syrians and Turkish people believed that America combined a certain idealistic international faith in her stubborn belief in the League of Nations and in the possibilities of mandatory system, when honestly carried out. She was naturally prepared therefore, they believed, to throw herself into the responsibilities of a mandate: steadfastly to seek to train people entrusted to her care into self pendence: and promptly to withdraw would measure the success stewardship by both the completeness In the third place, both the Syrian and the Turkish people, in expressing their desire for an American mandate. have laid steady emphasis upon the asrecord in dealing with other peoples. They believed in her unselfish aims in the war, and that she was now seeking | dix. for no share in the spoils of the war. They believed that she had no territoria lieved in her high and unselfish aims in dealing with Cuba and the Philippines.

daries of Syria and Mesopotamia as with special reference to allowing the Kurds a measure of autonomy or imperialistic ambitions. close mandatory rule, possibly They believed that she was not involved and in any joint plan for an exploiting di-Nestorian Christian minorities in this vision of either Syria or Turkey. They whole region shall be carefully guarded. believed in the high quality of her relief service, and, especially of her educational service in both countries—a ser-6. A general single mandate for the vice so fine, that so competent and imto partial an observer as Ramsay can say: | nors were consulted in the preparation Mesopotamia or Syria) to include under the mandate for Armenia, the mansolution of the 'Eastern Question' in Turkey than all the ambassadors of all program themselves. No attempt was date for the Constantinopolitan State. the European powers have succeeded in discerned to hinder any groups which and the mandate for the continued doing to render that solution difficult." Turkish State, each with a Governor of They believed that, so far was America though there were a few complaints its own to insure full attention to its from scheming to obtain a mandate in as to restricting the size of the particular interests, besides a Governor-Asia, she was honestly reluctant to un-I delegations. In one or two cases it was General over the whole. The various dertake such a mandate of any kind. interrelations and common concerns of In the fourth place. America is pecuthe constituent States would thus be liarly fitted to be the single mandatory studied and cared for, as well as their power for all Asia Minor, not only beindividual needs. The reasons for such international faith, and her record, but also because the course of duty for her i 7. That the United States of America would seem to lie in this direction. be asked to take this general single Obligations Upon Us.

mandates for the Armenian State, the Constantinopolitan State, and the con-It is no part of the task of the com linued Turkish State. This recommendation is made for the following reasons, which need to be developed in single mandate for Turkey, with its . (1) As already pointed out, it seems three involved subordinate mandates. to be generally desired that America should take the mandate for Armenia. lies seem agreed—and even the Turks, if belongs (if proper conditions can be fulthere must be an Armenian State at all. take this mandate without at the same the Peace Conference to put the sulting obligation squarely up to the time taking a mandate for the rest of American people. Can America deny all obligation For, in the first place, this Armenian this matter of a mandate for Turkey? mandate would be in many respects the She has believed, perhaps more than any other people, in the high possibilibegin in relations of bitter hostility; beties of the League of Nations: but, from the bottom under most peculiar the League of Nations is not to be sham and a delusion, all nations must date would have to be prolonged against be willing to bear their share in the resulting responsibilities. America, certhese difficulties would all be accentutainly, cannot be an exception. ated if the surrounding conditions could carry those war purposes through to the harbors. On the other hand, some exclearly succeed. Its mandatary should end? Here in Turkey is an unrivaled op- pressed a desire that America should portunity to try these purposes out for come as mandatory power. There was the good not only of a single people, but a general agreement that France could appears in an examination of the princiof the entire world; for here in Turkey come to the control of all Syria only too closely related to be wisely entrusted has been through centuries a centre of with a great show of force, and the probintrigue and strife that has engulfed all ability of considerable fighting. ferent ideals and methods. That situanations in its consequences. Moreover. tion would inevitably tend to produce America's intervention in the war went friction, waste and bad feeling, and unfar to determine the war's issue. Was 2. O. E. T. A. West-the Frenchthat intervention justified? America It was too evident that in all O. E. T. A. would naturally spread to other States must still do her utmost to complete the West the French military Governors and exploitation areas, the direct hin-They need far better provision drance to the working out of a truly conceived mandate in Armenia would they need renewed faith in one another

and in one another's honest purposes of

The New Cynical World. The war destroyed that faith between territorially and strategically disinter- live sort, to do something to bring back The mandatary for this interna- men's faith in men. If we can see the tional State should be herself strong, to radical necessity of such faith, to prediscourage any further intrigue for con- vent or break a financial panic, are we trol of the Straits: disinterested, to com- to see less clearly in times like these mand the confidence of all the nations of a moral world panic? Cynicism and concerned: and in unmistakably earnest disillusionment, as we have seen. sympathy with the aim of such a State, rife. Can they be conquered? Only by and with those international means by indisputable examples to the contrary. which this aim is to be achieved—the It may be doubtful, then, if America League of Nations and its mandatory could do anything so significant for the These needed qualifications are human race today as to prove that she had not forgotten her own ideals and fruits of such an international State burposes in the war, but was willing cult and distasteful, but highly important and far-reaching task—by taking on the general mandate for Turkey (as well as for Syria, if the Peace Conference thought best). In fidelity to herself does not America owe that demonstration to the world? It is hard to esof Nations being carried through wit would mean a reality of the League Nations: It would make a reality of the standard in international relations. genuinely high aims in the war. Nothing has been said of America's more easily comprehensible points from ample means for the economic develop- this program was emphasized. though it is not suggested that the fi- agents tried hard to persuade, cajole, or nancial relations of Turkey to America threaten all, Christians and Moslems present condition, however, is so neces- lence, imprisonment, or banishment with French area now than under the Turks. sitous in a thousand ways that very a view to influencing declarations before large amounts of capital would be ini- the Commission. The Emir Feisal had cially in the war to such an extent that tially required and returns at first would concluded agreements with the Druzes they have not the means to restors be small and slow. But before the man- and the Greek orthodox Christians, as France itself or to develop what possesdate ended a fair return on capital put represented by their Patriarch, in which sions they have already. They cannot into direly needed public improvements these agreed to support his Government therefore give Syria the financial and sources might properly be expected, at and promises of proper treatment. cial profits. But if even so favorable a the Greeks every assurance of fair for America. But the positive reasons- result as that indicated proved quite imlions to insure relations of peace and ticular task in hand-a fitness growing good-will among nations, rather than Armenian bands, each anxious to acquire the datary to do all possible to develop the naturally out of her experience as a the billions required for another war great growing democracy, largely freed sure to come if the present cynical nahitherto from European entanglements, tional selfishness and lack of good-will These reasons, that is, lie inevitably are not checked.

No Idea of Imperialism.

As against the considerations now presuggestion of so large and significant a mandate for America is itself proof that power. The answer is that America's and England are equally satisfactory to into position so that France is held re-America, too, is grasping imperialistic sonally to the Commission that America certain great dominant conviceven if a mandate for Syria were added better prospect of a speedy larger Arah of these children, meetings of the relato the mandate for Turkey the whole union if Syrla and Mesopotamia and tives—the "Unfortunate Syrians," now would mean no long retention of power other areas are under the same super- not only strengthens the sentiment for of its attainment, in spite of all sordid by America) except as the League of vision, he prefers in his inmost heart Arab independence, but stirs feeling manifestations to the contrary, and Nations should continue her as manda- the mandate of Britain. that to bring such a righteous peace nearer she entered this war. They saw that she literally does not want this 11. SUMMARIES OF ARGUMENTS that she had a passion for democracy. mandate, except to meet her fair share, PRESENTED TO THE COMMISSION. of responsibility in the world today spite of inconsistencies at home and that she would have to be persuaded by abroad, and could treat men of all races a campaign of education to take it on: and that she ought not to take it at all insight into their own individual gifts. They felt sure that she would not go (5) Considerations on which America and to stamp American customs on a

really believed in democracy, she had ditions are: That she is really wanted

somehow combined belief in the princi- of outside peoples, into spheres of in- station, modern methods of agriculture, ple of the separation of Church and flence and exploitation areas should be utilization of water power, reclamation These conditions are necessary to a the like, the land can contain several Unless they are America ought not to take the mandate to sell their lands they will receive a under a to a democratic state on modern lines ers do not recommend that the mandate be given to America if these conditions cannot be essentially met. Respectfully submitted. HENRY C. KING.

CHARLES R. CRANE. CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX. For the Use of Americans Only.

Since the commission was the American section of a projected international the report in such form that copies could trying squarely to face all the facts, The opportunity has also been taken i cussions that treat with a little more detail certain important aspects of our

inquiry and so throw light on the broader bearings of our report. Interference of Occupying Govern-O. E. T. A. South-At Jefferson I firmly believe that Robert College of the commission's programs. At has done more to render possible a safe other places they prepared the entire desired to meet the commission, alnecessary to request a Governor to leave besides the commission, a delegation,

> had been made to influence opinion in is due to German and Turkish. sucfavor of a British mandate, though with ceeded by Arab and British, propaganda, no great amount of success. The "Mos- and that it is not deep seated. The Come em-Christian Committee" and the offi- mission went to great pains in testing cials of Jaffa, the Kadi of Jenin, and these affirmations by questioning. Gersome groups of Acre, were said to have mans and Turks did conduct a vigorous seen chosen by the occupying Govern- propaganda, during the war, against the nent and were declared not to represent French, and against the other Allies as the people. Two or three military Gov- well. There was no evidence found of ernors seemed to have taken some action | direct propaganda by the British against to secure votes for Britain. Orders had the French, and frequent denials were peen issued at Jaffa against declaring made that the Arabs had worked thus... for complete independence. Evidence appeared of some French ac- French had themselves conducted an ivity in this area. likewise with little anti-French-propaganda by their actions success. There was much enterprise on since the Armistice. On the other hand the part of members of the Arab Gov- it was charged that some Arabs were ernment at Damascus. Such were not hindered by the British authorties from moving about freely, distributing printed forms and giving instruc- of Syria resent the just punishment tion according to definite programs. It may be remarked that a number of British officials, including some at Jerusalem, were proceeding as though expecting that Britain will remain permanently in control of Palestine. For instance, they were planning for the growth of cities, the building of roads and railways, and the construction of

French Propaganda.

America's obligation goes still had worked with varying energy and which they carried on directly and some l

in the newspapers, attempts at brow-IFrench education tend to become unconbeating and espionage, the hindrance by itrollable French soldiers of the attempts of indi-1 viduals and groups to reach the com-inatives as equals in Algeria and Tuwho had been removed because they had land developed in some detail declined to support a French mandate. as to be insulting to the intelligence and I Maronites. almost to the dignity of the commission. cers, who kept their methods out of greatly during the war. They thus en-Agents of Price Feisal were also tionalism on a non-religious basis. West in support of the program of the licy of colonization, by which they wish Syrian Congress at Damascuc. There to substitute the use of the French lanwas no evidence of direct action by the guage for native tongues, and make the British in this territory. Perhaps there people into Frenchmen. The Syrians was an ulterior motive in the special and wish to preserve the use of the Arabic

somewhat conspicuous kindnesses which language, and to retain their separatethey showed the commission during ness. Furthermore, it is inherent in this Pressure for an Arab Union.

of considerable pressure exerted by the Government to secure the union of lements upon one program. This took the form for the more intelligent groups French officers and officials now in of the declaration of the Syrian Congress at Damascus. For others, as the Circussians and Bedouins, who appeared at Amman, a selection of simpler and In that area in particular Government than those of alike, into subscribing. No good evi-Turkey's | dence appeared anywhere of actual viodevelopment of natural re- in return for a measure of autonomy time that Turkey's own is noteworthy that these agreements in- financial exploitation of subject areas, volved a request for a British mandate, and would govern Syria, not for its own which the Druzes and the Greek orthodox stood by, while the Congress went over to asking for an American man-Some British officers showed signs of favor of the Americans as first choice, to note that most of the Syrians believe mandate over Syria, and the Commis- control of the country. sion was informed that Mr. Balfour sent! a message to this effect, which Gen- with the execution of Arabs by Jenial eral Allenby conveyed to the Emir Pasha, and this acts against the French. Evidence was presented that the Emir triguing with the Arabs against the

secure the support of certain councils, for a request for a British mandate, and that he had failed. While he stated perhim, it may be that because of the bene- sponsible for the hangings. Every reffits he has received and continues to re- erence to the "Arab Martyrs," by subceive from England, and because of the scriptions for their orphans, exhibitions

1. For and Against Zionism.

if certain important conditions cannot be presented by its supporters have often Syria: Absolute independence, the manbeen stated and need not now be pre- date of Britain, the mandate of France, sented in detail. The chief elements are and the mandate of America. The only that Palestine belonged once to the considerable groups that favored division Jews, and they were driven out by force: were those who supported a separate by the Turkish people; that Turkey for 2,000 years they have been longing Palestine for Zionism under Britain, and Conference. They aim to prevent a sel- every nation, and as absolutely essential should give evidence that she is ready and praying to come back; while the a separate Lebanon, whether or not ento do justice to the Armenians, not only Jews of the world are now far too larged, under France in case the rest of the desires of the people of Turkey upon from an area where better order was kept by They intend not less surely to ground fore, that as a mandatary she would by the allotment of the territory within numerous to be collected in Palestine, Syria is under another mandatary. the Constantinopolitan State is by the the choice of mandate. But many indi- twelve British officers than can be main- such division of Turkey as is recom- gird herself to help a people fulfill its her borders recommended for the Ar- they are entitled to have somewhere a Christian Christian General Adviser, Dr. Lybyer, and puts cations tend to confirm the opinion that a few Christians of own highest possibilities. They be- menian State, but also by encouraging State which can be a refuge to the scheme, except that a few Christians the great majority of thoughtful Turkish be no settled peace until either a Greek con- justice and the good of all men. And lieved, indeed, that she had a passion the repatriation of Armenians, and by our pressed among them, and an express were willing to entrust the question to leaders sincerely desire an American quest has swept far to the interior, with in this spirit they endeavor nonestly to for the development of a national spirit seeing that all possible just reparation sion of their continuance and unity; the mandatory power. The Jews are disgreat destruction of property and life, or un-face the grave problem arising, and to in every people, not as narrow con- is made to them as they return to their despite proposals at Paris there is perse- thethy for Britain as mandatory, power, seek their solution in the light of the ceit, but as faith in a divine individu- homes; that Turkey should also give cution of the Jews in Poland at the because of the Balfour declaration, latter case the question would still remain: full discussion which precedes. That ality, to which the people must be true, evidence that she is ready to become a present moment, there is a prospect of though many think if the scheme work 1. The primary reason for the setting off the term, is sufficiently remarkable, and of a separate area at Constantinople, to be forever under a special regime controlled by the League of Nations, is that the straits

Should an area in Western Asia Minor be discussion has been so full that the if they were to be significant members modern constitutional State, and to set off as a special Greek region and placed constraint members modern constitutional State, and to set off as a special Greek region and placed constraint members modern constitutional State, and to set off as a special Greek region and placed constraint members modern constitutional State, and to set off as a special Greek region and placed constraint members modern constitutional State, and the term, is sufficiently remarkable, and discussion has been so full that the set of as a special Greek region and placed constraint members modern constitutional State, and the term, is sufficiently remarkable, and discussion has been so full that the if they were to be significant members modern constitutional State, and the term, is sufficiently remarkable, and in the term, is sufficiently remarkable, and in the term, is sufficiently remarkable, and the term, is sufficiently remarkable, and in the term, is sufficiently remarkable, and in the term, is sufficiently remarkable, and in the term, is sufficiently remarkable, and the term, is su discussion has been so full that the if they were to be significant members modern constitutional State, and to a disintegration of the Jews in West- ahead, American Jews will become to between the Black Sea and the Mediterra. Turkish journalist, who wrote: "The that she combined in claims upon Russian Armenia; that the should have an opportunity to restore As regards the Lebanon, the official nean, being a concern of many nations who Turks have been so hardly tried by the that no good natural boundary can be found reasons for a general American man- a way fairly unique, educational em- Alles should cordially welcome Amer- their ancient language and culture and Maronites and Catholics who support their ancient language and culture and language and culture an

of waste lands, scientific irrigation and Turkish | times its present number of inhabitants: if some of the present population desire good price and there is plenty of room for them in other Arab countries; the Jewish colonies have been a great benefit to the native Arabs by teaching methods of agriculture. improving sahitation and the like; the unfolding of the Zionistic plan would bring great prosperity to all in the land, both present population and immigrants. The native Arabs and Christians. Who

so unitedly oppose Zionism, urged the following principal considerations: 'The land is owned and occupied by them Arabs were there before the Jews came: the Jews were immigrants, who treated the former inhabitants with the greatest cruelty. (this alludes to the wars by the be furnished to representatives of all the Children of Israel when they "possesallied powers, if that were desired. The sed " the Land of Promise) and who inde- body of the report, therefore, though remained a comparatively short time: they were unable to maintain contro when that task was complete; for she has been written with that possibility over the whole land or even union among themselves: they were expelled At the same time there was material by the Romans and formed permanent and the promptness with which her task involving criticism of our allies that residence elsewhere 2,000 years ago: the ought not to come into a report to be Arabs conquered the land 1.300 years put into their hands, and yet that the ago, and have remained ever since: it American delegation to the peace con- is their actual home, and not merely ference and our own State Department a residence of long ago: as Christians ought to have, as involved in a com- and Moslems, they can honor all the surance which came from America's plete statement of the case. That ma- holy places, whereas the Jews can terial prepared by Dr. Lybyer has been honor only their own: the Jews are a gathered into this confidential appen- religion and not a nation; they will, if given control, forbid the use of the Arable language, the measure which caused

the break between the Young Turks and the Arabs: the Jewish colonies l have shown no benevolence to the Araba in their neighborhood: it is denied that their activities have influenced the Arabs toward progress: the Jews have much money, education and shrewdness, and will soon buy out and manocuvre away the present inhabitants: the Araba are friendly toward the Jews long resident in the land who use the Arabic language; they will resist to the utternost the immigration of foreign Jews and the establishment of a Jewish gov-

2. Arab Feeling Toward the Brench. While the commission was prepared

beforehand for some disinclination toward France in Syria, the strength, unlversality and persistency of anti-French the room, since it was the uniform rule feeling among practically all Moslems to allow no officials, nor indeed anyone and non-Catholic Christians (except & cause of her national convictions, her and perhaps an interpreter chosen by the division of the Greek Orthodox). came delegation, to be present during inter- as a distinct surprise. Friends of the French affirmed that it

> It was said several times that the working against the French, and also against the British and all foreigners. Friends of France say that the Moslems which the French gave them in 1860. and their disposition to treat the native Christians as fully equal to the Moslems. an attitude which the British do not take in Egypt and India.

.Complaints of the Syrians. Apart from the questions of process

and recency, the anti-French feeling does

seem to be deep-rooted in a large pro-

portion of the Syrian population. This

coal reasons given by the Syrians for their opposition to all French interference in their affairs. They say: i. The French are enemies of religion. the appearance of a desire of a French | Anglo-Saxon. It leads to familiarity mandate. Their propaganda, some of with that kind of French literature which is irreligious and immoral. The hrough native officials and agents, took | Moslems recognize that the time has come for the education of their women. The commission saw inspired articles and they say that those who receive iv. The French have not treated the

mission, and the ushering in of officials, inisia, but have imposed differences in manifestly unsuited to their positions, office holding and in various civil rights. freshly appointed in the room of others | This argument was presented very often v. The French have shown a marked Authentic information came to hand tendency to give an undue proportion f threats and bribes and even imprison-lof offices, concessions, and the like, to ment and banishment for the same pur-1 the Christians of Syria. Non-Catholics pose. The management of the sessions complain that the same discrimination at Tyre, Baabda, and Tripoli was so bad is shown in favor of Catholics and vi. By this discrimination, and by vaand was saved from this at other places rious intrigues since the occupation, the by the greater intelligence and French have increased the religious dinatural politeness of some French offi-lyisions is Syria, which had been reduced

danger the possibility of Syrian navii. The French are inclined to a polpolicy that the French would never leave

Handicap of French Losses. vili. The French have lost so many

men in the war that they are unable to give needful protection or adequate administration. This is illustrated by the. few soldiers and the inferior type of Syria. (Friends of the French deny that France lacks good officials, and blame the French foreign office for choosing badly those who are sent out.) Again while for the English the Eastern service is a career and draws the best of the young men for the French It seems a kind of exile, and the best prefer to remain at home. It was affirmed that bribery and intrigue are worse in the ix. The French have suffered finandevelopment, but for the profit of It is not necessary here to try to eatimate the measure of truth that lies behind these statements. It is sufficient

subsantially the whole of this, and are therefore very strongly against French Much feeling persists in connection Despite the fact that France was in-Turks before the great war, the knowledge that M. Picot, upon leaving his position as Consul in 1914, failed to secure his correspondence, so that fatal evidence fell into Turkish hands, has played

8. The Request for an American Mandate.

Four possibilities were seriously con-The arguments in favor of Zionism as templated by the supporters of a United

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esperation scheme are undoubtedly care. Not only have they many s mental ties toward France, but realize that no other power than Fr will support them in their privil Many of their followers, espec those who have personal ties with United States than France. Those

Unnted States, would rather have side the Lebanon area who are undo edly for France as a mandatory po ers comparatively few. They inc most of the Catholics of every desc tion, and a section of the Greek Or dox who would have been for a Rus mandate had Russia not collapsed. latter group prefer France to Brit but there was evidence that many them would prefer America to Fra It there were a certainty of accepta In all Syria surprising few, aside f the Druses, declared for Britain as i choice not nearly so many as France. The fact is that Britain America were classed together, wit distinct preference for America, but l were greatly preferred to France. Jews and the majority of the Gi Orthodox, and some of the Protesta were fer Britain. The great majorit; the Mosiems were for Britain as sec choice. Most of those who made Bri their first choice were for America second choice. Practically no one for America or England as first ch and France as second choice.

Mosiems All for America.

Practically all of the Moslems, number about four-fifths of the popu tion of Syria, are for America as ti first choice. It is true that there little direct expression of this in Pa tine, since after their first declarati at Jaffa the question of choice of m date was held up and referred to Dam cus. Possibly this was done under structions from the Emir Feisal, v may have been trying to hold the fl for Britain. If so, the evidence of E cere declaration for America is all stronger, since the Congress read

unanimity for America. As for the Christians, while compa tively few declared directly for Amer as first choice only a part of the Pr estants and Syrian Orothodox and Arr plans-they were bound by old ties a recent agreements to declare for Brit or France, but a large proportion in tioned America as a second choice a stated"that they would welcome h while there were abundant assuran that an American mandate would satisfactory to practically all.

The members of the commission c entertain no doubt of the genuineness the desire for the United States as me datory power, in view of the countle earnest appeals, both by individuals a groups, and of the manifest enthusia shown on many occasions, in spite of t commission's discouragement of demo strations and avoidance of every form ostentation. It was, furthermore, alwa possible to ask why a group or in vidual objected to France or Englar but not to ask why a group failed declare for the United States. It is, course, also a fact that France, and or less openly England, were making bi for the mandate, while the United Stat Was not.

Reasons for Their Attitude. The principal reasons advanced for d siring an American mandate were as it lows:

i. Confidence in President Wilson mainly responsible for the freedom Syria and as championing the rights **Emall** and oppressed peoples. ii. Gratitude to America for relief the starving and naked. Thanks to Preident Wilson and America was express in a thousand forms and with the grea est emotion, independently of the desi as regards a mandate. iii. The feeling that America can into the war for no selfish reason, ar

could be trusted to take care of a sma people in an unselfish way. iv. The knowledge that America is n a colonizing power, seeking to gover for the advantage of its own people, ar to exploit the governed. The example of Cuba and the Philippines were fr quently cited.

v. The feeling that America can relied upon to withdraw from the cour try when her work is done, which is the case with no other power. The experence of Cuba was contrasted with the of Egypt and Algeria. vi. The feeling that America is ric

and abundantly able to advance th means for the desirable speedy develor ment of the country economically. vii. A hearty approval of and desir for the extension of American education in the country. England has done little educationally for Syria. While France has done much, she seeks to denation alize the native peoples and mak Frenchmen of them. America, especial ly through the Syrian Protestant Co. lege, has taught Syrian nationalism. Th American training and the Anglo-Saxo literature and civilization are regarde as morally superior to the French. vili. A conviction that America wi be absolutely fair and just as between

would be expected to favor Christians especially Roman Catholics, and Eng land to favor Moslems. · ix. America is abundantly supplied with trained men, from whom expert can be supplied in "various branches o science, industry, administration, and above all, éducation."

the different religions and sects. Franc

x. The Americans are 'lovers of hu manity." Many British officials, not excepting General Allenby, think the best solution to be an American mandate over the whole of Syria. England might be very glad to get out of the difficulties of the situation in this way. As for France she cannot desire to take the whole o Syria, when so much of it is utterly adverse to her. She also may ultimately conclude that the best way out is complete withdrawal. This would, perhaps not hurt her pride seriously if at the same time England were to withdraw and if her special prewar relationship be scrupulously continued.

III. Special Discussions.

It is evident that the French feel resentment toward the British as not having played a fair game in the Syrian area. Without going into historical details, the Sykes-Picot agreement provided that France should have ownership or influence in a large area, including Damascus and Cilicia, and extending to Sivas and Harpoot, while say that he is not as strong as the men England should be in a similar position around him, but he gave the impression toward the former Turkish area southeast of this. At the present moment, France is threatened with the loss of monarch, who could work amicably in all her sphere, while England complac- co-ordination with a mandatory power. ently holds all that was then assigned to her, and extends her influence toward mains the head of the Syrian State, that much of the rest.

menia, and even by the sending of the rious complications might arise in the Commission on Mandates to Syria, future. seems to the French to be an accomplice of England in despoiling France. The French feel that the English took advantage of their dire necessity, by reason of which they were obliged to promises full recognition of the "rights keep practically all of their men in of minorities" in the Syrian constitution. France, to occupy more than a due On account of the evident fears of share of Syria and to seduce the affec- many Christians, based on the policy of tion of the Arabs.

English to the Emir Feisal of a large pains to inquire of many Moslem groups monthly subsidy, which they claim cov- what they propose to do to insure the ers a multitude of bribes and enables rights of the smaller sections of the the British to stand off and show clean population. The answer was sometimes hands while Arab agents do dirty work given, logically enough, that there would in their interest. They feel that in arm- be no minorities, since all would be ing the Arabs the British are again absolutely equal in the new State. But working against the French. They ordinarily the promise was made of conclaim further that the British are more stitutional guarantees. or less directly responsible for the un- There was discussion in the Damascus deniably strong anti-French feeling Congress of a proposal-to grant Moslems shown by practically all the Moslem and one-half of the seats in the future legisnon-Catholic Christian elements of lative assembly, while the other half Syria. They feel that Britain has been would be distributed among the rest of unable to resist the desire to connect the population. What method might be Egypt with Mesopotamia under one used in apportioning seats to different control as a bulwark of India, and as a new field for profitable commercial exploitation.

British Withdrawal Advocated.

It cannot be denied that some of the Brench contentions are difficult of refutation, and that the whole situation is such that British honor would seem cleaner if Britain were to withdraw wholly from Syria. Yet the aversion of the people to France, however it may have arisen, is so great and deepseated that England cannot leave Syrla to France Without seeming to abandon her friends to their enemies, a process which would probably react strongly in Egypt and elsewhere in the Moslem world. There is good reason for the position of many Englishmen, who are strongly desirous that America should rake the whole situation off their hands, including with the French and Arab entanglements the promise to Zionism.
The denial in the "Damascus Program" that the French have "rights" anywhere in Syria leads to an inquiry into the bases on which such rights These conditions are superior in form might be claimed. (France was given, from the standpoint of a modern State to and now holds, a mandate over Syria, the Turkish system of recognizing a cer-including Damascus. She held Cilicia tain measure of autonomy and self-gov-for a time, but surrendered it to the Na-ernment in various religious groups, tionalist Turks). In brief, there have thus perpetuating differences and makbeen in Syria Roman Catholic mission- ing concessions which later become priviary workers, using principally the leges and the source of friction. It French language, for several centuries. would be better to aim at one system of These have developed an extensive sys- education, wherein certain hours each

tem of churches, schools and monas- week should be set aside for religious teries. France has had commercial re- instruction under special teachers for lations and small groups of resident cit- each group than to have several State izens since the Middle Ages. French has supported school systems. But these are long been the principal Western lan- details for future adjustment. Suffice i guage used in Syria. France has taken to say that great readiness was shown a special interest in the Maronites and by the majority group to provide ade intervened on their behalf in the Lebanon in 1860.

None of these relationships, however, give the least "right" to claim territory or mandatory control. Otherwise it could be held that America, through her missionary work and business relationships, had acquired a measure of political rights in India, China, South America and Syria itself. France herself could claim all of Turkey with near-

ly the same justification. It would comprise all the missionary work in the world if the doctrine were admitted that such work established political claims. No doubt the French have acquired many personal relationships and sentimental attachments. But there is no reason why any tie that France has had with Syria in the past should be severed or even weakened under the control of another mandatory power or in an independent Syria.

3. The "Greater Lebanon." The latest policy pushed by the French in the Lebanon region contemplates complete separation of the country from Tyre to Tripoli, as far inland as the crest of the Anti-Lebanon, to be given to France in case the remainder of Syria should go to another mandatory power. Such a plan is objectionable for many

reasons: i. It is apparently contrary to the wish-of the majority of the people in the area itself. ii. The Syrians outside the area are so opposed to the plan as to be inclined to

make war rather than accept it. iii. If put into effect by overwhelming force a state of settled equilibrium could probably never be attained, because of such questions as the just control of "Hollow Syria." where the Christians by their own figures own 65 per cent. of the property, but have only 40 per cent. of the population; the water supply of Toms, which comes from territory claimed for the "Greater Lehanan"; the commercial access to the sea of the regions of Damascus and Aleppo. In short, the land is too small, and too in- the older and wiser among the Moslems, asked regularly for the independence of of a federation of Arabs with Turks or timately connected, to be capable of sat- recognized fully that some form of man- Mesopotamia, and a few of them hoped of a political union of any sort the isfactory division.

iv. The separation off of the Greater Lebanon, especially if accompanied by a separation off of Palestine, would intensify the religious differences in Syria, which it is most desirable to diminish in favor of the growth of national feeling. The tendency would be for Christian Syrians to concentrate in the Lebanon, Jews in Palestine, and Moslem Syrians in the remainder of the country. v. The Government in each area would countenance and probably conduct in-

trigue in the other regions. vi. The three areas would be implicitly hostile, and must either carry heavy burdens of armament against each other, or be protected at great expense by the it to be just. The failure of the Young affirmed that the sentiment of Syrian the commission discerned no trace of mandatory powers vii. The mandatory powers would

themselves be in danger of hostility over

the questions which would inevitably arise between the portions of a country and a people thus unnaturally severed. A plan which would add to the Greater Lebanon the remainder of O. E. T. A. West, extending from Tripoli to Alexandretta, and give the whole to France, and at the same time give the interior to Britain, would intensify all the above difficulties, and would besides cut off

access to the sea. 4. The Emir Feisal's Position.

Aleppo and Western Mesopotamia from

Unless the attempt be made to rule Syria as a conquered country, or unless the experiment of republican government be tried in the old land, the obvious plan is that the Emir Feisal should be head of the State, third son of the Shereef of Mecca, Husseln, who was recognized during the war as King of the Hedjaz, the Emir Feisal led the Arabs in co-operation with the Allies against the Turks, and entered Damascus in triumph. He spent several months in Paris, and returned a few weeks before the arrival of the commission. He had agreed with Clemenceau to labor at allaying the Arab feeling against the French, but believing after a time that the French were playing false with him, he ceased his efforts. Shortly before the arrival of the commission in Damascus he endeavored to obtain declarations in favor of a British mandate. He assured the commission that he would be pleased with either Britain or America as man-

datory power. The British Government has been advancing money to his Government for a long time, and at present allows it \$750,-000 per month (£150,000). Of this Feigal draws about \$200,000 per month for his personal expenses, staff, propaganda agents, &c. The balance is spent on the administration and the army of 7,000 and gendarmerie of 4,500, in supplement to the inadequate receipts from taxation. The estimate was made that the Prince could manage under settled conditions with a salary of \$125,000 per year, and that after a few years the country could carry itself by taxation, maintaining a very small army. This does not allow for carrying a portion of the Ottoman debt, nor for large expenditure on needed public improvements.

The present attachment of the popula-: tion to Prince Feisal varies in the different regions. Not many Christians declared themselves positively in favor of him. Some others said he is a good man, with bad advisers. Others fear him because of his membership in a powerful Moslem family. The Moslems of Palestine made almost no declarations in his favor. It was said that if he would come to Palestine, all Arabs would be enthusiastically for him. In the O. E. T. A. East, and among the Moslems of the West, he was asked for, often with enthusiasm. An exception was found in some Moslems of the North, who said they do not know him.

Emir Feisal gave the impression of being kindly, genial and wise. Whatever was the case previously, he has had during the past two years in the desert and at Damascus and Paris an excellent political education. He desires the friendly co-operation of the Moslems and Christians of Syria, and wishes to promote the education of Moslem women. Some of being able to maintain his leadership. He promises well as a constitutional It should be provided, in case he rehe renounce all rights of inheritance of America, by showing interest in Ar- the crown of the Hedjaz; otherwise se-

5. The "Rights of Minorities."

One clause in the Damascus program massacre that has been employed so They also resent the payment by the often in Turkey, the Commissioners took

> groups and sects, as the Druses, Maronites, Shiltes, Nusairlyeh, Ismailians, Turks, Jews, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, &c., was not discussed; the mere enumeration suggests the diffi-

culty of the problem. 'Mention has been made already of the agreements made by Prince Feisal with the Druses and the Greek Orthodox. He promised in return for the Greek Orthodox support that he would govern under seven conditions:

(1) He would rule in the fear of God without despotism. (2) He would establish constitutional government. (3) He would respect all religions.

(4) Equal rights should be enjoyed by (5) Public security should be guaranteed for all; the private carrying of rifles should be prevented. (6) Public instruction should be equal; Greek Orthodox schools should be on the same basis as Moslem schools. (7) No one should hold office because of family or influence, but only because fitted for the place.

quately for the protection and rights of the other groups, and it remains only to bring this purpose into action.

It is desirable to bear in mind that the Moslem and Druse minority in the Lebanon is also in need of protection and that in the event of a Jewish majority in Palestine, Moslems and Christians would need protection there. A former Governor of the Lebanon stated that a large part of his work was given to watching lest the Maronites and other Christians infringe the rights of the Moslems and Druses.

6. "Complete Independence."

One item in the Damascus program deserves special attention, as going below the problem of a mandate, namely, the request for "complete independence." The protest against the application to Syria or Article 22 of the Covenant is closely related to this. The feeling that the Syrians are in at least as advanced a condition as were the different Balkan States when their independence was arranged for was present in the first Moslems whom the commission met in Syria, and the same note was sounded everywhere by some of the delegations. The groups which were inclined to sup-

port this view in an extreme form were Bedouins, villagers of the south and 7. Syrian Nationalism, Pan-Arabism, east, and some of the younger Moslem men. The Syrian Union Party declared in this direction, and the few but prominent men and women related to the "Arab Martyrs"—the men who were executed by Jemal Pasha for intrigues very emphatic against any form of relationship to another nation; the Syrian Union Party ask that the League of Nations guarantee the independence rand the Constitution of Syria. The declaration was made that when Syrians now govern the country well. few of them are educated and the coun-dence of all Arab countries. to the majority.

son to recommend modification of this public documents bear his name.

erning State in which Moslems and Christians should be equal makes it especially desirable that the new Syriar State should in its first years be watched closely, since it has the additional difficulty to be overcome of emergence from subjection.

The fourth article of the "Damascus Program" provides for the possibility of a mandate, defining it "as equivalent to the rendering of economical and technical assistance that does not prejudice our complete independence." Here also the restriction may be too great The mandatory power should have a real control over the Administration so as to eliminate as far as possible corruption, waste, inertia, serious er-

rors of judgment, &c. In spite of all that was said in favor of complete independence, it is altogether probable that either America of Britain would be allowed without resistance as much control as the Council of the League of Nations judges to be wise. In fact, assurance was given on very high authority that the demand for under one independent Government the complete independence is to an extent Arab-speaking portions of the former artificial, being in part motivated by Turkish Empire. This would not necesthe fear of a French mandate, and in sarily be a theoretic Moslem State, part by apprehension of the conversion though the large majority would of mandatory control into permanent belong to the different Moslem sects. possession. If adequate assurances be is hard to see how much a federated had against both these possibilities, the State, with its territory largely desert objectors to/a mandate, limited so as and lacking a centre and speedy comto secure its exercise in the interests of Syria, will be reduced to a small and impotent group. In time, when all things are ready, a true and lasting "complete independence" can be awarded by the League of Nations.

and Pan-Islamism.

. The programs presented to the commission by all the Moslems and about two-thirds of the Christians of Syria against the Turkish Government-were were nationalistic; that is to say, they called for a United Syria under a democratic constitution, making no distinctions on the basis of religion. In response to repeated questions in many in the Turkish Parliament did indeed places, it was steadily affirmed by the suggest that an Ottoman prince might abroad return, there will be a suffi- Moslems that they had no desire what- be chosen as king of Syria, but this was ciency of educated and trained men to ever for Moslem privilege in the govern- an individual opinion. On the other ment, nor for political union with the hand, there were many expressions of On the other hand, a large proportion Arabs of the Hejaz, whom they felt to joy and thankfulness because of the end of the learned men and of others from be in another state of civilization. They of Turkish rule. If there is any thought datory control is necessary, since the for some form of political union with commission saw no trace of it. Still less Syrians have long been in subjection, that area. A few asked for the indepen- was there any sign of movement toward try is poor and backward in its develop- The commissioners often asked the idea. The Turks had some thought of ment. The Christians, and most other question of Moslems, whether they con- this early in the war, but it disappeared non-Moslem groups, are unanimous in sidered the Caliphate to be at Stamboul in favor of a Pan-Turanian idea on a the belief that a strong mandate is nec- or at Mecca. With very few exceptions racial or linguistic rather than a religessary for a considerable time, because they replied that it belongs now to King lous basis, from the time when Jemal they do not feel confidence in an Arab Hussein in Mecca: One or two said Pasha hanged the leaders of the Syrian Government, which in a country four- that it belongs still to the Turkish Sul- Arabs. fifths Moslem might be too favorable tan, and cannot be changed except by an | One may conjure up the picture of an

Pan-Islamic scheme, and would quickly plate the opposite possibility. abandon Syrian nationalism if they saw a chance for the success of either of these ideas. It would seem safe to assume that those who speak for themselves strike nearer the truth than others who assume to speak for them. Nevertheless, it is worth while to give consideration to the criticism.

The Turkish National Pact.

Pan-Arabism [this is the portentous, program set forth in the Turkish Nationalist Pact. It would apparently eliminate both France and Great Britain from the confines of the former Ottoman Empire] in a narrower sense would unite munications, could be more of a danger to the world than the Turkey of which it forme a part. In a larger sense Pan-Arabism would

wish to add also the Arab-speaking belt across North Africa. Since this is held by three great powers, each of whom has a larger population and infinitely greater resources than the Pan-Arab area contains, its accomplishment against their will is a mere dream. Pan-Islamism in a narrow sense would re-establish one Government in the former Turkish Empire by agreement of the two Moslem groups of north and south—the Turks and the Arabs. The commission found no sign of a desire for the re-establishment of the rule of Turkey over the Arabs. One former deputy the realization of a larger Pan-Islamic

agreement of all the Moslems in the attempt at restoring the Saracen Em-The nations in forming the league world. All affirmed that King Hussein pire, by the stages of Syrian, Arabian have pronounced in the Covenant that is in no sense their political head, but and Mesopotamian independence, follow-Syria should be under mandatory con- only their religious head. Prayers are ed by federal union in a strong conquertrol. The commission did not find rea- said in his name, and certain seals for ing state, which would then become imperialistic in the directions of Persia, decision but abundant cause for holding Certain Christians, on the other hand, Armenia, Turkey and North Africa; but Turkish attempt to conduct a self-gov- Nationalism is new and feeble, and that such a notion, nor is it practically con-

he expressions of it made before the ceivable under present world conditions. ommission gave a false impression. If the European civilization has suf-They claimed that the Christians who ficient wisdom to avoid further extensive adhere to this view do so as making a self-destruction, it can with the greatest desperate effort to live on good terms ease control the Moslem world; it is not with the Moslem majority, and that the necessary for those who labor to estab-Moslems much prefer a pan-Arabic or lish the League of Nations to contem-

The fundamental question in this con-

nection, and, indeed, in several other

Western Attitude to Moslems.

great immediate problems, is the basal attitude of the Christians toward the Moslem world: Shall this be friendly or hostile? In the war now ending Christian Governments gave their Mosiem allies promises of fair treatment and full rights. Now the Moslems of Syria offer their hands to their non-Moslem fellow-citizens with the promise of putting religious separation out of sight. Shall they be taken at their word? Or shall they be told: We do not believe what you say; we do not trust you; we think it best to break our word with you, so that you may not have the opportunity to break your word with us? The western world is already committed to the attempt to live in peace and friendship with the Moslem peoples, and to manage governments in such a way as to separate politics from religion. Syria offers an excellent opportunity to establish a state where members of the three great monotheistic religions can live together in harmony; because it is a country of one language, which has long had freedom of movement and of business relations through being unified under the Turkish rule. Since now the majority declare for nationalism, independent of religion, it is necessary only to hold them to this view through mandatory control until they shall have established the method and practice of it. Dangers may readily arise from unwise and unfaithful dealings with this people, but there is great hope of peace and progress if they be handled frankly and loyally,