The Clinton Administration has sensibly revised America's nuclear warfare guidelines to catch up with the diplomatic and military changes since the end of the cold war. The new doctrine, approved by President Clinton last month, marks an important step toward a world in which the United States relies on fewer nuclear weapons for its defense.
Outlining circumstances in which Washington might use nuclear weapons may seem a surreal exercise. The idea of waging a nuclear war appears inconceivable and winning one meaningless, given the scale of destruction on all sides. But these plans are important because America continues to rely on its formidable nuclear arsenal to deter potential nuclear, biological and chemical attack.
The new guidelines replace plans drafted by the Reagan Administration, which envisioned protracted nuclear exchanges with the Soviet Union using all of the more than 10,000 deliverable nuclear warheads America then possessed. The updated version anticipates a more than adequate deterrent force of some 2,500 warheads. The guidelines have also been changed in response to China's increased military power and the germ warfare and nerve gas programs of countries like Iraq.
Two major arms reduction agreements with Moscow have already cut American and Russian warheads to around 6,000 each. Informal discussions have begun on a third treaty that could bring both sides down to 2,000 warheads or lower. Once the United States and Russia reach that level, arms reduction talks will have to include the other nuclear powers, Britain, China and France, as well.
Meanwhile, threats like biological and chemical weapons are becoming more menacing. Washington's new guidelines allow, but do not require, America to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks with germ warheads or poison gas. President Bush's implicit threat of such a response may have helped persuade Saddam Hussein not to use his terror weapons during the Persian Gulf war.
That example is reason enough for America not to rule out nuclear responses to biological or chemical attacks. But Presidents must be extremely cautious about actually using nuclear weapons, even where the guidelines permit it. As American Presidents have understood since Harry Truman declined to use nuclear bombs in Korea, legitimizing the use of these weapons in battle would weaken the taboo that restrains other nuclear powers from using theirs, doing far more to imperil America's global security than to advance it.
Washington's nuclear warfare guidelines are always more bellicose than actual American policies because they represent a list of nuclear options available to the President. As the Cuban missile crisis tapes from the Kennedy White House show, Presidents have understood that the use of nuclear weapons must be the option of last resort, and even then, one that is all but unthinkable. President Clinton now has an improved nuclear planning document that takes account of arms cuts already agreed to and leaves room for further reductions.
Copyright 1997 The New York Times Company