U.S. Balks on Plan to Take Plutonium Out of Warheads

By MATTHEW L. WALD



WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 — A program conceived by the Clinton
administration to rid the world of 100 tons of American and Russian
weapons-grade plutonium is likely to be abandoned by the Bush
administration, according to people who have been briefed about the
project.

 Under the plan, which was first proposed in the mid-90's, 50 tons
of American plutonium and 50 tons of Russian plutonium would be
taken out of nuclear weapons and either converted into fuel for
nuclear reactors or rendered useless for weapons by mixing it with
with highly radioactive nuclear waste, a process known as
immobilization.

 When the plan was drafted, Clinton administration officials said
the program would reduce the risk that the plutonium would fall
into the wrong hands, where it could easily be turned into weapons.

 By reducing the availability of weapons-grade plutonium, the
project had the added benefit of bolstering treaties between the
United States and Russia to cut the number of nuclear warheads
deployed by each side, by making it harder to turn plutonium from
decommissioned weapons back into warheads.

 Bush administration officials deny that the program is dead, but
acknowledge that it has difficulties, primarily financial ones.

 "The issue is under review," said an administration official who
would speak only if not identified. "We've made no secret of that.
But no decisions have been made."

 But the official continued, "It's no secret that there are a lot
of equities to balance here."

 One major equity, he said, is money. Early this year the Energy
Department predicted a cost of $6.6 billion, about triple the
initial estimates, to convert the American stocks to fuel for
civilian nuclear reactors. It put Russia's cost at $1.76 billion,
which is money Russia does not have.

 The expectation under the Clinton administration was that the
United States and other rich countries would help pay, but no
concrete pledges were ever made.

 In 1999 the Clinton administration did agree to pay a consortium
of power companies $130 million to use plutonium that the
government would convert into fuel. But the conversion factories
are not yet built, and the conversion itself was contingent on an
agreement with the Russians to take similar steps to dispose of
plutonium from their weapons.

 Despite the program's expected benefits, the Bush administration's
proposed Energy Department budget this spring did not include the
money needed to mix some of the plutonium with nuclear waste.

 The second path — converting it to fuel for American nuclear
reactors, the strategy the Clinton administration hoped would
induce the Russians to do the same — also appears likely to be
dropped soon.

 "There is no enthusiasm for it whatsoever," said a Congressional
aide who was briefed by officials of the National Security Council,
referring both to the current strategy of immobilization and to
conversion to reactor fuel.

 The issue of what to do with plutonium from decommissioned nuclear
weapons has haunted policy makers for years.

 One particular fear is that the material from Russian weapons
would be bought or stolen by terrorists or a "rogue" government who
could construct a nuclear bomb. In recent years, the security of
bomb materials in Russia has been improved markedly by joint
Russian-American efforts, administration experts say.

 Bush administration officials insist that they share the goal of
disposing of American and Russian plutonium.

 "There's no philosphical shift that says suddenly we're perfectly
fine with surplus plutonium laying around — we're not," said an
administration official familiar with the Clinton-era program. But,
he added, conversion to fuel for existing reactors or mixing with
waste are "not the only options for disposing of it safely."

 As an alternative, the Bush administration appears to be
considering a variety of untested technical options, including a
new generation of nuclear reactors that could burn plutonium more
thoroughly.

 "They're trying to improve on it by giving up on getting started
any time soon," said Matthew G. Bunn, a nuclear expert at the
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, who was an adviser to the
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Clinton
administration.
 He and other experts are skeptical that a new generation of
reactors, which was also mentioned in President Bush's energy plan
as a way to dispose of nuclear waste, would ever be built.
Construction on the last nuclear plants built in the United States
country was begun more than 25 years ago.

 "We're back at Square 1 with the program, and they're looking at
imaginary options, like advanced reactors," said Tom Clements,
executive director the Nuclear Control Institute, a nonprofit group
that opposes the use of plutonium for reactor fuel. "For financial
reasons, it's not going to be viable."

 Though the administration is considering dropping the program to
convert or immobilize weapons- grade plutonium, a separate
Russian-American program to reduce the inventory of another Russian
bomb fuel, highly enriched uranium, is continuing. In fact, uranium
that was intended for Russian bombs now meets more than half the
needs of American power reactors.

 But diluting uranium to the type used in power plants is
technically far simpler and cheaper than the process required for
plutonium, which must be converted from the metal form used in
weapons to a plutonium-uranium ceramic used in American power
plants.

 In fact, enriched uranium has economic value as reactor fuel,
while converting plutonium appears to be a money-losing
proposition.

Even so, Russian officials have said repeatedly that they view
plutonium as an asset and would like to build new breeder reactors,
so named because they produce plutonium faster than they consume
the other main reactor fuel, uranium.

 The end of the plutonium program would be mixed news for groups
concerned with proliferation.

 For example, the Nuclear Control Institute has pushed vigorously
for immobilization and against converting plutonium to reactor
fuel, which is known as mixed oxide, or MOx.

 Officials of the institute say conversion to MOx is very expensive
and would encourage international commerce in weapons material.

 "We think their assessment of MOx is correct," said Mr. Clements,
referring to the administration. "The problem is, it appears
they've also rejected the cheaper alternative, which is
immobilization."


Copyright 2001 The New York Times Company