POWER SHARING AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN ETHNIC
CONFLICTS
June 1996
Timothy D. Sisk
Program Officer
United States Institute of Peace
Copublished by the United States Institute of Peace and
the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
Table of Contents
Foreword
Executive Summary
Ethnic Conflict:
Approaches, Patterns, and Dynamics
Democracy and
its Alternatives in Deeply Divided Societies
A Typology of
Conflict-Regulating Practices
Power Sharing
and Peace Processes
International
Intervention and Power Sharing
Policymaking
and Power Sharing
Foreword
The horrors of ethnic violence defy the imagination: Mass murder, rape,
and wanton destruction of places of worship and
universities carried out in some cases by people who had lived together
peacefully. The world watches, seemingly helpless
before the overwhelming force of hatred, and asks the inevitable question:
"Couldn't someone have done something to prevent
this?"
People who have devoted their lives to the study of ethnic conflict
have sought answers to three components of this large
question: What political conditions drive people to violence? What
conditions allow people to settle their differences
peacefully? What is the role of the international community when relations
between groups become violent? Scholars have
developed theories of ethnic conflict and of political institutions
that can manage conflict and prevent the turn to violence. They
have extracted principles from a comprehensive study of past conflicts
and moments where conflicts have been avoided, and
they have presented their results to policymakers, hoping that the
principles will guide foreign policy.
Yet, scholars notice that policymakers are often bored by these theoretical
discussions. It is as if the scholar and policymaker
are from two different cultures that thrive on different types of information.
The scholar looks backward to find lessons; the
policymaker looks ahead and often must improvise. The scholar can wait
until all the facts are in; the policymaker cannot. The
time horizon of the scholar may be years; the horizon of the policymaker,
weeks, days, or hours. Scholars complain that
policymakers' decisions are ad hoc and without a strategy informed
by scholarship. Policymakers say that they often have no
choice.
In Timothy Sisk's path-breaking study, copublished by the United States
Institute of Peace and the Carnegie Commission on
Preventing Deadly Conflict, scholarship bridges the gap to policymaking.
This is the first study to apply theories of democracy
in multiethnic societies to international mediation aimed at preventing
or stopping ethnic violence.
As Sisk's work notes, in deeply divided societies, where fear and ignorance
are often driving forces of ethnic conflict, people
tend to identify themselves by their ethnic group, the defining characteristic
of the society. Such societies can ignite in violence
especially when there is inequality among ethnic groups and discrimination
against one or more groups, and when
discrimination is reinforced by public policy.
To avoid violence political institutions must allow ethnic groups to
participate in the political process and they must protect
human rights. Rather than feeling fearful, ethnic groups will feel
valued in such a society.
The power-sharing arrangements laid out in this book can help lead divided
societies toward a stable democracy and away
from violence. Power sharing , appropriately structured, can encourage
moderation and discourage extremism. It can be based
on politicians' self-interest: They will do whatever is needed to get
elected.
Power sharing can begin a profound movement of the society away from
ethnicity as the strongest identifier. Coalitions may
form along ethnic lines at the outset, but ideology or class may become
more important. People feel strongly about ideology
and class but they are less likely to defend themselves to the death
than ethnic extremists. Power sharing has been successful in
some societies but ineffective in others. It was essential in the peaceful
change of government in South Africa. Without an
agreement on transitional power sharing, the conflict over apartheid
may not have been brought to an end, or a new round of
killing may have occurred. Yet a power-sharing pact in Rwanda did not
prevent genocide.
For this reason the book focuses on
the conditions under which the international community should promote
power-sharing efforts to prevent deadly conflict.
The lessons of this work are for the leaders of deeply divided societies
and for the international community attempting to
prevent conflict. All too often international mediation deals with
the process of political change: Is it peaceful or violent?
Mediators want to stop the violence by any means possible. The international
community must be more involved in shaping the
institutions that will ensure an enduring peace -- the outcomes of
political change. It needs to be involved early and address
what may be the most important question: Is power sharing necessary,
and possible, in this society or is separation a better
course? Prescriptions are not possible because every situation is different.
The value of this book is in the range of options
presented to policymakers.
A number of Institute of Peace activities and initiatives address peacemaking
in multiethnic societies. In addition to myriad grant
and fellowship projects on specific conflicts, many in-house activities
in recent years have focused on ethnic conflict
amelioration, with special emphasis on the former Yugoslavia, Africa,
the former Soviet Union, and South Asia. For example,
one of the institute's earliest grants in the late 1980s supported
the volume edited by Joe Montville, Conflict and
Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, upon which the Sisk book builds.
The institute has also focused on the tools of
conflict prevention, work which yielded the recently published Institute
Press book, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A
Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, by Michael Lund. A wide array of
past and present institute programs on religion and
conflict, the rule of law and transitional justice, negotiation and
mediation, elections and conflict resolution, and managing
today's "complex emergencies" through peacekeeping and diplomacy also
relate to the power-sharing theme.
The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict is deeply concerned
with the democratic processes that Sisk
describes. In identifying preventive measures the Commission distinguishes
between long-term structural tasks and immediate
operational tasks to defuse a crisis. Structural prevention includes
strategies to build intercommunal confidence, overcome
deeply held mistrust, and restructure institutions that discriminate
against certain ethnic groups. Democratization, which
performs all these tasks, is a crucial element of structural prevention.
Thus, the Commission sponsors research -- such as this
work -- and international forums to highlight the role that democratic
institutions and power-sharing arrangements must play in
the post Cold War world. A study by Larry Diamond, a leading scholar
of democratization, led to a recent Commission
report, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues
and Imperatives. A forum in Moscow
addressed power sharing among institutions, minority groups, and the
states of the former Soviet Union. The established
democracies, with so much relevant experience, can play essential catalyzing
and sustaining roles to help countries negotiate the
complicated and slow process of democratization. The Commission is
attempting to distill lessons from the recent record of the
international community in conflict prevention.
There will be ethnic conflicts in the future, conflicts that could easily
become very violent. The critical question is whether such
conflicts can be managed without resort to violence, and, ideally,
through the structures of participatory democracy. An alert,
active international community -- with the close collaboration of scholars
and policymakers -- can help parties forestall a turn
to violence by encouraging the adoption of an appropriately structured
power-sharing agreement based on democratic
principles.
We hope that this book, a road map to scholarship and analysis of the
international role in promoting ethnic amity, will serve
the policy and academic communities well as they grapple with today's
-- and tomorrow's -- conflicts.
David A. Hamburg, Cochair
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
Richard H. Solomon, President
United States Institute of Peace
Executive Summary
Despite the proliferation of new nations after the Cold War, most ethnic
groups fighting for self-determination in a sovereign
state will not realize their dream. For a variety of reasons, the dissolution
of multiethnic states into ethnically homogeneous
countries is fraught with problems. The bloody civil wars throughout
history testify to the difficulties inherent in the struggle to
partition states.
Ideally, claims for self-determination should be accommodated in a democratic
framework within existing states. Such
accommodation is considered a fundamental human right. In fact, many
ethnic conflicts do not begin as a quest for territorial
sovereignty, but unless grievances are addressed early, they often
result in a movement to secede. Power sharing -- practices
and institutions that result in broad-based governing coalitions inclusive
of all major ethnic groups -- can preserve multiethnic
states by allowing groups some measure of self-determination.
Although power sharing normally evolves out of internal processes, the
international community has often promoted power
sharing in response to ethnic conflicts, with some successes and some
failures. Rarely, however, is the international community
informed by the leading contemporary scholarship on power sharing.
This book presents the scholarly and practitioner debate over power sharing in the context of ethnic conflict. It discusses:
The roots of ethnic conflict
Approaches to introducing democracy into deeply
divided societies
Types of conflict-regulating practices
The contribution of power sharing to peace
processes
The role of the international community in
power sharing
In conclusion, it draws some lessons for policymakers about the conditions
that contribute to the success of power sharing.
This summary highlights some key points.
ETHNIC CONFLICT: APPROACHES, PATTERNS, AND DYNAMICS
Ethnic conflict is either primordial and innate
or instrumental and (at least partially) socially constructed. The extent
to
which analysts perceive ethnicity as immutable
and innate versus socially constructed or manipulated by political leaders
influences beliefs about the types of institutions
and practices that can best ameliorate ethnic conflict. A critical factor
is
whether ethnic groups are threatened by each
other simply because they are different or whether there are perceived
pragmatic reasons for the conflict.
Perceptions of pragmatic differences are amenable to peaceful management.
The severity of ethnic conflicts depends in
large part on the nature of the relationships, for example, whether identity
or
socioeconomic differences overlap. An important
predictor of the severity of the conflict is the role of the state: Does
it
stand above conflicts and mediate them, or
does a group "own" the state and use its powers to the detriment of other
groups.
A common thread that runs through all violent
ethnic conflicts is the manipulative role of ethnic group leaders who foster
discrimination and mobilize group members
against their foes. Ethnic outbidding refers to extremist ethnic group
leaders
who decry moderation with enemies as a sellout
of group interests.
Ethnic conflicts can escalate, that is, intensify
or spread, or they can de-escalate. The post-Cold War world contains
examples of both. Escalation occurs when background
conditions of ethnic strife are combined with "conflict triggers" or
precipitating events. A useful way to conceptualize
moves toward more peaceful ethnic conflict management is through a
phases or stages approach to de-escalation,
in which conflicts that reach a stalemate are managed through protracted
negotiations.
DEMOCRACY AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES
Ethnic conflicts have more often than not been
managed with nondemocratic, authoritarian practices such as subjugation
and control. However, informal practices of
ethnic balancing have at times kept a relative peace even in societies
that
are not democratic. Democracy is inherently
difficult in divided societies, but democratic practices offer greater
promise
for long-term peaceful conflict management
than nondemocratic ones. Even when democracy is unlikely to be
introduced quickly in a society, practices
can be put into place that help manage ethnic tensions.
Simple majoritarian democracy contains special
problems for ethnically divided societies. Minority ethnic groups expect
to be permanently excluded from power through
the ballot box and fear electoral contests conducted under the principle
of simple majority rule. Power-sharing practices
offer an alternative to simple majoritarian forms of democratic
governance.
There are two broad approaches to constructing
democracy in divided societies: the "consociational" or group
building-block approach that relies on accommodation
by ethnic group leaders at the center and a high degree of group
autonomy; and the "integrative" approach,
which seeks to create incentive structures for moderation by political
leaders
on divisive ethnic themes and to enhance minority
influence in majority decision making. Consociational approaches rely
on elite accommodation and guarantees to groups
to protect their interests, such as a mutual or minority veto, whereas
the integrative approach relies on incentives
for intergroup cooperation, such as electoral systems that encourage the
formation of preelection pacts among candidates
or political parties across ethnic lines. This paper argues that both
approaches can lead to "power sharing" while
acknowledging that there is some debate over the question of whether the
term applies to integrative practices as well.
A TYPOLOGY OF CONFLICT-REGULATING PRACTICES
The consociational and integrative approaches
can be fruitfully viewed as conceptual poles in a spectrum of specific
conflict-regulating institutions and practices
that promote power sharing. Which approach and which practices are best
is highly contingent upon the patterns and
dynamics of a particular conflict. Indeed, a given political system may
fruitfully
incorporate aspects of both approaches simultaneously.
It is useful to consider the practices in terms of three sets of
variables that apply to both approaches: territorial
division of power, decision rules, and public policies (for example, on
language, education, and resource distribution)
that define relations between the state and ethnic groups (see Table 1).
Five consociational conflict-regulating practices are
1.Granting territorial autonomy and creating confederal
arrangements
2.Creating a polycommunal, or ethnic, federation
3.Adopting group proportional representation in administration
appointments, including consensus decision rules in the
executive
4.Adopting a highly proportional electoral system in a
parliamentary framework
5.Acknowledging group rights or corporate (nonterritorial)
federalism
Five integrative conflict-regulating practices are
1.Creating a mixed, or nonethnic, federal structure
2.Establishing an inclusive, centralized unitary state
3.Adopting majoritarian but ethnically neutral, or nonethnic,
executive, legislative, and administrative decision-making
bodies
4.Adopting a semimajoritarian or semiproportional electoral
system that encourages the formation of preelection coalitions
(vote pooling) across ethnic divides
5.Devising ethnicity-blind public policies
POWER SHARING AND PEACE PROCESSES
Power-sharing practices, when they are adopted
by parties in conflicts, often evolve as a direct response to a history
of
violent conflict. Pragmatic attitudes toward
other groups can emerge from the belief that the failure to accommodate
will
precipitate wider strife. Political leaders
and publics must be motivated to avoid worsening or more violent conflict
if
power sharing is to be successfully adopted.
Unfortunately, such motivation does not always exist: high levels of violence
do not inevitably mean that political leaders
will be more moderate and adopt power sharing.
Transitional moments, changes in international
relations and in relations among groups within states, are moments of
promise and peril. Ethnic relations can improve
or worsen. Power sharing can evolve from transitions or peace
processes in which parties adopt agreements
or mutual security pacts that seek to limit the ability of groups to harm
each other. The degree of unity and organizational
coherence of the parties, and the ability of political leaders to
persuade their constituents to act peacefully,
are the most important variables in creating improved relations among
ethnic groups. Conciliatory attitudes must
be both broad (including "hard-liners") and deep (including key segments
of
the public as well as leaders).
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION AND POWER SHARING
International intervention in ethnic conflicts
focuses both on the process by which groups rearrange their relations,
through violence or dialogue, and on the terms
and structures of the outcomes that are reached. Despite the inherent
problems of partition, the international community
should not assume that the borders of an existing state are sacrosanct.
The principal decision that the international
community must face is whether separation or power sharing (living together)
is the most achievable, sustainable, and just
outcome. This is especially true when the parties themselves cannot reach
an
agreement on this fundamental question.
The international community often places too
much emphasis on democratic elections without considering their potential
perverse impact in situations of severe ethnic
conflict, especially if such elections are held with simple majority-rule
electoral systems and without prior mutual
security pacts. Elections are critical moments in peace processes; they
are
turning points in which relations can polarize
or in which new national unity can be forged through the creation of a
legitimate government. Much depends on both
the electoral system chosen and the actual administration and monitoring
of the election event. Elections provide important
opportunities for intervention to help ameliorate ethnic conflicts
because they are especially amenable to monitoring
and an ongoing international presence.
Both historically and more recently the international
community has promoted power sharing by offering formulas --
institutional blueprints for postconflict
political structures -- and has often sought to induce disputants to accept
them
through a combination of diplomatic carrots
and sticks. Increasingly, the international community is using linkages
to
other issues, such as membership in collective
security, trade, and other international organizations, to induce states
to
adopt practices that promote ethnic accommodation.
Promoting conflict-regulating practices in this manner can be a
useful tool of preventive diplomacy to arrest
the escalation of ethnic conflicts into violence.
The paradox of promoting power sharing early
in the escalation of an ethnic conflict is that parties may be unwilling
to
embrace power-sharing practices because they
are not sufficiently desperate or feel insufficiently compelled. At a late
stage of conflict, after significant violence,
enmities may be too deep for parties to share power for mutual benefit.
Determining when a conflict is "ripe" for
a power-sharing solution is a difficult judgment requiring intimate knowledge
of
a situation, especially the willingness of
parties to live together within a common or shared political framework.
Thus, a second paradox is the problem of judging
intentions. Tactical adoption of power sharing can set the stage for
new grievances and new strife. Moreover, the
international community is often asked to secure successful
implementation of agreements or to guarantee
them, which in essence ties the international community to the substance
of a settlement.
The promotion of power sharing by the international
community in situations of deep ethnic conflict is riddled with
normative considerations, such as potentially
rewarding aggression or appeasement of extremists. It also entails
considerable risks, such as inducing parties
to share power when their underlying perceptions are still deeply suspicious
and based on mutual harm.
When an international mediator goes beyond
facilitating a negotiation process and backs a power-sharing solution at
either an early or late stage of escalation,
this policy involves choosing sides. This is true of choosing among parties
to a
conflict (often in favor of minorities who
seek to limit the power of majorities) as well as bolstering more moderate
factions within a given party or government
against more hard-line elements.
POLICYMAKING AND POWER SHARING
Power sharing involves a wide range of practices
and not a simple model or formula that can be universally applied.
Thus, in a given conflict there is no substitute
for intimate scholarly and policymaker knowledge to reach conclusions
about whether any given power-sharing practice
will likely have an ameliorative or potentially adverse effect on ethnic
conflict. For example, in some situations
consociational power sharing may be an appropriate interim measure but
should not become a permanent feature of political
life. Likewise, parties in an ethnic conflict may be too insecure to
accept the incentive mechanisms of the integrative
approach, preferring the more firm guarantees of consociationalism.
In many countries democracy may be a long
way off, but the international community can exert pressure on
nondemocratic states to adopt conflict-regulating
practices such as fair treatment of ethnic minorities and integrative
security forces.
Conditional generalizations can be made that
can serve to inform policy. Power-sharing arrangements are successful in
managing ethnic conflict when
They are embraced
by a core group of moderate political leaders who are genuinely representative
of the groups
that they purport
to lead
The practices
are flexible and allow for equitable distribution of resources
They are indigenously
arrived at, not agreed upon as the result of excessive external pressures
or short-term,
zero-sum expectations
of the parties
Parties can
generally eschew the extraordinary measures that some power-sharing practices
entail and allow a
more integrative
and liberal form of democracy to evolve
TABLE 1: CONFLICT-REGULATING PRACTICES
CONSOCIATIONAL APPROACH
INTEGRATIVE APPROACH
Territorial
Divisions of
Power
Granting autonomy and creating confederal arrangements
Creating a polycommunal federation
Creating a mixed, or nonethnic, federal
structure
Establishing an inclusive, centralized, unitary
state
Decision-Making
Rules
Adopting proportional representation and consensus
rules in executive, legislative, and administrative decision
making
Adopting a highly proportional electoral system
Adopting majoritarian but ethnically neutral
executive, legislative, and administrative
decision making
Adopting a semimajoritarian or
semiproportional electoral system
State-Ethnic
Relations
Acknowledging group rights or corporate federalism
Adopting ethnicity-blind public policies
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