Matt Tomback
Political Science 498
Professor Raymond Tanter
April 21, 1998
Syria & Israel: A Move Towards Peace
The peace process in the Middle East between Israel and the Arab states has been slow and difficult. The Middle East has been characterized by relatively continuous conflict interrupted by breakthroughs of peace negotiations and foreign intervention. Recently, the importance of peace has regained importance as regional actors have begun to realize the danger of future wars and the impact of conflict on the political and economic structures of each state. After the initial agreements were made between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, peace with Lebanon has assumed prominence in achieving a greater sense of peace and security in the Middle East.
Peace between Lebanon and Israel has been reached, but only through the involvement of Syria as well. Israel has agreed to negotiate with Syria to withdraw all of its forces from the Golan Heights and return the land it gained in the 1967 War - and annexed as part of Israel in under the Golan Heights Law of 1981. Prospect theory can explain the actions of both Israel and Syria in satisfying all of the requirements of the peace agreement, including the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. One must also study the deep history and special relationship between Syria and Lebanon in order to understand Syria’s role in this historic agreement. In this paper, I will attempt to prove why "the key [to peace] is in Syria’s hands, and not in Lebanon." [1]
Syria and Lebanon: A History of Cooperation
The early years of the Republic of Lebanon
The relationship between the modern states of Lebanon and Syria dates to the creation of both states by the French Mandate in 1920. Syria and Mount Lebanon had been a part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries until the end of the World War I, and the fall of the Turkish regime, gave the Allied powers control over the Middle Eastern countries. France’s first action was the expansion of the state of Lebanon in 1920 into Grand Liban, or "greater Lebanon," essentially carving a new nation out of what was once Syrian land. The French controlled Lebanon until 1941, when the Vichy government granted Lebanon its independence.
Lebanon formulated its own constitution and set up its government to give power to the main religious sects in the country – the president would be Maronite Christian and the prime minister would be Sunni Muslim. The National Covenant, as this agreement was termed, sought to resolve the years of conflict between the two groups since the creation of Lebanon. The Maronites pushed for an independent Lebanon, while the Sunni Muslims wanted Lebanon to be re-incorporated with Syria and become a part of the greater Arab states.
Lebanon remained relatively quiet in the Middle East for many years. Its economy was worse-off than its neighbors and did not involve itself in much of the early conflicts with Israel. The Christian and Muslim sects were at odds over the importance of allying with other Arab states against Israel. Lebanon was not militarily involved in the 1967 War and was pulled into the Yom Kippur War of 1973 because of the tremendous numbers of Palestinians living in Southern Lebanon and the increasing presence and power of the PLO. It was then embroiled in its own civil war in 1975-1976, which was followed by almost fifteen years of fighting by Lebanese groups. During these years Syria increased its presence in Lebanon by influencing the country politically, militarily, and economically.
The stage for Syrian and Lebanese cooperation was set. Syria had great interest in Lebanon and a large number of Lebanese citizens looked to Syria as a partner and leader.
The development of Syria
Syria, like Lebanon, was very unstable politically and economically in the early part of this century. There were more than a dozen coups in Syria in the decades following its independence from France in 1946. Because of its proximity to Israel, Syria has also been involved in border skirmishes and attacks from Israeli troops. In the 1967 war Israel took the Golan Heights to protect itself from Syrian attacks and has had it since. Israel even annexed the territory in 1981, further embroiling the conflict between Syria and Israel. One of the main requirements for peace with Israel has always been the return of the Golan to Syria. There will be no peace without it.
Under the leadership of Hafez al-Assad Syria has remained relatively stable, both politically and economically. Assad took power in November 1970 as part of a political coup. He centralized the power of the country and brought Syria out of its isolation. Assad joined Egypt in the 1973 War with Israel and began establishing relations with other foreign powers, both in the Arab world and even some Western powers. Assad also garnered the support of the Soviet Union, which supplied Syria with arms to keep up militarily with the well-financed and superior Israeli army. He supported the U.S.-led coalition in the Gulf War against Iraq in 1990, further enforcing the position of Syria as a leader in the Middle East. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Syria’s position in the Middle East has weakened somewhat but other suppliers of aid have recently bolstered Syria’s military to the extent that it is competitive, both in size and advancement, with the Israeli military.
Assad has been the leader of Syria for almost thirty years. Elections are held every seven years, but he has been the only candidate in each of the four elections since his ascent to power. He has greatly strengthened the Syrian economy, drawing foreign investment and support to his country and utilizing the limited resources (the oil reserves are not as great in Syria as in some of its Arab neighbors) that are available.
Assad is a very important part of any prospect of peace with Israel because he has almost absolute authority over the government. "Key decisions regarding foreign policy, national security, international politics, and the economy are made by President Assad with counsel from his ministers, high ranking members of the ruling Ba’ath party, and a relatively small circle of security advisors."[2] Indeed, Assad will be an important part of any negotiations with Israel and Lebanon.
Lebanese and Syrian Cooperation since 1975
"[Lebanon] maintains preferred relations with Syria based on the roots of close affinity, history and common interests."[3]
- Text of Ta’if Accords, signed October 22,1989
Syria and Lebanon have historically had very close ties. After the eruption of the Civil War in Lebanon, Assad and Syria become heavily involved in the politics and economy of Lebanon.
Civil War in Lebanon broke out in 1975, as the PLO and the Lebanese Left sought to take over the government from the more moderate Christian Maronites in power. Assad did not interfere in the war at first, but when the insurgents were getting closer to defeating the government he sent Syrian troops in to end the war and put down the PLO and save the Maronite government. As part of the arrangement to keep peace in Lebanon, Syrian troops remained in the country. Assad continued to influence Lebanese leaders – he appears to want a "compliant Lebanese government in which Syrian influence plays a strong hand."[4] Indeed the presence of Assad in Lebanese affairs has been quite effective in controlling the country’s policies and future. Throughout the 1980s Assad financed rival factions in the continued struggle over Lebanon. Syrian troops also fought with the Lebanese army to defend the invasion by Israeli troops in 1982. Syria also influenced the presidential elections in Lebanon in 1988, setting off another conflict between rival factions. Syria supported a new regime to take over, and supplied the rebellious faction with arms and supplies. Syria was an integral part in the ouster of the current regime for a new government, sympathetic to Assad and willing to allow Syrian influence.
Over the years, Lebanon and Syria have signed many accords and treaties that have reaffirmed their relationship and cooperation. Syria was a major actor in a "tripartite agreement" signed in 1985 between competing Lebanese factions. Syria also was involved in the Ta’if Agreement (1989) which set new guidelines and made minor changes in the Lebanese political system. The main goal of the accords was to establish "a joint Syrian-Lebanese mechanism for making future decisions" about Syrian troop deployment in Lebanon and contained a security agreement between the two states.[5] The Ta’if Accords were followed by the Lebanon-Syria Treaty of Cooperation, signed in May 1991. The main text of the agreement confirms the relationship between the two nations:
The two states will work to achieve the highest level of cooperation and coordination in all political, economic, security, cultural, scientific, and other fields in a manner that will … expand and strengthen their common interests as an affirmation of the brotherly relations and guarantee of their common destiny.[6]
These agreements lay the groundwork for direct Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs.
II. Peace between Lebanon and Israel : Syria’s role
"…the continued occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights since 1967 and their annexation by Israel on 14 December 1981 constitute[s] a continuing threat to international peace and security."[7]
- U.N. General Assembly Resolution
Lebanon and Syria have both looked to United Nations Security Resolutions 242, 338 and 425 in their insistence on Israeli withdrawal from both the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon. (For full text, see Appendix) The agreement between the three countries had indeed satisfied all of their demands. The security of Israel, the autonomy of Southern Lebanon from Israeli control, and the return of the Golan Heights were all necessary prerequisites to peace in this region. Perhaps the most important piece of this negotiation puzzle was the return of the Golan Heights to Syrian control. "Peace was a strategic choice for Syria, but they would not concede any territory or bargain on Rights. When Israel withdrew to pre-1967 lines, Syria would be ready to talk."[8] Prospect theory can be used to explain the actions of Syria and Israel and why a settlement is close after years of conflict and bitter rivalry.
Prospect Theory
Prospect theory explains the behavior of actors by focusing on relative losses rather than relative gains, which is the focus of classical strategy. Actors operate from a "basement of fear" rather than a window of opportunity. The reference points in prospect theory are what the actor stands to lose by not negotiating rather than what the other side stands to gain. These reference points establish the status quo – both sides want to return to their former situation. In this way, prospect theory is more about how the two sides can get to yes. This makes a solution more feasible than if one actor concentrates solely on the maximization of gains. Prospect theorists concentrate on getting to the negotiating table and separate interests and positions. An actor’s interests are more important than its position because interests can be negotiated and compromised to reach an agreement.
Applying Prospect Theory
To fully understand this scenario completely, we must look at the motives of each actor as though the negotiations have been completed and Syria has the Golan and has withdrawn from Lebanon.
Syria, as a part of the agreement between Israel and Lebanon, must withdraw its troops from Lebanon. In return, Israel will withdraw from the Golan Heights and return the territory to Syria. Why did Syria agree to withdraw from Lebanon in exchange for the Golan? What were its motives and how can Assad’s behavior be explained after years of direct involvement in Lebanese affairs? Many things must be taken into consideration when attempting to explain Syria’s actions.
i. Main factors affecting the involvement of Syria
Syria’s position in the Middle East has ebbed and flowed over the years. Recently, because of the importance of the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria’s prominence in the region has been maintained. Assad is an important actor in the peace process. There has also been a tremendous amount of international pressure to negotiate a peace between the Arab states and Israel. In order to retain power, though, Assad could not give up the Golan to Israel. Since 1967, there has been overwhelming public support for Syria to retake the region and accept nothing less. It would have been very difficult for Assad to negotiate any peace with Israel without getting the land back. "The core of the conflict…was the occupation by Israel of Arab lands (the Golan Heights)…and the acquisition by force in violation of the United Nations Charter."[9] One must also consider the firm grip that Assad has on the Syrian government. As stated above, Assad enjoys almost complete autonomy in his actions and does not temper his actions to the wishes of the Syrian people.
On the other hand, his reign is limited. He is very old and may not be in power much longer. His death would disrupt the decades of stability that Syria has enjoyed under his regime. A new government may not be willing to negotiate with the Israelis at all, and Assad recognized the importance of resolving the conflict now. Otherwise, Syria might have lost its chance to get the Golan back from Israel and end the border skirmishes that have plagued his country for years.
Also, Assad had to maintain Syria’s bargaining power in the Middle East. Because of Syria’s involvement in Lebanon, Assad is a necessary part of any negotiations with Israel. If Israel and Lebanon had agreed to a treaty independent of Syria then Israel would not have a compelling motive to give up the Golan. Syria had to be involved in these negotiations in order to maintain its position as a powerful actor in the area. Furthermore, Syria’s prominence in the Arab League would have been weakened if it did not grant Lebanon a certain amount of autonomy.
Another consideration is the economy of Syria. The country is very dependent on foreign aid for economic growth. In fact, after the Gulf War Syria was rewarded with billions of dollars of foreign aid in return for its cooperation with the U.S. and its allies. This resulted in an immediate jump in the country’s economy. "Gulf War-related aid flows spurred GDP growth of 7-8 percent."[10] In a prolonged conflict with Israel and the absence of Syria in an Israeli-Lebanese peace agreement, foreign aid to Syria would no doubt decrease and the economy would suffer.
ii. Getting to yes
Therefore, Assad was acting in a domain of loss with the Israelis. In accordance with prospect theory, it would then follow that Assad was risk acceptant. He was willing to take a bigger risk in order to save the opportunity of a return of the Golan that may not be an option in a few years (or even months). His reference point is the return of Syria’s original borders. (Israel’s status quo in the agreement is the end of conflict with both the Syrians and Lebanese - peace.) In order to negotiate with the Israelis - and get the Golan back - Assad had to be willing to negotiate an agreement with the Lebanese also. The mitigating agreement was the withdrawal of a significant number of the 30,000 Syrian troops that are in Lebanon.[11] In order to protect Israel, Syrian military influence had to be removed from Lebanon. Both of these prerequisites are integral parts of the agreement.
This agreement is similar to the Golan Heights Disengagement Accord (1974), proposed by Israel and brokered by the United States. According to this agreement, Israel would withdraw its troops from the Golan Heights in exchange for the establishment of a buffer zone in Southern Syria. Syrian missile placements would also be turned away from Israel. Assad would also guarantee that Palestinian terrorist groups would be prevented from launching attacks on Israel from Syrian soil. In addition, the U.S. would resume diplomatic relations with Syria. The main parts of this agreement, which was never kept by either the Syrians or Israelis, have been satisfied by the current agreement.
An understanding of each country’s interests is also important in using prospect theory to explain the peace settlement. The positions of Syria and Israel are clear – Syria would not agree to negotiate with Israel unless the Golan is returned, and Israel would not give up any land without assurances of security and protection from attacks. Each country’s interests, though, were different. Syrian’s interest was to get the Golan back, and Israel’s interest was to assure peace. A combination of these interests, and the major steps of Lebanese involvement in the process, allowed the actors to get to the negotiating table and to establish an agreement that satisfied everyone’s interests.
Earlier peace agreements made between Arabs and Israelis are also very important precedents. The Oslo Accords and the agreement signed by Lebanon, the Hizbollah and Israel have set the tone for future peace accords. Arab and Muslim pride – the recognition of the existence of the State of Israel - will not encumber peace. Symbolic interests are very difficult to overcome, but earlier precedents have made it easier for other states to put aside traditional blockades to the peace process.
Conclusions
Conditions have been agreed upon, and Syria and Israel will go to the negotiating table. Syria's role is instrumental in the peace between Israel and Lebanon. Once the Golan Heights is part of Syria, there will be a greater sense of peace and security between these states.
Endnotes
[1] "Syria is the key to any Lebanon deal: Israeli army chief says." AFP, 4/12/98. http://www.lebanon.com.news/newswire/1998/april.html
[2] http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/1998/neareast/syria98.html
[3] The Ta’if Accords, text at http://almashriq.hiof.no.lebanon/300/320/327/taif.txt
[4] Diller, Daniel C., ed. The Middle East. Congressional Quarterly, Inc: Washington, D.C. 1994. P. 353
[5] http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/327/taif.txt
[6] http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/327/lebanon-syria.txt
[7] http://www.un.org/plweb-cgi/idoc.pl?1687+unix+_free_user-+www.un.org..80+un+un+webdepts+webdepts++Resolution%26adj%26425
[8] Abou-Hadid, Khalil. Speech to U.N. General Assembly, 12/3/97. http://www.un.org/plwebcgi/idoc.pl?1842+unix+free_user_+www.un.org.80+un+un+pr1997++Resolution%26a%26425
[9] Ibid.
[10] http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/1998/neareast/syria98.html
[11] "Syria is the key to any Lebanon deal: Israeli army chief says." April 12, 1998. AFP. http://www.lebanon.com.news/newswire/1998/april.html
Sources used
Appendix A
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242
November 22, 1967
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
1.Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2.Affirms further the necessity
For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3.Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and
accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4.Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.
Appendix B
U.N. Security Council Resolution 338
October 22, 1973
The Security Council,
1.Calls upon all parties to present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2.Calls upon all parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3.Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
VI. Appendix C
U.N. Security Council Resolution 425
March 19, 1978
The Security Council,
Taking note of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon and from the Permanent Representative of Israel,
Having heard the statement of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel,
Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace,
Convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East,
1. Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;
2. Calls upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;
3. Decides, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its
effective authority in the area, the Force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four hour on the implementation of the present resolution.