by Corey Schuster

Future Scenario

Kurdish opposition forces have begun to move south towards Baghdad from their stronghold in Northern Iraq. Their movement south has been sparked by Turkish fears of a Kurdish uprising toward their nations. These fears have increased as the United States has begun to heavily arm the United Kurdish Front (UKF).

The UKF is a merger of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The PUK and KDP joined forces after an extended mediation, in Jordan, led by the United State's Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA agreed to funnel massive amounts of money and arms into a Kurdish insurrection against Saddam Hussein if the PUK and the KDP could come to terms. After months of negotiating during the summer and fall of 1998, Massoud Barzani, leader of the KDP, and Jalai Talabani, head of the PUK, reached an agreement as both sides realized that their dispute hurt, rather than help the people of Kurdistan. Barzani agreed to let Talabani lead the military effort, as the PUK had more sophisticated weapons and training, under the condition that popular elections would held following the rebellion.

The United States then began to aid the Kurds at their bases in Northern Iraq. The CIA provided communications equipment that sent broadcasts across Iraq, criticizing Saddam Hussein and building support for the UKF. The CIA then followed through on its promise to heavily back the UKF with military aide in the form of guns, tanks, and missiles. The Kurds were armed with Surface-to-Air Missiles to help prevent Iraqi air strikes, but were also given ground-to-ground missiles to launch more effective attacks and stop advancing Iraqi tanks. The arming of the UKF with these ground-to-ground missiles is what irritated the U.S. ally of Turkey. Fearing that these weapons would be turned against them as well, the Turks began a major military build up in Northern Iraq and an offensive campaign that forced the Kurds to focus their efforts south.

The UKF was able to build and maintain their strength due to the United States cracking down on Saddam Hussein's aggression. Unlike in September of 1996 when Saddam Hussein was able to march north and destroy the Kurdish and CIA bases, the U.S. provided air support that kept the Iraqi Republican Guard from sustaining a legitimate attack on the UKF.

The UKF also coordinated a mass defection of top Iraqi military officers. Through the use of stolen Iraqi communications equipment, the UKF to contacted these officials. With the assistance of King Hussein of Jordan, the UKF and the Iraqi National Accord organized a joint effort to uprise against Saddam Hussein. The INA provided the UKF with Iraqi military officers who they understand will join them in revolt when necessary.

Question: Why will the CIA assist a Kurdish based revolt against Saddam Hussein?

Historical Precedent

The Central Intelligence Agency is in the business of overthrowing governments which are not in sync with the United States. Since 1947, the CIA has launched nearly 2,000 missions to change the course of political events in foreign states (1). They have ranged from infecting the scuba diving suit of Cuban leader Fidel Castro to toppling South Vietnam's dictator Ngo Dinh Diem(2). As with the Diem plot, many have succeeded, but like the numerous and highly publicized Castro attempts, many have failed. Former CIA official Allan Goodman said, "We know this business very well. It doesn't mean we're good at it. (3)"

The CIA has tried to oust Saddam Hussein on three previous occasions, all of which failed. In May of 1972 the Shah of Iran asked President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to arm the Kurds. This would aide Iran in its struggle with Iraq. The CIA then shipped $16 million in weapons to the Kurds through Iran. The operation continued through President Gerald Ford until March 1975. In a secret deal, the Saddam Hussein agreed to amicably end a border dispute if the Shah cut off weapons to the Kurds. The Shah did so and within hours the Iraqi forces attacked the Kurds. The Kurds appealed to the U.S. to intervene, but the aide never arrived (4)

A second revolt was attempted during Gulf War II. As the U.S. began to attack in January 1991, the CIA aimed propaganda at the Iraqi Kurds to "force Saddam Hussein the dictator aside.(5)" Hussein retaliated and the Kurds were murdered by the thousands.

The CIA must learn from its failures of the past, especially the most recent attempt that collapsed. This operation had the most financial backing and had been in the planning stages for years. Through the encouragement of politicians and the media, the CIA had found it hard to deny anyone who asked for assistance in toppling Saddam. From 1991-1996, the United States spent $100 million, or $20 million dollars a year, on an anti-Saddam campaign (6). However, this amount is pennies on the dollar when compared to the amount of money the U.S. spends in the region. This money was supposed to build a paramilitary force capable of toppling Saddam. When the 1996 operation was finally foiled by Saddam, and thousands of Kurds were subsequentlykilled, the U.S. spent more money in retaliation. The United States launched 27 cruise missiles on Iraqi installations in its preliminary attack on Iraqi installations, and 17 cruise missiles in a follow-up attack. At approximately one million dollars a missile, the U.S. spent over $44 million in less than twenty-four hours. None of these missiles were fired into northern Iraq or Saddam's forces that threatened the Kurds; rather, they were aimed hundreds of miles away at rebuilt air defense sites in southern Iraq (7). The U.S. must learn from this lack of aiding the Kurds, both financially and militarily. Its next planned revolt must have more money, effort, and military coordination. Clinton received quite a bit of grief from politicians and the media for not coming to the aid of the Kurds earlier. He will learn from this mistake and provide military cover for the UKF as it builds a military front against Saddam.

The main problem the U.S. and the CIA face is the strife between the PUK and the KDP. In the early 1990's the two groups worked together to govern the "exclusion zone." Following a close election that was to decide who would lead the government, Talabani and Barzani agreed to spit the power and a regional parliament was established. However, by 1995 the two sides began to argue and the coalition fell apart. This was in part caused by suspicions about the reliability of the CIA. The CIA had planned an assault on the Iraqi outposts of Kirkuk and Mosul in March 1995 with the PUK and the KDP, but Barzani withdrew the KDP support at the last minute causing an even greater rift (8).

Saddam's foiling of the campaign that began in 1992 was assisted by the KDP. Following infighting in northern Iraq and being pushed back by the PUK, the KDP turned to Saddam for help. Saddam's Republican Guard headed north and pushed the PUK forces out of their stronghold of Salahuddin which overlooked the city of Irbil. CIA agents were forced to flee their bases and leave behind their equipment for Iraq (9). As a result of the KDP's seeking Iraqi assistance, the PUK turned to Iran, the U.S.'s other main concern in the region (10). The Kurds are enemies with the Iraqis and the Iranians, but the inability of the CIA to bring the feuding coalitions to an agreement, and the lack of support from the U.S., forced KDP to the point where it sought help from a man who had used poison gas on them in 1988.

Part of the reason the Kurds distrusts the U.S. is that the U.S. has never supported a separate Kurdish state. Pressure from Turkey and other Arab nations has caused the U.S. to maintain that Iraq must remain a united nation even if Saddam is overthrown. The U.S. fears that an autonomous Kurdistan would stir up an already volatile region (11). Without a chance of gaining their independence with backing from the United States, the Kurds have turned to these leaders who committed atrocities against the Kurds in the past, and will who will probably try to annihilate them again in the future. This time around the U.S. must rise to the occasion and make a commitment to the Kurds that a separate state will be set up in the future if Saddam is toppled. The region will be thrown into chaos if Saddam is toppled. A regime that would be ready to be placed in Kurdistan could help to stabilize the region. Iraq will fall into a quagmire once Saddam is overthrown because the Shiites in the South and the Sunnis in the middle will be struggling to find a leader. An established government in Kurdistan will solve a third of this problem.

The CIA can bring the Kurds together if an umbrella organization is formed. The Iraqi National Congress and Iraqi National Accord attempted to due this during the third plot. The INC was formed in 1992 by the CIA with Ahmed Chalabi as its leader. Chalabi was led to believe that the U.S. would back his effort to topple Saddam. The INC began to build an army, but the CIA lacked confidence in it. Despite this fact the CIA trained the INC to coordinate the March 1995 attack. Former Iraqi General Adnan Nuri was recruited to help Chalabi, but the CIA then told Nuri to lead a rival group based in London, the INA. On the eve of the planned attack, Nuri flew to Washington and told the White House that Chalabi was planning on drawing the U.S. into a war with Iraq. Worried by this news, the U.S. withdrew support and the March 1995 attack failed. The INC continues today, but receives no assistance from the CIA. Former field agent Warren Marik, who worked with the INC, believes the INC would have succeeded in overthrowing Saddam and creating a democratic society had the CIA given them more time and support: "(The Clinton White House) got too impatient with a genuine effort to install democracy." He said that the U.S. instead turned to former Iraqi generals who hoped to take Saddam's place (12). This time around the CIA will learn from its past through agents like Marik. It can not afford to be as indecisive and change the groups it backs.

The economic sanctions placed on Iraq affect the Kurds as well. They are not allowed to trade under the embargo. This inhibits their ability to raise money for a revolution through their trade. Recently, the U.S. officials have come under fire for not lifting sanctions on the Kurds. This would drastically increase the Kurd's power and weaken Saddam's ability to control them (13). In the near future, the U.S. will probably lift the sanctions on the Iraqi Kurds to allow them to boost their resources.

Theory

Prospect theorists assert that people act based upon fear of losing. An actor who believes he will lose something if he does not take action is risk acceptant and an actor who believes he only will gain is risk adverse. Prospect theorists also claim that both sides tend to cooperate when they both frame the problem as an avoidance of loss than the maximization of relative gain (14).

For the previous three operations, the U.S. has been risk adverse as they only had something to gain. Toppling Saddam would mean easier relations for them in the Middle East, but they lose little if the mission fails. The United States was operating out of a domain of relative gain.

On the other hand, the Kurds were operating from a domain of loss, as was Saddam. Their own lives were at stake. The Kurds became risk acceptant and began to side with the enemy. The KDP accepted the great risk of aligning with Saddam. This enabled them to remain strong in the region and avoid being exterminated by Saddam for the time being.

The PUK's domain of loss increased when the KDP sided with Saddam. They could no longer rely on the minimal help of the United States. Instead, as prospect theorists would assert, they began to take great risks as well. The PUK sided with perennial enemy Iran in an attempt to avoid being pushed out of Iraq and losing control of their homeland. The domains of gains and losses have changed for the 1999 scenario. The United States is now acting out of a domain of loss. The U.S. is at risk of losing credibility as the world's hegemon. Saddam has repeatedly pushed the U.S. to the point of war only to back down at the last minute. Saddam emerges from these power struggles as the David fighting off the evil Goliath. He persistently defies U.S. orders to stop producing weapons of mass destruction. The creation of these weapons further puts the United States in a domain of loss. Saddam has the ability to kill thousands of people with his biological weapons with only a vile of VX or a bag of anthrax. The United Kingdom can vouch that the threat Saddam poses is real, for weeks in March of 1998 they put their ports on high alert, fearing Saddam's followers were going to unleash their biological or chemical agents on England in retaliation for the February 1998 confrontation. Due to this domain of loss, the U.S. will be more risk acceptant. A prospect theorist will contend that where the U.S. would not wholly back an effort to topple Saddam in previous operations, they will do so now. Putting a legitimate effort into the operation is perceived as a risk for the United States. If the operation fails then the U.S. loses even more credibility. However, if the U.S. does not act and continues to allow Saddam to push the U.S. to the brink then it might be perceived as a risk not to challenge Saddam. The United States will increase its efforts as a result of Saddam's February 1998 confrontation. These greater risks will include taking military offensives to protect the Kurds and supplying the Kurds with sophisticated arms. The United States will be taking another risk supplying the Kurds because it could create a conflict with close ally Turkey, but as the U.S. has become risk acceptant, this is no longer an obstacle.

The Kurds are acting out of an even greater domain of loss in the 1999 scenario compared with their domain of loss in previous operations. Turkey is putting pressure on the Kurds from the North, and the Kurds are at risk of losing their homeland due to these attacks and being pushed into Saddam's forces. Prospect theory asserts that if parties focus on their gains over their losses then cooperation is likely; foregone gains do not hurt as much as perceived losses. Parties first look at reference points, which are what the party thinks the status quo should be. By focusing on the possibility of tens of thousands of people dying due to losing to Saddam, and a large portion of their comrades becoming refugees from the failure to collaborate, versus the nominal gain of being the leader of a divided Kurd region in Iraq, the PUK and the KDP will likely join forces to avoid such great losses. As the United States will take a greater role in the mediation of the Kurds, Prospect theory asserts that the use of a third party, which distinguishes the positions of the two sides from their interests, will facilitate the union of the PUK and KDP. The two groups share a common interest of defeating Saddam. Furthermore, the followers of each group do not hate each other; it is more a feud between Barzani and Talabani than the Kurdish people. Prospect theorists would suggest that as the third party negotiator, the U.S. could breakdown the barriers of where the parties stand, and show the two sides the interests they share. Simple aide incentives to the Kurds will help them maintain cease-fires. These cease-fires will build trust, which is a step towards synergy.

Due to their domain of losses, prospect theorists will suggest that the U.S. will want to remove Saddam Hussein from power. A key step in the removal of Saddam is a domestic revolution, centered on the Kurds. The Kurds have an incentive to join and unite against Saddam. Therefore, prospect theorists will confirm that the U.S. has the incentive to bring the Kurds together for an uprising and the Kurds will unite, through a U.S. facilitated mediation, for this call to arms.

Motivations

The United States has many motivations for having the CIA back a Kurdish uprising against Saddam Hussein. Within the U.S. there is a public hatred of Saddam Hussein. Hussein has consistently been portrayed in the media as a maniacal dictator, sometimes even being compared to Adolph Hitler.

The citizens of the U.S. "rallied 'round the flag" for Gulf War II as American boys went to the Middle East to fight a war. This embedded in the public a sense that Saddam should not be in power if their sons are going off to battle against him. Following the war, President Bush was second guessed by the press and the country for neither removing Saddam from office nor assassinating him. Now, with Saddam's repeated confrontations with the United States, the typical citizen, as well as many bureaucrats and politicians like former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcraft, want Saddam gone. As public opinion for action against Saddam increases, so will the pressure upon President Clinton to take action. This public pressure could be increasingly important the next time Saddam pushes the U.S., because the Presidential elections of the year 2000 are right around the corner.

An effort against Saddam could prove risky, but it could also serve as a springboard in Gore's quest for the Presidency. Financing a CIA inspired Kurdish revolution is a tempting option. The U.S. risks little military effort and the chances of U.S. casualties are minimal compared with an air assault or full scale attack. If the mission fails, the U.S. does not stand to lose as much as their is a great deal uncertainty of what occurs in covert operations. Also, Gore could wish to avoid a re-opening of his questionable campaign practices that allegedly included fund raising phone calls from the oval office. International activities take the focus away from the Republican-Democrat cleavage and places emphasis on the U.S. versus the world dimension. Citizens tend to support the U.S. when it is placed on a global scale as patriotic sentiments prevail.

Much has been made of President Clinton's quest to be placed in the history books. Thus far his Presidency has been marred by scandal and little action. Any type of military action is generally recognized and studied by future generations. A successful removal of Saddam would be an accomplishment that his predecessor could not achieve. Having the CIA start operations is an excellent way to begin the destabilization of the Saddam regime.

The United States is the dominant power in the world and does not wish to relinquish that role. Saddam has continually challenged the U.S. in an effort to discredit the nation. His ability to defy orders, produce weapons of mass destruction, and remain in power, is a slap in the face to the U.S. The U.S. wished to make a statement in February 1998 by attacking Saddam, but United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan intervened, issuing the built up forces useless. The next time that Saddam blatantly provokes the U.S., the United States will respond to make a statement to all despot leaders throughout the world.

Additionally, the CIA is motivated to prove themselves. The agency has been berated over the years for failed operations. Their most recent failure in Iraq has caused a decline in support for them. CIA wants to shed their reputation of botching operations and creating international embarrassment for the nation. A well planned mission in Iraq would re-establish the confidence that the public, but most importantly the government has in the agency.

There are many motivations for the U.S. to go forward with a plan of destabilizing Iraq, but their are motivations against it. Primarily, the leaders of the United States does not want to get the military in a situation where ground forces will be necessary. While this is a motivation against U.S. action, it is also a motivation for CIA action. CIA involvement and a Kurdish rebellion would decrease the likelihood of a U.S. ground invasion. By having a force of Kurds on the ground, the U.S. could plan air strikes that would deplete the Iraqi army. With a weaker army to face, the Kurds could fight the Saddam's forces and recruit Iraqi military officers to join the revolution against Saddam.

Other considerations include the fact that the U.S. has never wanted to give the Kurds their own state and a fear of disrupting the fragile Middle East peace process. Giving the Kurds their own state would mean irritating the surrounding nations. Iran and Turkey are archrivals of the Kurds and conflict between these nations would probably ensue. The Middle East peace process is fragile and the United States does not want to break it up by having nations taking sides in a conflict, but if Israel is removed from the conflict then this would alleviate their fears. The motivations for conflict do outweigh the motivations to avoid conflict. The lack of accountability inherent in covert missions enhances the United States motivation to initially support a Kurd uprising as a method to assess whether to proceed with their own troops, or abandon the mission entirely.

Conclusions

Based on the historical evidence, prospect theory, and motivations, it is reasonable to assert that the United States will take action against Saddam Hussein, in a scenario similar to the one previously laid out, the next time the Iraqi leader chooses to confront the United States. The basis for this military operation will be a CIA induced, Kurdish revolution. Furthermore, the Kurdish rebellion will be a joint effort between the previously feuding PUK and KDP.

The United States will make the right in proceeding with a CIA led rebellion against Saddam. A rebellion within a nation stimulates the people to take arms against their repressive leader, but foreign military intervention often creates anxiety amongst the people for they fear how the unfamiliar soldiers and country will act. By having the Kurds begin a revolution, the door is opened for the U.S. to join the side of an already existing faction in Iraq. Rather than the perception of the U.S. fighting against the Iraqi people, they will be perceived as fighting alongside the Iraqi people. Having the CIA support the Kurds will be the method that the United States employs.

1 Tim Weiner, "For 3d Time in 21 Years, Saddam Hussein's Foes Pay Price for a Foiled U.S. Plot," The New York Times, 11 September 1996 sec A, 6. [Return to Text]

2 Daniel Schorr, "A time to kill?," The Christian Science Monitor, 31 September 1996, 19. [Return to Text]

3 Weiner A6. [Return to Text]

4 Ibid A6. [Return to Text]

5 Ibid A6. [Return to Text]

6 R. Jeffrey Smith and David B. Ottaway. "Anti-Saddam Operation Cost CIA $100 Million," The Washington Post, 15 September sec A, 1. [Return to Text]

7 Eric Schmitt, "Targets Were Chosen to Punish and Weaken Hussein, U.S. Officials Say," The New York Times, 4 September 1996, sec. A, 9. [Return to Text]

8 ABC News.com: Unfinished Business: The CIA vs. Saddam. [Return to Text]

9 R. Jeffrey Smith and David B. Ottaway. "Anti-Saddam Operation Cost CIA $100 Million," The Washington Post, 15 September sec A, 29. [Return to Text]

10 Stephen Kinzer, "'History's Losers' Fight Neighbors and Each Other, Often Assisted by Foes," The New York Times, 4 September 1996, sec. A, 9. [Return to Text]

11 Kinzer A9. [Return to Text]

12 ABC News.com: Unfinished Business: The CIA vs. Saddam. [Return to Text]

13 CNN- U.S. Continues to Plan for Saddam Hussein's Demise. [Return to Text]

14 Professor Raymond Tanter's Homepage. [Return to Text]