Sharon, who as Defense Minister of Israel led Israel to invade Lebanon, asserted that "Lebanon has become a real burden to Israel," and he continued that the choice was either to change tactics or to withdraw "on the basis of our own decision and timetable" (1). This can be analyzed that the decision that Israel withdraws from Lebanon would be made without making any deal with Syria or Lebanon. And in the light of the Israeli people's recent emotion concerning the presence of the Israeli troops in the southern Lebanon, where Israel designated "security zone," it is considered that this unilateral withdrawal will be conducted in the near future. Actually, the withdrawal from Lebanon has been articulated by a great number of Israeli people, including a leader of the Labor Party, Yossi Beilin, Israeli Interior Minister Avigdor Kahalani, and renowned Israeli hawk, Ariel Sharon. In the bottom line, this movement for withdrawal is based on the fact that the Israelis are now more concerned about peace in the Middle East.

So what makes the Israeli people so concerned about the presence of the Israeli troops in southern Lebanon? Since the occupation of the southern part of Lebanon, a great number of Israeli soldiers have killed by guerrillas. Incessantly, Lebanese Shiite Muslim guerrillas, such as Hezbollah, attack Israeli soldiers who stay in Lebanon. This fact makes the Israelis think that the occupation of southern Lebanon has not been for Israel's security, but rather exposing them to danger. Since 1982, Israel has lost 1,200 soldiers in Lebanon, and every year the number of casualties among Israeli soldiers has been increasing: In 1997, thirty-nine Israeli soldiers and fifty-four guerrillas were killed in Lebanon (2). The primary reason for Hezbollah's attacking Israeli soldiers is that they want to oust Israelis from the territory of Lebanon: Hezboollah chief Shikh Hassan Nasrallah claims that "The only logical and acceptable solution is for these occupation forces to withdraw from our land without conditions and leave the responsibility of the security of the security of the region to the Lebanese themselves" (8). Hence, if the Israeli troops withdraw from the "security zone," attacks from Lebanese guerrillas will likely be less than the present situation for they have to cross the northern border of Israel to attack Israelis, and therefore, there will be less casualties among Israeli soldiers.

This exposure of the Israeli troops to the danger psychologically makes the Israeli people think that the Israelis are in the domain of loss. Because of losing Israeli soldiers, the people feel the occupation of southern Lebanon does not bring any advantage for them. As matter of fact, movements by civilians against Israeli troop's stationing have already started actively. For instance, in February 1997, four mothers of Israeli soldiers stationed in Lebanon established "a grassroots anti-war movement known as 'Four Mothers' after 73 soldiers died in collision of two helicopters en route to south Lebanon" (3) . And this movement has rapidly been growing in Israel: about 20,000 Israelis have signed its petition for the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. Furthermore, recently some 200 Israelis with placards stating "Let's get out of Lebanon" protested outside the home of Prime Minister Natanyahu, a day after 11 Israeli soldiers were killed in southern Lebanon (4). The voice of unconditional withdrawal is even coming from the commander of Israel's force in Lebanon, Maj. General Amiram Levine. Last November, he stated that he favored troop pullout from Lebanon: he said, "The alternative--delaying a pull out until Syria and Lebanon sign a peace accord--is unacceptable because it means Israel would continue to suffer casualties at the hands of Hezbollah (5). From these pieces of evidence, the reference point for the Israeli people has changed from national security to peace.

From this reference point, it is plausible to see Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon is more likely to happen in the near future. On April 1, 1998, the Israeli cabinet decided to accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 425, which calls for "strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries," and "withdraw forthwith its forces form all Lebanese territory." This acceptance is because Israeli people's voice for the unilateral withdrawal has been laud. And because of this, the acceptance of the UN Resolution 425 was inevitable; in fact, the reaction to the civilian movements for the withdrawal from Lebanon has already become more apparent in the Israeli government. For instance, in the fall of 1997, after 12 Israeli soldiers were killed in Lebanon, Labor MK Yossi Beilin established "the Movement for a Peaceful Departure from Lebanon" (MPDL). This plan called for Israeli forces to "unilaterally withdraw form the 'security zone' over a six month period" and to strengthen northern border. With the articulation of this plan, Beilin maintained that "The security zone is not giving us any security. It's a psychological barrier, a line we're afraid to change fearing things could be worse . . . " (6). As this statement implies, a number of the Israeli government officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Natanyahu, are primarily concerned about national security, and by keeping the territory Israel occupied by force in 1982, they claim they can prevent further terrorism in Israel. This proves that their decision-making and diplomacy are psychologically operating from the domain of gain. In other words, the occupation of this "security zone" brings them psychological security-- risk averse. But the Israeli government, where voice of the population strongly reflects, will likely consider the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon as inevitable. Yossi Beilin claims that "The main reason we remain there [southern Lebanon] is a lack of public pressure on the government" (6). But now, the feeling that the Israeli people want the Israeli troops to withdraw from Lebanon has been articulated more and more strongly; in fact, pressure for a retreat escalated "following the death of 39 Israeli soldiers in clashes in Lebanon last year, the heaviest toll since 1985" (8). This fact is evidently providing the strong possibility to conduct the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in the near future, which will create a stage for another peace accord in the Middle East.

Along with the pullout from Lebanon, the peace scenario will grow much further and clearer. Another Israeli occupation tied with national security concern is the Golan Heights. This continual occupation since 1967 has also already been considered to exchange for peace by the Israeli government. Since the historic agreement of 1993 between Israel and the PLO, it has been clear for most of the countries in the Middle East that Israel is willing to withdraw from its occupations in exchange for full peace. In 1996, Prime Minister Benjamin Natanyahu confirmed that "his predecessor had tacitly agreed to give back all of the Golan Heights in exchange for a peace agreement with Syria" (7). Certainly the reference point of Israel has mainly been peace; hence, the return of the Golan Heights to Syria will also happen followed by the withdraw from Lebanon, whose territory has been controlled by Syria. In the southern part of Lebanon, where Israeli troops continually stay in the name of national security, Syria actually supports or allows activities of the Lebanese Shiite guerillas. One of the primary reasons for Syrian supports for activities of Hezbollah in the southern Lebanon is that by continual attack to the Israeli troops, Syria hopes for its favorable negotiations with Israel to get back the Golan Heights--conflict as the opportunity for diplomacy. Attacks by pro-Syrian terrorists are the only bargaining chip possessed by Hafez al-Asad (3). But because of Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, this strategy is no longer useful; supporting the guerrillas rather prevents negotiation with Israel. Therefore, Syria will now stop supporting the Lebanese guerillas and the return of the Golan Heights will be the main concern for Syria. And in the process of peace talks with Israel, the reference point of Syria will therefore be the return of the Golan Heights.

These psychological perceptions of both countries will bring an agreement between them that Israel accepts to withdraw from the Golan Heights to the July 4, 1967 line. Since Israel wants peace and Syria gets the Golan Heights back, both countries have a broad range of acceptable agreements. From prospect theory, this condition will bring a corporation because Israel does not want to lose peace and Syria does not want to lose the Golan Heights--both counties will be operating from the domain of loss. Hence, without the problem of Lebanon, the talks between Israel and Syria will likely bring a peace accord based on each own reference point.

To conclude, I assume that the scenario that Israel will conduct in the near future is the unilateral withdrawal from the southern part of Lebanon, following the agreement to return the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria. This will happen because Israel is basically operating from domain of loss: the Israelis are primarily concerned about losing peace. This is conspicuously seen in the fact that the Israeli people increasingly feel that losing soldiers in the southern Lebanon is unbearable; they think that the "security zone" does not bring security, but endangers themselves. As a result, the Israeli troops will withdraw from Lebanon. This withdrawal will foster the peace negotiation between Syria and Israel and they will reach the agreement that Israel withdraws from the Golan Heights in exchange for peace. Yet, the future of the Middle East is incalculable because condition in that region is very fluidity. Therefore, prospect theory does not explain everything, but makes predictions of the current and future events. But what we can do is not only to anticipate the peace in the Middle East, but also to get involved in the peace-making.

(1) Schmemann, Serge. (1997, September 8). "More Israelis Questioning Military Presence in Southern Lebanon." The New York Times.

(2) Goller, Howard. (1998, March 2). "Israel Seeks Terms for Pulling out of Lebanon." Reuters.

(3) Gambill, Gary. (1998). "The Pro-withdrawal Movement in Israel: Is Peace in Sight?"

(4) "Israelis Demand Lebanon Pullout" (1997, September 6). The Associated Press.

(5) Trounson, Rebecca. (1997, November 29). "Top Israeli general favors troop pullout from Lebanon." Los Angeles Times.

(6) Yudelman, Michael. (1997, September 30). "Call for Lebanon Pullout Sparks Debate with Labor." The Jerusalem Post.

(7) "Natanyahu confirms that Rabin agreed to give up Golan Heights." (1996, September 12). The Associated Press.

(8) Jallad, Edgard. (1998, April 6). "An Israeli Pullout: Not If, But When." Monday Morning.