Introduction

The prevailing political circumstances within Lebanon at the close of 1998 represented a major obstacle in the implementation of the Oslo accords, and hence prevented the advancement of peace in the Middle East. The importance of Lebanese stability to the security of both Israel and Syria, coupled with the historic inability of Lebanese government to maintain order within its borders, yielded a situation in which both Israel and Syria found it difficult to abandon their military commitments within Lebanese territory. The possibility of the removal of these forces from Lebanon seemed remote at best.

However, developments in both Israel's and Syria's recognition of mutual interests that did not necessitate the maintaining of their military positions within Lebanon lead subsequently to the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. Under an agreement in accordance with and secured by international law, Israel and Syria agreed not only to withdraw, but also promised not to violate Lebanon's borders in the future, in exchange for UN guarantees of Lebanese domestic stability. Most promising of all, Lebanon, after a quarter century of severe strife amongst its internal political factions, was able to establish a secular democratic state that laid the groundwork for future stability and development of a diverse and resilient country.

The focus of this paper will be an examination of the steps that lead to this seemingly unlikely conclusion of Lebanese domestic strife. Preliminary discussion will involve the role that foreign interests played in the Lebanese situation, including a brief synopsis how the situation developed, with emphasis being placed on the underlying interests and motivations of Syria and Israel. The vital role of the international community and international law will comprise the second section, emphasizing the importance of brokered peace, and the framework of international law as it corresponded to the establishment of a sovereign state in Lebanon. The final section will detail Lebanese domestic politics, and how the groups and individuals that had a major role in the resolution of the Lebanese domestic crisis managed to put aside their difference to secure a better future.

At all times the focus will be determining the interests of the major political actors in the arena, by examining the real and imagined constraints under which they functioned. The process of "getting to yes", will demonstrate how interests can come into concordance, despite seemingly irreconcilable differences of position.

Section I: Syria and Israel in Lebanon: A Position Without Interest, An Interest Without Fruition

In the spring of 1998 it became increasingly apparent that Israel was no longer willing to incur the costs of maintaining a military presence in southern Lebanon, and was looking for a tactful way to withdraw Israeli troops from the embattled area. At the April 4th meeting of the committee for national security, the Israeli government made clear its intentions to adhere to resolution 425, and proffered withdrawal plans whose only preconditions were the establishment of security in Southern Lebanon on the part of the Lebanese government, and a guarantee of safety to members of the Southern Lebanese Army. No mention was made of a correspondent withdrawal of Syrian forces.¹ This position represented a marked change on the part of Israel, who was previously trying to negotiate for Syria's departure as well.

This change in position was due to the untenable nature of Israel's presence in Lebanon, the mounting disapproval of the international community, and Israel's inability to secure its interest of preventing terrorist attacks into northern Israel. Pressure from Security Council resolutions made under article six of the UN charter² and from NGO's like Amnesty International³ , coupled with admonishments from foreign countries⁴ , made it increasingly difficult for Israel to receive support for its interests in other areas, particularly from Arab nations whose trust Israel needed to earn for the success of the peace plan. Israel was paying a heavy political price for its presence in Lebanon, but was unable to achieve its objective of eliminating the terrorist presence. Instead, conflict continued to escalate until the outbreak of open war on April 11 1996.⁵ A cease-fire reached on April 26 halted open warfare, but did not provide a solution for the underlying conflict.

Perhaps the most alarming drawback of Israel's military presence in southern Lebanon was the alienation of the Lebanese people. Christians and Muslims, who had originally welcomed Israeli troops that promised to drive out the PLO, began to question Israeli motivations and tactics. Politically, Lebanon was being turned towards Syria, creating a situation where instead of securing a stable northern border, Israeli occupation was exacerbating tensions and creating an enemy where previously there had been none.⁶

The complete failure of Operation Grapes of Wrath forced Israel to realize that the resolution of the Lebanese problem would require more than the application of military prowess, and that Israel's interests in Lebanon could be better served by another approach. For Israel, the key became a negotiated withdrawal as per the precise instructions of UN Security Council resolution 425.⁷ As mentioned above, Israel's primary interest was the guarantee that the Lebanese government, the UN task force, or a combination of both would control terrorist activities in Southern Lebanon.⁸ It was with these goals in mind that Israel went to the table trying to negotiate out of a position which no longer benefited its interests.

Syria's position in Lebanon was markedly different from that of Israel. Like Israel, Lebanese stability was an important security issue for Syria, but was just one of a multitude of other interests that effected relations between Syria and Lebanon. These interests expressed themselves in a number of different positions. Among these was the idea of a "Greater Syria" that would include parts of the Golan Heights and modern Lebanon, and a close monitoring of fundamentalist Muslims within Lebanon in both their bids for power and their harassment of Israel. Additionally, both Syria and Israel recognized the capacity of Lebanon to serve as an alley for invading troops into either country, and Syria recognized the importance of a military presence in Lebanon as a bargaining chip with Israel.

One important aspect of analyzing the actions of Syria in the establishment of a sovereign Lebanon, were the underlying goals of Hafez al-Assad. It has been noted that of the different schools regarding Assad's rationality and decision making, the best theories substantiate Assad's image as a shrewd politician able to cautiously weigh alternatives and avoid getting bogged down by ideology. His prominent role in Syrian government makes any analysis of Syrian actions incomplete without considering Assad's motivations.⁹

Unlike Israel, Syria had no conflict of interest resulting from their military presence in Lebanon. The key then for Syrian withdrawal, was a change in circumstances that would make it advantageous to leave. It was in this respect that Assad's motivations had the greatest importance, as pressure from different fronts would try to manipulate the situation to make withdrawal an attractive offer for Assad.

First among these fronts was Israel, who saw Syrian hegemony in Lebanon as a direct threat to their Northern border. Israel's announced policy with its Arab neighbors was to make peace whenever possible utilizing the formula established at the Madrid Conference in 1991.¹⁰ Having had to unilaterally withdraw from Lebanon put Israel in the domain of loss, and consequently made them risk acceptant. As a result, Israel offered Syria negotiations on the Golan with fewer preconditions than their previous demands had stipulated, on the condition that Syria remove their military presence from Lebanon.¹¹

While this offer alone was an attractive incentive for Assad, it was made all the more attractive by domestic developments within Lebanon that made the Syrian military presence a liability. In addition to the Christian factions that were opposed to Syrian occupation, the withdrawal of Israel created a situation in which the Hizballah and Syria no longer had a shared interest. In fact, Hizballah, with its commitment to an Islamic state, was completely at odds with Assad's Ba'thist politics. Assad harbored well documented fears for Fundamentalist Islam, which had lead him to ruthlessly attack Shia groups in his own country in 1982. One of the prime reasons for Syria's initial occupation of Lebanon was to prevent the PLO from coming into power.¹²

Hizballah's own acceptance of Syrian occupancy and influence within their organization was a result of pragmatic realism on the part of its leaders. Fadlallah was aware of the discrepancies in the ultimate goals of Hizballah and Syria, but for the time being was willing to ignore them in favor of collaborating against the greater enemy Israel.¹³ With the departure of Israel from Lebanon, Hizballah and Syria found themselves largely at odds with each other, and the Shia wound up tacitly supporting Christians and other ultra-nationalists who had formerly patronized General Aoun in his fight against Syria.

In addition to growing discontent with Syrian military occupancy fostered by renewed Lebanese nationalism, the international community played a vital role in encouraging Syrian withdrawal by pressuring Assad to follow Israel's example and adhere to UN resolution 520, which called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanese territory.¹⁴ While the international community was concerned with Lebanese sovereignty, the underlying motivation for international concern was the recognition of Lebanon as a key obstacle to the peace process. If either Israel or Syria maintained a presence in Lebanon, the other country would perceive it as a threat, making the likelihood of peace remote.

The combination of these pressures played upon Assad's own interests and perceptions of the status quo. Nearing the end of his life and eager to secure his legacy, Assad's cognitive position with respect to the Golan Heights put him in a domain of loss and made him therefore risk acceptant. He was willing to risk the chance of popular disapproval within his own country, and his control over Lebanon, in exchange for a chance to negotiate for the Golan, secure a peace with Israel, and win international approval.

One important factor, without which neither Israel nor Syria would withdraw, was the assurance on the part of the international community that UN forces would maintain domestic stability within Lebanon. As has been mentioned previously, Israel and Syria both feared Lebanon as an alley for invading troops. Previous invasions had been in part due to the fear that the disintegration of Lebanese control over the nation would allow the other country to seize a military advantage. Israel was concerned with the cessation of terrorist attacks, and Syria was worried about the establishment of an Islamic state. Only by the international community ensuring that Lebanon would remain stable, were both Syria and Israel willing to withdraw. This highlights the important role that the international community played in the establishment of a sovereign Lebanon, which will be the focus of the next section.

The peace situation in the Middle East is often characterized as a game of "chicken", in which opposing sides consider the costs of all out war (mutual defection), as too great, and consequently end up cooperating. While this may be true, the situation with respect to security is quite a different matter. The advancement of weapons and their ability to be used both defensively and offensively, coupled with the generally small size of Middle Eastern countries and their close proximity, makes bearing the risk of being at a security disadvantage a high cost to bear should the other side defect.

This situation can best be modeled by the prisoner's dilemma, which is a situation where the cost of one-sided cooperation is so exorbitant, that each side is compelled to defect. Computer models have shown that the best method of dealing with the prisoner's dilemma is tit for tat, in which one side starts out cooperating, and then responds to their opponents in exactly the same way, cooperating when they cooperate, defecting when they defect. In this way trust is established, and the perceived security threat diminishes over each successive cooperative round.¹⁵

In the case of Israel and Syria, the idea of withdrawing from Lebanon is fraught with worry that the other side will take advantage of the situation. This perceived security risk makes unilateral withdrawal extremely risky. From a theoretical standpoint, cooperating in the first round when the other side defects could end the game altogether, making even tit for tat an extremely risky initiative. These circumstances make cooperation highly unlikely, and virtually preclude the establishment of trust. Nothing provides better evidence for this phenomenon than the large military build-ups in the Middle East, and the inability to reach agreements despite mutual desires for peace.

It is for precisely this reason that the international community, operating through international law, had such an important role in the withdrawal of military forces from Lebanon. The idea behind a brokered peace is to make cooperation less risky for each side, by ensuring that the cost of cooperation in the face of defection is not too high. By bringing parties to the table, brokered peace allows for the establishment of trust between antagonists, so that a precedence of cooperation will make the costs of defection higher and higher over time.

For Israel and Syria, international guarantees of both Lebanese domestic security and Lebanese territorial integrity in the face of defection on the part of either side made the risk of withdrawing tenable. Of absolute importance was the UN's utilization of the precepts of its charter, and of resolutions 425, 426, and 520.¹⁶ The UN used its authority to establish an interim force to regulate internal affairs, monitor the borders, and work towards the establishment of elections. Working in conjunction with Lebanese military forces, the UN was able to maintain domestic order, and foster an environment in which rival Lebanese political factions could begin the process of restoring their nation. The next section will deal with how this final step was achieved.

One thing that was often forgotten by the world as it watched the establishment of a Lebanese state, was that Lebanon once had a stable government that only disintegrated under the pressure of a Palestinian presence, and the resultant interventions on the part of Syria and Israel. Lebanon was conspicuously neutral in both the '67 and '73 wars, and was very careful about maintaining a distance from involvement in the growing tensions of the Middle East.¹⁷ This stability and neutrality offered a blue print for the success of a Lebanese state.

Even more promising for the chances of a Lebanese government succeeding was the fact that the PLO had agreed to cease military operations in Lebanon and remove PLO weapons from Lebanese territory.¹⁸ The removal of this potentially volatile element from Lebanon helped to limit the chances of foreign intervention, and eliminated the cause behind the original problem in the deterioration of Lebanon.

Despite these promising developments however, many questions still remained to be answered. First among these was the relationship of Muslims and the Christians in Lebanon. Muslim groups like Hizballah and Amal, and Christian groups like Lebanese Forces, Free Lebanon Christian Organization, and supporters of Michel Aoun, all had different stated positions as to what their goals for Lebanon were. The resolution of these conflicts appeared remote indeed, particularly in light of the seemingly unalterable positions of these groups. Three factors were essential in the diffusion of this situation: The recognition of the Taif Accords as the groundwork for political reform, the UN disarmament of remaining militia groups as per the Taif Accords, and the multilateral conferences sponsored by the UN.

Lebanon adapted The Taif Accords in 1989 in conjunction with the Arab League and Syria in order to restore domestic order in the country. While the accords by no means destroyed the confessional system of politics that had prevailed in Lebanon to that point, they did lay the groundwork for the future transition to representative government, and proved that domestic security was important enough to override short term group interests. Most importantly, Taif provided for the disarmament of militia groups in Lebanon, with the exemption of the Hizballah, who were encouraged to continue their war on Israel. This disarmament was a resolute step towards the establishment of peace.¹⁹

The second important factor was the UN's disarmament of Hizballah as an enforcement of the Taif accords. The withdrawal of Israel and UN protection left no justification for the continued possession of weapons on the part of the Hizballah. Additionally, with Syria no longer exerting influence in Lebanon and engaged in the process of negotiating for the Golan, Hizballah was cut off from their major arms supplier, Iran. These two events combined to leave Lebanon relatively demilitarized, which forced groups to seek political solutions through compromise.

The most important factor in establishing a stable secular government in Lebanon, were the UN sponsored multi-lateral talks, which forced political and religious groups into a dialogue, and reinforced the spirit of compromise for the better good that had fostered the Taif Accords. Crucial to the success of these talks was the posturing of groups like Hizballah, who following the trend of their spiritual leader Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, abandoned the ideologue mind set and resolved to negotiate from a realpolitik standpoint.²⁰ In the process of "getting to yes", Hizballah recognized its shared interest of an independent Lebanon, and was willing for the time being to "pocket the concession"²¹ of representative government, and work towards their political goals through the framework of the system.

In light of Hizballah's willingness to abandon for the time being, the establishment of an Islamic state, the Christian and Druze minorities, representing roughly thirty-two percent of the population,²² agreed to abandon confessional politics, and adopt a representative government with a constitution guaranteeing individual liberties. This concession on the part of the Christians not only fulfilled their commitment "To the freedom, independence, and sovereignty of Lebanon,"²³ but also diffused hatred on the part of Muslims who had not been equally represented in the previous government.

The result of the multi lateral talks was that each group found empowerment through compromise and the recognition of shared interests. The precedent that was established laid the foundations of trust that would facilitate the resolution of conflicts of interest in the future. The new government held elections, and Lebanon found itself stable, sovereign and without foreign troops for the first time since 1975.

Only six short months after the establishment of a new government in Lebanon, an official treaty was signed with Israel establishing a stable border between the two nations, and confirming the intentions of both countries to honor the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other. The treaty marked the beginning of a new era for Lebanon, who having signed a similar agreement with Syria months earlier, was secure on all its borders, ready to revive the Lebanonese economy, and rebuild Beirut. The treaty represented the triumph of the international community and compromising for the future in the resolution of a seemingly intractable conflict, and set the tone for further progress in the establishment of a peaceful Middle East.

Endnotes