Beginning with the Madrid conference in October 1991, Israeli-Arab relations began to take on a new form

Bye-Bye, Bibi:

An Examination of Domestic Public Opinion

in Israel and a Future Scenario for Change

Jennifer Bucholz

April 1998

The year is 2000. Due to the conservative political approach of Prime Minister Netanyahu, the peace process is still well behind schedule, and permanent status negotiations, originally scheduled to have commenced no later than May 1996, have not yet begun. Frustrations among the Palestinians have erupted in a series of minor violent confrontations in response to Netanyahu’s policies. As scheduled, elections are held in the state of Israel for a Prime Minister. Incumbent Netanyahu is replaced by Labor party leader Ehud Barak, elected through the support of his own Labor party and an increasingly strong left wing characterized by a pressing desire to achieve genuine and lasting security through a peace with the Palestinians, as outlined in the Oslo II / Taba Accord. For the second time in five years, Israel’s policy regarding the peace process changes, this time from one of relative non-compliance to cooperation.

* * * * * * * *

Beginning with the Madrid conference in October 1991, Israeli-Arab relations began to take on a new form. Israel and the PLO for the first time recognized each other and began to negotiate, producing the Declaration of Principles. Though the process was sure to be slow, these two long-time enemies had embarked on the path to peace. No longer characterized solely in terms of conflict, Israeli-Arab relations were transformed into a situation of negotiation.

The peace process was furthered by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the Labor government, which was in power from July 1992 to May 1996. Under Rabin, the monumental Oslo II or Taba Accord was reached with the PLO. Among other things, this accord provided for Palestinian self-government, scheduled gradual redeployment of Israelis from the West Bank, prevention of terrorism and violence, and further permanent status negotiations (Interim Agreement). In May 1996, following the assassination of Rabin and six months of rule by Shimon Peres, Rabin’s Foreign Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister.

Prior to becoming Prime Minister, Netanyahu had favored the peace process with other Arab countries, but was adamantly against peace with the Palestinians (Rimon). However, upon entering the office of Prime Minister, it was necessary for him to put aside his own predispositions and commit to continuing the peace process as initiated under Rabin. However, while he did insist that he wanted peace and would honor Israel’s commitments and prior agreements, he also expressed sentiments that undermined these statements: that Israel would never accept a Palestinian state, that Israel would retain Jerusalem and the Golan Heights in their entirety, and that Israel reserved the right to enter Palestinian self-rule areas if necessary (Bickerton and Klausner, 301). With Netanyahu as Prime Minister, the peace process was bound to take some interesting turns.

A brief summary of relevant events since Netanyahu’s May 1996 election will be given here. In September 1996, Israel opened a new exit of the recently excavated Hasmonean Tunnel, which ran alongside the western perimeter of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. The tunnel was said to have undermined the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque, important Muslim holy sites, and Palestinians in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza responded to the "Judaization of Jerusalem" with riots, resulting in several days of confrontation and over seventy deaths. The crisis was quieted only by intervention by U.S. President Clinton (Bickerton and Klausner, 302-303). Only four months later, in January 1997, significant progress was made on another crucial issue: Hebron. The sticky issue of Hebron had been postponed by the Labor government, and successfully conquering this hurdle was perhaps Netanyahu’s most significant contribution toward the progress of the peace process. Control of 80% of the overwhelmingly Palestinian city was turned over to the Palestinians, and Israeli forces began their withdrawal immediately (Bickerton and Klausner, 303-304). In March 1997, though, Netanyahu announced plans to proceed with a large new Jewish housing project at Har Homa, a hill overlooking East Jerusalem. This resulted in widespread rioting by Palestinians and further terrorist attacks by Hamas. Again, the tensions resulting from this provocative act were quieted only by Clinton’s intervention (Bickerton and Klausner, 304). Shortly thereafter, in April 1997, Netanyahu was plagued by accusations of fraud regarding a political appointment, which seriously undermined his credibility domestically (Bickerton and Klausner, 305). A final significant event was a recent government-sponsored Passover / 50^th anniversary celebration in Hebron in mid April 1998. The protest by Israeli peace activists called the celebration a provocation, asserting that such an event in a primarily Palestinian city emphasized the wrong values – continued occupation – and undermined the progress of the earlier Hebron agreement (CNN, 12 April 1998).

The events noted above demonstrate the strained progress that has been made under Netanyahu, as well as the impediments to progress that have occurred as a result of his administration’s decisions. Later, Israeli public opinion regarding the progress or lack thereof under Netanyahu will be examined. First, though, I digress to provide some background on the Israeli parliamentary system as it applies to this scenario.

In 1992, Israeli election law was changed to allow for direct election of the Prime Minister by the people, as opposed to his selection as the leader of the single largest party in the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, as had been the practice previously. This change was intended to strengthen the office and independence of the Prime Minister and put an end to the party bargaining that had previously plagued the Prime Minister selection process before. It has resulted in increased fragmentation in the Knesset, as voters could vote for their hearts for the Knesset, casting votes for representatives from smaller parties, and still make a practical compromise selection for Prime Minister ("New Rules, New Games" and Perlmutter). Also, it allowed for an unprecedented situation in which the Labor party had more Knesset seats than Likud, thirty-four as compared to thirty-two (Bickerton and Klausner, 300), but yet the Prime Minister was from Likud. Under the old system, Peres, the Labor leader, would most likely have been selected Prime Minister, as his party and its coalition dominated in the Knesset, but the new election system selected Likud’s Netanyahu as Prime Minister. Hence, this new law drastically changed the outcome of the 1996 elections and the future of Israel.

Other parliamentary practices which will take on significance during Netanyahu’s April 1997 scandal are the ideas of a vote of no confidence and a commission of inquiry. A vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister requires a simple majority in the Knesset, and would have the effect of immediately removing the Prime Minister and dissolving the Knesset, requiring new elections. Calling a commission of inquiry also requires a majority vote of the Knesset or a cabinet decision. In the past, commissions of inquiry have drawn resignations even without revealing any concrete evidence of wrongdoing. However, this course of action is particularly rare (Rosenblum).

Having provided a sufficient background both in relevant events under Netanyahu and in the Israeli parliamentary system, I will now move on to examine the 1996 elections in detail, and the relevance of these elections and their outcome for the present situation in Israel. I will begin with a comparison of the platforms of the two major parties, Labor and Likud, proceed with an evaluation of the 1996 elections, and conclude with a detailed exploration of public opinion over the last two years and at the current time.

Regarding the peace negotiations initiated by Labor under Rabin, the Labor party vows to continue conducting peace negotiations in order to work towards their goal of a reality with no more terrorism or war, postulating that only this future reality, reached through continued negotiations, can strengthen Israel’s security. The Likud party vows to "honor international agreements" and "continue the diplomatic process," also planning to "act to reduce the dangers to the future and security of Israel resulting from these agreements." Though the distinction is diplomatically subtle, the Likud policy statement clearly implies that it perceives objectionable parts to the previously concluded agreements ("dangers… resulting from these agreements") that it plans to somehow modify or renege on ("reduce the dangers"). Hence their pledged honoring of the international agreements is not entirely complete.

Regarding the issue of settlements, the Labor party boasts in its platform of the prohibition of new construction and termination of ongoing construction which it introduced in 1992, and of the fact that "virtually no new construction was permitted in the settlements all through the period, 1992-1996, of the Labor-led government." In stark contrast, the Likud platform pledges to rescind the (Labor) decision to freeze settlements. Accordingly, in October 1996 Netanyahu canceled the government freeze on construction in the territories and announced plans to expand existing settlements and build new roads and industrial parks throughout the West Bank and Gaza.

Opinions on the policy of "land for peace" also differ between the two parties. Labor claims to be "open to compromise [with Syria] on the basis of land for peace and security," and notes the fact that "Labor-led governments, under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, affirmed the principle of land for peace in Syrian track negotiations." Netanyahu, on the other hand, adheres to a modern revisionist philosophy, which is cautious about relinquishing any Israeli territory, seeing it as dangerous to the country’s security. He is said to be "a fierce opponent of those who had followed the mainstream tradition of… a willingness to compromise on territory for the sake of peace" (CNN Netanyahu biography). The Likud party refuses to acknowledge the progress which was made in negotiations conducted by the Labor government regarding land for peace with Syria. This has resulted in a stalemate with Syria and hence also with Lebanon, and has perpetuated the conflict with Hizbollah terrorist forces in Lebanon.

Regarding the possibility of Palestinian statehood and final status of territory, the Labor party platform acknowledges the "rights to self-determination and statehood" of the Palestinian people and insists that "to insure stability in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship and the viability of the emerging Palestinian entity, geographical contiguity must be allowed for on most of the West Bank." The Likud party stands in stark contrast, blatantly stating that it will "oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state." It "seeks to extend Israeli sovereignty over a majority of the territory on the West Bank" with the result of "preventing the creation of a viable, contiguous Palestinian geographical entity."

About Jerusalem, both parties pledge to maintain the city as the united capital of Israel, but Labor tolerates Palestinian residents and even grants them rights in their quarters of the city, while Likud has systematically encouraged repopulation of Arab quarters of the city such as Ras El Amud and Silwan by Jews. In the particular situation of Har Homa, a hill overlooking East Jerusalem, both parties consider it to be within the boundaries of Jerusalem, but Labor advocated withholding any development out of recognition of the consequences of such unilateral action before a decision in the final status talks. Obviously, however, Likud chose to initiate the development program there, which had disastrous effects as noted above.

Finally is the question of military armament and development of weapons. The very introduction to the Labor party platform envisions a reality where "resources will no longer be committed to the arms race," while the Likud platform quite explicitly lays a plan for earnest weapons development: "Israel will draw on all its science and technology potential to develop special weapons systems in order to… prepare the Israel Defense Forces for the battlefield of the next century" ("Labor Platform" and "Likud Platform").

The question remains: why did Labor lose out in the Prime Minister election in May 1996? First, it is important to remember that May 1996 was by no means a total loss for Labor. Indeed, as noted before, the Labor party was actually granted more seats in the Knesset than Likud. And even in the Prime Minister election, the race was unbelievably close. According to two different polls taken three days before the elections, results indicated a 4-5 percentage point difference, with Peres in the lead (Copans and Xinhua News Agency, 26 May 1996). In the end, Peres received 49.5 percent of the vote, while Netanyahu edged by not even a whole percentage point higher with 50.4 percent. The vote was decided by a difference of a mere 30,000 ballots (Bickerton and Klausner, 300)!

With a situation this close, the decision could very well have been made on the basis of very timely events in the weeks and days before the elections, and not on the basis of general policies as described above. Detracting from the support of Peres was Operation Grapes of Wrath in April 1996. The ill-fated spectacle, which included a mistaken Israeli bombing of a UN outpost sheltering displaced civilians, resulted in chastisement of Israel, a personal victory for Syria’s Assad, vindication of Hizbollah’s ongoing battle against Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, damaged relations with moderate Arab regimes, and outrage of Arab Israelis. Operation Grapes of Wrath did little to inspire confidence in Peres’ leadership among the general Israeli population, and particularly cost Peres many Arab Israeli votes (Bickerton and Klausner, 296-298, 300).

Additionally, a wave of Hamas suicide bombings in February and March 1996 severely undermined Israeli trust in Peres’ ability to maintain security, despite his measures in closing the territories and the Grapes of Wrath strikes against Hizbollah targets in Lebanon (Bickerton and Klausner, 299, and Levey).

Finally, lukewarm perceptions of Peres as an individual, as opposed to policy issues or concerns about recent events, also played into Netanyahu’s hands. Peres, 73, and Netanyahu, 47, were clearly from different generations. Peres was an experienced politician, part of the old guard in Israeli politics, whereas Netanyahu was younger, more charismatic, and more inspiring (Bickerton and Klausner, 300, and Levey).

Polls taken less than six months before the elections showed that an overwhelming 70% of Israelis were in favor of the peace process and the progress it had made under Rabin (Bickerton and Klausner, 291). Overall, there seems to have been popular support for the peace process in general and the progress it had made under the Labor party, but the negative opinions of Peres himself combined with the many timely events mentioned above together shifted support away from Labor.

Netanyahu "played the terrorism card and won" (Bickerton and Klausner, 300). He campaigned on a slogan of "peace with security," blaming the recent terrorist attacks on his assertion that the Labor party was racing too quickly towards peace (Levey). His assertion seems to make little sense, for if the Israeli government were rushing quickly towards peace and thus appeasing the Palestinians, it seems that Palestinian terrorism against Israel would have subsided rather than increased. Nonetheless, Netanyahu was able to effectively place the blame for recent calamities upon the failure of the ruling Labor government. The support garnered from the general public as a result of this initiative, combined with the en bloc vote of ultra-orthodox Jews for their coalition partners the Likud party (Levey), allowed Netanyahu to ride to a narrow victory in May 1996.

The various incidents described above by way of introduction – the opening of the Hasmonean Tunnel in September 1996, the Hebron agreement in January 1997, the Har Homa settlement decision in March 1997, Netanyahu’s domestic political scandal in April 1997, and the government-sponsored Hebron celebration in April 1998 – have each had a significant impact on Israeli public opinion since Netanyahu’s election.

The opening of the tunnel and the resulting deterioration of Israeli-Palestinian relations, undermining of relations with other Arab countries, and condemnation of Israel by the world community appalled many Israelis. A poll taken on 30 September 1996, six days after the opening of the tunnel and in the midst of the resulting riots, demonstrates that 54% of the population thought it was unwise for the government to have opened the tunnel at that time, that 57% were not satisfied with Netanyahu’s performance in the wake of the tunnel opening, and that 63.5% concluded that Arafat had gained more politically from the crisis than Netanyahu (Shvakim Panorama Marketing Company).

The Hebron agreement of January 1997 seems to have been the only major event that resulted in positive public opinion toward Netanyahu; it also is his solitary major accomplishment thus far in terms of the progress of the peace process. When the agreement came before the Knesset for ratification, it passed by an overwhelming margin of 87 to 17 (Bickerton and Klausner, 304).

Like the tunnel opening, the settlement initiatives in Har Homa in March 1997 resulted in rioting and further terrorist attacks (Bickerton and Klausner, 304), undoubtedly decreasing public satisfaction with Netanyahu’s policies. Furthermore, the revelation a month later of fraud regarding a political appointment dealt a harsh blow to Netanyahu’s credibility in the eyes of the nation (Bickerton and Klausner, 305).

In the meantime, public opinion continued to show support for the Oslo accords. Furthermore, in the interest of a lasting peace, a majority of the people supported concessions that went beyond what Netanyahu and his Likud party said they were willing to give: the creation of an independent Palestinian state and a degree of Palestinian sovereignty over parts of East Jerusalem. A poll taken in August 1997 revealed 59% support for the former and 51% for the latter (Marcus).

The final in this series of events was a recent demonstration in response to a provocative Israeli government-sponsored Passover / 50^th anniversary celebration in Hebron. Members of the activist group Peace Now demonstrated peacefully but effectively against the celebration in Hebron. Naomi Chazan, an opposition member of the Knesset, called the celebration "a state-sponsored celebration in a place that represents everything that Israel cannot and should not stand for" (CNN 12 April 1998). This demonstration shows that a significant portion of the Israeli populace is opposed to continued Israeli presence, military or otherwise, in such clearly Palestinian cities as Hebron, and that it will no longer tolerate the government’s stubborn insistence on asserting Israeli hegemony in such areas.

The Israeli public has begun to criticize Netanyahu’s performance as Prime Minister as erratic and inconsistent. One journalist described Netanyahu’s policies as "zig-zag," commenting on the seven month swing from the September 1996 Hasmonean tunnel fiasco to the pragmatism and progress of the Hebron agreements in January 1997 back to the headstrong ideology of non-cooperation evidenced by Har Homa in March 1997 (Rosenblum). Furthermore, the failure of Netanyahu’s erratic and generally non-compliant policies to bring about the promised "peace with security" is frustrating the public, as demonstrated in the recent Hebron protest.

Distribution of Knesset support for politicians of Netanyahu’s Likud and the opposing Labor also indicate the level of public agreement or disagreement with Netanyahu and Likud policies. In the Knesset Netanyahu himself has only a 61-59 parliamentary majority (CNN 27 March 1998). Perhaps more revealing, though, is the March 1998 reelection of President Weizmann, a member of the Labor party. Weizmann won 63 votes as compared to Likud member and Netanyahu favorite Amor’s 49 votes. Polls suggest that Weizmann has the backing of more than 70% of the population, and his supporters even include several key Likud lawmakers. In addition to the obvious difference in parties, Weizmann’s reelection and public support further reflect on Netanyahu because of Weizmann’s public criticism of Netanyahu. Weizmann publicly criticizes Netanyahu’s lack of progress in the peace process, and has prodded him to do more; indeed, during U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s visit to Israel in the fall of 1997, Weizmann told her that she should "knock heads together" to get the stalled negotiations moving again (CNN 4 March 1998). Hence Weizmann’s support both from the public and in the Knesset lends public endorsement to his attitude that Netanyahu should be doing more in terms of the peace process.

As illustrated by the Hebron demonstration of 12 April 1998, activist groups of private citizens such as Peace Now reflect the sentiments of various sectors of the public. Peace Now is a group that formed in opposition to the "Greater Israel" policy of previous Likud governments. Peace Now also advocates for the cessation of settlement expansion, Palestinian political independence, territorial compromise ("land for peace"), and political equity for Jews and Palestinians in Jerusalem (Peace Now). During the Rabin years, the Peace Now movement lost its energy as the Rabin government adopted its policies and eliminated the need for its existence, but under Netanyahu the organization is making a comeback (Markus). Peace Now opinion regarding Netanyahu is that he has been detrimental to the progress of the peace process. In an article in April 1997, Peace Now founder and political director Mark Rosenblum asserted: "The substance of the Oslo accords looks increasingly incompatible with the policies of Netanyahu… Either the Oslo accords or the Prime Minister may be on the verge of being relegated to the past" (Rosenblum). Later, in October 1997, Galia Golan, a spokeswoman for Peace Now, said: " People feel that all his policies, taken together, are just leading us further and further away from peace" (Markus). The opinions of Peace Now are not simply those of an isolated group, however. Peace Now has found evidence of significant public support for its agenda, as in the September 1996 survey mentioned before which found 79.5 % of the population in favor of the continuation of the implementation of the Oslo accords (Shvakim Panorama Marketing Company). Additionally, through aggressive public outreach and highly visible demonstrations, Peace Now has also expanded its own active membership (Markus).

Though Netanyahu has had one major victory regarding the progress of the peace process – Hebron – the public response to many other incidents, such as the Hasmonean tunnel incident and the reaction to Har Homa settlement, has been largely critical of his approach to the peace process and his insensitive treatment of the sensitive issues involved. In more than one incident, rioting and conflict resulting from these actions has threatened the all-important Israeli security. Public opinion has slowly but surely begun to turn decisively against Netanyahu.

* * * * * * * *

Because of continued quarrels between Netanyahu and Arafat regarding the fulfillment of minor conditions on each side, the peace negotiations remain at a relative stalemate, despite attempts by the U.S. to provoke cooperation. Under Netanyahu, the government continues poorly thought out provocative actions such as the Hasmonean tunnel incident and Har Homa, and as in those situations continues to incite minor violent confrontations between the Palestinians or Arabs and Israeli citizens. Eventually, as in those situations, Israelis become more and more fearful of the threat to their security that these skirmishes cause. Added frustration with the lack of progress in the peace process and resulting reality of there being no permanent end in sight provokes many Israeli voters to swing towards the left, willing to try another approach than Netanyahu’s, which has continued to be relatively unsuccessful, and elect Ehud Barak.

Works Cited or Consulted

Barak, Ehud, profile; http://www.israel.org/sites.html (under "Israel Labour Party" and "Head of Israel Labour Party").

Bickerton, Ian J., and Klausner, Carla L.; A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict; published by Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 1998.

CNN, 4 March 1998; "Weizmann Re-Elected as Israel’s President"; http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9803/04/israel.president/.

CNN, 19 March 1998; "Netanyahu Unable to Stave Off U.S. Peace Initiative"; http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9803/19/us.mideast/index.html.

CNN, 27 March 1998; "Ross Reveals New U.S. Peace Plan to Arafat, Netanyahu"; http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9803/27/mideast.meeting/.

CNN, 29 March 1998; "Israel: No Pullbacks Without Palestinian Security Commitments"; http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9803/29/middle.east.update/index.html.

CNN, 12 April 1998; "Protesters Take Aim at Israeli, Palestinian Policies"; http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9804/12/hebron.protest/index.html.

Copans, Laurie; "Expert: Israeli Race Too Close to Call"; U.P.I., 26 May 1996.

Interim Agreement Between Israel and the PLO, 28 September 1995; available on pg 307-310, Bickerton and Klausner (see above).

Labor Party Platform; http://www.israel.org/sites.html (under "Israel Labour Party" and "Peace Watch"); published May 1997.

Levey, Zach, Political Science Professor, University of Haifa, Israel; personal communication, 15 April 1998.

Likud Party Platform; http://www.israel.org/sites.html (under "Likud Party", "Likud Platform", and "1996 Likud Party Platform"); published 1996.

Markus, Aliza; "Israel’s Peace Movement Fights to Regain Posture Among Public"; http://www.jta.org/oct97/13-kipp.htm; published 13 October 1997.

Netanyahu, Benjamin, profile; http://www.cnn.com/resources/newsmakers/world/middle.east/netanyahu.html.

"New Rules, New Games"; Time, 147:34-35, 10 June 1996.

Peace Now; "Statement on the Israeli Elections"; http://www.peacenow.org/news/docs/bibi.htm; published 31 May 1996.

Perlmutter, Amos; "The Splinter Factor"; The New York Times, 1 June 1996, pg 19.

Rabin, Yitzhak; Remarks at Tel Aviv Peace Rally, 4 November 1995.

Rimon, Tzipora, Consul General of Israel to the Midwest; speech at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 14 April 1998.

Rosenblum, Mark; "Peace Process Status Report – Oslo and Netanyahu: An Odd Couple in Crisis"; http://www.peacenow.org/news/docs/status5.htm; published 25 April 1997.

Schiff, Ze’ev; "Who Failed?"; http://www.peacenow.org/hebrew/docs/failed.htm; published 4 October 1996.

Shvakim Panorama Marketing Company; "Poll: Israeli Public Attitudes Toward the Recent Israeli-Palestinian Crisis"; http://www.peacenow.org/hebrew/docs/poll.htm; poll conducted 30 September 1996.

Xinhua News Agency, "Peres, Netanyahu Clash Head-On in Israel’s Pre-Election Debate"; 26 May 1996.