Since its own war, the Lebanese Government has demonstrated little real soverneigty because of several exterior conflicting forces. Israel and Syria have used Lebanon as a buffer state and battleground. Israeli soldiers occupy the security zone in southern Lebanon with stateless Palestinians in refugee camps as their neighbors. Hizballah rebels in the south urge the government to help free Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails, provide welfare services for many Lebanese in the south, and work toward the elimination of Israel from Lebanon. Lastly, Syria maintains a strong military in Lebanon that has been recognized as a major presence. In addition to this, the Lebanese Government must consider Syrian interests when formulating Lebanon's domestic and foreign policies because the two countries signed a Treaty of Brotherhood, Co-ordination and Co-operation in 1991 covering economic, political and security spheres.

International politics is a broad topic with many sub-topics of study. I will be attempting to use analyses of core concepts and theories as a framework under which the discussion will unfold. This paper is written under specific pretexts with active negotiations developing within the Middle East. Those pretexts include: Israeli soldiers have withdrawn from southern Lebanon, peaceful relations have developed between Lebanon and Israel and negotiations between Syria and Israel are being established. Major details of my analysis will center on this last pretext, including such factors as the Golan Heights, relevant history, and foreign involvement, all of which led to Israeli-Syrian negotiations. For additional support of my hypothesis, I will explore the actors, terrorism, and critical questions.

Historical Conflicts

History is relevant for this paper because it demonstrates the ongoing conflict in the region. Examples of this conflict are seen throughout both the Six-Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. For the purposes of this paper, the history of the conflict will include events shortly before these wars up to the present.

In 1964, "An Israeli project to divert water from the Sea of Gaulee along the Aqueduct to the Negev desert led Syria to call for joint Arab action against the Israeli effort" [1]. This Syria-prompted action was followed by the creation of the Arab League, which then established the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). This organization used Syria-backing of military aid to conduct raids and terrorist acts against Israel-commonly from the strategic location of the Golan Heights [2].

These acts of violence devastated the Israeli government that fought back futilely. While the Israeli government was ailing from attacks, Arab states, specifically Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, became trusted allies with one another. On June 1, 1967, the Israeli government fell; however, under the leadership of Moshe Dayn, Israel resurrected itself, stronger than before. On June 5, Israel, under fear of security conditions launched a preemptive strike against the Arab allies and gained the advantage over them. "As a result of the war, Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This was the turning point in Arab-Israeli relations. Before the war the key issues were quite simple: the final settlement of Israel's borders and the ultimate disposition of the Arab refugees. After the war several new issues emerged. Among these were the terms by which the Sinai Peninsula would be returned to Egypt, and the Golan Heights to Syria; the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; [and] the status of Jerusalem [3]..." Also, the Six Day War attracted international attention resulting in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. This resolution has had long standing effects and is a sustaining influence on Arab-Israeli relations.

The lasting outcome of the war in 1967 has presented a scenario showing the bitter hatred between the people of Israel and the people of Syria. Nevertheless, peace is a plausible goal regardless how hard it is to achieve; Hafiz al-Assad stated, "We want this peace, but I can tell you now that the road is long [4]." If peace with Syria is what Israel is working for, and if the Syrians wish to end the conflict with Israel, a chance to resolve the no-peace, no-war scenario is possible.

The Golan Heights: A Major Point of Contention

Hafiz al-Assad is currently the Syrian leader and has been since 1970. During the Six-Day War in 1967 he was commander of the Syrian airforce and therefore Assad has often been blamed for the loss of the Golan Heights. As a ruler, Assad is considered a rational and cunning head of state. Also, he is thought to be averse to gambles, but this does not always hold true in regard to the peace process. "Assad is fearful that the international community will accept Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights as permanent: because of this fear, he may be willing to take risks in the peace process in order to effect the return of the Golan [5].

Of coarse, a major point of contention between Israel and Syria has been the Golan Heights. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 called for Israel to return the land to attain peace in the region. Unsatisfied with this, neither Syria nor Israel has attempted to budge from their positions, and since 1973, have been living in a no-peace, no-war position until just recently. The deadlock over the Golan Heights stems from each state's respective bargaining strategies and reference points of interest. An important factor is the fact that when states have been in conflict for a lengthy period of time, issues become the key topics and the actual territory becomes increasingly symbolic.

Israel's Reasons of Distrust

There are three principle reasons as to why Israel does not trust Syria. These reasons have continually been a stumbling block for any diplomatic actions taken towards peace. Those reasons are:

Constant Syrian aggression toward all its neighbors, headed by Israel.
Syrian refusal to recognize the sovereignty of its neighbors as the fundamental principle of "Greater Syria" concept, which also includes Israel and Jordan to the Gulf of Aquaba in the Red Sea.
The nature of the Syrian regime and those at its head. [6]

Israel's main concern in dealing with Syria is its own security, and Israel views the Golan Heights as a means to this security.

Golan Heights as a Strategic Point

Currently, a tactical balance exists on the Golan Heights and all of its borders are defensible. The topographical height makes it easy to detect and respond rapidly to any Syrian military effort [7]. Yitzak Rabin summed up the importance of the Golan by stating, "it is inconceivable that even in peacetime we should go down from the Golan. Whoever thinks of such a possibility is forsaking the security of Israel." [8]

Israel has learned from the Six-Day War and countless terrorist attacks the prominence of the Golan Heights as a strategic point. By occupying the Golan Heights, Israel confirms that it will not be attacked from a height advantage. This increases the security of Israel that is the position it maintains.

The Peace Process and the Stalemate

Syria also values the Golan Heights and sees it as a means towards a larger goal. Syria is determined that the entire peace process must go through the Golan. Both states have theoretically come to an impasse because of their respective bargaining strategies and reference points. Each wishes to acquire what the other denies. This discord marks adverse bargaining and negotiation strategies. Traditionally, one should not bargain over positions, but rather, bargain over interests; separate the people from the problem and search for options with mutual gain [9]. This synopsis plays into pressing questions: Why did Syria agree to negotiate after years of deadlock? What does the future have in store for this volatile relationship?

During the previous Labour-dominated government, the then Prime Minister Yitzhek Rabin had expressed readiness to negotiate the terms for turning over the Golan Heights to the Syrians. At the time, Hafiz Assad had declined to cooperate, however, since the formation of the Netanyahu government; he has expressed an interest to negotiate the return of the Golan Heights. But the Netanyahu government became less than willing [10].

The United States and Syria as a Rogue

In the post-Cold War era, the United States has confirmed many questions of its preeminent power. Syria continues to be viewed with distrust by the US despite its active involvement in the Gulf Conflict, anti-Iraq coalition, and its subsequent participation in United States sponsored Middle East peace talks. The US's distrust emanates from a number of things: clashes with Israel in 1967, 1973, 1982 and its continuing anti-Israel military posture; Assad's support for radical Palestinian organizations and other groups linked by the US government to terrorist activities; and Syrian efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. [11]

Syria's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, most notably chemical and biological arms and ballistic missiles, is especially worrisome because it remains the last front-line Arab country still formally in a state of war with Israel. Those deadly weapons are just minutes away from causing potentially incalculable harm to Israel. The Chinese government, since the late 1980s, has been involved in Syria's growing ballistic missile capability. The PRC (Peoples Republic of China) is believed to have sold Damascus eighty or more M-9 ballistic missiles which have a range of 600 kilometers and the capability to deliver their payloads to all points within Israel together with more than thirty launchers. [12]

Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau wished to clarify the US interest in the Middle East with this statement, "They [US interests] include: -first, and foremost, achieving a just, comprehensive, secure and durable Arab-Israeli peace-helping. Maintaining the security and well being of Israel--preventing regional conflicts and supporting friendly nations--...--suppressing terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction--containing rogue regimes in Iran, Iraq, and Libya... advancing respect for human rights, and rule of law and open, participatory societies." [13]

With these interests in mind, the US has added Syria to a list of countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism. This categorization of Syria comes with the label of 'Rogue State' [14]. Syria and other Rogue states have received sanctions as a consequence. The most significant sanction, from a military point of view, is that these Rogues have attempted to circumvent existing international restraints on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Sanctions, The USSR, Domestic Fears

The basic features of these sanctions are: "prohibition of US economic assistance and military sales, controls on dual use equipment which could support terrorism or military activities, and prohibition on US Government support for multilateral economic assistance [15]." These sanctions helped plunge Syria's economy in a downward spiral. President Assad, Syria's leader, is well aware of how to rectify this situation. The 104th Congress H. R. 3890 House passed a resolution stating that Syria would be restored to a most favored nation status, and be removed from the list of Rogue States in the event that the "President determines that Syria is participating in the Middle East peace process in good faith." [16]

Alone, the sanctions placed on Syria have never been enough to bring it to peace negotiations; nevertheless, Syria has come to the bargaining table. "During the Cold War, Syria received billions of dollars worth of aid from the Soviet Union... ...during the 1980's 95 percent of Syria's arms imports came from the former USSR... If the Assad regime once aspired to destroy Israel with military force, the demise of Syria's super power arms dealer now makes such a goal clearly unrealistic; a peaceful solution has thus become more appealing [17]." It is very rational for Assad to seek out methods other than force to obtain the Golan Heights.

The crumbling of the Soviet Union not only affects Syria's military, but also its agriculture and economic interests. The Soviet Union was a primary market for the sale and distribution of goods. In addition, the Soviet Union used to supply irrigation technology and important foodstuffs to the people of Syria in need. The pressure imposed upon the Syrian people has created direct pressure on the government. Syria now must look to the West for aid.

The domestic situation of Syria is the third leg to the tripod of reasons why Syria began negotiations with Israel in 1991. One single factor could not have pressed Syria into talks with Israel, but the combined factors of the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States' sanctions, and domestic problems threatening Assad's power, have all lead to the opportunity to enter negotiations.

Assad fears being displaced as leader of both the Arab world and within Syria. The increase in fundamental Muslim government takeovers, such as Algeria, and the assassination attempt on Egypt's President Mubarek has Assad worried. As a Middle Eastern dominant force, Assad wishes to maintain his and Syria's dominance over Lebanon. Whenever its grip over Lebanon is challenged, Syria's occupation takes a harsh turn. In fact, there are three issues which the Syrians are very zealous about in Lebanon: anything that deals with Syrians' armed presence, news or views associated with Syrians' corruption, and President Assad and his family is a taboo subject. The Syrians deal very harshly with any transgression into these three categories. Syria's presence in Lebanon may be seen as justified by the 1989 Taif agreement that helped conclude Lebanon's civil war. However, this also may be considered an example of Syria's idea of "Greater Syria."

Assad's Infuence and Support

In the Middle East region, two major allies of Syria, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Jordan have signed pace accords with Israel. Syria has supported the PLO from its origins. With the implementation of the Palestinian state, the PLO leaders will not depend on, nor will they be as influenced by the Syrian government as they once were. Like the PLO, Jordan was also once thought of as an instrument of the Syrian government, but because of the increase in Israeli relations, Syria is also less affecting Jordan.

Within his own country, Assad is aware that he is walking on thin ice in respect to his power. Assad is part of the secular government that makes up a very small minority within Syria. It is the Sunni Muslims that make up a 90 percent majority and do not wish to create a peace with Israel. The people of Syria have been much more anti-Israel than their own government. However, the entire state of Syria holds sovereignty very dear and wishes to regain the Golan Heights.

The Endowment Factor and the Golan Heights

Syria's strong feelings toward the Golan Heights can be partially explained by the endowment factor. The endowment effect is "a phenomenon that enhances the pain of loss [18]." The assets that Syria has lost are the Golan Heights and sovereignty. The endowment effect appropriately describes Syria's situation; its loss of assets leads to an increase in the desire to regain the Golan Heights. Assad must determine which is the reference point of the majority of his nation: If the Sunni reference point is the Golan Heights, then Assad must obtain the Golan Heights. If the Sunni reference point is to stay clear of peace with Israel then Assad must comply. The personal reference point for Assad is maintaining his own power. Assad must decide what the Sunni reference point is.

Assad has taken risks by negotiating to acquire the Golan Heights. If he succeeds, his obsession to leave a legacy will be fulfilled and he will be viewed as a national hero. Currently, the only conceivable option to do this requires a guaranteed peace. For peace to occur, Syria needs to demonstrate that the Golan Heights are not essential for Israeli security. Israel demands that peace with Syria must contain a secure foundation. "These four pillars [for a secure foundation of peace] are recognized borders, security arrangements, peaceful relations, and phased implementation. These stipulations include the reduction of Syrian forces, the establishment of demilitarized zones, the creation of early warning stations, and the use of effective monitoring (vis-à-vis a multinational Force of Observers)." [19]

A Relative-Gains Concept and the Egyption Example

Previously, Syria has insisted on preconditions to any negotiations with Israel. Syria values the Golan Heights as a must in the peace process, a 'relative-gains' concept. Walid Mualim, chief negotiator for Syria in the previous session of Israeli-Syrian peace talks, commented, "If we are not certain that the end of the negotiations will be a return of the Golan to the lines of 4 June 1967, there is no reason for us to go for talks [20]." Syrian President Hafiz Assad told visiting US Senator Arlen Specter that he did not want to start from scratch in negotiations with Israel. [21] "Netanyahu (Israel's Prime Minister) has said such a move [giving into Syria's preconditions] would compromise Israel's security." [22]

There are many incentives for the peace process to move forward, but because of preconditions and unsatisfactory peace agreements, the negotiations have come to a standstill before they have had a chance to begin. According to Professor Ze'ev Maoz, Director of the Jaffe center for Strategic Studies, "The longer that the freeze in negotiations continues, the more Syria may be motivated to initiate a war to thaw it [23]." Wars are not always started to be won, and war and peace are not always incompatible.

In July of 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint communiqué that hardly mentioned the Middle East and did not refer at all to UN Resolution 242. President Sadat of Egypt viewed this action by the Superpowers as an attempt to freeze the situation in the volatile Middle East. Sadat, wished to retain its military options: "He [Sadat] reasoned that even a limited war would help him achieve his aims by at least forcing the international community to turn its attention once again to the Middle East [24]." Sadat saw the United States as the only force that could press Israel into negotiations and force the implications of UN Resolution 242, specifically, the return of the Sinai.

On October 6, 1973, Egypt, with the help of Syria, attacked Israel in what has become known as the Yom Kippur War. The Israeli and Egyptian forces were backed heavily by the United States and Soviet Union respectively. The cost of this war was great and Israel suffered severely, yet was obviously the military victor. Nevertheless, Sadat had achieved his goals, and had attracted international interest. UN Security Council Resolution 338 secured the cease-fire and called for direct negotiations between the parties concerned under situations that implemented Resolution 242: land-for-peace.

Israeli Withdrawal as the Stimulate

Instead of following Sadat risky example of initiating a limited war to gain back lands lost in the Six-Day War, Assad can use the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon to initiate negotiations. Under the pretext that Israel has withdrawn from Lebanon, Syria may view this as an attempt by Israel to divide the Syrian-Lebanese partnership or even as an attempt to avoid facilitating negotiations concerning the Golan Heights. Contrary, Syria should look at this event as an opportunity for diplomacy, using this to its advantage in two important ways. First, because of Syria's close relationship to Lebanon, Syria can allow Israeli-Lebanese negotiations to unthaw the stalemate between Israel and Syria and actually stimulate diplomacy between the two states. Second, through maintaining troops in Lebanon while at the same time refraining from posing as a military threat to Israel and ensuring peace throughout the Israeli-Lebanese boarder, Syria will demonstrate that Israel's security is not at risk. Later, Syria will be able to use this to better negotiate to gain back the Golan Heights.

The Shrinking Window of Opportunity

Assad's health is a concern, and it is questionable how much longer Assad will live. In November 1983 Assad suffered a heart attack. Currently, Assad has been treated for prostate cancer and there have been reports that his health is again fading. In February 1997, Syrian officials had to deny Western press reports that President Assad, who had recently undergone surgery, was seriously ill [25].

Another pressing concern Assad has to consider is the Israeli and Palestinian relationship. As the two parties' conflict draws toward a conclusion, Syria's window of opportunity to regain the Golan Heights is shrinking. If the Palestinian issue is concluded, Israel will have returned all the lands gained during the 1967 War except the Golan Heights. Israel has always regarded that UN 242 only requires territories be returned to the extent that Israel has secure borders. Once the Palestinian issue is resolved, the international community will relax its pressure on Israel to return the Golan Heights to the Arab state. The Arab community may perceive that Israel has fulfilled its obligations to return all lands acquired in the 1967 War and has complied to UN Resolution 242 and 338: land-for-peace. The Golan Heights issue will then only be seriously challenged by the Syrians.

Brinkmanship and Proxy Wars

Syria has been trying to increase its bargaining position with Israel through the practice of brinkmanship and tacit support of terrorist groups in the past 'no -war, no-peace scenario'. Brinkmanship is a passive use of force and is defined as "confrontations in which states challenge important commitments of adversaries in the expectation that the adversaries will back down [26]." Although, by definition, brinkmanship intentionally creates a crisis situation, "Brinkmanship succeeds only if the initiator achieves his goals without provoking war." [27]

Israeli intelligence sources claim that Syria maintains 40,000 soldiers in Lebanon and dominates the country's foreign policy. It is widely believed that Syria wishes to keep Israel "embroiled in Lebanon to pressure Israel to return the Golan Heights to Syria [28]." In addition, Syria has been using groups such as the Hizbullah to wage 'proxy wars' and to keep the Golan Heights item on the agenda of the peace process. The Hizbullah is an organization of various radical Shi'ite groups that wish to expel Israel from southern Lebanon where Israel has set up a buffer zone to protect its northern settlements from Katyusha rocket attacks. The Syrian military keeps a short leash on the Lebanese government; allowing and even encourage Iran to supply the Hizbullah with military aid. For this reason, the Hizbullah posed a constant threat to Israeli forces occupying southern Lebanon.

Hizbullah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, claimed that "the latest attacks merely continued the battle against Israeli occupation--a battle that Iran, Syria and the Lebanese government support but do not control --and had no relation to political developments [29]." Nonetheless, Israel perceives that Syria controls all of Lebanon, and has enough troops there to keep the Hizbullah in check. "After the Grapes of Wrath they [Syria] have 100 percent control of Hizbullah."[30]

Syria has been no stranger to using proxies to achieve its goals. In April 1985, heavy fighting occurred in Muslim West Beirut between the Shi'ite Amal militia and the Druze, and the Sunni Murabitoun militia with its Palestinian allies. This affirmed Syria's attempts to prevent Yesser Arafat from reestablishing a power-base in Beirut by using the Amal against him [31].

Swaggering

It is conceivable that Assad will implement swaggering until a defined Syrian-Israeli agreement. Much like brinkmanship, swaggering is a passive form of force. Swaggering is a category for the different uses of force. "Swaggering is in part a residual category, the deployment of military power for purposes other than defense, deterrence, or compliance. Force is not aimed directly at dissuading another state from attacking, at repelling attacks, or at compelling it to do something specific. Swaggering almost always involves the peaceful use of force and is expressed usually in one of two ways: displaying one's military power at military exercises and national demonstrations, and buying or building the era's most prestigious weapons [32]." Since 1973, Syria has increased its military capabilities with chemical warfare capabilities [33], ground to ground missiles [34], and weapons of mass destruction [35]. Although its effort in the weapons of mass destruction area have not attracted as much attention as those of other regional rogues, Syria has long sought a strategic deterrent to Israel's own nuclear and chemical capabilities.

Swaggering is the type of instrument which Syrian leader Assad wishes to engage in. "A state or statesman swaggers in order to look and feel more powerful and important, to be taken seriously by others in the councils of international decision making, and to enhance the nation's image in the eyes of others. If its image is enhanced, the nation's defense, deterrent, and compelling capabilities may also be enhanced; but swaggering is not undertaken solely or even primarily for these specific purposes. Swaggering is pursued because it offers to bring prestige 'on the cheap.'" [36]

Syria currently has forces in the area between Damascus and the Golan Heights plateau, and are kept at a high state of readiness during normal times. Military training exercises can provide perfect cover for a quick strike with overwhelming force very similar to Egypt's actions in 1973 [37]. This threat causes Israel to remembering Sadat's actions in 1973 and provides Israel the incentive to negotiate to gain security through means other than military.

Negotiation is the Better Move

Assad's intentions may vary, but Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon might shake up the peace process enough for Israel and Syrian to come to the negotiation table. Time is running out for Syria, especially for Assad, to gain back the Golan Heights. It is a risk for the Syrian Government to negotiate with Israel, however, it is a necessary for the future goals of both parties: Syria to regain sovereignty, and Israel to maintain its security. Syria has never gone to war against Israel on its own and the likelihood for Syria to initiate a limited war is minimal and would do so only to achieve some kind of symbolic significance.

Foreign involvement in Syria's actions, like any Middle Eastern confrontation, will always be a crucial variable. Saudi Arabia has been increasing its military recently, however, supporting Syria in any confrontation against Israel is doubtful. Saudi Arabia will not risk breaking its security alliance with the West. Iraq is still hurting from the Gulf War and is ideologically split with Syria. Syria's strong allies during the Six-Day War, Egypt and Jordan have both made peace treaties with Israel and are not interested in war; the West has rewarded them with benefits.

Understandably, Syria does not desire any large confrontation with Israel because of the consequences of a full-scale war in this region is detrimental. It will be a long road through the peace process, but if Syria takes advantage of Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon and is successful in reshuffling the stalemate, it may just be successful at reestablishing negotiations. The out come of those negotiations are not for this paper to tell. One must make note of previous examples, the reference points of the actors involved, and the critical questions. Future peace agreements are based on past precedents. History does have a way of repeating itself and in the Middle East history runs long and deep.

ENDNOTES:

[1] The Middle East. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1994. 26.

[2] Ibid, 26

[3] Ibid, 29

[4] Kirisci, Kemal. "Democratic Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East: A Preliminary Model For Cooperation Among 'Like-Minded' Countries." University of Michigan: Ann Arbor, MI, October 31, 1997. (Al-Ahram Weekly, p. 2, 8-14 May 1997).

[5] Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

[6] "What is the Origin of Israel's Total lack of Faith in Syria?" Peace with the Golan

Available: http://www.golan.org.il/syria.html#6

[7] "There can be No Territorial Compromise in the Golan Heights" Peace with the Golan.

Available: http://www.golan.org.il/security.htm

[8] "A Convenient Case of Amnesia," Shmuel Katz. Peace with the Golan

Available: http://www.golan.org.il/article8.html

[9] Tanter, Raymond. "353 Winter 1997 Syllabus." University of Michigan, 1997

Available: http://www.umich.edu/~rtanter

[10] Kirisci

[11] Klare, Michael. Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy. Hill and Wang, New York, 1995. Pg. 142-149.

[12] Gafney, Frank J. Jr. "China Arms the Rogues." Middle East Quarterly. September 1997, Volume IV, Number 3. Pg. 36.

[13] As Assistant Secretary of State, he delivered a speech on the USG's position in regard to the Middle East. Pelletreau, Robert H. "U.S. Policy Toward the Middle East: Steering a Steady Course." speech before the Chautauqua Institution (On Line): New York, 21 Aug. 1996.

Available: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/960821.html

[14] Klare, Michael. Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995. 148.

[15] Ambassador Wilcox is the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism and provides testimony justifying the categorization of Syria as a rogue nation, a nation in support of terrorism. He includes an outline of the measures the USG has taken in its attempts to deter the Syrian government. Wilcox, Philip C., Jr. "Syrian Support for Terrorism." Testimony before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives (On Line): Washington, DC, 25 July 1996. 1.

Available: http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/960725.html

[16] 104th CONGRESS, 2d Session. H. R. 3890

Available: gopher://tad.micro.umn.edu:70/00/bills/104/1/10438901/billtext

[17] Hartman, Harris. "Last of a Breed: Syria Examines Its Role in the New Middle East." The Harvard International Review (Spring 1994): 45.

[18] Tanter, Raymond. "Prospect Theory: Choosing to Cooperate." Class Notes, 472Not11.Doc. University of Michigan, 8 Sept. 1996.

Available: http://www.umich.edu/~rtanter

[19] Chaim Schacham is the Israeli Consul for Press and Information to the Midwest. Schacham,Chaim. "The Israel-Syria Negotiations-What Are We Trying to Achieve?" Midwest Jewish Week (March 1995)

Available: http://www.israelemb.org/chicago/syria.htm

[20] CONFER PS353. Confer: 52, Ali Ahmad. Jerusalem Post. Winter 1997.

[21] "Netanyahu seeks to revive Israel-Syria talks." September 10, 1996. CNN Interactive, World News.

[22] Ibid

[23] CONFER PS353. Confer: 5, Professor Tanter. Professor Ze'ev Maoz, Director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies: 1. Winter 1997.

[24] I. J. Bickerton, C. Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict Second Edition. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1995, p.172.

[25] Europa 1997. Pages 3142-3151. Europa Publications Limited 1997. Pg. 3145.

[26] Lebow, Richard N. "The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?" In Psychology & Deterrence, Ed Robert Jervis, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, 180. The Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 1985.

[27] Lebow, Richard N. "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War." In Psychology & Deterrence, Ed Robert Jervis, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, 119. The Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 1985.

[28] "Lebanon rejects Israeli conditional withdrawal offer." CNN Interactive, September 26, 1997.

[29] "The Hizbullah Conundrum: Israel and Lebanon" The Economist, March 30, 1996.

[30] "Israeli official says Iran has rearmed Hizbullah," Mon. 27 Jan 1997, c-reuters@clari.net, Reuters.

[31] Europa Pg. 3143

[32] Robert J. Art offers four categories for the uses of force. He classifies all uses of force as either deterrence, defense, compellence, or swaggering. Art, Robert J. "The Four Functions of Force." In International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, 137. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992.

[33] Syrian Missiles: A Review of Wyrian Missile Strategy, October 27. 1996 SNS News Service Shamron Hills, Israel

Available: http://www.snsnews.co.il/sns/special/40syrian.Missiles.htm

[34] Syria Federation of American Scientists,

Available: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/syria.htm.

[35] Available: http://www.security-policy.org:80/papers96-P42at1.html [37] Art, 137 [38] "A Grab for the Golan? Israel Carefully Watches Syrian Actions." The Near East Report, November 4, 1996.

Available: http://www.aipac.org/ner/ner1104.htm#syria

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Exterior Conflicting Forces