•Introduction
•Planting
the Seeds for Hizballah: The History of the Lebanese Shia
•The
Rise of Hizballah
•Can
Two Enemies Confront Peace?
•Endnotes
Beginning with the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of an Allied victory in World War I, the quest to create an enduring order in the Middle East has been a continuous struggle. Complicated by the conception of the Jewish State in May 1948, attempts at establishing a modicum of order have necessarily been focused on creating conditions for peace between Israel and its neighbors. Although the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979 (1) signaled an important step in this direction-peace between Israel and Egypt, as well as a framework for peace between Israel and the rest of the Arab community-serious impediments to a pervasive peace still abound. Even a lasting agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, which appears imminent after the Oslo Accords(2) does not guarantee peace. Once seen as the foundation of any enduring peace in the region, it is becoming increasingly evident that an Israeli-Palestinian covenant is a necessary, though not sufficient condition for agreement on relevant issues between Israel and other actors. At issue for states such as Syria and Lebanon is territory that Israel holds in defiance of United Nations' resolutions declaring Israeli occupation to be a violation of each state's sovereignty. A brief comparison between the two states and the respective circumstances that dictate their prospects for peace with Israel illustrates the complexities surrounding a ubiquitous peace.
The conditions for peace between Syria and Israel are relatively straightforward, but nonetheless problematic. Any accord will involve Israel's withdrawal from Southern Lebanon-as stipulated in U.N. Security Council Resolution 425(3)--and a settlement between Syria and Israel over the Golan Heights within the framework of Security Council Resolution 242(4). Although the particulars in any such agreements will undoubtedly be subject to unwieldy demands from each side, thus inhibiting and protracting an eventual peace; there is at the very least a sense of what needs to be done, with both states thoroughly capable of fulfilling their obligations to the other. In a sense, a stable, de facto framework for peace currently exists.
By contrast, an agreement between Israel and Lebanon is less contingent on the resolution of any key issues than it is concerned with the means of implementing a resolution. While it might seem that an agreement would simply be conditional on Israeli withdrawal from the South, this is at best only a necessary condition. Even if, as indicated, the Lebanese government would agree to peace following an Israeli withdrawal (5), the governmental approval would merely amount to satisfaction of tertiary Israeli strategic interests-specifically a demonstration of good faith bargaining with Syria. Of greater concern to Israel is the threat to Israeli intrinsic interests posed by the Iranian backed, Syrian allied, Shiite resistance group Hizballah. Vehemently opposed to Israeli occupation of the security zone in Southern Lebanon, and not aligned to the Lebanese government, Hizballah continually engages the Israeli forces in the security zone and fires Katsyusha missiles at settlements in Northern Israel. Unlike Syria where Assad can be held accountable for the state's obligations in a peace treaty, in Lebanon, Hizballah is capable of acting outside the control of the weak central government and thus must be treated as a separate, crucial actor. Since Hizballah is capable of effectively nullifying any agreement Lebanon makes with Israel it is important to further investigate the role of this group before postulating as to the likelihood of any scenario, be it war or peace, between the two countries.
Spelled in a variety of ways; Hizballah, Hezballah, Hizbollah, Hezbollah, and Hezbullah, translated, all mean the same in Arabic-"The Party of God." Ironically, this group formed in the name of god appears to many westerners as the human manifestation of fear and evil. Renowned for their trademark suicide car bombs, Hizballah has inexorably ingrained its image in the minds of many throughout the world as the foremost proponent of violence as a way of achieving a political agenda. This proclivity for brutality must not be seen as irrational, it in fact appears quite rational if one examines it in the proper context-as a phenomenon inextricably linked to the birth and development of the organization.
Historically, the early Shia experience in Lebanon can be characterized as one of neglect and victimization of calculated manipulation. Given the mandate for Syria and Lebanon after WWI, the French were immediately subjected to pleas for an expansion of Lebanese territory from the Maronite Christians. As the historical protector of the Maronite community-dating back to intervention on behalf of the Maronites in a conflict with the Druze in the 1860s-and desirous of a long-term Christian stronghold in the Middle East, the French were naturally receptive. Subtracting from the Syria mandate the Bekka Valley, what came to be South Lebanon, and a stretch of Mediterranean coastal plain, the French greatly increased the geographic size of the Lebanese state, which had previously consisted solely of the Mount Lebanon area. With the new territory, Lebanon gained a large population of Sunni and Shia Muslims. The Sunni Muslims identified strongly with Syria, and were virulently opposed to their sudden change of nationality. To safeguard against a potential Muslim alliance, the Maronites cleverly wooed the historically persecuted and isolated Shia community, knowing that the Shia would rather be one of many minorities in Lebanon than revert back to their second-class status in a Sunni dominated Syria. The Shia were quickly rewarded for their support. Subject to constant discrimination under the rule of the Ottomans, the French allowed the Shia the freedom to practice their religion, to set up their own religious courts, and to practice the sacred religious festival, Ashura.(6)
With the backing of the Shia community and the questionable findings of the National Census of 1932-declaring that the ratio of Christians to Muslims in the country was six to five-"the Maronites emerged as the dominant force in the new state." Under the National Pact of 1932, based on the National Census that year, the foundation of the Maronite-favored, Lebanese government was formed. The ratio of deputies in the government was to favor the Christians six to five. Additionally specified, the key positions: president, prime minister, and speaker, were to be held by a Christian, a Sunni Muslim, and a Shia Muslim, respectively.(7)
The system of representation set up in 1932 clearly emphasized and exacerbated sectarian differences that existed among the various Lebanese confessions. By 1958, conflict between the western affiliated Christians and the emerging, Nasser influenced, pan-Arab Muslim leaders over allegations of a fixed election by President Chamoun abruptly led to civil war. To restore order, the United States was called in, Lebanese leaders evoking the Eisenhower Doctrine under the pretence that Nasser and his followers presented a communist threat to the regime.(8)
After their initial courting on behalf of the Maronites, the Shia community was conspicuously disregarded.
"(W)hile the rest of Lebanon flourished economically and Beirut won fame as a cosmopolitan capital, the Shiites remained locked in a time warp, the underdogs of the population."(9) "The government neglected them and the Shiites' own feudal, landowning leaders were more interested in their personal pursuit of power than the welfare of their community. The Shiites not only lacked representation, but the basic necessities of modern life, such as schools, hospitals, roads and running water. In comparison with the prospering areas of the Sunnis and Christians, their standard of living was medieval. When the political awakening finally came, it was not a Lebanese leader that brought the Shiites out of their obscurity, but an Iranian cleric."(10)
In 1959 the Lebanese Shiites formally requested Musa Sadr become their religious leader. A friend of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini and the Syrian leader, Hafez al-Assad, Sadr ready to accept a leadership role of his own, gladly accepted the invitation. In the next 15 years Sadr's accomplishments on behalf of the Lebanese Shiites were awesome. After uniting them as a community, Sadr succeeded in creating the Lebanese Shiite Islamic council in 1967 and the Movement of the Deprived in 1974. Shiites now were granted the recognition and representation of the other main factions in the country. Capitalizing on the outlets he created for airing the grievances of the Shia community, Sadr lobbied the government and mobilized his followers effectively enough to justify the establishment of the Council of the South, an organization dedicated to the improvement of the Shiite areas.(11)
During Sadr's ascension to political power, another important situation was developing in Lebanon. After the Six-Day War in 1967 and the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1967, the Palestinian population of Lebanon grew substantially. Consequently raids into Israel from Lebanon by Palestinians rapidly increased. Israeli retaliation for these raids was of extreme relevance to the Shiite community, which inhabited the land in the South where the Israelis and Palestinians were clashing. As Sadr's requests for Shiite protection fell on deaf ears, a massive migration to the North began. Although camps were set up where Shia and Palestinians were together trained to defend themselves, relations became strained as the Palestinians continued to evoke Israeli reprisals, seemingly without concern for Shiite losses that were incurred.(12)
Tensions between the Christians and the Palestinians with their allies, the Sunni Muslims were similarly manifesting themselves. There was general anxiety on the part of the Maronites as to the effect that the new Palestinian population would have on the delicately balanced nature of Lebanese society. Eventually, fighting between the two sides erupted. The pressure of this conflict combined with the Israeli attacks, Shia grievances with the Palestinians, and increasing demands to change the representation stipulated in the original National Pact, proved to much for Lebanon's fragile order. In 1975 full-scale civil war erupted.(13)
Only Syrian intervention in 1976, brought on by the fear that a Sunni Muslim victory would lead to an increased Israeli desire to engage Lebanon, could bring a halt to the conflict.(14) Distraught with the influence that Syria had gained through intervention in the Lebanese civil war, Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978. Using as a pretense for the launch of "Operation Litani" the Palestinian attack on an Israeli bus earlier that year, the Israeli's succeeded in gaining control over South Lebanon and establishing Major Saad Haddad's South Lebanese Army to patrol the area.(15)
Following Israel's invasion, on August 31, Musa Sadr disappeared on a visit to Libya, where he was supposed to meet with Muammar al-Qaddafi.
"Sadr's mysterious disappearance echoed the fate of a central figure in Shia theology: the Twelfth Imam, considered the rightful leader of Islam, who vanished in the ninth century…Already a savior of the Lebanese Shiites, Sadr was elevated to the status of a martyr. The cataclysmic succession of events-civil war, Israel' 1978 invasion and Sadr's disappearance-was capped by the Iranian revolution in 1979. The fate of Sadr and the triumph of Shia Islam under Khomeini, at a time of civil ferment in Lebanon, was a potent political and theological cocktail for the Lebanese Shiites. Sadr had politicised the Lebanese Shiites and the Iranian revolution had catapulted Shia Islam on to the world stage. When Israel invaded for the second time in 1982, the force which ultimately emerged to resist its occupation was the child of these ground- breaking events."(16)
By most accounts the initial Israeli invasion and occupation in June 1982 was relatively uneventful.(17) In fact, a significant proportion of the Lebanese, especially the predominantly Shiite community in the South, were outright grateful to the Israeli "liberators." The prospect of vanquishing the PLO from the South where they had been responsible for so much destruction was truly cause for joy. The PLO's presence had become increasingly burdensome By the time of the Israeli invasion, the moderate Shiite group Amal, created by Musa Sadr and now headed by Nabih Berri, was regularly engaging the Palestinian forces. Truly the Shiites and the Israelis had a mutual interest in expelling the PLO from Southern Lebanon. Israel would not be subjected to constant bombardment by the PLO forces and the Shiites would be able to return to villages in the South that they had vacated years before.(18)
Citing Israel's recent invasion as proof that the presence of the PLO was unambiguously detrimental to the interests of the state, the Lebanese government expelled the PLO from Beirut and Southern Lebanon in August.(19)Indeed for a short time there was an air of optimism that emanated from both the Israeli and the Lebanese side. Israel rejoiced in the speed with which it had been able to achieve its objective of ridding the South of the PLO(20). "Lebanon's Maronite leaders understandably interpreted this as a victory for their cause and particularly for Bashir Gemayel, who was duly elected president."(21) Prospects regarding the future were considered especially high for the Shiites to the extent that a "construction industry boom" was undertaken in the South by refugees returning home; encouraged by the prospect of economic prosperity through economic relations with Israel.
"Nearly all believed that the occupying forces would leave after a few months. Ironically, Israel, Berri, and the Southern Shiites all wanted the same thing-an end to the Palestinian presence and guerilla activity in South Lebanon, as well as security across both borders. Some Israeli officers suggested cultivating the Shiites as allies. If the proposal had been adopted, Israel could have secured the southerners as staunch guardians of the border. Instead, it turned them into one of its deadliest enemies." (22)
The first indication that an Israeli withdrawal might take longer than expected came when Bashir Gemayel was assassinated before taking office. Israel immediately invaded West Beirut and secured the election of his brother Amin to the presidency.(23)In the next few months it would become increasingly evident that Israel's agenda extended beyond the mere ousting of the PLO. The Israeli Defense Force's introduction of their plan for the "Organization of a Unified South" in early 1983 was the first clear signal of a revised agenda. The scheme called for the creation of committees in the main regions that would be responsible for self-government. Additionally, an Israeli trained military force called the "National Guard" would back the newly formed administrative councils. The proposal of the plan, while objectionable in that it intimated a higher degree of Israeli involvement than was ideally thought to be necessary, was not in itself sufficient to produce large-scale dissatisfaction amongst the Lebanese. The main source of outrage was the way in which the IDF went about implementing the plan. There is evidence that the attitude of the Lebanese, especially in the South, was gradually changing with respect to the Israeli occupiers even before the strong-arm techniques designed to insure adherence to the plan took effect.(24)However any change that occurred before the IDF started threatening the Lebanese with various punishments for refusing to comply with the plan, would pale in comparison to the swift decline that followed.(25)
"Those villages who refused to join the scheme were told that a militia of outsiders would be imposed on them. From this point onwards, in the view of most Shiites, those same Israelis who had earlier been seen as liberators were now regarded as occupiers. The alarm bells began to ring in a community which was renowned for its fierce sense of independence. Turning a blind eye to Israel's trespass on their land for the sake of the common aim of expelling the PLO was one thing, but becoming their surrogates and allowing Israeli domination of their lives and territory was totally unacceptable to the Shiites. They had, after all, fought their Muslim Palestinian brothers for those very reasons."(26)
Soon there was a pervasive fear amongst the Lebanese that the Israeli campaign was merely the culmination of a long sequence of political designs on Lebanese land. After all, in 1919 and again in 1948 prominent Jewish leaders publicly espoused ambitions for Jewish reign over parts of Lebanon. It was in fact the hope of Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon in 1982 that the Jewish forces would be able to firmly entrench the Christian leadership in Beirut and subsequently form a strong alliance with Lebanon. Cognizant of the potential for a protracted Israeli occupation, the Shia began to empathize with the plight of the PLO, their recently departed enemy.(27)
"If the Shiites had learnt anything from the Palestinian experience, it was that fighting was the only way to prevent Israel or anyone else from taking ther land. Everyone remembered how the Palestinians were driven out of their homeland when the state of Israel was founded. Most had heard how the refugees had believed their displacement would only be temporary, but it had lasted nearly four decades. Above all, the Palestinians' ordeal had taught the Lebanese not to abandon their villages and homes: confrontation and opposition were the only answer…And so the resistance began."(28)
The first inklings of an insurgency were minor, ranging from the boycott of Israeli products to actually detonating small homemade bombs. These acts of defiance were completely spontaneous and unorganized.(29) As the Israelis began to crackdown on the resistance in a progressively harsher manner, the Lebanese responded by increasing the degree of their opposition.(30)
"On 16 October 1983, the Israeli's committed the final provocation. The Shiites were commemorating Ashura, the most sacred religious festival in Shia Islam, in the market town of Nabatiyeh. It is the traditional gathering centre for the annual procession in which thousands of people and villagers gather to mourn the slaying of the Imam Hussein in Karbala, Iraq, 1,300 years ago. The ceremony, attended by 50,000 southern Lebanese, was at its height when an Israeli military convoy drove into town. The Israeli commander insisted on driving through the crowds, infuriating the Muslims who saw the act as an outrageous violation of their holy day. The Israelis, on the other hand, regarded the crowds behavior as a rebellion against their authority. When the convoy forced its way through the throng, people reacted furiously at the intrusion. Screaming abuse at the invaders, men, woman and children threw stones at the soldiers, set fire to tyres and placed obstacles in front of the moving line of vehicles. In the mayhem that followed, an Israeli truck was overturned and set alight. The soldiers who were caught in the midst of the hysterical crowd called in reinforcements and started shooting. Two Shiites were killed and fifteeen others injured.
Sheikh Mehdi Shamseddin, head of the Higher Shiite Council in Beirut issued a fatwa immediately after the incident calling for 'civil resistance.' While it was not a demand for an all-out war against the Israelis, the moderate sheikh's cry was the first official call for confrontation and one which would soon be reiterated by others."(31)
By Mid 1983, Israel had already begun its retreat from the Lebanese capital. Taking nearly two full years to evacuate troops from lands it had occupied, in February 1985, Israel's withdrawal would commence with the removal of troops to a 900-square-mile area below the Litani River, over which it maintained an "Iron Fist" policy. In retrospect Sheikh Mehdi Shamseddin's proclamation two years earlier would indicate an impending heightening of conflict between the Shiites and the Israeli forces. However, the sequence of events that led to Israel's retreat to the security zone, and ultimately to the public appearance of Hizballah, would prove infinitely more tumultuous than anyone could have expected.(32)
Shortly after the fateful events at Nabatiyeh, the IDF and the SLA began to encounter organized resistance from an Amal led Lebanese National Resistance (LNR). In the South though, the LNR increasingly strayed from its secular, Amal influenced roots and instead became noticeably Iranian in its orientation. Pictures of the Ayatollah Khomeini first appearing in Shiite strongholds, Maarakek and Jibsheet, were by 1984, ubiquitous in the Shiite area known as the "Arc of Resistance." With its unofficial capital at Jabel Amel, the "arc" was home to "radical Lebanese clerics"(33) who coordinated Shiite activities and spread their revolutionary message.(34)
Unnerved by the revolutionary nature of the nascent movement, the Israelis formulated a strategy that targeted the reputed Shiite leaders. Ironically, in what is characteristic of Israeli occupation in the South as a whole, the Israeli strategy would accomplish the exact opposite of the desired goal. The two instances in which Israeli forces succeeded in assassinating Shiite leaders are each indisputable points at which the rebellion became further radicalized. On February 12 1984 the Israelis murdered Raghib Harb, one of the first leaders of the Shiite cause in the South. This episode is widely believed to have contributed to the utilization of the suicide car bomb. Until, March 4, 1985, the Shia revolt was still a resistance rather than a full-fledged war. However, when the 25-year-old, Khalil Jarradi, another local Shiite leader was killed, the conflict assumed a qualitatively different complexion.
"The earlier modest call for a 'civil resistance' against the occupiers was now transformed into a call for an all-out Jihad (emphasis in original) against the Israelis. The holy war was finally declared. The spontaneous resistance against an occupation had become a lethal crusade with wider dimensions. Six days after Jarradi's murder, on 10 March 1985, a young man drove a red pick-up Chevrolet, containing 900 kilograms of explosives, into a military Israeli convoy just two miles away from Israel's settlement Metullah, north of Galilee…The bomber…killed twelve soldiers and wounded fourteen others. The fact that the attack took place so close to Israel's northern settlements and border with Lebanon unnerved Israel. It confirmed Israel's worst fear-that the spirit of the resistance had extended to the 'security zone', where Israel had believed itself to be safe and in the least danger from its Shiite foes."(35)
Hizballah, which had made its public debut on the first anniversary of Harb's death-coinciding with the first phase of Israeli withdrawal-was incensed by Jarradi's death. Even when Israel completed its removal to the security zone, exactly three years after its invasion on June 6 1985, Hizballah promised vengeance. In their manifesto published on February 12 Hizballah stated it willingness to fight all attempts by the west, namely the U.S. and Israel, to impose its will on the Muslims of the Middle East. Citing Iranian inspiration, they vowed to vanquish Israel from the security zone and under no circumstances to accept the presence of the "Zionists" anywhere in the region.(36)
Since 1985 Hizballah has been involved in numerous terrorist attack, often claiming responsibility under pseudonyms.(37) Support for the group has increased in Lebanon specifically, and in the Middle East in general. Paradoxically, in the late 1980s this growing stature almost destroyed the movement. As it expanded, Hizballah came into conflict with Amal. The violence that ensued caused Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad great anxiety. Fearful that Hizballah's increased support was coming at the expense of his own influence in Lebanon, and particularly weary of its clashes with Syrian backed Amal, Assad got the two parties to sign the Iranian-brokered Damascus Agreement in January 1989.(38) Soon after Hizballah was free to resume its fight against the Israeli forces.
With vigor similar to that of the mid eighties Hizballah has carried its war with Israel to this very day. However by the late 1980s critical changes were occurring in its political orientation. Although Hizballah was the only militia in Lebanon that did not relinquish their arms after the Taif Accord of 1989, a movement towards embracing the newly organized Lebanese governmental structure was beginning to manifest itself. Ushering in the end of the Lebanese civil war that started in 1975, the Taif Accord changed proportional representation in the Lebanese government, and transferred the power of the president to a council of ministers. Under this context
"Hezbollah astutely realized that, unless it participated in the rapidly changing political scene in Lebanon, it could end up losing its official backing and representation. Encouraged by both Syria and its Iranian mentors, The Party of God dropped its earlier objections to participating in Lebanon's political system and entered the country's 1992 parliamentary elections, the first to take place for twenty years.Hezbollah won with a landslide in the areas where it had candidates and secured eight members in parliament. Along with four other allied deputies, who ran on the same list as Hezbollah, the group commanded the largest political single block in the house until 1996. It was also the first Islamic bloc in the Lebanese Parliament."(39)
Hizballah is now split into two related but distinct entities. The more moderate political element has focused its efforts on achieving the organization's goals through formal means. Conversely, the more traditional, radical military wing has continually challenged Israeli forces. Fighting has been especially intense following events such as the 1992 assassination of leader Sheikh Abbas Musawi, the 1993 Israeli "Operation Accountability," and the 1996 "Operation Grapes of Wrath."(40)
The split in behavior of the two factions reflects the differing ideologies. The political wing tends to indicate that an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon would suffice to end the conflict with Hizballah. Those on the front line seem less willing to end the conflict following an Israeli withdrawal. This latter group seems more inclined to pursue an agenda that includes a struggle to obliterate the Jewish State entirely.
A long history of conflict necessarily presents itself as an obstacle to peace. If one examines the Oslo Accords and the Camp David Accords though, it is eminently clear that any such obstacle in not impervious to shrewd diplomacy. One might point towards the inapplicability of these examples of conflict resolution with respect to a prospective Hizballah-Israeli armistice insofar as prevailing circumstances were different in the first two relative to the current dilemma. Inasmuch as the Oslo Accords and the Camp David Accords were influenced by environmental factors different from those surrounding the Hizballah-Israeli conflict, they were similarly ordained under differing conditions. Any comprehensive examination of factors surrounding the first two agreements and those purported to be relevant in a prospective Israeli-Hizballah treaty wound undoubtedly reveal an incomprehensibly large number of similarities and dissimilarities. For this reason, the following discussion will focus on the particulars of the situation at hand, looking at history only of this specific conflict. With this in mind one can better examine the prospect of peace between Israel and Hizballah.
Clearly, as a starting point, one must examine the factors responsible for keeping Israel in the security zone. After all, any peace must involve an Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon.
By all accounts Israel has suffered massive casualties from their operations in Lebanon. Many Israeli soldiers have died, countless have been injured, and the operation has produced a significant strain on the economy. Additionally, by this point the Israelis are aware that the resistance that they now endure is directly attributable to the carelessness and unnecessary length of their occupation. Still, the fact remains that both Israeli forces and northern territories are subject to bombardment virtually every day. Israel is reluctant to pull out of the security zone and subject themselves to the same level of siege that they encountered currently, because Israeli territory would be at much greater risk. Even if the security zone is frequently little more than a hurdle to be jumped over by Katyusha rockets, it does supply a modicum of protection to the otherwise completely vulnerable north. It seems plausible then that Israel would be willing to withdraw from the security zone if they could be confident that in doing so Hizballah would not "pocket the concessions" and proceed to unleash their wrath on Northern Israel. Apparently, all that is needed is an assurance from the Hizballah leaders that they would in fact cease their Jihad. Strangely enough, this type of a decree has already been given. Unfortunately, Israeli leaders are not convinced that it honestly represents the intentions of the group.
Israel views the move from the position outlined in the original manifesto-expounding the goal of ridding the Middle East entirely of the Jewish presence-to the more moderate position taken by leaders recently, as a way of furthering the same interests; those that were accurately represented in the groups nascent stage. In all likelihood the Israeli reluctance to accept any guarantee by the Hizballah leadership is a result of cognitive misperceptions.(41) Specifically, the Israeli leadership is influenced by the availability bias-the notion that a person is inclined to ignore the saliency of key factors in a dispute because he or she is otherwise preoccupied with prominent features of an adversary's history that come to mind quickly. In this case, Israel's perception of Hizballah is still influence by the unforgettable acts of terrorism, most notably car bombs that the Shiite group has been associated with detonating. Israeli leaders ignore the clear fact that situational factors influencing Hizballah's behavior have changed dramatically in the last 13 years.
Unlike 1985, Hizballah now has a governmental outlet within which they can pursue an agenda of increased Islamization of the Lebanese State. Additionally, goals that Hizballah had in their early years such as increased Shia representation in the government, and a general reworking of representation based on the National Pact of 1932, have already been remedied. Surely an agreement with Israel would provide political wing of "The Party of God" with great prestige and further their legitimization.
Importantly, Israel has also demonstrated that if necessary, it is capable of controlling the security zone for an indefinite period of time. This has significant implications for a prospect theory analysis of the conflict. In short, prospect theory is a framework that attempts to explain decision-making processes as a function of actors' risk taking propensities. Prospect theorists posit that decision-makers unwittingly make choices of varying degrees of risk according to where they perceive themselves to be relative to their subjective status quo. That is, an individual will interpret his current situation as indelibly placing him either above or below a specific reference point. Consequently, if an actor is below his reference point, he will be motivated by the desire to minimize any further losses en route to regaining what he believes to be his own. By contrast, if an actor perceives himself to be above his status quo, he will cautiously evaluate choices, hoping to maximize his gains without in anyway jeopardizing his status quo. Thus, an actor is said to be risk acceptant in the domain of loss and risk acceptant in the domain of gains.(42)
A prospect theory interpretation of the Israeli-Hizballah conflict goes as follows: Israel's initial occupation of Lebanon impinged on the Shiite's status quo. Not surprisingly violence ensued. Precisely because they were risk acceptant, Hizballah was willing to risk a conflict with Israel over everything, even the very existence of the Jewish state, in order to recover what they considered to be an essential feature in their status quo. However, the length of the Israeli occupation has shifted the collective reference point of Hizballah. In prospect theory terminology, the Shiites have renormalized their status quo. Although they are still unambiguously below any reference point, they do not value a return of the South as heavily. In effect they are in the domain of loss but not to the same degree as they were upon Israel's initial seizure of their land. Perhaps they believe their status in the Lebanese government is not worth jeopardizing at all costs. Whatever the reasons for their renormaliztion, the "Party of God" would be more inclined to view the return of the South as a gain than they would have in previous years. Operating from the domain of gains, Hizballah would certainly not risk renewed conflict with the Israelis.
Disregarding any notions of renormalization, one could still foresee an Israeli return of Lebanese territory that offset the feelings of loss initially incurred by the seizure of the Shiite's land. In this scenario, it is imperative that Israel provides the Shia with the opportunity to renormalize their gains and induce a prudent "domain of gains mentality." The fact that Israeli plans for a prospective withdraw consist of a U.N. enforced waiting period in between stages of retreat, indicates that the true nature of the Shiite risk propensity may be closer to this latter explanation.
Other factors are likely to influence a risk averse Hizballah. First, Israeli withdrawal would increase the likelihood of a U.S. rapprochement with Iran. Second, an Israeli-Syrian accord would appear feasible after Israeli retreat. Third, the inevitable continuation of the peace process with the Palestinians would increase esteem for Israel in the eyes of its neighbors. All three of these dynamics decrease any existing leverage the Lebanese Shia would have with respect to Israel. Evoking a rational choice metonym, one might say that Hizballah would no longer have the ability to jump through an "expansionist window of opportunity."
Clearly then, there are a myriad of reasons that could reasonably be assumed to contribute to an Israeli-Hizballah peace. In light of this, one might wonder why it has not already occurred, and consequently why it might be expected to occur sometime in the future? Simply, we may expect peace in the near future because it is only now that Israel has sustained enough casualties to induce them to leave. Operating from a domain of gains, as they have not since the early stages of the attack had any designs on a permanent role in the Lebanese state, Israel is essentially a rational actor. The Israeli's calculate expected benefit and weigh it against expected cost. As mentioned earlier, the utility of the security zone is diminishing. The protection it provides to the North while important, is nonetheless small in comparison to the resources devoted to its upkeep. This simple rationale might appear paradoxical initially. After all, earlier it was stipulated that Israel recognized the decreasing utility of the security zone but could not risk removing it. The key difference is that earlier, misgivings regarding a removal of Israeli forces was alluded to as a way of illustrating how the conflict became so protracted. The latter interpretation of the Israeli willingness to withdraw is meant to convey the notion that the accumulation of casualties will at some point in the future (probably in the near future), be capable of inducing Israel to take the necessary first step that will lead to peace.
One should view the prospect of an Israeli-Hizballah peace with qualified anticipation. If there are no new disturbances to the delicate relations between the two parties the chance for an end to hostilities appears to be on the horizon.
1Congressional Quarterly, The Middle East. (Washington, D.C.Congressional Quarterly Inc.)69-73. Return to text.
2
3 http://leb.net/bcome/leb/un_resols/425 Return to text.
4 http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/peace/docs/scres242.html Return to text.
5 http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/hizballah-ifm-9702.html Return to text.
6 Hala Jaber, Hizballah Born With A Vengance (New York: Columbia University Press.) P.9. Return to text.
7 ibid, p.10. Return to text.
8 ibid, p.10. Return to text.
9 ibid, p.8. Return to text.
10ibid, p.11. Return to text.
11 ibid, p.12. Return to text.
12 ibid, p.12. Return to text.
13 ibid, p.12. Return to text.
14 Congressional Quarterly, The Middle East. (Washington, D.C.Congressional Quarterly Inc.) p. 295. Return to text.
15 Hala Jaber, Hizballah Born With A Vengance (New York: Columbia University Press.) p.13 Return to text.
16 ibid, p.13-14 Return to text.
17 ibid, p.14. Return to text.
18 ibid, p.15. Return to text.
19 Congressional Quarterly, The Middle East. (Washington, D.C.Congressional Quarterly Inc.) p.294. Return to text.
20 gopher://israel-info.gov.il/00facts/history/state/h5h Return to text.
21 Congressional Quarterly, The Middle East. (Washington, D.C.Congressional Quarterly Inc.)p.295. Return to text.
22 Hala Jaber, Hizballah Born With A Vengance (New York: Columbia University Press.) p.16 Return to text.
23 http://www.nando.net/newsroom.nt/421many.html Return to text.
24 Augustus Richard Norton, "Making Enemies in South Lebanon: Harakat Amal, the IDF, and South Lebanon", Middle East Insight, Vol.3,No.3 (January-February 1984): pp.1-19. Return to text.
25 Hala Jaber, Hizballah Born With A Vengance (New York: Columbia University Press.) p.16. Return to text.
26 ibid, p.17. Return to text.
27 ibid, p.17. Return to text.
28 ibid, p.18. Return to text.
29 ibid, p.18. Return to text.
30 ibid,p.18. Return to text.
31 ibid, pp.18-19. Return to text.
32 Ibid, p.17-25. Return to text.
33 Ibid, p.22. Return to text.
34 ibid, p.17-20. Return to text.
35 Ibid, p.24. Return to text.
36 http;//almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/314/314.2/hizballah-manifesto Return to text.
37 http://www.survivalguide.com/info/hizballah.htm Return to text.
38 Hala Jaber, Hizballah Born With A Vengance (New York: Columbia University Press.) p.35. Return to text.
39 ibid, p.72. Return to text.
40 http://www.nando.net/newsroom/nt/421many.html Return to text.
41 All discussion of Bounded Rationality is based on: Robert Jervis and others, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press,1991). Return to text.
42 All discussion of Prospect Theory is based on: Barbara Farnham, Avoiding Losses/ Taking Risks Prospect Theory and International Conflict (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press,1997). Return to text.