PS 498.002, 2/12/97
-Ben Orbach: First though, reference points and prospect theory were re-enforced again.
1. Reference points are anchors or goals that are set by an actor as to what they want to achieve through either war or diplomacy. An example is Ben-Gurion's raid on Gaza in 1955. Ben-Gurion's reference point was to stop the cross border guerrilla sabotage, and to reopen the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.
2. Once again, prospect theory was defined as a psychological explanation to the way an actor acts in a certain situation. Prospect theory is the mind set of acting out of a basement of fear rather than a window of opportunity. An example could be Assad going to Peace Conference in Madrid in 1991. He went because he was scared that the peace process would pass him by if he did not go, and that he would never reacquire the Golan Heights.
-Larico Harley: 1991- Assad jeopardized his control at home in hopes of getting back the Golan Heights, The Sunni Muslims (which Assad is not a member of) who consist of 90% of the population in Syria do not want peace, but Peace is seen as the only way for Assad to regain the Golan Heights. Assad attended the Madrid Peace Conference with hopes of increasing his chances at gaining the Golan Heights. Assad has a reference point of the entire Golan Heights. By having this as his reference points, Assad would not be satisfied with anything less than the complete acquisition of the Heights. Assad must hope that the reference point of the people of Syria is the Golan Heights as opposed to having no peace with Israel. If the reference point for the Sunnis within Syria is no peace, than it will be difficult for Assad to maintain power if he attempts to deal peace for the Golan Heights with Israel.
-Michael Janson: Prospect theory as a way to create scenarios for peace and war - speculating about the future. 1. If Assad, were acting as the Prospect Theorist anticipated, then he would focusing more on what he was losing, instead of what he was gaining. 2. Risks for peace? Risk hold on domestic power, to not lose Golan. 3. Prospect theory as strategy? NO. Prospect theory is a psychological phenomenon, not a rational course of action. When a puzzle is discovered, that cannot be explained by classical strategy, Prospect Theory may provide a explanation. 4. Prospect Theory - Focus more on losses more than gains = more likelihood to strike a bargain. Assad would lose power if didn't strike a deal with Israel - would he be willing to gamble to keep control of Syria? 5. Madrid Conference - Baker told Assad that Syria was more likely to gain Golan if Syria wan peace train, Assad went to conference. Implication? Either Assad has control of Syria, Assad fears loss of Golan more than loss of power, or Golan is integral to Syria maintaining power. 6. What is the reference point of Assad? What is the reference point of the people of Syria? If the peoples reference point is the Golan, then Assad must get Golan to retain power. If the peoples reference point is NOT making peace with Israel, then Assad must not make peace with Israel to retain power. Both statements assume (1) Assad's power is threatened, (2) Assad's thinks his power is threatened.
-John Valentine: Use Theory to predict actions in the future
1. If Assad were acting as a prospect theorist, he would focus on what he lost in his most recent deal vs. what he had gained. To look at war/peace scenarios, he would take risks for peace in order to keep the negotiations ongoing (risky because he doesn't want to be toppled by Sunni majority) because he sees loss of Golan as very important. On Assad: 10% minority (Alawite, not true Muslims) Sunni Muslims don't want peace with Israel. Assad took a major chance going to Madrid. Sec. Baker -- you are more likely to gain the Golan by attending than by sitting out. The risk of not getting the Golan back was feared more than was the risk of alienating his people and losing power. If he has to get the Golan back to keep control of Syria, he may gamble in the short run to get back the Golan. He is risk-acceptant with respect to the Peace Process From 472not11: "Sadat Used As His Reference Point The Return Of Sinai Not How Much Israel Stood To Gain. Sadat Emphasized How Much He Stood To Lose From Not Making A Deal -- He Looked At Losses From Failure To Agree And Thus Choose To Cooperate." This is somewhat analogous to the Assad's actions with regards to the Golan.
2. Brinkmanship is defined by classical theory; if you cannot determine why actors have not acted in accordance with classical theory, e.g. brinkmanship or prisoners dilemma, then Prospect Theory may describe actions.
-Adam Spiegelberg: Prospect Theory and Reference Points: If the reference point of Assad is the opinion of the Syrian people -- 90% of whom are Sunni who are in opposition to the Assad regime -- then Assad must decide what the reference point is of those Sunni. If the Sunnis reference point is the Golan Heights, then he would do whatever it takes to get back the Golan heights, including agreeing to peace with Israel. If the Sunnis reference point is maintaining a situation of no peace with Israel, then Assad will avoid any peace talks even if that means no return of the Golan Heights. However, if Assad's reference point is not the opinion of the Syrian people, and is instead the reference point of strategic superiority, than gaining the Golan Heights will be his primary objective regardless of the cost.
-Ben Orbach: We also spoke about brinkmanship. Brinkmanship is when a conflict is escalated to its greatest point so that the enemy will back down. Brinkmanship is a dangerous policy though and does not always work. An example of its failure can also be seen in Ben-Gurion's raid on Gaza in 1955. Ben-Gurion meant for Egypt to back down and open the straits of Tiran. However, the result was an escalation to war in 1956.
-Ben Orbach: One other topic that we talked about was the use of brinkmanship and classical strategy in initiating a Peace accord. The example of Sadat in 1973 was cited, as well as the Jerusalem tunnel incident a few months ago. Both were violent actions meant to result in a peaceful accord. We concluded that an actor could prepare for war, but still have a strategic commitment to peace.
-Larico Harley: Hizbullah is present to keep Syria on the Israeli agenda, so that they will not be overly concerned with the PLO and forget about Assad. It is necessary to heat up situations through force and negotiations, and in effect force a peace scenario. Assad is a strategist in his mixture of threat and diplomacy: The neither war nor peace goal utilizes aggression and diplomacy. Similar to Arafat, who used the tunnel crisis and other situations to help heat up the scenario and force actions by the Israeli government. >>The Art of War:http://home.navisoft.com/entisoft/artofwar.htm#3] "Sun Tzu ---- 2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting." Sun Tzu states that fighting is not necessary to achieve all goals. They can often be achieved through preparation for war and deterrence. Can Assad use force and diplomacy? Assad used low levels of military exercises and making preparation for war, to lead to peace. Assad went to war in 73 to push the peace process.
-Michael Janson: Difficulty to understand how War can be an ingredient in a Witches Brew of Peace. Move to peace by preparing for war. Begin, Arafat, and Sadat all strategists who combine crisis (violence), with diplomacy. War for Peace. W.W.I similar is American History? A War to End all Wars? Assad heats up situation to bring attention, to not allow Israel to ignore Syria.
-John Valentine: Syria has made a strategic commitment to peace. Janson -- Syria does want peace; it must start with Golan. He uses Hezbollah to signal a crisis, as an opportunity for diplomacy. Maneesh -- Madrid is a puzzle: Why go to Madrid, but still conduct exercises and open the valve to Hezbollah? Sadat went to war to make peace in 1973; Assad may act the same way. War and Peace are not always incompatible. He may be heating up a situation in Lebanon to do so. Syria, however, could be making a long-term commitment -- making a long term commitment (esp. by recognizing Israel by going to Madrid.) Israel may be satisfied with the neither-war-nor-peace scenario currently present, but Assad uses Hezbollah to remind the Israelis that they cannot be contempt with the current situation. Also, another method of initiating action (to bring about peace) is the introduction of superpowers.
-Adam Spiegelberg: Unless Syria can hurt Israel, why should Israel give back the Golan? --- Israel feels secure within their borders so why should they give up any territory. Israel feels that it only needs to offer peace for peace to Syria. It feels that it has no obligation to offer Syria concessions. Assad would not go to war with Israel because unlike in the 73 war where Egypt could initiate a war, make quick gains, and then sue for a cease-fire in their favor which the Super power conflict of the cold war would ensure, today, without a super power conflict, a United Nations Cease-fire is not guaranteed. Therefore, because of Israel's military superiority, Assad would not risk a war which he knows he would lose. Also, unlike in the Nasser age, attacking Israel, does not necessarily mean support from throughout the Arab community because the desire to destroy Israel is no longer present due to the peace treaties between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and the PLO. Now the super powers do not exist to force a peace on the situation in Lebanon and the Golan Heights. Israel should realize that Syria can not really go over the brink and engage in war because the international consensus would not be to grant Syria a cease-fire in favor of them. Therefore, unless peace is traded for peace, Israel has no motivation to grant concessions, because Syria can not engage in a successful war against it, militarily or politically.
-Ben Orbach: We spent most of class discussing Confer Item #5, the Israel - Syria - Hizbullah relationship. Geoff Tudisco argued that Israel should try to negotiate a direct peace with Hizbullah. This would benefit Israel in that they would be able to negotiate with Syria from a power position on the Golan, without the threat of violence along the Lebanese border. For more information about this debate, Confer Item #5 should be referred too.
-Michael Janson: Lebanese terrorists as Syrian proxy? or as individual organization that only seeks Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon? Tudisco indicates that Israeli withdrawal would end Hizballah's military role. Negotiations must be under the table, because not to do so would destabilize the entire Lebanese regime. Interesting questions - If Hizbollah strike a deal with Israel, what will Syria do ? Is there a race going on - Syria must get concessions from Israel before Hizbollah gets concessions from Israel. Does Hizbollah goals and Syrian goals match up? Focus on Golan takes away from withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, or does it?