Jeff Hogg in confer ps353 item 19 states that:

"Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Shara told the press at a

Washington press conference in October of 1994 that the decision to make

peace with Israel is a Strategic Choice. In other words, peace provides

a means by which the Arab state of Syria can accomplish its goal of

eliminating Israel. According to a recent editorial by Aaron Lerner If

anything, peace with Israel will enable Syria to tilt the balance of

power in its favor. If Syrian-Israeli relations follow the pattern of

the Egyptian-Israeli experience, Syria will enjoy open access to the most

sophisticated of Western arms supplies after it signs an agreement with

Israel. (http://golan.org.il/letter6.html)."

There is ambiguity in the use of the term, strategic. Hogg interprets the

word to mean a that peace is a way to achieve an assumed objective of

Syria to destroy Israel. But when the Foreign Minister uses the term, some

scholars think that he means that Damascus has made a long term commitment

to make peace with Israel. They based their inference upon objective

factors like the disintegration of the Soviet Union leaving Syria window

without a superpower ally, the end of the hot war in the Gulf, that found

Damascus and Washington on the same side of the fighting and on the same

side of the post war peace planning, as well as a willingness of Syria to

take a chance that the Arab-Israel peace process can facilitate return of

the Golan Heights and the military option cannot.

At issue is whether Syria, in fact, has made a strategic commitment to the

Arab-Israel peace process or not. In this respect, here follows is an

excerpt from the Syrian chapter of a book: Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes,

St. Martin's Press, forthcoming, 1997.

First, has Assad made a strategic commitment to the Arab-Israel peace

process in alignment with the United States? Or, second, has Assad made

only a tactical adjustment in a long term process to weaken Israel as

prelude to the destruction of the Jewish state?

On the one hand, if Assad has made a strategic commitment to the peace

process, then the United States could build on this shift, accommodate

Damascus, and embrace Syria as a partner in that process. On the other

hand, if Assad has made a tactical move en route to wearing down and

destroying Israel, a policy of containment and even confrontation would be

advisable for Washington. Appeasement would occur if Assad were to make a

tactical move to weaken Israel, and the United States made concessions to

appease him.1 Two schools of thought dominate the debate about Assads

intentions. Both schools assume that his personality has a great impact on

the foreign policy of Syria.

The first perspective presumes that changes in the international balance

of power and domestic economic problems are main factors influencing a

shift in Syrian foreign policy towards a political settlement with Israel.

The second viewpoint presupposes that despite the significance of such

factors, domestic politics constrain Assads freedom of action and prohibit

him from making concessions necessary for peace.2 A leader of the first

approach is Moshe Maoz. He holds that Assad has made a strategic

commitment to make peace with Israel. A leader of the second approach is

Daniel Pipes, who believes that Assad has not made a commitment to make

peace.

Maoz contends that President Assad has accepted the principle of a

political settlement to the conflict with Israel, albeit it on his own

terms. During late 1973, Syria adopted UN Security Council Resolution 338,

which called for peace with Israel in return for territories occupied by

it in the 1967 War. Since 1988, Assad has given priority to a political

solution instead of a military option.

Maoz reasons that Assad made a strategic decision in favor of a political

solution because of economic difficulties and changes in Soviet policy

that occurred even before the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Following the

1992 election of Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister of Israel, Assad noted a

flexible policy by Israel towards Syria in general and the Golan Heights

in particular. Hence, Assad has been ready to sign a full peace agreement

with Israel, if it withdrew from the entire Golan Heights and southern

Lebanon.

If there is not a political accord reached between Israel and Syria,

Damascus is likely to sustain its ideological motivation and military

preparation to fight Israel over the Golan Heights. Syria also is likely

to enhance its political support for Hezballahs war of attrition against

Israel in southern Lebanon. While strengthening its strategic alignment

with Iran, Syria would seek to sabotage Israels rapprochement with the

Palestinians and with Arab states that are contemplating a political

settlement with Israel.

In contrast, an accord with Israel might reduce the militant intentions of

Damascus, weaken its military ties with Iran, and expand Syrias economic

development. Additionally, an agreement would foster progress towards

peace between Israel and the Palestinians and encourage other Arab states

to establish normal relations with Israel.3

The Maoz school assumes that Assad not only has made a commitment to make

peace with Israel, but that he also has the power and resolve to force an

accord upon an unwilling populace. This approach presumes that Assad

desires to avoid losing the Golan to permanent Israeli control so much

that he would risk his hold on absolute power.4 Alternatively, Assad may

be willing to run high risks in the peace process in order to avoid

domestic political losses: Turning his back on the prospect for a peaceful

return of the Golan Heights could significantly damage his hold on power.5

The Pipes school holds that existence of an enemy, Israel, is a main basis

for Assads rule. If peace with Israel were established, Assad would find

himself without a major external threat. The majority anti-Israel Sunni

population could turn its hostilities upon the ruling minority Alawites,

from which Assad himself comes. Syria has been in a state of emergency

since 1963. As a result, Assad can justify his oppressive security

apparatus. Remove the potential of war in the Middle East and it would be

nearly impossible, even for Assad, not to lift the state of emergency and

refrain from political crackdowns on potential opponents to his rule. If

Assad feared domestic pressures as much as losing his chance to regain the

Golan Heights, he would not be as cautious in his decisions to make peace,

according to the Pipes approach.

But the Pipes approach overlooks the role that Assads ruthlessness plays

in maintaining his power. Just as Assad ordered the killing of thousands

of Islamist rebels in the city of Hama during February 1982, he should be

willing to enforce a peace accord with Israel. But Pipes would contend

that Assad does not want to regain the Golan Heights so much that he would

risk his hold on absolute power. At issue is which aim is Assads reference

point--the Golan Heights or ruling.6

The dissolution of the Soviet Union, the absence of Moscow as a patron of

Damascus, and the presence of Syria in the American-led Gulf War coalition

are three reasons Maoz puts forth to explain Assads strategic commitment

to peace. The Pipes approach, however, would downplay the significance of

these external events. Rather, the main forces driving Syrian foreign

policy are internal political constraints on Assad. These domestic factors

are incentives to maintain a state of no war no peace with Israel.

Consequently, Assad has not made a commitment to make peace with Israel,

according to the Pipes perspective. The United States should refrain from

accommodating Syria and too close an embrace of Assad. Following the

reasoning of Pipes, containment and perhaps confrontation would be the

best course of action based on Assads personality and political

constraints under which he operates in Syria.

Pipes also asserts that the Golan Heights is not a key issue for Syria in

the peace process with Israel. Rather, maintaining Israel as an enemy is

of utmost importance in cementing Assads hold on power. Maoz, in

contrast, claims that the re-acquisition of the Golan Heights and southern

Lebanon has consistently been demanded in negotiations with Israel. Pipes

contends that it is Assads fear of losing power in Syria that influences

him not to make concessions in the peace process. Maoz suggests that the

fear of forever losing the Golan Heights is what influences Assad to

negotiate with Israel. Despite the anti-Israel majority in Syria and

risking domestic repercussions, Assad is willing to take the chance for a

peaceful return of the Golan.

In short, Maoz contends that it is a fear of never regaining the Golan

Heights that propels Assads risk-acceptant attitudes in favor of peace;

Pipes claims that it is Assads fear of domestic political losses that

encourages him to be risk-averse in the peace process. The Pipes approach

is the conventional wisdom about Assad: He is a rational, patient, and

cunning politician. In other words, that wisdom assumes that Assad is

cautious to a fault, that he is averse to gambles. In fact, however, Assad

has been a risk-taker in aligning with the United States against Saddam

Hussein and in joining the Madrid peace process with Israel.7

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ENDNOTES

1 Embrace is a process of forming a tacit alignment, accommodation is a

procedure of compromising with a bargaining partner on issues but not

principles, and appeasement is method of buying off potential antagonists

at the sacrifice of principles. Containment is an effort to isolate, e.g.,

through the imposition of economic sanctions. Confrontation is a process

of issuing threats that may imply military action.

2 Moshe Maoz, Asad, The Sphinx of Damascus: A Political Biography. New

York: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1988; and Pipes, op. cit., p. 50. Also, see

Maoz, Middle Eastern Politics. NY: St. Martins Press, 1996, and Patrick

Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East. Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1989.

3 See Moshe Maoz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking. New York:

Oxford University Press, 1995.

4 Why would Assad be willing to take a great chance regarding his hold on

power to avoid losing the Golan Heights to Israel? Prospect theory

suggests an answer. It holds that individuals are risk-averse concerning

gains and risk-acceptant regarding losses: They fear losses more than they

desire gains and hence are more willing to take chances to avoid losses

than to secure gains. Losing a million dollars is more painful than a

corresponding gain would be coveted. Individuals chose risky alternatives

when they frame choice as avoiding losses rather than obtaining gains.

5 During the Cold War, Soviet decision-makers were willing to run high

military risks to avoid domestic political losses. Retreat would have

harmed the prospects for the ruling coalition to retain power. See Dennis

Ross, Risk Aversion in Soviet Decisionmaking, in J. Valenta and William

Potter (eds.) Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security. Boston: Allen

and Unwin, 1984, pp. 237-251.

6 Prospect theory in the field of cognitive psychology defines a reference

point as a threshold value above which individuals perceive gains and

below which they see losses. See Jack Levy, An Introduction to Prospect

Theory, in Barbara Farnham (ed.) Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect

Theory and International Conflict. Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan

Press, 1994, pp. 7-22; and Robert Jervis, Political Implications of Loss

Aversion, in Farnham, op. cit., pp. 23-40.

The assumption here is that Assad frames prior Syrian possession of the

Golan Heights as his reference point for negotiations. Outcomes falling

below that point are losses. Hence, Assad perceives the status

quo--Israeli control over the Heights with the application of Israeli law

there--as a severe loss. He could opt for a risky gamble that might return

the situation to the former status quo, i.e., undisputed Syrian

sovereignty over the Golan.

For the Pipes view of how some Arab leaders frame their problems and

fears, see Daniel Pipes, The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy.

New York: St. Martins Press, 1996.

7 Prospect theory supports the Maoz approach better than the Pipes

perspective because it accounts for Assads risk-taking behavior.