Bryan Ziegler Poli. Sci. 472 Prof. Raymond Tanter Final Paper The Containment of a Desert Fire I. Preface To preface this paper an explanation about it setting must first be made. To set this paper in context, it is dated June 17, 1997 yet it details the steps leading up to a scenario that I have envisioned for the date August 6, 1999. The scenario that will be detailed is in accordance with both historical precedent as well as theoretical analysis of current conditions that will lead to the occurrence of the following event. New York Times Headline for August 7, 1999-- Long Term strife in Middle East has finally come to an end!! A long term agreement has finally been reached between Saddam Hussein and the UN Security Council that has paved the way for the immediate lifting of economic sanctions against Iraq. Introduction For many years leading up to the lifting of the economic sanctions against Iraq, Saddam's regime has been regarded by the US as a rogue regime. Iraq had adequately fit the logistical description of a rogue regime as a Third World state, possessing a large military establishment, substantial supply of modern weapons and a desire for weapons of mass destruction.1 Iraq's desire to attain regional hegemony was exhibited when it invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990.2 Saddam's attempt to subsume Kuwait and make it part of Iraq drew accolades from people around the world that ranged from being called the "Anti-Christ" to the "Next Hitler." Common perception of Hussein was that he was clearly a threat to the security of the US's interest's in the Persian Gulf region. However, Hussein's vile reputation leading up to his invasion of Kuwait was not unwarranted. Hussein was also responsible for countless human rights violations including chemical attacks on the Kurds in Northern Iraq.3 Human rights violations is also a major issue in the extension of UN sanctions. These include "arbitrary arrests and detentions, enforced or involuntary disappearances, torture, inhuman or degrading practices, extrajudicial [sic.] killings, summary or arbitrary executions, hostage taking and the use of persons as 'human shields', the lack of freedom of expression and the absence of an independent judiciary."4 The focus on the factors leading up to the lifting of sanctions against Iraq must be directed not so much on the actual events of the Persian Gulf War but rather the sanctions themselves, the effects that they had, the effects the US thought they would have, as well as the reasons why they remained intact until 1999. View from Washington Focus on the US's motivation and involvement in this peace accord is important because of the way the UN Sanctions Committee is set up. The fifteen nations that sit on the committee all have veto power. It only takes an objection from one delegate to deny an import request even if the other 14 feel completely the opposite. One must realize that the committee's decisions cannot be appealed and do not need to be justified. In the case of Iraq it has been the US delegate that raises the most objections.5 The perplexing issue here is what factors would cause the US to suddenly step out of the way and allow for the sanctions against Iraq to be lifted when in the past the US had taken such a hard-line stand against Iraq. One thing that was never kept secret from the International community was the fact that the Bush and Clinton administrations main objective in determining sanctions policy was to overthrow Saddam Hussein.6 The belief that these sanctions would be enough to get Saddam out of power is clearly a motivated bias on the part of the two administrations. A stranglehold on the economy of Iraq by way of economic sanctions that would cause the overthrow or resignation of power by Saddam is clearly what Bush-Clinton wanted to see. However, historical precedent indicates this is really not probable. In fact "Never in contemporary history have sanctions brought about the fall of a regime, however weak."7 An example of this would be to look at Cuba. The Cuban economy has taken a huge hit from thirty years of economic sanctions but Fidel Castro is still prospering as a powerful leader. The embargo is actually the justification he needs for the failing economy.8 The economy in Iraq is one of the main issues as to why the US has changed their stance on the situation. The acknowledgment, by Clinton, that the economic embargo is hurting the civilians rather than the administration was a major step towards the agreement. Standing in the way of the US agreeing to step aside and allow the economic sanctions, including the oil embargo, to be lifted were two UN resolutions that Iraq would not or had not yet complied with. Resolutions 706, 712, 687 (destruction of Iraq's weapons) and 715(permanent surveillance to prevent against any Iraqi attempts to rearm) were handed down by the UN in 1991. It was agreed that compliance with these four resolutions by Iraq would precipitate the immediate lifting of the oil embargo. When Saddam had officially complied with all these resolutions in 1994, this included the destruction of his chemical weapons and nuclear manufacturing facilities. At this time Clinton, with British backing, announced publicly that he would not allow the oil embargo to be lifted unless Saddam also complied with Resolutions 688 (human rights) and 833 (remove Iraqi troops from the Kuwaiti border).9 This was a unilateral move that undermined the integrity and credibility of the Security Council's ability to offer rewards to different states for compliance with resolutions. These sanctions have deteriorated the economic conditions in Iraq so badly that it is now ranked in the lowest group of least developed countries in the world.10 The sanctions forbid the importing of any and all goods outside of food and medical supplies. Conditions had gotten so bad in fact that the UN agreed to allow Iraq to sell $2 billion worth of oil every six months in exchange for food to go towards it's citizens.11 The status of Iraq also effects the economic status and growth of the rest of the oil producing region. The more quickly Iraq can return to it's pre-Gulf War oil producing status the faster conditions will improve for the citizens of Iraq. In fact, economic conditions are so poor that Iraq's GDP was lower in 1995 (population 18 million) than it was in 1962 (population less than 7 million).12 Without the ability to export oil, Iraq doesn't have the resources to fully repair damage that was done during the Gulf War. One example of how this damage has affected the citizens is in the case of destroyed power plants. A destroyed power plant deprives citizens of drinking water, irrigation systems for agriculture are affected and sewage systems become clogged. This leads to an accumulation of garbage and debris, which in turn leads to enormous amounts of rats that cause disease and an epidemic follows.13 One of the major reason's that the US stood strong for so long was Saddam's unwillingness to comply with the Human Rights Resolution 688. However it can be viewed as another misperception by the US government that holding on to economic sanctions were not hurting the citizens of Iraq (that they were trying to protect with Res 688) more than Saddam's human rights violations alone. The oil embargo was simply compounding the everyday hardships that Iraqi citizens already faced under the hands of Saddam. Although to the International community, the US was proclaiming that the best interests of these people were the number one priority, it was not. This once again goes back to the motivated bias that was held by Clinton and Bush because the real priority was to get Saddam out of power not the Human Rights and welfare of the Iraqi citizens. Once the US realized that it was more feasible to protect the people than it was to overthrow Saddam, bargaining was able to take place. The US did not come to this conclusion alone however. This thinking was helped along by the continuing dissension that was emanating from the rest of the international community. This dissension was becoming more and more evident in 1994 as Iraq finally conceded to the US and formally recognized Kuwait's sovereignty with the strong urging of Russia and France. Yet the US was not ready to accept this as adequate. Clinton remained firm on his distrust of Iraq and refused to allow Iraq to export oil. Members of the international community questioned the US intentions and openly criticized Clinton's stance as one that was used to win favor in domestic politics in order to win the upcoming election.14 Dissension was once again apparent on September 3, 1996, three days after Saddam's troops attacked the Northern Kurdish city of Irbil, the US decided to fire missiles at strategic targets throughout Iraq.15 Clinton was once again openly criticized by Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov as acting unilaterally to further his own domestic popularity.16 China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang also announced disagreement with the US attack, "We believe Iraq's territory should be respected. We hope all sides show an attitude of restraint."17 France is openly adamant about European fears of suffering the brunt of retaliation by Iraq to US strikes in the form of terrorism due to their proximity to Iraq.18 If an observer looks at this situation of growing dissension between major powers like France, Russia, and China towards the US it is understandable why this was the major deciding factor in Clinton's decision to negotiate with Iraq. A falling out between the US and anyone of these countries could considerably damage the relations and position of the US with and in the International community in the future. In terms of Prospect theory Clinton viewed the gains of remaining in a hard-line position against Iraq of much less value than the risk of hurting the US future hegemonic position in the world political system. Clinton's movement towards risk aversion, brought about by the recognition of negative feelings toward the US's unilateral moves against Iraq, led to his negotiation with Saddam. The risk of damaging US credibility in the future was a much greater loss than the gain of the pleasure knowing that Saddam is out of power. Therefore rather than pursuing the overthrow of Saddam, Clinton decided that an agreement and an end to this situation, if possible, would be best for all involved. This new outlook on the situation allowed for Clinton to overlook his original desire to prevent Saddam's troops to remain on the Kuwait border as long as the troops movement would be carefully monitored by the UN in exchange for other concessions. Clinton's can justify this as a protection of Iraq's sovereignty because Saddam should be allowed to position his army as he sees fit within his own borders. This can only be valid however if Saddam was willing to reset his point of reference as Kuwait does not belong to Iraq and is it's own sovereign state. Therefore, the troops on the border should no longer be viewed as a threat to Kuwait. After eight years of not controlling Kuwait, after only a short occupation during the Gulf War, Saddam was willing to renormalize his reference point and concede to these terms. By this concession it was finally determined by the US government that Saddam has shown peaceful intentions and were even further willing work out a settlement for the long term. Once the US had a large enough sense of security that Saddam was willing to bargain in good faith, Clinton was able to pursue his next objectives. In immediate desire to restore a level of humanity to the citizens of Iraq, Clinton pushed for Saddam to comply with Res. 688 (including the instituting of long term monitoring programs) and put an end to the blockade that is currently restricting the flow of food and medical supplies to Northern Iraq. In exchange for aide and a promise that the US would no longer stand in the way of the UN lifting sanctions against Iraq, Saddam was willing to put an end to this 9 year ordeal and return some semblance of peace to the people of his nation. Although the US was not able to accomplish all of its originally intended goals such as establishing free elections and a democratic political system to Iraq, the end of this conflict was much more appealing than the prolonged suffering of a nation's people. The main change that precipitated this negotiation and peace agreement was Clinton's ability to reframe the situation. He was able to realize that the punishments he was pursuing against Saddam were not really affecting Saddam but rather the people that he was openly declaring the desire to protect from Saddam's wrath. Another motivation was that the people of Iraq are the only ones who are truly empowered with the ability to overthrow Saddam yet under the economic conditions they could barely get through their normal daily routines let alone overthrow a government. Regardless of whether Clinton still desires to have Saddam overthrown or whether his interest for negotiating peace was strictly out of concern for the people of Iraq, the lifting of the sanctions was the best decision in respect to the situation at hand. Works Cited 1Klare, Michael, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995) pg. 130. 2Ibid. 35. 3Waller, Douglas, Glass Houses The New Republic: 203: Nov. 5, 1990 pg. 14. 4http://www.acda.gov/reports/a/res/46/134/chap5.htm 5Rouleau, Eric, America's Unyielding Policy Toward Iraq Foreign Affairs:74: Jan/Feb '95 pg. 63. 6Ibid, pg. 68. 7Ibid, 68. 8Schwenninger, Sherle R. The Rift Over Rogues, The Nation: 263: Oct. 7, 1996. pg. 24. 9Ibid, 66. 10gopher://gopher.un.org/00/esc/docs/1997/E97--45.EN 11Ibid. 12Rouleau, 62 13Ibid, 62. 14Ibid, 67. 15http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/html/iraq.html 16http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9609/03/iraq.reax.update/index.html 17Ibid. 18Schwenninger, 22.