The Future of U.S.-Cuban Realtions: Cooperative Steps Toward Peace The vacancy left by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the resultant end of the Cold War has been filled by the emergence of the new threat posed by the so-called ÒrogueÓ nations. By definition, those countries which Òhave large conventional military forces, condone international terrorism, and/or seek weapons of mass destructionÓ are classified as rogues. Despite the recent development of the rogue threat, the validity thereof is not automatically negated. The menace posed by rogue countries was not simply invented as a justification for the continuance of a defense budget of Cold War magnitude, but rather was precipitated by a unique ensuance of events. Admittedly, examination under even the most minimal scrutiny reveals that Cuba does not conform to the conventional definition of a rogue country. Nonetheless, Cuba is not on the verge of quietly disappearing from the world scene in the wake of the Soviet demise. Instead, Cuba still merits the receipt of the label ÒrogueÓ because of its past connection to the Soviet Union and thus historically adverse and precarious relationship with the United States. To make the assumption that the collapse of communism elsewhere in the world unquestionably indicates that similar events will soon transpire in Cuba is to commit a grave error, since in doing so important differences between the situations are discounted. As a result of this fallacy, international change has fostered poor relations between the U.S. and Cuba. However, presently, a shift away from this faulty supposition and toward peaceful relations between the United States and the ÒoutlawÓ nation of Cuba appears to be underway. On June 23, 1998, the United States and Cuba reached an agreement which intends to suppress historical antagonism and establish a positive tone for future cooperation. According to the terms of this agreement, the United States agrees to lift economic sanctions against Cuba by eliminating the Helms-Burton Act and related legislation in exchange for a pledge, to be initiated by an immediate demonstration, by the Cuban government to make serious strides toward guaranteeing human rights to its citizens. This new agreement marks an entirely different approach to U.S. association with Castro and attempts to realize U.S. goals in Cuba. The inherent ideological conflict between democracy and communism implies that, while the nature of the conflict will not necessarily adhere to the pattern which has been established over the past thirty-five years, neither party will suddenly decide to abandon their long-standing beliefs or easily forget about their differences. This pact openly accepts these facts and the realistic constraints on relations between the two nations. Unlike in the past, the U.S. has not unilaterally issued a piece of legislation with terms which require an immediate transition to democracy in Cuba. Rather, the two countries worked together to modify their respective behavior in order to adhere to standards and expectations which have been set by the international community. The heightened level of communication and mutual concessions promise to be more progressive than past efforts have proven by circumventing the incompatible problems of, on the one hand, U.S. determination to impose its will on Cuba, and, on the other hand, CastroÕs resolve not to budge in his convictions. In order to appreciate the current status of relations between the United States and Cuba, one must understand the history of U.S.-Cuban relations. Dating back to the late 1800s, the experience of U.S. and Cuban interaction is best characterized as a constant attempt by various presidential administrations to extend their influence to the realm of Cuban affairs. The U.S. occupied Cuba between 1898 and 1902 and again from 1906 to 1909. The U.S. managed to prolong its occupation under a different guise by establishing a ÒprotectorateÓ in Cuba between 1902 through 1934, during which time troops were sent to Cuba on several occasions. In general, the U.S. exhibited a paternalistic and imperialistic attitude toward its neighbor, while Cuba struggled to maintain its sovereignty. The combination of U.S. interference in Cuban affairs and certain events relevant to economic relations between the two nations occurring in the latter half of the twentieth century effectively set the stage for indefinite conflict. The U.S. trade embargo on Cuba originated on February 3, 1962 because the Kennedy administration wearily anticipated the impending alliance of Castro with the Soviet Union. Two years later, the U.S. was joined by the members of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.), excluding Mexico, in halting trade with Cuba. In addition, the international financial institutions refused to grant Cuba credit. The embargo had a severe detrimental impact upon the Cuban economy since during the 1950s Cuba sent 71% of its exports to and received 64% of its imports from the U.S. Eventually, the resultant economic isolation was partially alleviated with the decision of the O.A.S. to lift its economic and diplomatic embargo in the 1970s. Also in the mid-1970s, the Ford administration was persuaded by various congressional and academic groups to attempt to establish civil relations with Cuba. Despite the insistence by many supporters that Cuba had changed, Ford quickly ceased his brief efforts to renew cooperation with Cuba because of CubaÕs military engagement in Angola in 1975. In 1980, Castro again demonstrated his unwillingness to cooperate with the U.S. during the Mariel boatlift. In order to improve his domestic situation on both political and economic levels, he permitted 125,000 Cubans leave Cuba for the U.S., but amongst these immigrants he interspersed numerous criminals and mental patients. These showings of bad faith led the Reagan administration to strengthen the embargo against Cuba. Therefore, historical tensions increased in the post-Cold War era as well, since ReaganÕs policy toward Cuba served to reinforce the tone of mistrust and antagonism characterizing U.S.-Cuban relations. The continued conflict led to the creation of the Cuban Democracy Act (C.D.A. or ÒTorricelli BillÓ) under President Bush in October, 1992. This piece of legislation reinforced the pre-existing embargo against Cuba by forcing a decrease in foreign subsidiary trade with Cuba as well as discouraging nations receiving foreign aid from the U.S. from giving assistance to Cuba. In response to an increase in human rights violations and CastroÕs failure to institute democratic change, the goal of the bill was to weaken the Cuban government enough to force the desired changes. Several years after passing the C.D.A., the U.S. still struggled to exert even more pressure upon the Cuban government in an attempt ultimately to elicit the Cuban acceptance of U.S. will and power. Indeed, by passing the Helms-Burton Bill on March 12, 1996, the U.S. hoped to expand its own economic embargo against Cuba to an international level by preventing trade between foreign businesses and Cuba. The text of the bill enumerated the following purposes: 1)bringing freedom and prosperity to the Cuban citizenry by promoting the democratization of Cuba, 2)reinforcing the long-standing economic sanctions against Cuba by the United States on an international level, 3)ensuring the national security of the United States as undermined by the terrorism of CastroÕs government , American property stolen by CastroÕs government, and problems of a high influx of Cuban immigrants to the United States, 4)promoting supervised democratic elections in Cuba, 5)creating a foundation for U.S. support of a transition government in Cuba, and 6)receiving compensation for property seized from United States citizens by CastroÕs government. With this policy, the U.S. overstepped its boundaries in the realm of international relations and provoked hostile responses on multiple levels. First of all, funding for the passage of the Helms-Burton Act has been linked to donations from members of the Cuban exile community, which, for many people, calls its legitimacy into question. Also, merely the existence of such an act raises the sensitive issue of the sovereign rights of nations. The U.S. has been criticized for infringing upon the sovereignty of other nations in an arrogant attempt to organize the world according its own system of beliefs. Furthermore, the nature of the legislation is hypocritical on its face considering the source. Although the U.S. is a nation deeply rooted in the principles of freedom and democracy, policy-makers nonetheless believe that they are entitled to subvert the freedom of other nations to the pursuit of democracy abroad. Generally, the U.S. has lost the support of the international community, including such groups as the O.A.S., the United Nations General Assembly, and the European Commission. Due to the harsh criticism the Helms-Burton Bill has received and the impropriety of compromising values which are inherent in the U.S. system, it proved unwise to continue the pursuit of this policy. In addition, the longevity of an embargo that failed to advance the principal U.S. policy goal of converting Cuba to a democracy indicates the necessity for change. Over the past thirty-five years, the economic embargo did not ruin or severely impair the development of the Cuban economy, nor did it create governmental instability. Therefore, for the sake of progress, the U.S. finally chose to demonstrate an actual commitment to improving both relations with Cuba as well as the internal conditions of Cuba by adopting a policy which reflects those goals. In fact, U.S. policy has evolved in response to the new face of the Cuban threat. The passage of time has shown that the disintegration of the Soviet Union did not signal the demise of the rest of the communist nations in the international community. However, that occurrence clearly marked the end the previous characterization of the expansionist nature of the communist threat. The perception of danger stemmed from the unification of nations in their adherence to a particular ideology with a strong central organization. The absence of the Soviet Union means that there is no longer a single dominant nation in a position of leadership, and that Cuba is not a locally established and supported Soviet threat to the U.S. Instead, the nature of the new threat includes problems such as drugs, the environment, and illegal immigration. The altered, and in certain respects diminished, threat provides an opportunity to pursue interests in potential economic cooperation between the U.S. and Cuba in the post- Cold War era. Even though the collapse of the Soviet Union did not instantly cripple Cuba, the nation suffers from certain inevitable problems in the aftermath. For example, CastroÕs strength to support military forces was largely derived form the receipt of around $5 to $6 billion in aid from the Soviet Union. Now, Castro can no longer pay subsidized rates for the Soviet petroleum on which Cuba is heavily dependent. Also, the change of Eastern European economies to democratic markets means that Cuba is cut off from the subsidized machinery and technology on which it previously relied. In the past, when faced with adversity, the Cuban economy remained viable and maintained the potential for growth despite difficulties. For example, during the early 1980s, Cuba experienced economic growth while other countries in Latin America suffered through depressions. However, the need to integrate into the world economy is implicit in heavy Cuban dependence upon trade. Fortunately, there is presently a worldwide trend toward the formation regional trade blocs, and there exists an elevated U.S. interest in creating a trade bloc in its own hemisphere for several reasons. First of all, there is greater potential for U.S. expansion of trade in Latin America than in Europe. Second, a combination of the U.S., Canada, and Latin America would include more people than in both Eastern and Western Europe. Therefore, the U.S. would benefit from encouraging Cuban participation with the U.S. and Latin America since they all possess related interests and are affected by the same decisions. By including Cuba, the U.S. would lay the foundation for future cooperation. As the stability and prosperity of the western hemisphere increases in importance to the U.S. economy, the prevalent method of organization will be financial. Basically, the U.S. will work with other countries in the region to establish a competitive Òdollar blocÓ to counter those of Asia and Europe. Beyond the economic motivations behind current U.S. policy, factors relevant to prospect theory are evident in the current situation as well. According to prospect theory, people are more repelled by the idea of incurring loss than they are pleased by the idea of achieving gains. Therefore, Castro is highly unlikely to be seduced by the idea of a transition to democracy in Cuba, which promises enormous potential losses, including his position of power. The proposition for democratic transition is unappealing because it will result in extreme disarray due to the termination of central planning, the removal of price controls, the ending of subsidies, and the sale of public enterprises. The difficulties experienced during the reunification of Germany provide an accurate example of the decline in welfare programs, the increase in unemployment, and the decrease in wages which occurs when communism is abandoned in favor of democracy. A further degree of complexity surfaces when one considers the operation of biases on both the part of the U.S. and Cuba. In reality, both countries lack knowledge about the other, and repeatedly negative contact between the two nations has perpetuated stereotypes. Basing their decisions upon prior experiences and beliefs indicates the operation of unmotivated biases, which breeds misperception. The U.S. and Cuba are also at a disadvantage in terms of the critical issue of trust, which is virtually non-existent as a precedent in their prior interactions. From the U.S. perspective, Cuba previously terminated several agreements regarding hijacking, joint search and rescue missions, the prohibition of drugs, and migration between 1976 and 1985. From the Cuban perspective, the track record of the U.S. is not much better due to the U.S. refusal to recognize Cuban sovereignty and equality as a nation, the inconsistency and unpredictability of policy decisions, and the hypocrisy of U.S. actions. Due to the constraints on rational behavior which result from the operation of biases, the U.S. and Cuba must attempt to minimize elements of mistrust and pursue policies of mutual accommodation in which both nations sacrifice in order to arrive at decisions which are acceptable to both parties. The present policy closely adheres to this recommendation by abandoning ineffective strategies in favor of new alternatives. The U.S. has opted to utilize a method of reassurance rather than risk the possibility of a punitive strategy backfiring by building popular support for the Cuban government . The continuation of the economic embargo is not conducive to building opposition to Castro, and instead suggests an increase in anti-U.S. sentiments by inflicting hardships, such as shortages of food and medical supplies, upon the Cuban people. Also, current policy acknowledges the precarious element which CastroÕs mental state contributes to the situation. To Castro, the decline of other communist regimes is cause for concern for the future existence of Cuba as well. Castro has been abandoned by his former Soviet ally, and maintains communist opposition to the U.S. on his own. He operates from the perspective of a leader who is trapped a Òbasement of fear,Ó and may act dangerously or irrationally in his attempt to escape. Thus, a continuation of the embargo would ignore, and only serve to exacerbate, CastroÕs fear. The recent agreement between the U.S. and Cuba makes strides towards noticeably and positively impacting the lives of Cuban citizens by initiating change within the Cuban governmental system. Instead of using human rights violations as an excuse to achieve loftier U.S. goals, the U.S. is now directly addressing the issue of human rights violations. In the past, under false pretenses, U.S. policy failed both to improve the Cuban governmentÕs respect for human rights and to force the transition to democracy. By delivering basic rights to Cuban citizens, while postponing more drastic change, the U.S. still works indirectly toward its ultimate purpose. A transition to democracy is more probable when the failures of CastroÕs government become evident to and are opposed by the Cuban people themselves. Popular revolution as a method for change is an integral aspect of democratic ideals and should not be imposed by an outsider, but arise from within the nation itself in order to be truly effective. Endnotes 1. Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes (Unpublished book, 1997), 2. 2. Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws (New York: Hill & Wang, 1995) 7. 3. Tanter, 82. 4. Richard Betts, ÒThe International Context of Cuba-U.S. Relations,Ó in Cuba and the United States, eds. Joseph S. Tulchin and Rafael Hernandez (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 121. 5. Carlos Rico F., ÒCuba and the Latin American Security Agenda,Ó in Cuba and the United States, eds.Joseph S. Tulchin and Rafael Hernandez (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 118. 6. Jorge I. Dominguez, ÒThe Obstacles and Prospects for Improved U.S.-Cuban Relations: a U.S. Perspective,Ó in U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 1990s, eds. Jorge Dominguez and Rafael Hernandez (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), 20. 7. Dominguez, 16. 8. Adolfo Leyva De Varona, Ph.D., Propaganda and Reality: A Look at the U.S. Embargo Against CastroÕs Cuba [Online] September 1996. Available: http://www.canfnet.org/canf-lib/embg-eng.txt. 9. Eliana Cardoso and Ann Helwege, Cuba after Communism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992), 104. 10. Leyva De Varona, Ph.D., http://www.canfnet.org/canf-lib/embg-eng.txt. 11. Cardoso and Helwege, 104. 12. Leyva De Varona, Ph.D., http://www.canfnet.org/canf-lib/embg-eng.txt. 13. IPS Correspondents, ÒTrade: U.S. Remains Isolated in WTO on Blockade of Cuba,Ó [Online] April 17, 1996. Available: http://www.igc. apc.org/cubasoli/blockade.html. 14. Friedrich Hayek, Helms-Burton Bill [Online] March 12, 1996. Available: http://www.hayek.org/english/HBBtext.html. 15. ÒU.S. Report Links Helms-Burton Act to Political Donations,Ó in Granma [Online] January 3, 1997. Available: http://www.granma.cu/ ener3/3ene11.html. 16. Marta Rojas, ÒSovereign Countries Must Oppose the Helms-Burton Act, or They will be neither Free nor Sovereign,Ó in Granma [Online] November 7, 1996. Available: http://www.granma.cu/noviemb/16nov7i. html. 17. Teresa Gutierrez, ÒHelms-Burton Act Arouses Worldwide Anger,Ó in Workers World [Online] July 25, 1996. Available: http://www.workers.org/cuba/helms.html. 18. Philip Brenner, From Confrontation to Negotiation: U.S. Relations with Cuba (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), 81. 19. Leyva De Varona, Ph.D., http://www.canfnet.org/canf-lib/embg-eng.txt. 20. Douglas W. Payne and others, Latin America: U.S. Policy after the Cold War (New York: Americas Society, 1991), 47. 21. Payne and others, 53. 22. Payne and others, 48. 23. Payne and others, 51. 24. Kenneth P. Jameson, ÒU.S.-Cuban Economic Relations in the 1990s,Ó in U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 1990s, eds. Jorge I. Dominguez and Rafael Hernandez (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), 209-210. 25. Cardoso and Helwege, 76. 26. Payne and others, 55. 27. Brenner, 91-92. 28. Jameson, 222. 29. Jack S. Levy, ÒAn Introduction to Prospect Theory,Ó in Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict, ed. Barbara Farnham (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1994), 10. 30. Cardoso and Helwege, 81-82. 31. Dominguez and Hernandez, 4. 32. Dominguez, 22. 33. Dominguez, 25-26. 34. Dominguez, 24. 35. ÒThe World Federation of Public Health Associations: Resolution Against the U.S. Embargo,Ó Background on the U.S. Blockade Against Cuba [Online.] Available: http://www.igc.apc.org/cubasoli/ blockade.html. 36. Dr. Jorge Dominguez, ÒThe Current Economic Situation in Cuba: Panel Discussion,Ó Abstracts of Main Presentations [Online.] Available: http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba1/panel.html. 37. Tanter, 377. Works Cited Betts, Richard. 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