Karim Sadjadpour Spring PS472 Dr. Tanter The US and Iran: A New Beginning Though the epitome of a Òrogue nationÓ and at the bottom of the U.S.Õs most revered list, Iran-American relations recently saw a glimmer of hope with the election of a relatively moderate cleric as IranÕs new president. Former Iranian culture minister Mohammed Khatami handily defeated his opponent Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri- the ultra- conservative speaker of the Parliament -by winning nearly 70 percent of the 29.1 million votes cast. The result was a major shock to the pro-Nateq-Nouri religious establishment who have ruled Iran for the past 18 years, and also caught the eye of the United States. Some government experts and independent scholars on Iran believe the landslide victory of Khatami could mark a turning point in the Islamic Revolution, and provides an opportunity for improved relations between old friends. ÒIt puts a totally new light on the regime,Ó said Kenneth Katzman, a former CIA analyst who monitors Iran for the Congressional Research Service, ÒI see an opportunity.Ó Even U.S. 1President Clinton labeled the election as a Òhopeful signÓ, but also added that Tehran should stop backing terrorists and trying to acquire nuclear weapons if it wants to be more amicable with Washington. Khatami however has taken the opposite approach, saying at his first press conference that improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations Òwould depend on changes in the attitude and positions of the U.S.A.Ó Unfortunately this has been the all too familiar rhetoric between the two nations since 1979, both sides claiming the other must take the first step in making amends. To better understand the current relationship between Tehran and Washington however, one must go much further back than Khatami and Clinton. First enemies, then friends, then back to enemies, Iran and the U.S. have seen their kinship reach sky high during the ShahÕs tenure to absolute rock bottom during the 1979 hostage crisis. In the present day it would be impossible for either Clinton or Khatami to take an action without being influenced by 2biases and 3heuristics based on historical precedent in their 20th century relationship. So to more suitably predict what effect the election of Khatami will have on U.S.-Iran relations, let us first examine their how their relationship has evolved to what it is today. The Descent of Mossadegh and Ascent of the Shah The importance of Iran on the global scale increased dramatically with the discovery of oil in 1908 by Australian William Knox DÕArcy. On the eve of World War I, 4Britain purchased 51% of DÕArcyÕs company- the Anglo-Persian Oil Company-and used Iranian oil to help fuel their fleet during the war. During this time period IranÕs leadership did not remain stable, changing several times before Muhammed Reza Shah finally came into power in 1941. The Shah took over for his father, Reza Shah, an Iranian military leader and the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty. Muhammed Reza assumed leadership of the country during W.W.II which was a very tumultuous time period in Iran. Because of their strategic location on the southern border of the Soviet Union, 5Iran was occupied by the Allied forces which resulted in deteriorating economic conditions. Dissatisfaction with the shah, whom many Iranians felt Ògave inÓ too much to accommodate foreign oil interests, led to the election of Muhammed Mossadegh, leader of the rightist National Front, as prime minister. Mossadegh rose to power in April 1951 and immediately created a great sense of nationalism and pride within the country. Within weeks he submitted to the Iranian Majilis his proposal to nationalize Iran's oil industry, which at that time was still controlled mostly by the British government (Anglo-Iranian oil company). The State Department had warned Britain that Iran might explode unless it got a better deal, but the U.S. did not press the issue firmly enough to make London listen. The results of this nationalization were mostly negative for all parties involved; The west lost out on Iranian oil and oil prices shot up; Iran didnÕt have the technical ability to run their own refineries and their economy began to suffer as a result of the lost oil revenues. Though this move by Mossadegh caused a great deal of headache for both Iran and the West, he remained popular among his people because of his national pride and was committed to a form of democracy. Mossadegh may have been admired in Iran for standing up to the west, but as the economy began to deteriorate, so did his popularity. Growing national discontent with Mossadegh 6led him to take desperate measures to try and protect his power. He dissolved the Majils and tried to take over the government in the summer of 1953. Muhammed Reza Shah was forced to flee the country and that is when the U.S. intervened. Within days the CIA brought the Shah back into the country and after a nine-hour battle between pro- and anti-Mossadegh army factions, the monarch assumed absolute rule. While MossadeghÕs aim was to rid Iran of Western powers, the ShahÕs goal was to build the most thoroughly Westernized nation in all of the Muslim world. Quickly he negotiated a deal with foreign oil companies under which the companies managed IranÕs oil operations for a substantial profit. With the help of petroleum revenues he bought billions of dollars worth of sophisticated military equipment from the United States, who aimed to deter Soviet aggression in the Middle East. Though the ShahÕs plans to 7stimulate economic growth and social development were applauded, there was growing dissent throughout the country. By 1978 the Shah had alienated almost all elements of Iranian society. Westernized intellectuals were angered with the rampant corruption and repression; workers and peasants saw the ShahÕs policies as 8Òmaking the rich richer, while the poor remained in mud hovels;Ó the clergy were appalled with the casinos, bars, and discotheques that seemed the most visible result of Westernization. The Shah however seemed to pay little heed to his critics and continued to rule with an ÒIron FistÓ. Non-conformers were ruthlessly suppressed, and his secret police-the SAVAK-was notorious for its use of torture. Regardless of this, the U.S. saw the Shah as a stable and valuable ally. 9In August of 1978 the U.S. depended on Iran for 9.1 percent of its crude oil imports , and more importantly the Shah was staunchly anti-Communist as well as a valuable player in Middle East politics. The U.S. government lent the Shah their full support, allowing him to buy all the modern weapons he wanted so Iran could act as 10ÒAmericaÕs surrogate policemen of the Persian Gulf.Ó Because Washington had strongly committed itself to the Shah, they had a 11motivated bias in believing that their investment was buying stability and friendship. This led them to ignore the growing discontent within Iran, which the Shah dismissed as 12Òthe blah-blahs of armchair critics.Ó By winter of 1978 demonstrations and protest marches were on the rise and spreading like wild fire. The ShahÕs troops made the fatal mistake of killing unarmed protesters during the first parade, which started a deadly cycle; marches to mourn the victims of the first riot, more shooting, more martyrs, crowds swelling into the hundreds of thousands and eventually millions in Tehran. By then it was too late to do anything and Washington knew it. It was only a matter of time before the ShahÕs regime would fall, the only question was who would assume IranÕs leadership? The ensuing answer would be the start of the downfall of U.S.-Iranian relations. Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution Though at its outset the Iranian revolution was a grass-roots movement which had no visible leaders, demonstrators had begun waving pictures of the Ayatollah Khomeini, an ultra-conservative Islamic cleric who had been forced into exile by the Shah in 1964. Even in exile Khomeini denounced the Shah as a fraud and a traitor to Islam, and he demanded he step down in favor of an ÒIslamic Republic.Ó He would soon get his wish when on January 16, 1979, after months of daily protest parades, the Shah and his Empress flew off to exile. Khomeini now became the active head of the revolution, ending the thirty-seven year reign of Muhammed Reza Shah. The Islamic Republic of Iran was officially declared on April 1, 1979, and Khomeini wasted no time in making sure that Iran follow 13Òin the image of (the prophet) Mohammed.Ó Alcohol was forbidden, Women were segregated from men in schools, swimming pools, beaches, and other public facilities. The Ayatollah even banned music from radio and TV, 14Ò..because it involves pleasure and ecstasy, similar to drugs.Ó Though Khomeini came into power by preaching the mercy of God, he showed little of his own, condemning more than 650 Iranians to death at trials where defense lawyers were rarely present. Many of them were high-ranking politicians and generals under the Shah, sentenced to death by firing squad. Initially there had been a struggle for power between the Khomeini-led Shiite clerics and secular nationalists, both of whom were supporters of the revolution. Eventually though, the unified clerics swept aside their disbanded secular rivals, using political maneuvering, propaganda, and terror. IranÕs fundamentalist clerics dominated the government by the end of 1979, and Khomeini became the final authority in all matters of government and social policy. The AyatollahÕs hatred of the West was evident from the beginning and he used this to his advantage in helping to orchestrate the destruction of the ShahÕs pro-Western regime. He fueled his campaign with hateful rhetoric aimed at the West, charging that the U.S. (and the CIA) was responsible for the countryÕs ills. Khomeini also encouraged many anti- American riots by Muslims throughout the Middle East, causing many Arab leaders to regard him as a 15Ò..complete menace...who is trying to play God.Ó But what caused KhomeniÕs deep hatred of the west? According to University of Michigan Political Science Professor Raymond Tanter, 16ÒKhomeni has many reasons to be bitter towards the West. 17His father, Mostafa, was killed by agents of the Shah, whose family was installed with the help of CIA intelligence operatives. Disgusted with the corruption capitalism had brought to the predominately Islamic Iran, Khomeni vowed to Òbring death to the Great Satan.Ó According to Tanter, three factors marked the rule of the Ayatollah Khomeni: ÒAn intense belief in Islam, a great hatred towards the West, and an aggressive reaction towards a perceived threat.Ó The latter of the three will be exemplified in the eight year Iran-Iraq war. U.S. Embassy Hostage Crisis and Prospect Theory November 4, 1979 is a date many Americans will never forget, the day 3,000 Iranian revolution students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking 66 Americans hostage. Though the attack was meant as a symbolic gesture and was expected to last only a few days, the students immediately received the support of the Ayatollah and proceeded to settle in for longer than they had anticipated. Though a handful of hostages would be released, 18fifty-two of the embassy staff members remained prisoners of the students for 444 days until their negotiated release on Jan. 20, 1980, two minutes into the Reagen presidency. In April of 1980, President Jimmy Carter undertook a dramatic military rescue attempt. Though Carter was widely considered a 19humanitarian in world politics and a military rescue would involve great risk, he was clearly operating in a domain of losses. According to 20Prospect Theorists, an actor is more risk-acceptant when facing losses and risk-averse in a domain of gains. When the hostages were taken Carter had sustained huge losses to personal popularity, national honor, and international interests. With each day that went by, the losses were growing heavier and the acceptance of risk was increasing. Carter was given two frames of reference as to what to do regarding the hostages. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance opposed the rescue mission, arguing that it was too risky both politically and militarily. Vance framed his reference in terms of mortality, claiming that it would be impossible to rescue all hostages without any casualties. He proposed to do nothing until the political situation in Iran settled down; for right now the hostages were safe and unharmed. On the other hand, National Security Advisor Brzezinski felt a military rescue was necessary, for national interest and honor (not to mention CarterÕs campaign) had plummeted. Operating in a domain of losses, Carter was willing to take great risks, and followed BrzezinskiÕs advice to follow through with a military rescue 21Òbefore things got worse.Ó Though it was against CarterÕs nature to proceed with the mission, desperate times called for desperate measures. In retrospect, it is obvious that Carter would have been better off paying heed to VanceÕs advice, as the rescue mission failed and eight U.S. servicemen were killed. However, since losses loomed large, Carter did what was expected according to the prospect theory: Seek risk to regain the status quo. Unfortunately he was awarded no prize for his giant gamble. The War with Iraq/ Life after Khomeini Seeing the political chaos in Iran following the revolution as an apparent weakness, Saddam Hussein and Iraq attacked Iran in September 1980, expecting a quick victory. What ensued however would become the 22longest conventional war of this century, lasting eight years and claiming the lives of close to one million Iranian and Iraqi youths. Hussein had underestimated IranÕs threat because of their political unrest, but IranÕs army did not immediately roll over when attacked and instead they were able to quickly mobilize and eventually stage a series of counterattacks. In response to IranÕs counterattacks in 1982, Saddam withdrew his troops into Iraq and called for a cease-fire. Khomeini ignored this however and ordered another major attack across the border, which turned out to be unsuccessful due to shortages of equipment. This was how the war persisted, both sides launching attacks back and forth with neither side being able to hold a definitive edge. After the Iran hostage crisis it was obvious that the United States was in support of Saddam HusseinÕs Iraq both diplomatically and militarily, as was the entire Arab world save Syria, Libya, and Algeria. With Iraqi forces surging in the summer of 1988, Khomeini agreed to United Nations Resolution 598 which called for a cease-fire. So after eight long and bloody years, the Iran-Iraq war finally ended with very little resolved. Neither Iran nor Iraq made any substantial territorial gains and the war was a terrible financial catastrophe for both sides. Iran became even more isolated from the rest of the world and their economy was completely crippled. Following KhomeiniÕs death in the summer of 1989, Iran proved wrong many Western analysts who predicted there would be a lengthy power struggle among the religious elite for control of the government. Ali Khamenei, the outgoing president, was chosen to succeed Khomeini as supreme religious leader, and Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, former speaker of the parliament, was overwhelmingly elected as president. Though neither Khamenei nor Rafsanjani could be considered political moderates, to the United States they were a welcome change from the likes of Khomeini. Relations between the two countries showed no real signs of improvement, but the animosity left over from the 1979 hostage crisis had slowly begun to subside. Rafsanjani understood that his country was tired of the tribulations of war and revolution, and his primary goal as president was to reinvigorate the economy. Improving ties with the West was undoubtedly a way to improve IranÕs struggling economy, but Rafsanjani had to be careful not to draw fire from the anti-Western Islamist clerics. He put forth a five-year development plan that allowed for, among other things, modest economic openings to the West. 23Iran sought to renew ties with Saudi Arabia and Great Britain, but renewed relations with the United States remained a political impossibility. When Iran refused to budge on its stance that called for the assassination of 24Salman Rushdie-author of The Satanic Verses - by all Muslims, Western European nations became wary of increasing ties with Iran too quickly. With the Iraq invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 Rafsanjani began to see possibility of a Persian Gulf War as a unique opportunity. To have IranÕs two most hated enemies in a war against each other was a dream come true. The war would benefit Iran for the allied coalition promised to destroy IraqÕs military capabilities, while there would also be increasing opposition to the U.S. in parts of the Middle East. Though Rafsanjani declared IranÕs neutrality in the war, he took advantage of IraqÕs vulnerability, refusing to return top Iraqi warplanes hidden in Tehran, and also giving support to the Shiite rebellion in southern Iraq. By not taking sides in the Persian Gulf War Tehran managed to keep itself out of trouble with Washington, and at the same time gained an upper hand on Iraq without involving its military. RafsanjaniÕs ideology during the gulf war served dividends for Iran as he used the crisis in the Gulf as an opportunity for diplomacy with Iraq, yet conceded nothing to them and stayed neutral throughout. U.S. Embargo and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act In early 1995 President Clinton placed by executive order a complete trade embargo on Iran, including nuclear-related technologies. The principal 25goal in imposing these sanctions was to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear equipment, technologies, and know- how, including those necessary for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The U.S. trade sanctions against Iran are an example of deterrence by denial, for they intend to deter Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon by denying any and all trade with them. U.S. unilateral measures to contain Iran are based on economic sanctions, bans on Iranian imports, strict export controls, and the prohibition of foreign aid and credits. Although ClintonÕs intent was to make this a multilateral embargo with the U.S.Õs allies, many countries such as Germany and France have been uncooperative in joining the U.S. in placing embargoes on Iran, claiming the policy is too harsh. The U.S. fears IranÕs acquisition of a nuclear weapon for a number of reasons: 26The fact that Iran is a terrorist state; it is an opponent of the Middle East peace process; it is an enemy of Israel; it exports fundamentalist beliefs in the region; it is an obstacle to U.S. goals in that it took U.S. citizens hostage in 1979. Most critics of the embargo argue that there has not been much concrete evidence to support the U.S. claim that Iran is attempting to acquire nuclear technology to build a bomb. They argue that regardless of IranÕs actions, they will always be perceived as great threat for the 1979 hostage crisis has very high availability in the U.S.. According to Dr. Tanter, 27such misperception is an overestimation of the threat posed by IranÕs behavior. Though it is perhaps too early to judge, since its implementation in 1995, the U.S. unilateral embargo on Iran has been more of a deterrence failure than a success for a number of reasons. One is that few countries other than the U.S. have adhered to the embargo, therefore questioning the U.S.Õs global authority. According to 28Iranian foreign minister Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, "The signs of changes in how the world is managed are appearing and the most clear of all is the way the world has been treating the subject of U.S. trade embargo in Iran during the recent monthsÓ (June 1995). Another reason to suspect deterrence failure is the continued speculation that Iran will eventually get the bomb, if that is indeed what they want. 29Whether with outside assistance or not, there are Central Intelligence Agency reports to indicate that Iran may have a nuclear weapon by the year 2,000. Perhaps the biggest indication of the U.S. embargoÕs deterrence failure is the 1996 Iran-Libya sanctions act. For if the U.S.Õs unilateral embargo in 1995 were a deterrence success, the Iran-Libya Sanctions would not have to have been implemented, for the U.S.Õs embargo alone would have been sufficient. On August 5, 1996, Clinton signed the Iran and Libya Sanctions bill, which institutionalized his 1995 executive order into legislation. 30ÒThe Iran and Libya Sanctions Act seeks to deny both countries the ability to support international terrorism and to fund the development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. The Act limits the development of IranÕs ability to explore, extract, refine, or transport petroleum resources by pipeline. There is an extraterritorial feature in the Act. If foreign persons (people or firms) invest more than $40 million, they would be subjected to U.S. penalties..Ó In fact the Iran-Libya sanctions Act is a classic example of extraterritorialism. The U.S. is essentially placing a secondary boycott on Iran by punishing all companies and countries who do business with them, thus isolating them even more economically. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act is another form of deterrence by denial, and though it has not met without opposition from the U.S.Õs allies, thus far it has proved to be more successful than the U.S.Õs unilateral embargo. Moving Ahead: The Election of Khatami The election of Mohammed Khatami on May 23, 1997, was undoubtedly the biggest political upset in the history of IranÕs 18-year-old revolution. Khatami owes his appeal to a reputation as an open-minded religious intellectual and tolerant politician. He gained wide support among women, young people, and intellectuals who feared a harder application of Islamic rules in everyday life and restrictions on freedom of expression. What separated Khatami from the rest of the candidates was his diverse appeal: He appeals to devout Shiites because he holds the title Seyyed and wears a 31black turban, and at the same time he appeals to the growing number of moderates seeking a social ÒliberalizationÓ within Iran. To many, the vote for Khatami was one of protest against the current regime. ÒBy voting for Khatami, I want to change IranÕs image,Ó says Maryam Akhondan, a graduate business student in Tehran. ÒNot all Iranians are fanatics. Not all Iranians are terrorists, as you think in the West.Ó Says Mitra, a 20 year old female student, ÒI am very happy. It was very important that Nateq-Nouri did not become president. For the first time the people have rejected what the establishment wanted.Ó The youth were arguably KhatamiÕs greatest supporters (the legal voting age in Iran is 15, and 32over half the population of the country is 18 or under), and for them the vote was an investment in a better tomorrow. ÒWe want more variety on Iranian TV, more music and entertainment for young people,Ó says Mahdieh Zargar, 18, a high school senior who voted for Khatami. ÒIn Iran all the facilities have been allocated to men, and nothing is left for girls. We want more swimming pools!Ó Many observers outside Iran have also been impressed with KhatamiÕs credentials. A family man who has worked in the West, Khatami is fluent in English, German, and Arabic. Five years ago Khatami was driven from his role as Minister of Culture by ultra- conservative clerics who accused him of allowing an ÒinvasionÓ of decadent ideas from the U.S. and Europe. In his campaign speeches Khatami spoke out against the policies of the current regime, to the delight of his followers. ÒOur country has a long way to go,Ó he said, ÒThe government doesnÕt give people the opportunity to grow.Ó Khatami even has the backing of RafsanjaniÕs daughter, Faezeh, who is one of IranÕs most popular politicians and a potential vice-presidential candidate to Khatami. ÒKhatami believes in freedomÓ, she told TIME magazine in a June 2 interview. But how much freedom will Khatami be allowed to create new policies? Despite his enormous popularity, his power still takes a back-seat to supreme leader of the Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The supreme leader usually has the last word in determining policy and his word is considered sacrosanct. Khamenei also controls the foreign and intelligence ministries as well as the armed forces. It is expected that Khatami and Khamenei will start out with a bumpy relationship since 33Khamenei was in favor of Khatami's presidential opponent, ultra-conservative parliament Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq- Nouri. However one thing that was evidenced by the elections was that Khatami and his beliefs are truly representative of what the Iranian people want, while Khamenei is more of an Islamic figurehead than a politician. The election of Khatami was a vote for moderation and liberalization. Though his policies may initially be overruled by Khamenei, in time it is not unlikely to believe KhatamiÕs power will rise greater than that of Khamenei, for the vast majority of the public supports him. Peace Scenario GENEVA (AP) - On March 1, 2003, Iranian President Mohammed Khatami and Washington signed an historical agreement. The U.S pledged to terminate their 1995 trade embargo on Iran as well as lift all facets of the 1996 Iran-Libya sanctions act. In return, Tehran guaranteed to cease the development of weapons of mass destruction, play a positive role in the Mid-East peace process, and end its sponsorship of international terrorist organizations. In electing Khatami, Iran took one large step forward to making peace with the United States. However, KhatamiÕs decision to sign these historic accords was not an attempt to maximize IranÕs gains, rather he signed them while operating under a domain of losses. When Khatami took over for Rafsanjani in 1997 he seemed poised and optimistic despite inheriting an economy held back by vast foreign sanctions, and an astronomic inflation rate. Though in his first term as President he was able to retain somewhat the popularity that got him elected, since his re-election in 2001 he has not delivered on any of his campaign promises for economic reform. Unemployment has risen by 20% in the last two years, and inflation has been uncontrollable. Famine and social unrest have been widespread, and there have been growing protests since the Winter of 2002. Though Khatami has worked tirelessly to implement economic reform, there is very little he can do since the Iran-Libya sanctions Act of 1996 as well as the U.S. embargo of 1995 have not been lifted. It appeared that the economic and social situation was going to improve when Khatami first was elected, but this has been hardly the case, although it is no fault of KhatamiÕs. Within 15 weeks of his election Salman Rushdie was murdered by an Iranian student in London, claiming that he was hired by IranÕs government. Less than nine months after his inauguration, IranÕs involvement in the bombing of Saudi ArabiaÕs Khobar towers were proven in testimony by a right-wing Islamist in exchange for a more lenient sentence. Though the U.S. did not retaliate, they vowed to keep their economic embargo on Iran for at least another eight years, as well as the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. As a result, Khatami is dealing in a domain of heavy losses, and his reference point of the pre-1997 economic status looks impossible to retain. Khatami has come to swallow his pride, understanding that desperate measures need to be taken when a nation canÕt feed its own people. 34Iran possesses the world second largest oil reserves but they have no one to sell it to. All other options have been exhausted. The only way for Iran to come out of its horrendous economic depression is to agree to the U.S.Õs terms to lift the embargo and sanctions. Khatami, against the will of many conservative members of the parliament, agrees that Iran will: Play a positive role in the mid-east peace process, stop their support of terrorism, and agree to cease the development of weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. did not budge on its conditions of lifting the embargo and sanctions, and their deterrence had to worked to perfection. They eliminated Iran as a distraction to the mid-east peace process and they insured that Iran would not be capable of posing a nuclear threat. In agreeing to these historic accords, the U.S. used their relationship during IranÕs tenure under the Shah as their reference point, hoping to eventually have an amicable relationship with Iran once again. The U.S. also had many unmotivated biases in signing these accords. The government was receiving rampant criticism, even from Americans, to be more lenient in their policy towards Iran. Television footage of famine and poverty in Iran were common on the nightly news, leading many to believe that the government had taken its point too far. In the end, the United States and IranÕs 24 year old game of chicken came to an end. Mutual non-cooperation could have been disastrous for both parties. KhatamiÕs Iran was growing desperate and if they were to get there hands on a nuclear weapon itÕs conceivable that they could have used it against America. The embargo and Sanctions on Iran were slowly bleeding the nation to death, continued non-cooperation would have just meant increased social -unrest and depression. In the end, mutual cooperation occurred, and the 24 years of hate between the U.S. and Iran as well as the game of chicken were concluded with two signings of a pen. Footnotes 1 Araghi, Hamid. ÒLadiesÕ Man?Ó Newsweek, June 9, 1997. 2 ÒBiases are ways of treating information that diverge from standard definitions of rationality.Ó Jervis, Robert, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein (eds.) PSYCHOLOGY AND DETERRENCE. 3ÓHeuristic: A mental shortcut that allows decisions to be made quickly. Because people encounter such an overwhelming amount of information, they need shortcuts to make decisions quickly and efficiently.Ó Tanter, Raymond. http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/Heuristics. 4THE MIDDLE EAST. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1994. 5THE MIDDLE EAST. Country Profiles: Iran 6ÒProspect Theory: Generally--Losses are so salient in peopleÕs mind, that they will put more on the line to avoid losses, in spite of possible gains.Ó Tanter, Raymond. http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/ Mossadegh saw the potential for great losses-his job, soical order within the country-so he took great risks- dissoloving the Majilis and trying to take over the government-in order to retain the status quo. 7called the ÒWhite RevolutionÓ, the plan promoted ÒwomanÕs suffrage, literacy, health, and the nationalization of natural resources. The cornerstone of the White Revolution was land reform.Ó Middle East Quarterly. Country Profiles: Iran. 8ÒMan of the Year. Ayatullah Khomeini: The Mystic Who Lit the Fires of Hatred.Ó Time, Jan. 7, 1980. http://www.pathfinder.com/@@d6R6@wUAWNKCBOGW 9According to CIA figures. The Middle East Quarterly. Country Profiles: Iran. 10ÒMan of the Year. Ayatullah Khomeini.Ó Time, January 7, 1980http://www.pathfinder.com/@@d6R6@wUAWNKCBOGW 11ÒMotivated Bias: ÒSee what you want to see.Ó Motivated bias can lead to faulty assessment of an adversaryÕs resolve, overconfidence, insensitivity to warnings, and thus defeat deterrence.Ó In this case Washington had a bias to believe that Shah was doing a good job which was motivated by their strong commitment and investment in him. Caused them to be insensitive to warnings of dissent within Iran. Tanter, Raymond. http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/ 12ÒMan of the Year. Ayatullah Khomeini.Ó Time, January 7, 1980. http://www.pathfinder.com/@@d6R6@wUAWNKCBOGW 13ÒMan of the Year. Ayatullah Khomeini.ÓTime, Jan. 7, 1980 http://www.pathfinder.com/@@d6R6@wUAWNKCBOGW 14ÒMan of the Year. Ayatullah Khomeini.ÓTime, Jan. 7, 1980 http://www.pathfinder.com/@@d6R6@wUAWNKCBOGW 15Time, Jan 7, 1980 http://www.pathfinder.com/@@d6R6@wUAWNKCBOGW 16Rogue Regimes. Tanter, Raymond. 17Availability: A mental shortcut that leads to judgment based on how easily a belief structurecomes to mind.Ó KhomeniÕs hatred policy towards the U.S. is an example of a heurisitc called availability, or more specifically vividness. One, single, vivid event-the murder of his father by the CIA-backed Shah-is so vivmind that it effects his foreign policy towards a whole nation. Tanter, Raymond. http://www- personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/ 18Farnham, Barbara (ed.) AVOIDING LOSSES/TAKING RISKS. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994 19Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks. Farnham, Barbara. 20Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks. Farnham, Barbara. 21 quote by Brzezinski. Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks. Farnham, Barbara. 22Markovits, Elizabeth. The Iran-Iraq War:Personalities and Problems of Legitimacy http://www.is.rhodes.edu/Modus_Vivendi/Markovits.html 23Middle East Quarterly. Country Profiles: Iran. 24RushdieÕs book was considered by much of the Islamic World to be blasphemous. Khomeini called for the assassination of Rushdie immediately upon its publication in 1989. Middle East Quarterly. Country Profiles: Iran. 25Skootsky, Mark. ÒU.S. Nuclear Policy Toward IranÓ (http://infomanage.com/nonproliferation/najournal/iranuspolicy.html), June 1, 1995. 26Skootsky, Mark. ÒU.S. Nuclear Policy Toward IranÓ (http://infomanage.com/nonproliferation/najournal/iranuspolicy.html), June 1, 1995. 27Rogue Regimes, Tanter, Raymond. page #130. 28ÒResalatÓ, June 22, 1995. (http://netiran.com/press/politics-foreign/html/000000XXFP0007.html) 29Rogue Regimes, Tanter, Raymond. page #137. 30Rogue Regimes, Tanter, Raymond. 31Black turban is a sign that heÕs believed to be a descendant of IslamÕs prophet Mohammed. ÒModerate Khatami new Iran President.Ó Reuter, May 24, 1997. http://www.pathfinder.com/@@VOFSAQ.../news/latest/RB/1997May24/367.html 32Middle East Quarterly. Country Profiles: Iran 33ÒIranÕs Right Licks Wounds Over Election Defeat.Ó Reuter, May 25, 1997. http://www.pathfinder.com/@@VOFSAQ.../news/latest/RB/1997May25/243.html 34ÒKhatami sees Iran policy link to foreign inflows.Ó Reuter, June 6, 1997. http://cnn.com/WORLD/meast/9706/06/rb000731.reut.html