Ernesto Rodriguez International Security Affairs Professor Raymond Tanter Due June 19, 1997 Rogue Country: post-1959 Cuba The main issue or question that I will try to address in this essay is whether or not the United statesÕ policy of economic sanctions and embargoes that the U.S. has imposed on Cuba have been the best possible solution to what the U.S. perceives to be the problem with Fidel Castro and his country. In retrospect it is evident that this policy has not been successful in bringing down CastroÕs Marxist-Leninist regime. It has been successful in alienating the island- country and in prohibiting it from growing and expanding and at the same time it has been successful in keeping Castro from achieving his goal of socializing Latin America, one of his primary goals when he first stepped up as leader of Cuba following his ÒRevolucionÓ. This essay will consist of a historical background intertwined with analyses of specific circumstances that arose since 1961, a date that marks the beginning of what has escalated into todayÕs United States-Cuba relationship. It must be noted that during BatistaÕs regime and since the Spanish American war liberated Cuba from the Spanish, the relationship between Cuba and the United States had been one similar to that of a parent child relationship except for the fact that Cuba was technically autonomous as opposed to other territories in the Area such as Puerto Rico and what is today the many little islands that comprise the East Indies. Parent-child because according to the Platt amendment to the Cuban Constitution, the United states had every right to intervene in the economic and political situation in Cuba. From its inception into the international system in 1898, between 72 and 80% of CubaÕs exports were to the United states. This situation seemed to benefit both sides. he U.S. obtained some of the best quality sugar in the world for an unreasonably cheap price while Cuba had a steady customer for its main product and was establishing a close relationship with one of the up and coming world powers, and one of their closest neighbors. The tension between the United States and Cuba did not begin as a result of Fidel taking over but as a result of CastroÕs policies. shortly after taking over the government of Cuba, Fidel Castro commenced to nationalize what to that point had been profitable industry of the private sector of the United States. Some powerful and influential members of the private sector of the United States, namely Texaco, were losing oil refineries and other sources of income that had cost them a lot of money to begin with. Fidel was doing this despite the fact that the trade relations had remained the same, the U.S. was still the major purchaser of Cuban sugar, at rates close to 80% like I mentioned above. This would not last long. Shortly after this nationalizing process began, the United States, at the time under the Eisenhower administration implemented the Sugar Act which as of July 8, 1960, eliminated all purchases of sugar of Cuban origin. This was the first in a series of bills and laws that have passed in Congress since then sanctioning the Cuban economy. Fidel proclaimed this diplomatic measure as the beginning of an economic war. What was not general knowledge at the time was that Fidel Castro had managed to establish diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, which at the time was under the leadership of Nikita Kruschev. Fidel Castro had planned to cut all alliances with the United states government and affiliate itself with a regime that was ideologically more similar to its own (CubaÕs own). This posed a bigger problem for the United States than they anticipated. Not only would their economic sanctions not have an immediate effect on the Cuban economy but there was a potential enemy within 100 miles of its own coasts. The effects of the Sugar Act were not immediately felt because Cuba had quickly found an alternate customer for the gargantuan amounts of sugar that they needed to export in order to keep their economy from collapsing as a result of the Act. Nevertheless, these sanctions served another purpose. The United States made it clear to all of the other Latin American countries that contained Marxist-Leninist minorities that were thirsty for power that the U.S. would not be shy whatsoever in implementing potentially debilitating sanctions against countries that insisted in socialicizing themselves. basically, although the Sugar Act did not serve its purpose of weakening CastroÕs stronghold on Cuba, it did allow the United states to concentrate on taking future measures in one country only instead of potentially having to deal with an outbreak of communism in Central and South America. Like I said, these sanctions were not successful in deterring Castro, they actually made CastroÕs ties with the Soviet Union stronger and thus the situation at the time was deteriorating by the minute. So the United StatesÕ proceeded to impose more and stronger economic sanctions that consequently made the above mentioned ties stronger that made the ties tighter and so forth. This at time when the U.S. was vigorously battling against its biggest enemy in its history: communism. Fast Forward to the Present. The Soviet Union has ceased to exist. Communism is no longer a threat to the United States or the International System. Even the countries that used to be part of the U.S.S.R. have democratized and capitalized themselves (or are killing themselves trying). The Cuban economy hit rock bottom although lately European investors have resuscitated it so that its nose is above water. Yet Fidel Castro is still the power that be in Cuba. One has to ask oneself why, if the United States foreign policy was successful in eliminating communism in a system that at a time was equally powerful, or almost as the Soviet Union was, thus defeating this imminent threat, how was it (the United States) incapable of bringing down a communist regime in a small island no more than 250 miles away. One concept of prospect theory jumps up to our minds: Loss Aversion. Fidel Castro at all times seemed more driven to maintain his position of power in Cuba than he seemed interested in reestablishing CubaÕs economy. For some time the United States thought that they were dealing with an above all patriotic man who had orchestrated a revolution in order to right the wrongs. They thought this was a man who at one point in his youth contemplated playing baseball for the New York Yankees. They were surprised when CastroÕs behavior started to lean towards one of an infuriated instigator. Castro appeared to have self-proclaimed himself an anti-American-imperialism symbol. Many times, in his speeches he would lash out against the United States, saying that the United States main purpose in dealing with Cuba the way the U.S. had was so that they could suck Cuba into their sphere of influence. So we have dealt with why economic sanctions were unsuccessful in deterring Castro. Now we will try to ask ourselves whether or not further economic sanctions will be successful in bringing down Castro. The situation has changed a lot. Like I said above, the Soviet Bloc has collapsed so Communism is not a threat because Cuba is not a threat to anything except the United StatesÕ credibility. A lot of countries have gone on to more liberal policy standards since the end of the Cold war, and Cuba has become a distant dream for a lot of actors from the private sectors of many countries. Its virginity is very attractive to investors from the European Community as well as from the U.S., these not wanting to let the Europeans move in aggressively before the U.S. government allows its own corporates to do the same. Some have said that the latest bill that has gone to Congress, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act is a manifestation of a violation to the human right of Cuba and to the freedom of trade in the International system. If this bill were to pass in its entirety, there would be economic sanctions against anyone who capitalizes on what used to be United States industry in Cuba . So present and future economic sanctions that the United states might impose on Cuba have these two main obstacles: the opposition from International public and private sectors and opposition from the private sector domestically. The private sector of the united states has even gone as far as trying to get the government to lift the embargo so that they can capitalize on potential sources of income in Cuba. The United Nations itself, an international governing body that the U.S. has attempted to puppeteer for god knows how long issued a stance of opposition to the implementation of economic sanctions against Cuba. Thus it is evident that Castro has been successful in achieving one of his goals in standing firm against the efforts of the Unite States government to destroy his reputation. I say this because it is clear that he has been slowly but surely able to gather enough support from key actors in portraying himself as the victim and the United States as the imperialist oppressor, which before CastroÕs eyes is a big victory since being the rational person he is, he knows he would not stand a chance if it were Castro versus the United States, tete a tete. So now we must look at the consequences of future actions or for that matter non-action in part of the United States. One could very possibly say that the United States stands to lose on both circumstances, although domestically that may not be so. If the United sates were to impose further economic sanctions or sanctions of any kind as the possible passing of the Cuban Liberty and democratic Solidarity Act, the United States would bring upon itself an avalanche of criticism and bad sentiments from actors ranging from some of the members of the U.S. private sector, to private sectors in Europe and across the globe and even from a lot of its own legislators, some who vehemently advocate a 180 degree turn in the U.S. policy. Not only this but there is a possibility that this would gain Castro even further support and some countries would take it upon themselves to defy the U.S, establish themselves within the Cuban economy and thus reviving this Cuban economy, all hypothetical situations that have one thing in common, the victory of Castro and the defeat of the United states after an almost forty year diplomatic struggle. Possibly the best solution would be for the United States to lift its embargo. One possible negative aspect of this is the possibility that this would decrease the credibility of the United States within the International System. After the U.S.Õs misdealings with Saddam Hussein and a couple other conflicts, the U.S. cannot afford to lose any credibility in a system in which the U.S. has self-proclaimed itself the leader of the new world order. But one can try to look into the future and possibly predict very positive effects to a lifting of the embargo against Cuba. With the lifting of these embargoes, the flow of new industry and enterprise into Cuba will be tremendously large. The private sectors in numerous economies would jump at the first chance they got at virgin territories with possibly cheap labor. This in itself wool help the industries that do so and the Cuban Population. The Cuban population would be helped because they will be opened to a new standard of living that would be the result of the opening of this variety of industry. The population will possibly for the first time see how people outside Cuba have had a choice of what to do with their lives, from the most fundamental aspects of life to the most trivial. When the possibility of all these open for the Cubans, Castro will have to chose between two possibilities. he will have no other choice but to open up the market if he hopes to keep his control. If he chooses to stand firm and keep the flow of industry tightly regulated he would lose his battle of trying to make the United States seem to be the bad guy. Also, the general population of Cuba will have seen a possibility for them to enter a new stage in the nations life, they will have been able to smell the prosperity. This would diminish the already diminishing (yet firm) control that Castro has enjoyed over the close to 14 million people that live in the island. I must say that although a possible negative aspect of lifting the embargo would be the loss of credibility, it could also be very well argued against. Close to forty years of standing firm only to lift it in order to take advantage of new opportunities could be seen as a brilliant strategy. It was not what they intended originally but things have a funny way of turning out. We must conclude saying that the failure of the strategy used by the United States in trying to bring Castro down should be accredited more to the character of the person the United States was dealing with more than with the lack of effort or the quality of the policies. This was probably a result of misinformation and miscalculation of what the United States knew about Castro. We have also tried to prove that the lifting of the long standing embargo could potentially help the United states serve its original purpose of eliminating communism and keeping the neighbors as economic allies. Bibliography Smith, Wayne. The Closest of Enemies, 1987. W.W. Norton and Company, New york Smith, Wayne; Morales, Esteban. Subject to Solution:Problems in Cuban-U.S. Relations. Boulder and London Colorado, 1988 Scelling, Thomas. Arms and Influence. 1966. Yale University Press Political Science 472 notes. Ernesto Rodriguez International Security Affairs Professor Raymond Tanter Due June 19, 1997 Rogue Country: post-1959 Cuba The main issue or question that I will try to address in this essay is whether or not the United statesÕ policy of economic sanctions and embargoes that the U.S. has imposed on Cuba have been the best possible solution to what the U.S. perceives to be the problem with Fidel Castro and his country. In retrospect it is evident that this policy has not been successful in bringing down CastroÕs Marxist-Leninist regime. It has been successful in alienating the island- country and in prohibiting it from growing and expanding and at the same time it has been successful in keeping Castro from achieving his goal of socializing Latin America, one of his primary goals when he first stepped up as leader of Cuba following his ÒRevolucionÓ. This essay will consist of a historical background intertwined with analyses of specific circumstances that arose since 1961, a date that marks the beginning of what has escalated into todayÕs United States-Cuba relationship. It must be noted that during BatistaÕs regime and since the Spanish American war liberated Cuba from the Spanish, the relationship between Cuba and the United States had been one similar to that of a parent child relationship except for the fact that Cuba was technically autonomous as opposed to other territories in the Area such as Puerto Rico and what is today the many little islands that comprise the East Indies. Parent-child because according to the Platt amendment to the Cuban Constitution, the United states had every right to intervene in the economic and political situation in Cuba. From its inception into the international system in 1898, between 72 and 80% of CubaÕs exports were to the United states. This situation seemed to benefit both sides. he U.S. obtained some of the best quality sugar in the world for an unreasonably cheap price while Cuba had a steady customer for its main product and was establishing a close relationship with one of the up and coming world powers, and one of their closest neighbors. The tension between the United States and Cuba did not begin as a result of Fidel taking over but as a result of CastroÕs policies. shortly after taking over the government of Cuba, Fidel Castro commenced to nationalize what to that point had been profitable industry of the private sector of the United States. Some powerful and influential members of the private sector of the United States, namely Texaco, were losing oil refineries and other sources of income that had cost them a lot of money to begin with. Fidel was doing this despite the fact that the trade relations had remained the same, the U.S. was still the major purchaser of Cuban sugar, at rates close to 80% like I mentioned above. This would not last long. Shortly after this nationalizing process began, the United States, at the time under the Eisenhower administration implemented the Sugar Act which as of July 8, 1960, eliminated all purchases of sugar of Cuban origin. This was the first in a series of bills and laws that have passed in Congress since then sanctioning the Cuban economy. Fidel proclaimed this diplomatic measure as the beginning of an economic war. What was not general knowledge at the time was that Fidel Castro had managed to establish diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, which at the time was under the leadership of Nikita Kruschev. Fidel Castro had planned to cut all alliances with the United states government and affiliate itself with a regime that was ideologically more similar to its own (CubaÕs own). This posed a bigger problem for the United States than they anticipated. Not only would their economic sanctions not have an immediate effect on the Cuban economy but there was a potential enemy within 100 miles of its own coasts. The effects of the Sugar Act were not immediately felt because Cuba had quickly found an alternate customer for the gargantuan amounts of sugar that they needed to export in order to keep their economy from collapsing as a result of the Act. Nevertheless, these sanctions served another purpose. The United States made it clear to all of the other Latin American countries that contained Marxist-Leninist minorities that were thirsty for power that the U.S. would not be shy whatsoever in implementing potentially debilitating sanctions against countries that insisted in socialicizing themselves. basically, although the Sugar Act did not serve its purpose of weakening CastroÕs stronghold on Cuba, it did allow the United states to concentrate on taking future measures in one country only instead of potentially having to deal with an outbreak of communism in Central and South America. Like I said, these sanctions were not successful in deterring Castro, they actually made CastroÕs ties with the Soviet Union stronger and thus the situation at the time was deteriorating by the minute. So the United StatesÕ proceeded to impose more and stronger economic sanctions that consequently made the above mentioned ties stronger that made the ties tighter and so forth. This at time when the U.S. was vigorously battling against its biggest enemy in its history: communism. Fast Forward to the Present. The Soviet Union has ceased to exist. Communism is no longer a threat to the United States or the International System. Even the countries that used to be part of the U.S.S.R. have democratized and capitalized themselves (or are killing themselves trying). The Cuban economy hit rock bottom although lately European investors have resuscitated it so that its nose is above water. Yet Fidel Castro is still the power that be in Cuba. One has to ask oneself why, if the United States foreign policy was successful in eliminating communism in a system that at a time was equally powerful, or almost as the Soviet Union was, thus defeating this imminent threat, how was it (the United States) incapable of bringing down a communist regime in a small island no more than 250 miles away. One concept of prospect theory jumps up to our minds: Loss Aversion. Fidel Castro at all times seemed more driven to maintain his position of power in Cuba than he seemed interested in reestablishing CubaÕs economy. For some time the United States thought that they were dealing with an above all patriotic man who had orchestrated a revolution in order to right the wrongs. They thought this was a man who at one point in his youth contemplated playing baseball for the New York Yankees. They were surprised when CastroÕs behavior started to lean towards one of an infuriated instigator. Castro appeared to have self-proclaimed himself an anti-American-imperialism symbol. Many times, in his speeches he would lash out against the United States, saying that the United States main purpose in dealing with Cuba the way the U.S. had was so that they could suck Cuba into their sphere of influence. So we have dealt with why economic sanctions were unsuccessful in deterring Castro. Now we will try to ask ourselves whether or not further economic sanctions will be successful in bringing down Castro. The situation has changed a lot. Like I said above, the Soviet Bloc has collapsed so Communism is not a threat because Cuba is not a threat to anything except the United StatesÕ credibility. A lot of countries have gone on to more liberal policy standards since the end of the Cold war, and Cuba has become a distant dream for a lot of actors from the private sectors of many countries. Its virginity is very attractive to investors from the European Community as well as from the U.S., these not wanting to let the Europeans move in aggressively before the U.S. government allows its own corporates to do the same. Some have said that the latest bill that has gone to Congress, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act is a manifestation of a violation to the human right of Cuba and to the freedom of trade in the International system. If this bill were to pass in its entirety, there would be economic sanctions against anyone who capitalizes on what used to be United States industry in Cuba . So present and future economic sanctions that the United states might impose on Cuba have these two main obstacles: the opposition from International public and private sectors and opposition from the private sector domestically. The private sector of the united states has even gone as far as trying to get the government to lift the embargo so that they can capitalize on potential sources of income in Cuba. The United Nations itself, an international governing body that the U.S. has attempted to puppeteer for god knows how long issued a stance of opposition to the implementation of economic sanctions against Cuba. Thus it is evident that Castro has been successful in achieving one of his goals in standing firm against the efforts of the Unite States government to destroy his reputation. I say this because it is clear that he has been slowly but surely able to gather enough support from key actors in portraying himself as the victim and the United States as the imperialist oppressor, which before CastroÕs eyes is a big victory since being the rational person he is, he knows he would not stand a chance if it were Castro versus the United States, tete a tete. So now we must look at the consequences of future actions or for that matter non-action in part of the United States. One could very possibly say that the United States stands to lose on both circumstances, although domestically that may not be so. If the United sates were to impose further economic sanctions or sanctions of any kind as the possible passing of the Cuban Liberty and democratic Solidarity Act, the United States would bring upon itself an avalanche of criticism and bad sentiments from actors ranging from some of the members of the U.S. private sector, to private sectors in Europe and across the globe and even from a lot of its own legislators, some who vehemently advocate a 180 degree turn in the U.S. policy. Not only this but there is a possibility that this would gain Castro even further support and some countries would take it upon themselves to defy the U.S, establish themselves within the Cuban economy and thus reviving this Cuban economy, all hypothetical situations that have one thing in common, the victory of Castro and the defeat of the United states after an almost forty year diplomatic struggle. Possibly the best solution would be for the United States to lift its embargo. One possible negative aspect of this is the possibility that this would decrease the credibility of the United States within the International System. After the U.S.Õs misdealings with Saddam Hussein and a couple other conflicts, the U.S. cannot afford to lose any credibility in a system in which the U.S. has self-proclaimed itself the leader of the new world order. But one can try to look into the future and possibly predict very positive effects to a lifting of the embargo against Cuba. With the lifting of these embargoes, the flow of new industry and enterprise into Cuba will be tremendously large. The private sectors in numerous economies would jump at the first chance they got at virgin territories with possibly cheap labor. This in itself wool help the industries that do so and the Cuban Population. The Cuban population would be helped because they will be opened to a new standard of living that would be the result of the opening of this variety of industry. The population will possibly for the first time see how people outside Cuba have had a choice of what to do with their lives, from the most fundamental aspects of life to the most trivial. When the possibility of all these open for the Cubans, Castro will have to chose between two possibilities. he will have no other choice but to open up the market if he hopes to keep his control. If he chooses to stand firm and keep the flow of industry tightly regulated he would lose his battle of trying to make the United States seem to be the bad guy. Also, the general population of Cuba will have seen a possibility for them to enter a new stage in the nations life, they will have been able to smell the prosperity. This would diminish the already diminishing (yet firm) control that Castro has enjoyed over the close to 14 million people that live in the island. I must say that although a possible negative aspect of lifting the embargo would be the loss of credibility, it could also be very well argued against. Close to forty years of standing firm only to lift it in order to take advantage of new opportunities could be seen as a brilliant strategy. It was not what they intended originally but things have a funny way of turning out. We must conclude saying that the failure of the strategy used by the United States in trying to bring Castro down should be accredited more to the character of the person the United States was dealing with more than with the lack of effort or the quality of the policies. This was probably a result of misinformation and miscalculation of what the United States knew about Castro. We have also tried to prove that the lifting of the long standing embargo could potentially help the United states serve its original purpose of eliminating communism and keeping the neighbors as economic allies. Bibliography Smith, Wayne. The Closest of Enemies, 1987. W.W. Norton and Company, New york Smith, Wayne; Morales, Esteban. Subject to Solution:Problems in Cuban-U.S. Relations. Boulder and London Colorado, 1988 Scelling, Thomas. Arms and Influence. 1966. Yale University Press Political Science 472 notes.