Rogue Regimes Critique: The Impact of Psychology and Deterrence Theoretical Overview: The purpose of this critique is to apply principles in Psychology and Deterrence to relevant topics found Rogue Regimes. In a nutshell, they include: lapses of decision makers, motivated and unmotivated biases, threat perception and misperception, and commitment. This paper is not an effort to give a prŽcis of Rogue Regimes. Rather, this review shall be written with the assumption that the audience has already read Rogue Regimes so that more emphasis can be placed on those topics directly related to Psychology and Deterrence. Motivated and unmotivated biases are the source of many decision- making lapses. An unmotivated Bias is what causes one to see what he/she expects to see. It is basically the effect of past experiences. A motivated Bias is used when one sees what he/she wants to see. Even if a person were informed that he/she is biased, he would not change his perception because a motivated bias alleviates his psychological stress. These biases both distort the truth, and can lead to irrational decision-making.1 In the international politics arena, these biases work to distort threat perceptions. And threat perception determines what policy a leader will promote. Preface Rogue Regimes deals with those nations that Òhave large conventional military forces, condone international terrorism, and/or seek weapons of mass destruction.Ó 2 The behavior of these outlaws is a threat to the stability and livelihood of our civilization and must therefore be terminated. The question often pondered by Prof. Tanter and his trusty sidekicks is what deterrent policy the US should subscribe to. The three options for policy are as follows: 1.) contain these rogue regimes with economic sanctions and deter or coerce with threats of force, 2.) embrace with promises of rewards, and 3.) a mix of the two policies above. The debate over which policy is most appropriate depends on the intended purpose. If the goal is rehabilitation, i.e. to change the rogueÕs behavior, then one or more of the three options will serve, depending on the situation. But if the goal is retribution, then the best policy is to contain. In the preface, Prof. Tanter stresses the philosophical implications of the retribution vs. rehabilitation issue. Does one punish regardless of the gain incurred by the party administering the sanctions? Take, for example the case of Timothy McVeigh, bomber of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, USA. If, hypothetically, the administration of the death penalty will not deter potential criminals in the future, is it right for the US to take Mr. McVeighÕs life? Those for the death penalty may cite the harm done to the families of the deceased-- harm that can only be transcended when equal harm is delivered to Mr. McVeigh. Meanwhile, dissenters would hold that the damage to society has already been done, and killing yet another human will serve no practical purpose. In the context of international affairs, should sanctions that fail to rehabilitate rogue regimes be imposed on the basis of retribution? The retributive group favors unconditional punishment; thus, they do not care about the rogueÕs motivation. The rehabilitative group prefers that policy which will generate the most utility. In deciding what policy to follow, the rehabilitative group would first determine what caused the deplorable behavior, fear or prospect of opportunity. If the motivation was fear, then rehabilitators say we must embrace that scared soul, for it was only temporarily insane due to the stress of external factors. And compounding the fear of that scared would only cause him to lash out to escape mounting fear. If that rogue was driven by opportunity, however, then we must sanction, for that rogue was rational at the time and must thus be a naturally hostile being. Personality, Politics, and Policies Part of this chapter was dedicated to analyzing the personalities of rogue leaders and their effects on politics and policies. The leadership of these rogue elites can be described as highly personalized and arbitrary.3 They are free from the bureaucratic constraints of large totalitarian states and so their decisions most often reign supreme in their respective nations; it is no surprise that these leaders bear the brunt of any detrimental incidents regarding their countries. These leaders are susceptible to motivated and unmotivated biases. Unmotivated biases exist in all persons--they are each personÕs theory of what to expect in this world. In other words, unmotivated biases are experience-based theories which cause a person to see what he expects to see. These unmotivated biases tend to be reinforced by later events (since a person sees what he expects to see) and are thus formidable sources of misperceptions .4 These unmotivated biases inhibit adaptation to new circumstances. The leaders are also motivated to see what they want to see. Motivated biases serve these leaders a means to implement policies that they desire. The personalities of Saddam, Khomeini, Assad, Qadhafi, Castro, and Kim Jong-II all exhibit 3 characteristics-- 1.) and intricate framework of emotions, 2.) a drive for power, and 3.) a willingness to use violence in order to attain his goals.5 In order to easily illustrate to the reader that Saddam has the three traits itemized above, Tanter simply tells the reader that SaddamÕs favorite movie is the Godfather. Enough said. The ensuing comparison of Saddam and Vito Corleone is completely logical. In the comparison, Tanter shows how SaddamÕs rise to power (via an overthrow) proves that Saddam has an Óappetite for power.Ó6 Perhaps it would have been appropriate for Prof. Tanter to also attribute SaddamÕs paranoia to his method of ascendancy. Since Saddam rose to power by virtue of an overthrow, he has an unmotivated bias to perceive persons as subverters of his regime. Ayatollah Khomeini, IranÕs leader at the time of the Iran Hostage Crisis, is still remembered by most Americans as the perpetrator of evil, even though he was not initially involved. Saddam is seen as the Butcher of Baghdad due to his inhumane offenses in the Middle East. Assad will always be remembered as the killer of 10 000 in Hama, Syria. Qadhafi is synonymous with Pan Am Flight 103 and Castro is the guy helping our communist enemy. These images that are seen by the American public, as well as the American politicians, are all examples of unmotivated biases. These biases magnify threat perception, and so long as these unmotivated biases exist, they shall motivate politicians to overestimate the threat as well. Tanter posits that threat perception is dependent on a given countryÕs values and interests.8 Europe tends to underestimate the threat of these rogue regimes while the US tends to overestimate the threat. The difference in threat perception corresponds to the difference in desired sanctions. Since European interests are to sell products and industrialize these rogue regimes, they are motivated to embrace these regimes. Europeans rationalize that sanctions aimed at the leaders of rogue regimes only harm the people of that country and not the deviant leaders. They discount the fact that Europe had 473 international terrorist incidents in 1996. In the US, however, values of justice supersede business interests and so the US likes to impose sanctions. US values are so valued,so to speak, that we impose seemingly ineffective unilateral sanctions on these regimes. In 1996, suffered 73 international terrorist casualties.9 So why is it that the US is likes to impose sanctions more that the Europeans? Because the sanctions are retributive in purpose and thus are gratifying to Americans as soon as they are imposed. When the American ideals line up with domestic politics, sanctions shall be imposed. And if the rogue leader is acted in search of gain (window of opportunity), these sanctions will deter him in the future. However, America should beware. If the transgressor was operating out of a basement of fear, further stress (due to the sanctions) would only aggravate the situation. The rogue leaders could lash out in order to escape the mounting pressure, and for this to happen would undermine the purpose of sanctions. Iran The main focus of this chapter is the debate of whether to use dual containment or balance of powers as the US policy towards Iran. Iran has been an enemy to the US ever since the Shah was overthrown. IranÕs foreign policy goals since then have been to: export the Islamic revolution, become the leader of the Gulf region, oppose US stances, and frustrate the Israelis.10 American ideals have always called for sanctions against Iran because they continue to fulfill the three requirements of a rogue regime. They spend 14- 15% of the GDP on its military. Iran continues its support of terrorist groups. Iran is also currently seeking NW to add to its WMD arsenal.11 History proves that while Iran has not been a sensible nation, it has been rational. Long- term aggression cannot be attributed to acting out of a basement of fear, so Iran must be punished. Reagan served an American public that was disgruntled with the state of Iran. In the 1980 Reagan set up the October Surprise Committee, a measure that certainly proves the unmotivated biases held by the American public caused an overestimation of threat in the realm of the electorate. With regards to national security, threat was again overestimated by staff due to predicted results of a victory for Iran-- Iraq would call on the USSR and thus give the USSR an advantage in the international balance of power. Also, the odds of the victor in the Iran-Iraq War monopolizing the oil market were too great for the US to allow it to happen. So in the 80Õs, a balance of power approach was used in an effort to prevent the emergence of a new leader in the region. The practical implications of this approach are grand, but ideologically the policy fails. Consider the Desert Storm policy recommended by balance of power theory. The US would side with Iran in order to balance Iraq. Our hypothetical ally (Iran) was run by Rafsnajani at the time, and Rafsanjani holds the following opinion: ÒThe West has a lead of several centuries [on industrialization] .... How can we catch up...? Instead, we, GodÕs army, will impose our will on the West.Ó 12 Is America that hard up for an ally that we have to appease and ingratiate those who are otherwise foes? Balance of power establishes a US image of greed. The US was basically antagonizing a fight in order to reap the spoils of war. Rather than set the image of a superpower that will police inhumane acts unconditionally, the US conveyed to the world that it was motivated more by interests than ideals. Is the US not acting like an organized group of terrorists when it condones and facilitates fighting in order to subvert foreign governments? A better approach to deterring Iran is ClintonÕs policy of dual containment. It is a policy that treats Iran and Iraq as two separate issues. This ideological approach builds the USÕs credibility as an objective opponent to rogues, thus sending a message to the other rogues in the world that we will punish all transgressors. In 1995, Clinton tightened sanctions and in 1996 he signed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act.13 His purpose is clear--to deter by denial. Clinton will lessen IranÕs ability to sustain its rogue behavior by denying Iran the funds to support terrorism, a build-up of WMD, and/or sustain a large military. Tanter believes that this approach will cause Iran and Iraq to have a de facto economic and political alignment so that both may escape US sanctions.14 But I suggest that the deeply-rooted animosity towards one another will inhibit any such alignment. The irony of the policy debate on Iran is that dual containment is dependent on the hostility between Iran and Iraq, which is something that balance of power fosters. Keeping in mind that dual containment will be undermined by any de facto alignment between Iran and Iraq, I would suggest a flexible dual containment policy to allow the US to antagonize only to the extent that both of these countries do not form an alignment. Any antagonizing beyond the minimal level will only hurt US prestige as a country that rights wrongs. Selling weapons, as was the case during the Reagan years, would exceed that minimal level of instigation. Iraq In ÔPersonalities, Politics, and Policies,Õ Tanter illustrates how the lack of constraints on rogue leaders allows for whimsical and personalized leadership. In the case of Iraq, Saddam runs the show. When dealing with Iraq, the question to be answered is: do we contain or embrace Saddam? The US was highly motivated to side with Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War. He was a key player in the balance of power scheme implemented by Reagan, so at that time we were motivated to see him in a kinder light. Perhaps it should be noted in Rogue Regimes that the United States White House was acting out of a basement of fear when it chose to side with Iraq. If the war would have gone on without US intervention, Iraq would have called on the Soviets when he was losing. The possibility of the Soviets tilting the global balance of power as well as monopolizing the Gulf oil was unbearable. Economic interests converged with national security interests because businesses stood to profit from dual-use sales to Iraq.15 There was little opposition to the economic and national security vectors because opposing Iraq was difficult when their enemy, Iran, (still remembered for the hostage crisis) was winning the1980-1988 war.16 The end of the Cold War alleviated the psychological stress of the Gulf zone and so policy makers in the US were less motivated to assess the Iraqi threat in a biased way. ÒOnce the Gulf War began... rogue imagery dominated, and Saddam became a demon.Ó 17 IraqÕs regional threat has superseded the Soviet threat. Iraq endangers US citizens and military personnel.18 Iraq is a threat to regional allies of the US. It also proliferates WMD. It is now clear that Saddam has had a long history of aggressive tendencies (see Politics, Personalities, and Policies). US sanctions can be justified because it appeals to domestic political constituents, is in line with American idealism, and may even change his behavior. In reading this chapter, I found something was lacking. I canÕt quite put my finger on it, but I think it has something to do with the lack of attention to SaddamÕs personality. ÔPolitics, Personalities, and PoliciesÕ was promising in that aspect, but I feel that Tanter withheld any substantial psychological analyses in this chapter. Having already shown that leaders of rogue nations are less encumbered by bureaucracies and the like, I feel Saddam is behind Iraq and so he deserves more attention in the discussion of his country. Syria The debate of whether to embrace or contain Syria is not unlike the debate of Iraq. Of great importance in the matter is the motivation of Assad. He is Commander-in-Chief, makes foreign policy decisions for Syria, and initiates all laws.19 If his primary concern is to regain the Golan Heights, then he will be risk averse when it comes to acts that would jeopardize his shot at the Golan (e.g., breaking of talks with the Israelis). But if his primary concern is appealing to his constituents, then Assad will be risk averse towards any action that might hurt his popularity.20 The fact is that Assad has risked his domestic popularity in siding with the Gulf War coalition. Thus, AssadÕs primary concern is to regain the Golan Heights. In the contain or embrace discussion, Tanter notes that because of the Middle East peace process and SyriaÕs animosity towards Saddam, Washington has a motivated bias to neglect the Syrian threat. It is true that ClintonÕs biggest concern is the ME peace process; after all, Syria does have the weaponry and location to start a war in the ME. But the feeling is that by embracing Demascus in Golan talks, we can convince them to stop proliferating. The same is hoped of Syrian drug trafficking-- hopefully we can convince them to aid in reducing Syrias growing drug trade.21 I suggest that the Syria should be watched with a critical eye. If the Golan talks are resolved (or worse yet, go unresolved), then Assad has little reason to listen to US requests on non-proliferation of WMD, terrorism, and drugs. Libya To Americans, Libya has been the epitome of a rogue regime for many years. In 1979, the US embassy in Libya was burnt to the ground. In that same year Libya was designated a state that sponsors terrorism.22 Libya has always been a threat to US interests, both strategically and intrinsically. Because it sponsored the bombing of a German discotheque which Americans frequented, Americans abroad are at risk. Because it chronically funds the subversion of foreign governments, Libya threatens US resolve and credibility to defend the very allies Libya attempts to undermine.23 Because it defies many UN resolutions and continues to proliferate WMD, Libya is a threat to global security. It is clear that the US would find it in its best interests to impose sanctions on such a deplorable aggressor, but the for any bill in US government to pass unanimously is incredible. Are there enormous biases running freely in the American government? And if so, do these biases have the potential to push Libya into a dangerous basement of fear? Principal sources of misperception are bureaucratic politics, ethnic politics, and economics. Tanter writes that foreign politics and national security received help from those within the bureaucracy. But one should not be led astray by TanterÕs soap opera in the White House. Professor Tanter is highly motivated to overestimate the bearing of his service at the White House. Relatives of the Lockerbie victims and pro-Israeli groups demanded retribution. Also, Americans certainly have cognitive predispositions to despise Libya. Consequently, politicians are motivated to follow suit by magnifying the Libyan threat. Another reason a congressman might be compelled to overestimate the threat is the image of America as the sheriff of the world, ready to right all wrongs. But the question remains: Are we unwittingly pushing Libya into a basement of fears? Regardless of US sanctions, the Libyan economy has harbored a dramatic increase in the standard of living.24 The unilateral sanctions have had little or no effect on LibyaÕs economy. Therefore, deterrence by denial (sanctions) does not compel Libya to change its behavior. And unless multilateral sanctions are imposed, Libya is not likely to conform to international standards. But because European and American interest and ideals differ, it is hard to agree on a one-size-fits-all sanctions accord. That is why the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act attempts to control foreign companies that invest in Libya. Although US sanctions are inconsequential, so are the opportunities forgone. American will not let financial profits subvert its ideals. Therefore, American shall continue to impose retributive sanctions because they are innately satisfying. Dissenters may cry about the practicality of a retributive policy, but, it nothing else, we are building credibility and commitment. Psychology and Deterrence Theorists would recommend building credibility so long as it does not debilitate national interests. And since the national interests, namely the ideals, of the US converge with building credibility, retributive sanctions on Libya are a fitting policy. Cuba In the Cuba chapter of Rogue Regimes, Tanter questions the merit of US sanctions on Cuba. International communism is dead. Cuba no longer exports its revolution via terrorism.25 Cuba does not proliferate WMD. Also, CubaÕs military has been drastically reduced (due to shortages in fuel, spare parts, and USSR aid).26 Without fulfilling any of the three rogue criteria, Cuba is not a threat to the national security of the US. Domestic politics in Cuba and the US form a symbiotic relationship. The US populace remembers CastroÕs sin of Òdancing with the devilÓ of the Cold War, and so this unmotivated bias serves to cause threat overestimation. Consequently, American politicians are motivated to overestimate the threat in order to rally votes. Meanwhile, Castro uses the American embargo as a means to retain power.27 Castro diverts the interest of his people from pressing domestic issues by conveniently blaming the scapegoat US for problems. This scapegoat factor is certainly a major reason why Castro has withstood US sanctions for over thirty years. Castro also used the sanctions to diversify his economy. During the 80Õs, the USSR was receiving 80% of CubaÕs exports; after the disintegration of the USSR, he seeks European and Canadian investors.28 Tanter proves how the US sanctions are not rehabilitative, so they must be retributive. The reason is Cuban-Americans lobby with democratic ideals so that ethics and ideals converge. This convergence silences those who would like to trade Cuban cigars; the light of democracy overpowers the light of a cigar. Retributive sanctions are gratifying in the domestic politics arena, but do they serve to hurt US interests in the case of Cuba? Tanter believes that the destabilizing sanctions could cause an implosion and signs of that implosion could cause Castro to take the country down with his regime.29 This is the crux of his argument to end Cuban sanctions and so I think that Tanter should take more time to outline CastroÕs likely reaction to the threat of implosion. North Korea Tanter calls North Korea the sick man of Asia. throughout the chapter, he asks two questions: 1.) Under what circumstances will NK implode and/or explode across its boundaries? and 2.) What policy should the US pursue in the short-term in order to counter explosion and/or implosion? On the road to some answers, Tanter asks the reader to consider the aviary metaphor. Hawks believe that simple deterrence theory, raising the likely costs of an adversaryÕs action, will be sufficient in deterring. Hawks feel that actors are rational and act from windows of opportunity. Thus, credible threats that raise the cost of aggression will deter an adversary. Hawks are not so interested in the adversaryÕs motivations, they simply consider capabilities. Doves, on the other hand, warn that threats frequently provoke an otherwise timid adversary to lash out. They feel that there is a tendency of states to overestimate the hostility of others. And when the naive scientist is inconvenienced by anotherÕs policy, he infers deception; when he is threatened, he infers hostility.30 Therefore, doves would favor giving an adversary reassurance rather than threats. There are two breeds of doves-- libertarian and activist. Libertarians rely on the political-military balance of power and the magic of the economic marketplace to handle a particular situation. In the case of North Korea, libertarians would recommend accommodating NK (to reduce its motivation to attack SK) and eventually withdrawing from the Korean peninsula because SK is can take care of itself.31 Libertarian doves are motivated to push withdrawal from the Korean peninsula in order to save money, and so they neglect the effects of US withdrawal from Korea. It would endanger our commitment and credibility to defend allies. Activist doves, however abide by a moral duty to embrace and accommodate. Both hawks and doves presume that the behavior of the target actor is a result of external environment and not the internal environment.32 Both hawks and owl regard the internal motivations of an actor as negligible. But birds of a different feather, the omniscient owls, warn that emotions, from which decision makers are not immune, are almost impossible to control.33 Owl believe that in order to understand the perception of others, it is important to consider the values and images that others hold.34 In other words, internal biases affect how an actor will decode external situations. Thus, owls study the external and internal factors when drafting a policy. In order to illustrate the need for an owlish approach to decision making, Tanter analyzes historical situations in the Korean peninsula. In the early 50Õs, the libertarian approach was used by the Truman administration because South Korea was not considered as important to US strategic interests. The laissez faire policy neglected the impact of a US withdrawal. US commitment was diminished by the move and so NK was given a window of opportunity. Thus, lack of commitment confounded deterrence in that situation. After the invasion by NK, the US policy was more of a hawkish one, culminating in the US forces crossing the line of demarcation at the 38th parallel. The hawkish approach of handling NK, which was acting from a window of opportunity, neglected the consequences of crossing the 38th parallel with respect to the global environment. The hawks failed to consider the possibility of counterescalation. Owls would considered the perceptions of all actors in each case so that such surprises could be avoided. With regards to the future of NK, hawks and doves anticipate three scenarios: explosion, implosion, or a happy ending with the south. Hawks say that explosion would happen if NK is given a window of opportunity; doves claim explosion is more likely to happen if NK is pushed into a basement of fear. Implosion would happen if basic human needs go unfulfilled in NK. The happy ending is not likely, according to Tanter, because it would require US appeasement. The owls would consider all internal environments and the threat perceptions held by North Korea before giving a simple solution. They would deter implosion on the peninsula by providing humanitarian aid to NK. The humane acts recommended would not affect our credibility to use force if we also contain NK with regards to the chance of explosion. What owls recommend doing , in essence, is closing any tempting windows of opportunity while simultaneously deterring any basement of fear from developing. The beauty of such a policy is obvious: we show NK that we are friends, but ... not to cross us or the 38th parallel. Kudos to Professor Tanner for his excellent chapter on NK in particular. I hope he and other owls will reproduce and multiply so that their logical, all- things-considered approach to international politics will become prevalent on Capital Hill. Endnotes 1.) Psychology and Deterence Chapter 1 2.) Rogue Regimes page 2 3.) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation pg 44-45 4.) Psychology and Deterence page 18-19 5.) Rogue Regimes page 8 6.) Rogue Regimes page 12 7.) Rogue Regimes page 18 8.) Rogue Regimes page 18 9.) Patterns of Global Terrorism--1996 Report http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1996report/199 6index.html 10.) State Department Homepage Iran http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html 11.) State Department Homepage Iran http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html 12.) My Turn To Speak page 57 13.) Rogue Regimes page 59 14.) Rogue Regimes page 69 15.) Rogue Regimes chapter 3 16.) Rogue Regimes pages 86-87 17.) Tanter, class notes 18.) Rogue Regimes page 97 19.) Department of State Homepage Libya http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html 20.) Prospect Theory Notes 21.) Department of State International Narcotics Control Strategy report http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1996_narc_r eport/index.html 22.) Department of State Homepage Libya http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html 23.) Rogue Regimes page 112 24.) Department of State Homepage Libya http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html 25.) Patterns of Global Terrorism--1996 Report http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1996report/199 6index.html 26.) Department of State Homepage Cuba http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html 27.) Rogue Regimes page 171 28.) Department of State Homepage Cuba http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html 29.) Rogue Regimes page 179 30.) Psychology and Deterence page 162-4 31.) Rogue Regimes page 191 32.) Rogue Regimes page 193 33.) Rogue Regimes page 195 34.) Psychology and Deterence page 33 35.) Rogue Regimes page 23