pierce :) fayeannette Spring PS 472 Tanter ***** Introduction The Syrian Arab Republic is situated in an area called the Middle East. It borders Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Ninety percent of its population, which is about 15 million, is Muslim, leaving the remaining 10 % either Jewish or Christian. Syria has acted as a sovereign nation since declaring its independence on April 17, 1946. Its capital is Damascus. In 1971 Hafiz al-Asad assumed leadership via a national referendum which confirmed his initial seven year term. He remains the President of Syria to date. Syria represents itself as a democratic republic having legislative, judicial and executive branches. Yet, in practice, its governing style is more representative of a dictatorship. In 1973, this new Syrian constitution took effect. This constitution virtually guarantees Hafiz al-Asad will remain in power until his death. His powers extend deep into all facets of Syrian society as this new constitution gives the President the following powers: the right to appoint ministers, declare war, declare states of emergency, issue laws in states of emergency, declare amnesty, amend the constitution, appoint civil servants and military personnel. Additionally, it requires the President to be of the Muslim faith.1 The executive branchÕs powers extend deep into the legislative and judicial branches leaving them practically impotent. SyriaÕs relationship with its neighbor, Israel, has been tenuous and strained from the outset. It perceives Israel to be expansionist and hostile. It sees IsraelÕs claim to the Golan Heights evidence of its perception. The Israeli perception parallels the Syrian. Conflicts between these nations are set within the parameters of these perceptions. One major conflict between Syria and Israel is legitimate ownership of the Golan Heights. Although there have been few skirmishes over this issue, it has proven to be only a portion of the basketful of contentious situations between these countries. The negotiation process aimed at resolution of this issue has waxed and waned over the last thirty years. There appears to be little hope for resolving this tug-of-war within the boundaries of peaceful negotiations. Syria is now in a situation where a limited war would be beneficial to the economy. In addition, it would serve to lift the spirit of Arab nationalism within SyriaÕs borders and in other Arab nations. It may also aid Asad in strengthening his party and his ideology within the political structure of Syria and help to breakdown any emerging strengths of oppositional factions to Asad within Syria society. Syria senses its options for obtaining a settlement on this issue decreasing due to the changes occurring within the relationships of several of the Middle Eastern countries and influential groups. It perceives the issue of the Golan Heights a secondary issue to the Palestinian issue. Due to these perceived changes, as well as an increase in domestic problems, it is not impractical to believe a Syrian-Israeli war is near at hand as pointed out in the following pages. **** Chapter One MEMO: Date: 9 September 1999 Today President Asad of Syria issued the following warning to Israeli leadership. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ÒThe Syrian Arab Republic worked vigorously to promote peaceful negotiations with the government of Israel for three decades. These negotiations were carried out in good faith. In 16 January 1994 the Syrian Arab Republic clearly stated its wish for peace. ÒSyria seeks a just and comprehensive peace with Israel as a strategic choice that secures Arab rights, ends the Israeli occupation, and enables all peoples in the region to live in peace, security and dignity. In honor we fought; in honor we negotiate; and in honor we make peace.Ó2 However, it is now the position of the Syrian Arab Republic that future negotiation processes with respect to the Golan Heights would be futile. The time for negotiations is over. It is in this vein Syria sends this message to Israel. CONDITIONS FOR PEACE: ITEM I. Israel agrees to relinquish all claims, past, present and future, to the Golan Heights and its natural resources. ITEM II. Israel agrees to relocate its citizen population within six days of this notice. Although war is not a desirable option for either Israel or Syria, it is time for Syria to act with regard to reclamation of its land. The Syrian Arab Republic has exhausted all avenues in an attempt to bring about a peaceful resolution to the long-standing conflictual relationship with Israel. The Syrian Arab RepublicÕs military forces are at this moment moving into the Golan Heights. It would be in the best interest of the Israeli people to refrain from any attempts to block the reclamation processes.Ó Syria issued this warning to the State of Israel for the following reasons: 1. Security and safety for the Syrian people is a major concern to Asad. The Golan Heights is strategically located between Syria and Israel. The nation that legitimately holds the Golan also holds a militarily advantageous position. The Golan Heights are also close, {approximately forty miles} from SyriaÕs capital city, Damascus. The close proximity permits Israel to maintain a military presence, large or small , on the doorstep of Damascus. This was confirmed on October 3, 1994 by Mr. Rabin in a speech to the Knesset. 3 It would increase the security of Damascus, and Syria as well, to reclaim the Golan. 2. The Golan Heights is a key water resource for Syria, as well as Israel. The Euphrates River is SyriaÕs main source for agriculture use. The Golan Heights increased in its importance as a water resource when the Turkish government constructed a dam across the Euphrates River. Turkey believes the water of the Euphrates is Turkish water. The construction of the dam has Òlimited SyriaÕs hydroelectric power generating capacityÓ 4 requiring Syria to dip into its oil reserves. Oil is SyriaÕs primary export. 3. Syria has also lost ÔfaceÕ with its Arab neighbors in losing the Golan Heights to Israel in the 1967 Six Day War. Syria briefly held on to this area during the 1973 Yom Kipper War but ultimately lost it plus additional Syrian territory to Israel. This source of shame is still fresh in the minds of the Syrian people. 4. There is a significant and increasing threat to the regime of Asad from factions within Syrian society. Previous challenges to Asad have been Òdisposed In addition to this domestic challenge to his government, Asad is struggling to lift the economic position of the nation within the international community and within Syria proper. His hold on the business community remain fast but there is support building for more privatization and for loosing the governmental restraints on the banking system. SyriaÕs unemployment problems are escalating to the point Òof 60% to 80% for first-time job huntersÓ.5 Asad is an extremely competent leader. History shows he has been able to create his own opportunities and use them to his best advantage. It is possible, in his drive to maintain his authority over Syria, he is now ready to initiate a war with Israel. A war with Israel would move the focus away from domestic issues. This tactic, however detestable, is an open option for Asad given his range of power within Syria and one he has previously made work for him.6 **** Chapter Two If Asad is attempting to divert attention from internal problems by initiating war with Israel one explanation might be, in using the prospect theory, that he has redefined the status quo, being the ability to govern from a position of strength, to align with his position and justify his actions in this situation. Prospect theory attempts to explain behaviors/actions by claiming people act in ways that will protect the status quo. They will perceive events or situations as either a gain or a loss to the status quo. Additionally, people will treat a risk to acquire [gain] differently than the risk of a loss. Each risk, loss or gain, is viewed from the center of the status quo. Risks for gains are not given the same prioritial attention as risks of loss. A loss to the status quo is perceived to be more important than any gain. Asad perceives the status quo in this situation to be maintaining his present governing position. He realizes the opposition could use the increasing domestic problems against him and gain additional popular support. Asad has historically been quite successful in quelling any significant opposition forces, secular or traditional. At this point in time, acquiring the Golan Heights, although very important in itself, is also not his primary motivation. Foremost in his mind is the issue of his ability to maintain dominance within the Syrian republic. This is his status quo. The Golan Heights simply becomes an available tool for use in protecting the status quo. Evidence of this surfaces in the use of this tool. In 1995 Israeli Foreign Minister, Yossi Beilin on Israel Radio stated he was no longer certain Syria truly wished to negotiate for peace with Israel. Mr. Rabin agreed prior to the negotiations to Òwithdraw from all of the occupied Golan Heights, and IsraelÕs demand that Syria define the extent of the peaceful relationship it wants with Israel. In recent weeks, Syria has repeatedly postponed planned talks between the Israeli and Syrian Ambassadors to the United States.Ó 7 More evidence of this comes from Pipes who said, ÒPeres offered him{Asad} one thing after another, but Asad kept upping his demands when the two sides seemed on the verge of an agreement.Ó 8 Pipes, editor of the Middle East Quarterly, believes Òthis as part of AsadÕs game of not deciding on an unsettling peace in order to protect his own domestic political interestsÓ.9 Perthes acknowledged and agreed stating that the Òrelations with Israel is not the most important thing for Syria. Far more crucial are domestic and regional issues.Ó10 Asad has positioned himself to operate from a position of possible loss, that being, his position of power within Syria. Following the theoretical lines of prospect theory, his perception of risk of loss, being his own power to govern, has passed a 50/50 probability rate and he is more certain that loss is forthcoming. When threat of loss passes this salient point Asad is acutely aware of his Ôloss aversionÕ and will become risk-acceptant in his attempts to maintain the status quo. To be risk- acceptant, within the prospect theory, is to more readily accept a higher degree of risk in order to maintain your position or possession. To be risk-averse when there is potential for gains simply means the same degree of risk employed to keeping position or possession will not be used to gain position or possession. For example, the amount of energy expended to keep the status quo at present levels is not equal to the energy expended to acquire or add to the present levels of the status quo. If this is accurate, Asad will expend more energy and time to maintain his position than he will devote to the negotiation process at this time. He is actually able to use the Golan Heights process more to his advantage by not agreeing to peace than by settling this issue. If he were to settle for peace now, he would lose this negotiating tool, currently a part of his status quo, and be forced to redefine it. He would then see himself operating from within a survival frame, meaning the status quo has decreased and he will be pressured to solve the domestic problems which may result in forfeiting significant portions of power to others. Forfeiture would likely take the form of relinquishing control over the monetary system. SyriaÕs debts to foreign governments, CCCP , Iran and others including the World Bank have reached $16 billion. This has put Syria in the position of delaying payment. 11 SyriaÕs support of terrorism has caused domestic business difficulties. Syria is named on the U.S. list of states supporting terrorism. Because of this U.S. exporters can not buy their insurance or financing needs through Eximbank. The World Bank has closed its doors to Syria until their debt is paid. Domestically, of the five government-controlled banks, only the Commercial Bank of Syria has the authority to issue approval for import transactions. Syrian businessmen commonly use their own funds to cover import expenses through an off-shore bank in advance of shipment. This practice puts the Syrian businessman in a risky position of having to pay for products before receiving them. Additionally, Asad is a man of timing. Now is not the time to recover the Heights being that he can not acquire them without having to give something is return. He would like to be able to reclaim the Heights without having to make a significant sacrifice.12 He has made it clear his preference is to acquire the Heights on a land -for-peace foundation. Israel will only negotiate from a peace-for-peace position. Given these parameters, it is understandable that Asad would, at this point in time, maintain the status quo. **** Chapter Three Previous experience in negotiating with Israel and in dealings with the United States that the likelihood of a land-for-peace premise in settling the issue of the Golan Heights is practically non-existent. Asad has known he was unable to bargain from a position of strength and so has used the Heights to his advantage within the circumstances before him. All that changed January 28, 1998. On this day, Asad received word from the Center for Scientific Studies and Research that testing on SyriaÕs newest addition to its chemical weapons arsenal was complete. PNAD, Pseudocidnictinamide Adenine Dinucleotide, was ready for distribution. Knowing the capabilities of this agent, Asad could bargain from a position of additional military strength. Previous to this, Asad knew he was unable to win a war with Israel and he knew the rest of the world also knew it. ÒThe Syrians are probably under no illusions that they could win a war against Israel without significant support from other surrounding Arab states. Unlike 1973, Syria is now isolated in its opposition to Israel and would have to attack Israel without the benefit of its previous allies.Ó13 Additionally, Syria lost its largest military support, the CCCP. This was a major setback in Syrian foreign policy. ÒThe collapse of the former Soviet Union left the Syrians without a major military benefactor and forced President Asad to conclude that his drive to reach military parity with Israel is unachievable. ....Asad recognizes that Syria does not have the economic capacity to effectively compete with Israel in the military sphere.Ó 14 Although Asad knew he was not on a level playing field with Israel militarily. He also knew Israel would think long and hard before deploying nuclear weapons due to the damage it would inflict on its own people and the water supply. Yet, this was not enough to balance the power, or tip the power in SyriaÕs favor. With the completion of PNAD Syria now has the capability of bargaining from a more powerful position. Patrick Seales describes Asad as an extremely patient man. Evidence of this is obvious from LawsonÕs comments of AsadÕs ability to adapt to the changing status of the CCCP. ÒThe al-Asad regime adapted itself relatively handily to a world in which the Soviet Union no longer existed.Ó 15 Asad has been rewarded for his patience. Due to the delay in production of PNAD Syria had time to strengthen its relationship with North Korea, Iran and China. These four countries formed an alliance specifically to produce the longer range Scud-C missiles. These missiles are capable of being deployed from Syria and reaching deep inside the borders of Israel. ÒUsing these longer range missiles, the Syrians will be able to strike literally every point in Israel from any location in Syria.Ó16 Dr. Shoham from the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University stated, ÒSyria today is the strongest military power in the Arab world in the area of chemical weapons.Ó This statement was issued previous to the completion of PNAD. Certainly, Asad now has the confidence again raise the issue of negotiating on a premise of land-for-peace. Prospect Theory explains AsadÕs behavior by determining his status quo position, as inferior to IsraelÕs. From an inferior position prospect theory states Asad will not initiate a conflict he is unable to control. The concept of being risk-averse in this case is evident. However, now that Asad has acquired the agent PNAD along with the favorable status in the eyes of North Korea, Iran and China, he is able to rethink how it best use these additions, or endowments to his advantage. Prospect theory considers positive additions to the status quo as endowments. These endowments are quickly assimilated into the present status quo requiring renormalization of that status quo.17 The decision-making processes necessary in renormalizing the status quo also require an individual to adjust losses/gains to a new status quo accordingly. **** Conclusions In light of the previous information it is understandable why Syria is making it currents demands regarding the Golan Heights. 1. Syria believes they are operating from a position of strength with it recent of PNAD and it new relationships with North Korea, Iran and China. ÒRussel Leng demonstrates that Òa crisis is most likely to end in war when one of the parties believes that it can win a war relatively easily, and the other side believes that it has at least an even chance, and both parties have vital interest, or other immediate security interests, at stake.Ó18 Prospect theory would say Asad perceives his position as risk-averse with regard to his act of war. He believes he will win, if forced to fight. He is operating from the risk-acceptant position with respect to addressing his domestic problems. The idea of war has outweighed the idea of losing his power to govern Syria to the opposing groups in society. 2. Syria is troubled by many domestic problems it does not have the ability to solve at this point in time. Economically, Syria would need to repay its debts to the World Bank and Russia before there is any opportunity to garner financial support for any domestic projects. If Syria settles for peace with Israel at this time it would be forced to decrease its military personnel. Since Syria employs and significant portion of the general population, this would cause an already strained economy to breakdown. The opposing factions, Muslim Brotherhood being the largest, would capitalize on AsadÕs seeming weakness and most definitely strengthen in numbers and spirit. ÒThe political opposition of the 1990Õs not only seeks to reverse the splits of the preceding decades; in spite of the different ideological orientation of its various Islamist, BaÕthi, Nasirist, nationalist and communist components, it is at least verbally, united in its call for ÔdemocracyÕ.Ó This unity would be a major blow to AsadÕs power and definitely affect his ability to govern effectively. In this case he is acting upon the concepts of being risk-acceptant. War looks like a better option to him than fighting in-house. Additionally, if he can block the opportunity for unity among these groups, it is in his interest to do so. Ò...successive Syrian governments initiated coercive policies toward neighboring states whenever powerful forces outside the dominant coalition were gaining strength or political leverage as a result of widening intraregime fissures.Ó19 Lawson continues to explain that, Ò...a regime confronting severe internal challenges,.....may well decide that external conflicts are less costly than further measures to prop up a crumbling political-economic order at home.Ó20 3. Syria has tried the waters in regard what constrains would be extended if it supported terrorist activities. ÒDamascus is still very much in the business of supporting international terrorism. Some twenty-six terrorist organizations have headquarters or other facilities in Syria or in Syrian-controlled Lebanon.Ó 21 It appears to have come out ahead in this respect with the exception of the U.S. listing it as a Ôrogue stateÕ. The United States identifies a rogue state as one who Òare third world powers with a large military establishment, a substantial supply of modern weapons, and a desire for weapons of mass destruction --nuclear, biological, and chemical armaments.Ó22 Although this has been problematic to Syrian economy, the reclamation of the Golan Heights will put Syria in an advantageous position for any future negotiations. One being, the military advantage and the other having control to IsraelÕs water supply and the water that supplies Lake Kinneret which is a major tourism draw. All of this is perceived by Asad by a screen of motivated bias. A motivated bias causes an individual to skew his decision-making process to fit the outcome he desires. He is seeing what he wants to see and is framing the issues accordingly. If he were using an unmotivated bias he would most probably reach similar conclusions in his decisions, but he would be doing without any conscious effort. Some of the drawbacks in using prospect theory are the inability to evoke a strong certainty effect with so many individuals in a real-life setting. Another difficulty in using this method is the inability to ensure that the status quo is actually the status quo you want to use. If, for example, IsraelÕs response to Syria is to be equally staunch in their efforts to claim the Golan Heights and war does ensue then the stability for each country will be affected by loss aversion, risk acceptance, and their affect on the individual nations to bargain from a position of strength. Yet, prospect theory does give us a reasonable and realistic explanation in seeking to understand the ÔwhyÕ in SyriaÕs decision to go to war. MEMO DATE: 28 January 1998 UPDATE: CW Agent - Pseudocidnictinamide Adenine Dinucleotide [PNAD] Source: Center for Scientific Studies and Research Syria Development Completed - 28 Jan. 1998 PNAD capabilities: PNAD is the most recent development of the Syrian Arab Republic. Military units will have access to PNAD 02 February 1998 PNAD is not sensory detectable. It imitates NAD, Nicotinamide Adenine Dinucleotide, the initial cellular hydrogen receptor in the ATP processing. In imitating NAD and replacing it in the system, it is capable of prohibiting electron transfers and seals the cell membranes ultimately shutting down respiration. Expiration: After initial contact with PNAD there is a seven minute window of opportunity to decontaminate. Expiration occurs within twelve minutes. PNAD has multi-situational cababilities. The components in manufacturing PNAD are dual-use. This is problematic for detecting manufacture and production. Tracking PNAD is additionally challenging. SyriaÕs amicable status with Iran and North Korea and possibly China make PNAD a Priority Seven issue. ANALYSIS: This agent has the flexibility Syria has been looking for to allow them to use this without affecting their own population. PNAD has been formulated to contain a neutralizing enzyme which will render the agent harmless within seventeen minutes of release. TESTING: The CSSR testing shows an 87% success rate +/- .03. CONTROL FACTORS: To date the Security Center for Biological and Chemical Development has had only moderate success in neutralizing this agent the rate being 37%. 1 Bureau of Public Affairs. U.S. Department of State. Background Notes: Syria [Online]. March 1995. Available: usdosweb@uic.edu 2 Syrian President Hafez Asad. Press Conference with President Clinton, 16 January 1994 3 Foreign Broadcast Information Service. ÒRabin Speaks at Opening of Winter Knesset SessionÓ, FBIS - NES -94-192, Daily Report: Near East & South Asia, October 4, 1994, p. 44. 4 US Department of State. ÒBackground Notes: Syria, March 1995Ó [Online] March 1995. Available: usdosweb@uic.edu 5 University of Haifa FOCUS. ÒWar or No War? Syria Receives Thorough Examination at Conference. [Online] http://www. focus. 6 Lawson, Fred H.Why Syria Goes to War. Ithaca, New York:Cornell University Press, 1996. 7 Pessin, Al. Voice of America. Jerusalem, Israel. February 2, 1995. 8 University of Hafia FOCUS. ÒWar or no War? Syria Receives Through Examination At ConferenceÓ [Online] http://www.focus. 9 ibid. 10 ibid. 11 Bureau of Public Affairs. U.S. Department of State. Background Notes: Syria [Online] March 1995. Available: usdosweb@uic.edu 12 ÒIsrael Seeks U.S. Help in Talks With Syria.Ó The Salt Lake Tribune, 10 September 1996. 13 Pelletiere, Stephen C. ed. ÒThe Peace Process, Phase One: Past Accomplishments, Future ConcernsÓ [Online]. Available: http://Carlisle - www.army.mil/usassi/ssipeop/biopelle.htm. 14 ibid. 15 Lawson, Fred H.Why Syria Goes to War. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Publications, 1996. 16 Myths and Facts. ÒPeace With The Golan.Ó 3 May 1995. [Online] Available: http://www. israel/mythsfact 17 McInerney, Audrey. ÒProspect Theory and Soviet Policy Towards Syria, 1966-1967.Ó In Avoiding Losses/ Taking Risks, ed. Barbara Farnham. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press., 1994. 18 Lawson, Fred. H. Why Syria Goes to War. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 1996. 19 ibid. 20 ibid. 21 Here We Go Again!: After Iraqi Debacle, Will Syria be let off the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?. No. 93-D 102. Decision Brief. InThe Center for Security Policy. 8 December 1993. 22 Tanter, Dr. Raymond. Ò472not22.txt. In Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. New York: Hill and Wang Publishers. 1995.