When we endeavor to examine the nature of international relationships, it is incumbent upon us to understand the different political and psychological factors that lead to the development and implementation of international policy. The political relationship between the United States and Cuba has been tumultuous since the late 1950's. Although the world has seen vast changes in the political landscape and balance of power, the relationship with Cuba has worsened due to the inflexible stances, misperceptions and biases of both countries leaders. Cuba has been identified by the U.S. Department of State as a potential rogue state. As such, we should isolate our dealing with these nations and treat them differently. This paper will examine the psychological motivations behind our failed foreign policy as well as historical examples of these failures. I will further examine the nature of U.S.-Cuban relations in the Cold War and Post Cold War era. At issue is the feasibility of the Helms-Burton Act and its intended effects. Having laid the groundwork for this discussion, I will answer the question: What led to the repeal of the Helms Burton Act in the year 2002 thereby lifting all economic sanctions against Cuba and normalizing relations between the United States and Cuba? In order to fully understand (inasmuch as possible) the Cuban perspective, we should review Cuban history. Under Batista, and in the first two years of Castro's rule, Cuba enjoyed a prosperous relationship with the United States. In fact, in 1959, the Cuban economy benefited from over a billion dollars in American investments1. Additionally, Cuba received 65% of its imports, and sent 75% of its exports to the United States2. During the period of 1959-1961, Castro was supported in a large part by the United States government and free enterprise. However, in 1961, Castro declared himself a Marxist-Leninist and the face of United States/Cuban relationship would never be the same. Along with the declaration, Castro aligned Cuba as an ally of the U.S.S.R. Since the United States was already in the midst of the Cold War, an ally of the Soviet Union was assumed to be an enemy of the United States and was treated as such. The Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis are examples of a response to the perceived threat of Cuba. So that we may better understand the motivations and intentions of these actors, an orientation of a rational decision making process is in order. Decision making involves reduction of uncertainties and simplification of complexities. When we try to predict behavior of leaders, such as Castro, we tend to look at the situation through our own eyes, rather than through the perspective of the rogue leader. We assume that Castro would react a particular way (perhaps, as we might act?), given a particular set of circumstances. It is under this decision making model that we hold our leaders responsible for their actions. In order for a leader to be considered rational in his approach to international decision making, he must identify his options, estimate the likelihood of success, and be willing to trade off the expected costs for the benefits sought.3 In the international arena, this is one way to predict a leaders choices among a number of options. When we look at a situation and focus on external threats and opportunities, we assume a challenger's value assessments and judgments to be consistent with our own (as the defender or the evaluator). The academic examination of the theories pertaining to deterrence seem to build upon one another. Certainly, for a nation (or a unitary actor) to be considered a threat, they must have the capabilities to carry out the threat. Cuba had a strong military and was seeking nuclear capabilities during the late 1960's. These two indicators of military might would confirm Castro's capabilities during the Cold War. Thomas C. Schelling adds resolve to the scenario. Schelling offers an assessment of critical risk. Critical risk is a ratio of one's own payoffs compared with the credibility that the other side will stand firm.4 If the defender's critical risk is higher than the initiator's credibility of challenging deterrence, deterrence is likely to succeed. Deterrent theorists enter into a subjective arena at this point. During the Cold War, the United States concerned itself with the resolve of the Soviet Union. The difficulty was in the attempts to quantify an intangible such as resolve. It begs the question; How can we accurately predict what Castro (or Kruchev's) critical risk is? Deterrence theorists George and Smoke criticize Schelling because he fails to address the controllability and calculability of risk. There exist certain risk factors that are beyond the control of the actors involved, and as such, these risks can explain some failures of deterrence. Perhaps the greatest contribution to the field of psychology with regards to deterrence is that of the biases and misperceptions that international leaders and decision makers are susceptible to. In recognizing that these biases exist, we must identify and assess them in order to be able to accurately predict behavior. These assessments, however, are incomplete as it does not recognize the psychological motivations and/or hidden agendas of a leader. These biases are further explained through the use of Prospect Theory. Prospect theorists contend that leaders frame issues based on the status quo. Any deviation from the status is seen as a gain or a loss. Prospect theory maintains that leaders pay more attention to losses than to potential gains. In this respect, Castro has anchored himself firmly as the independent dictator of a Carribbean nation. He is the President, First Vice President, and the President of the Council of Ministers. Any change in status or title would be viewed as a loss. Prospect theorists explain that leaders are more willing to take (unreasonable) risks in order to protect and maintain the statuw quo. Castro is a made to order example of resolve; for nearly 35 years, he has risked devestation in order to protect every bit of his domain. The theory of bounded rationality recognizes that we cannot predict an outcome with any degree of certainty, unless we first consider the individual biases and (mis)perceptions held by the opponent. Bounded rationality is simply the acknowledgment that we cannot fully appreciate another's view of a particular set of circumstances. One must consider whether a leader (feels he) is leaping through a window of opportunity of hiding in a basement of fear. Certain biases, based on sometimes inaccurate or misinterpreted information, will create deviations from rationality. Robert Jervis, in his introduction to Psychology and Deterrence, states "...the close examination of the psychological factors at work in a number of cases may provide us with sufficient understanding of how people think to make it unnecessary for us to look as carefully at all the other cases."5 Jervis acknowledges that, while we can come up with models for rational decision making based on maximizing the utility of a particular set of circumstances, we should not assume "one size fits all" foreign policy when dealing with threats, either strategic or intrinsic. The particular biases that leaders may have can be broken down into two main categories; motivated and unmotivated. A bias is a distortion of reality. If a leader has motivated biases, he is seeing a situation as he wants to see it. This can lead to a faulty assessment of an adversary's resolve, overconfidence, insensitivity to warnings, and thus defeat deterrence.6 If a leader has unmotivated biases, he is seeing the situation as he expects to see it. The perception is based upon the anticipated outcome and the degree to which the data support or deny the (presupposed) conclusion. The discounting of relevant information because it contradicts an intended conclusion is a departure from rational decision making. I intend to show clear biases on the part of Cuba and the United States in their threat assessment of each other. Cold War Era The history of relations with Cuba during the Cold War was tumultuous. Cuba, under Castro, was seen by the United States as both a strategic and intrinsic threat. The reason for this is that Cuba, as an ally of the Soviet Union, was an experiment in Communism in the western hemisphere. The Soviet Union was an intrinsic threat, and by nature of Cuba's association with the U.S.S.R., Castro was also seen as a threat. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were the unitary actors in the world political scene. Cuba, as a virtual satellite of the Soviet Union, was strategically located approximately 90 miles to the south of Florida. The spread of communism to the western hemisphere was viewed by the United States as a strategic threat as well. The United States did not want a shining example of Marxist/Leninist communism within a stones throw of its borders. On January 3, 1961, the United States formally broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba. On April 17, 1961, exiled Cuban forces, who were organized and trained by the CIA, attacked Cuba in the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion. Since the United States had seen Cuba as a threat (motivated bias), both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations planned and supported the invasion. The view supported by both administrations was that the invasion was an appropriate response to the strategic threat that existed in Cuba at the time. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a further escalation of the situation and a disintegration of any diplomatic negotiation. In response to the Soviets secretly moving intermediate range ballistic missiles to be placed in Cuba, Kennedy ordered a naval blockade to prevent passage of the Soviet ships carrying the weapons of mass destruction. The United States response to the positioning of Soviet missiles in Cuba was necessary to prevent a strategic threat from becoming an intrinsic one. With Soviet controlled arms 90 miles off the coast of the United States, Kennedy declared the situation as unacceptable. In each of the above examples, the Soviet Union was seen as the threat to the United States, and Cuba was merely the location for the confrontation. As part of the UN negotiated compromise, the Soviet Union agreed to remove its offensive weapons systems and not reintroduce them. The United States, in turn, canceled its naval blockade and promised not to invade Cuba. In 1962, the United States enacted trade sanctions against Cuba. The intended effect of the embargo was to cripple a Cuban economy that had previously been dependent upon American investment. By cutting off economic ties to the United States, Cuba was forced to seek out new partners for international trade. The unintended and undesired effect was that it actually helped to diversify the Cuban economy. The reasons for the embargo were fourfold: 1. As a method of coercion, the United States was protesting the Cuban confiscation of 1.5 billion dollars of U.S. property under the Agrarian Reform Act.7 2. To make continued Cuban-Soviet relations as costly as possible, in hopes of leading to economic ruin. 3. To serve as a worldwide example of deterrence to others countries considering the nationalization of U.S. properties. 4. To expose Cuba as a shining example of a failing communist philosophy leading to a declining national economy. It is interesting to note that the embargo, while certainly disrupting the Cuban economy, accomplished the above goals only to a limited degree. The United States has not realized the 1.5 billion dollars worth of goods. This clearly was not a realistic expectation. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union has led to a lack of underwriting for the Cuban economy, there is no evidence of a direct causal relationship between the Cuban embargo and the fall of the Soviet Union. Because these two goals were not accomplished swiftly, it may have actually cost the United States in reputation, although no new examples of nationalization exist. Lastly, the Cuban economy survived for the better part of 35 years since the embargo. The struggling economy has not been an inducement for Castro to step down or for dissidents to stage a coup. Even if either event were to happen now, a 35 year time frame is a very long time for effective coercion without other factors being considered. Post Cold War Era With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the increased emphasis on the treatment of rogue states vis a vis the international community, Cuba has experienced difficult times. In 1992, Boris Yeltzin cut economic ties to Cuba. Contrast this with the $4 billion is military and economic aid the Cuba enjoyed in 1989. Castro no longer has the diplomatic "big brother". Since the end of the Cold War, the Cuban military is smaller by 7,000 troops.8 They also possess no nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, or ballistic missiles.9 It would seem that both strategic and intrinsic threats to the United States have been reduced considerably. Having achieved the goal of threat nullification, the State Department needed to find another justification for maintaining the trade embargo. At this point, the increased scrutiny of human rights abuses in Cuba was a rallying cry. (Interestingly enough, the United States has recently extended most favored nation trade status to China, a country with a worse human rights record than Cuba). In 1995 Cuba was listed as a country that sponsored terrorism. According to the 1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism, "...while there was no direct evidence of its sponsorship of terrorist acts in 1995, the Cuban government continued to provide safehaven for several international terrorists."10 Although trade sanctions against Cuba underwent modifications and enhancements, the most dramatic change in United States economic policy towards Cuba was precipitated by the shooting down of four Cuban-Americans during a "Brothers to the Rescue" mission. On April 12, 1996, this unarmed plane was fired upon while patrolling the international waters searching for Cuban refugees who had often decided to leave Cuba in makeshift and often dangerous rafts. The United Nations immediately condemned the actions of the Cuban pilots and the Cuban government. The American response to this international incident was the passage of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. This legislation was drafted by Senator Jesse Helms (Republican--North Carolina) and Representative Dan Burton (Republican--Indiana). The Helms-Burton Act, as it is commonly referred to as, provided for: 1. The encouragement of free and fair democratic elections in Cuba 2. The strengthening of international sanctions against Cuba 3. The support of Cubans seeking their freedom outside the Cuban borders. 4. Protection against the nationalization of private property owned by united States citizens. 5. A contingency support plan for a new democratic government, in the event of the fall of the Castro regime. 6. The continued security of the United States in dealing with any strategic or intrinsic threat from the Cuban government. While the catalyst for the signing of the Helms-Burton Act may have been the downing of the Brothers to the Rescue aircraft, Congress had been under consistent pressure from the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). Critics of the Helms-Burton Act point out that CANF donated almost 3.2 million dollars to the U.S. political system since 1979, with Jesse Helms being one of its biggest beneficiaries.11 In determining policy, CANF has shown itself to be one of the most effective and influential lobbying force in Washington. The point being made by vocal critics is that support for Helms-Burton may very well be motivated by campaign financing rather than national security interests. Another criticism of Helms-Burton is that the act is in violation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The claims provision of the act would allow foreign companies t be sued in U.S. courts if they have investments or ongoing business with property in Cuba that was expropriated in the nationalization of assets in 1962.12 Clearly, there exists a contradiction between free trade and the extended sanctions and reprisals against Cuba's North American trading partners. NAFTA was passed and the United States is bound by law and by honor to uphold the provisions of such an act. Perhaps the most vociferous critique of Helms-Burton is that it is entirely unnecessary. Cuba, without the support of the Soviet Union, is no longer an intrinsic threat to the security of the United States. The strategic threat to the United States is perhaps more tangible. Wayne Smith, in writing in the Center for International Policy Report, states "...security interests are not the key. It would now be illogical to disrupt important relationships with other countries over Cuba. Indeed, avoiding such problems should now be the principal objective of our Cuba policy."13 Because of the endowment effect, the United States is not willing to give up the fight after putting this much time and effort into trying to topple Castro's regime. Even so, the threat is minimal. The Cuban record of human right abuses is better than countries to which we have extended most favored nation trade status. Having examined the historical examples of the United States resolve to topple Castro's regime through the use of economic terrorism, can we expect the situation to continue until Castro leaves command? Clearly, Castro's aversion to loss of status and reputation have made him act out of basements of fear since the collapse of the Soviet Union. There are a few foreseeable scenarios under which Helms-Burton might be repealed. The first is perhaps the least likely to occur. If the Clinton administration and Fidel Castro were to re-frame the issues relative to a win-win situation. This is highly unlikely, as the arena of Cuban-American relations has been a zero sum gain. That is to say that one country's gain is another's loss. However, the Unites States has proven patient and tolerant with those of differing ideologies, providing that dissent is allowed and there is a "buck to be made". Rational choice would indicate that the United States could and should extend an olive branch of peace to facilitate dialogue on opening trade for medical and humanitarian supplies. It is more reasonable to expect this behavior from the United States, who could enjoy the worldwide reputation of a peacemaker in this situation. It is unlikely that President Clinton will reverse his stance for three reasons. First, a young Bill Clinton looked upon President Kennedy with great admiration as an icon. His prejudices against Castro may very well date back to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Clearly, Kennedy standing up to Castro and the Soviet Union was a defining moment for President Kennedy. Clinton's formative opinions regarding Castro and the perceived threat that he represent to the United States is deeply entrenched. Secondly, his views were crystallized when he was seeking re-election as governor of Arkansas. This was during the Mariel boat lifts. Many Cuban refugees found their way to Arkansas and Clinton was a casualty of the political fallout; he failed in his bid for re-election. Thirdly, the political and financial influence of CANF will continue and it is highly unlikely that Clinton would alienate such a powerful lobby anytime before the elections of 2000. Perhaps a more likely event is the repeal of the Helms-Burton Act after the death of Fidel Castro. Castro health is rumored to be failing and his support in Cuba is waning. I have chosen the date of January 1, 2002 because that is after the Clinton administrations tenure. I believe that Castro's death will facilitate a demise of communism in Cuba. After Castro's death, assuming continued pressure from the international community, it is plausible to foresee the repeal of Helms-Burton Act. While the Act would not necessarily be the cause of the collapse of communism in Cuba, the ends would have been accomplished and the legislation would no longer be necessary. At that point, negotiations could begin regarding normalizing relations with Cuba. PRESS RELEASE--January 1, 2002. (UPI) TORONTO--President Jack Kemp met with representative of the Cuban government to celebrate the repeal of the Helms-Burton Act of 1996. The Prime Minister of Canada had extended an invitation Kemp and newly elected President Canseco in hopes of beginning a dialogue regarding normalizing relations between the United States and Cuba. Canadian lawmakers hailed the repeal as a positive step towards global trade and international diplomacy. The leaders from Canada and the United States have pledged support for the fledgling democracy of Cuba. RELATED ARTICLE: American hotel and casino conglomerate seeks American League franchise for Cuba. "Cuba has a great love affair with baseball, and it will soon be the premier destination for tourists in the Caribbean." said Donald Trump, CEO and spokesperson for the Palm Tree Ltd. Investment Group. "Soon, Cubans will be able to go to a baseball game and order a rum and coke, or as it is referred to by the locals "a Cuba libre." Finally, Cuba is now free. 1 National Foundation, Sept., 1996, del Aguila, Jean M., CUBA, Dilemmas of a Revolution, Westview Press, London. 2 Ibid., page 53. 3 Tanter, Raymond. "472not1.doc" PS 472 Homepage. http://www- personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/Sp97ps472notes/472not1.txt. 4 Tanter, Raymond. "472not6.doc" PS 472 Homepage. http://www- personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/Sp97ps472notes/472not6.txt. 5 Robert Jervis, et al, Psychology and Deterrence, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. 6 Tanter, Raymond, lecture, International Security Affairs, University of Michigan, Spring, 1997. 7 Granma International. [online]. Available: http://www.granma.cu.feb2/5feb3i.html. 8 Klare, Micheal, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws, Hill and Wang, 1995. 9 Ibid. page 134. 10 1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism [online]. Available: http://www.usus.usemb.se/terror/TERSST.HTM#Cuba 11 Granma International [online] Available: http;//www.granma.cu/ener3/3ene11i.html. 12 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996. [online] available: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/L?d104:./list/d104sh.1st:160. 13 Smith, Wayne S. "Cuba After the Cold War; What Should US Policy Be?. Center for International Policy Report, March 1993. [online] Available: http://www.us.net/cip/coldwar.txt