James L. Liggins Jr. PS 472 6/25/97 Rogue Regimes Critique Introduction The book Rogue Regimes by Professor Raymond Tanter(RT) is a very unique book which ask and also answers alot of intriguing policy questions dealing specifically with rogue states. The term rogue regime deals expressly with the classification of certain nations having the tendency to practice or support terrorism, posses a large-scale conventional military force and to seek weapons of mass destruction.1 The task for this paper is to offer a critique of the major points within Rogue Regimes. However, being only a Òhumble student,Ó who am I to undertake such a critique of an author whoÕs experience and wisdom certainly well surpasses that of my own? That is to say, one would argue, how can a student credibly critique the teacher when the studentÕs own understanding of the topic comes mainly from discourse and discussion with the teacher? WouldnÕt that sort of critique just be a reiteration of the teacherÕs teachings? The way around this sort of mindless reiteration is for the student to focus not necessarily on how he as a student was impressed or disappointed by the discourse but rather, the student should examine how the book compares to other works by the teacherÕs contemporaries. In this way, the student can gain a further understanding of the discourse as well as point out probative perspectives and observations and view points from which the teacher may also grow and learn. Arms and Influence Arms and Influence, is a piece by Thomas C. Schelling. Schelling makes sure that the reader understands that his book is not a policy paper. It is a book on the theory of influence through the power of violence. The book was written during the Cold War and thus is extremely influenced by East-West ideology. I have undertaken the task of using this book as a comparison for Rogue Regimes. To tackle this objective, it is probative to ask the following questions: 1) In general, how does Rogue Regimes differ theoretically from Arms and Influence? 2) What are the general similarities, if any? 3) How does Rogue RegimesÕ retributive and rehabilative sanctions approach compare and contrast with Arms and InfluencesÕ theory of the power to hurt and the diplomacy of violence. Differences Before delving too far into things, a discussion of the general differences between the two books will provide a good starting point for discussing the gray area of common ground between them. First, a discussion of the approach of each piece is relevant. Next, the focus of each respective piece will be explored. Those things being covered, we will then move on to the similarities between the two works. A striking difference between ShellingsÕ book and TanterÕs is the approach that each author takes in writing their pieces. Shelling goes through great lengths to expressly point out that Arms and Influence is not a paper that is directed towards suggesting any type of policy. The book tends to be very theoretical and general. Although he does give certain examples to support his points, these examples tend to be quite general and never suggest broad sweeping policy points. This book specifically expounds upon ÒprinciplesÓ in question.2 Infact, he states matter of factly that the book really has nothing to do with policy. He felt that policies depend upon values and purposes, predictions and estimates.3 He sought to deal with principles on a more abstract and general level so as not cross the line of policy. In contrast, Rogue Regimes makes no attempts to pass as a paper simply on the discussion of certain principles. The book is expressly a book about policy. Specifically, it discusses the area of how and why policy towards rogue states have gone in the direction that they have over the past years; What effects does personality and politics have on the policy process; And, it directly addresses what direction US policy towards rogue states should take to be effective. Tanter also seems to have another objective in writing this book. Having been on the Regean AdministrationÕs International Security Affairs Council, he gives a very unique account of the actual formulation of policy. He gives a Òhands onÓ type account of the policy process. The book presents a very credible inside perspective which tends to be a very upclose and intimate dialogue of events. Rogue Regimes, however, is permeated with values and purposes, and predictions and estimates which at times cloud the very credible theoretic value of the piece. For instance, at times, Tanter seems so anti-Clinton Administration that one tends to wonder if he is not unduly biased by his association with the Reagan Administration. Another probative difference to explore between the two pieces is each authors frame of reference when writing their books and their expressed focus. ShellingÕs book was published by Yale University in 1966. It is very important to keep in mind that this was Òsmack in the middleÓ of the Cold War. The international system was one of a bipolar variety. The idea of Balance of Power was the center piece of most international political thought. It is not difficult to understand why Arms and Influence tends to have a sort of implied reference to East -West relations. ShellingÕs focus for the book was directed at how a country uses violence in a matter that influences other countries. He discusses how they use violence, the difficulties and dangers of certain approaches and the causes of success or failure. The book has a very distinguishing perspective because it sets forth the ideas of resolve, commitment, and maneuverability of risk as the determining factors for the effectiveness of this Òdiplomacy of violence.Ó Rogue Regimes, on the other hand, was written in an entirely different time period and with a very distinctive focus. Rogue Regimes is a very recent work to say the least.( Infact, recent is an extreme understatement) Therefore, the book was written in a Post- Cold-War setting. The Berlin Wall had fallen, the Soviet threat was no more. This being the case, Tanter focuses on another threat to US international security, mainly, rogue states. Tanter defines rogue regimes as Ònations that maintain large standing armed forces in relation to their population size, support international terrorism, and promote the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, biological, and chemical armaments.Ó4 Tanter distinguishes himself in several ways. First, he emphasizes the personal background of rogue leaders as a tool for understanding the policies of their regimes. Tanter uses this tool for understanding the motivations, fears, needs, and wants of these leaders. Tanter also, quite uniquely, discusses how politics i.e. government officials, interest groups, etc.., play a keen role in threat perception and the consequential policies developed toward these perceived threats. Tanter submits that attention to the afore mentioned qualities of the policy process is crucial in obtaining a thorough understanding of what our (US) policies should be towards rogue states. Towards policy, Rogue Regimes asserts that Òsanctions are of increasing importance for implementing coercive and retributive polices...Absent the Communist threat, rogue states continue to cross an American-defined threat perception threshold and subsequently receive a large proportion of sanctions.Ó5 Thus, Rogue Regimes focuses on the question of whether to contain or embrace these regimes. To coin a phrase, should we, ÒHug a thug or mug a thug?Ó Specifically, Tanter expounds on the success or failure of sanctions for rehabilitation versus sanctions for retribution. Focusing on the effectiveness of sanctions when a rogue state is acting from Òwindows of opportunities,Ó a Òbasement of fear,Ó or both. Arms and Influence and Rogue Regimes therefore are strikingly different in their respective approaches, subject matter, eras and focus. The key in this paper is how to link such different discourses together in a way that provides for a more thorough understanding of Rogue Regimes. For the solution, one must next discuss the intriguing similarities between both theoretical perspectives. Similarities As previously stated, Shelling focuses on diplomatic bargaining through the use of military force. He discuses how countries attempt to use their Òcapacity for violenceÓ as power to influence or as Òdiplomacy.Ó Shelling describes this diplomacy as the Òpower to hurt.Ó6 In contrast, Tanter attempts to discuss policies that are appropriate for democracies to deal with perceived threats from rogue states. Although Shelling doesnÕt apply his theories specifically to policy like Tanter does, these two pieces share a common ground. The area of ÒsanctionsÓ and Òthe power to hurtÓ is where an intriguing similarity can be developed. Recall one of the difference mentioned between Arms and Influence and Rogue Regimes. I am specifically referring to the different Òpolitical erasÓ they were written in. Shelling wrote his piece during the Cold War Era and thus was substantially influenced by East-West relations when formulating his thoughts on how a country uses its Òpower to hurtÓ as bargaining power. In Rogue Regimes, the Cold War is over however, a new another threat from rogue states has emerged in its place. Implicitly, Rogue Regimes speaks to the policy approach for utilizing the US power to hurt ÒeconomicallyÓ as a method of influence. What I am trying to ultimately express is the idea that TanterÕs ÒsanctionsÓ has some common ground with ShellingÕs Òpower to hurt.Ó I recognize that Shelling was referring specifically to Òmilitary powerÓ however, I believe that in this different era we can apply his theories of ÒmilitaryÓ bargaining power to the more relevant issues of ÒeconomicÓ bargaining power today. To accomplish this objective, a discussion of how Rogue RegimesÕ retributive and rehabilative sanctions approach compares and contrast with Arms and InfluenceÕs theory of the power to hurt and the diplomacy of violence is a probative direction to pursue. The Power to Hurt First of all, there should be no misinterpretation of the point I am trying to get across. I fully recognize and understand what Shelling meant by the term Ò power to hurt.Ó He was referring to the ability for a nation through military force to cause another nation pain and suffering; the ability to destroy things of intrinsic value to an adversary such has: lives, military facilities and equipment, industry etc... Shelling saw this power to hurt as a tool used to Òinfluence someoneÕs behavior, to coerce his decision or choice.Ó7 Shelling also makes the point that the power to hurt is most effective when it is not used at all or rather Òheld in reserveÓ as a threat of potential use. For example, at the end of W.W.II, the political target for the bombing of Hiroshima was not Hiroshima itself but Tokyo.8 This showing of US capacity to hurt promised more hurt if there was no compliance. My understanding of ShellingÕs point hopefully no longer in question, IÕd like to also clear up any misgivings about my understanding of TanterÕs rehabilitate and retributive sanctions. Tanter was referring to the use of sanctions as coercive diplomacy. He submits that absent the Soviet Threat, the use of sanctions as a method of coercion has become less effective. Specifically, he points to the effectiveness of sanctions if a leader is acting from a window of opportunity versus a basement of fear or both. He defines rehabilitate sanctions as sanctions with the goal of changing the behavior of the regimes. The justification for rehabilative sanctions is therefore behavioral change. However, retributive sanctions are not directed at changing behavior. They focus on the idea of Òpunishment for wrong doings.Ó9 There ultimate goal according to Tanter is to satisfy a desire to payback for a wrong doing. Thus, he contends that as soon as a retributive sanction inflicts harm, it has done its job. When leaders are acting out of windows of opportunity, they are focused on possible gains. However, because opportunist are concerned with what they can gain, they are also worried about what the consequences of pursuing those gains might be. In this situation rehabilative sanctions as well as retributive sanctions are effective because rogues operating through windows of opportunities are less willing to accept overbearing risk to attain there goal and Òthink twice about possible punishment.Ó10 However, when rogue leaders in a manner that assures an avoidance of loss domestically or internationally, Tanter describes them as Òtrapped in a basement of fear.Ó11 In this situation, the actors are willing to accept enormous risk to escape being trapped or to avoid some form of loss. For leaders who act from a basement of fear, rehabilitate and retributive sanctions are less effective because a rogue leader may be willing to Òengage in risky behaviorÓ regardless of what the threatened punishment may be.12 Infact, sanctions when a leader is acting out of a basement of fear may cause a response completely unintended. For example, sanctions may lead a ÒparanoidÓ actor to feel even further isolated and helpless, and desperate. Thus, he may act out of aggression in a fit of despair. When rogue leaders are acting of both a basement of fear and a window of opportunity, Tanter suggest that ÒWashington should be confident that its threats will deter the opportunistic side and not exacerbate the fearful side.Ó13 Thus, he advocates a combination of containment and engagement when dealing with such leaders. My understanding of TanterÕs point no longer an issue, IÕd like to pay special attention to the way in which Shelling developed the ideas of the power to hurt and the diplomacy of violence. The characterization of ShellingÕs power to hurt and diplomacy of violence strikes a intriguing similar chord with the characterization of the premises within Rogue Regimes. For example, Shelling insist that the purpose of inflicting pain is to influence behavior. To be coercive, this power has to be avoidable by accommodation. He states that the power to hurt is bargaining power and to exploit it is diplomacy.14 Likewise, he characterized the power of violence as the difference between taking what you and making someone give it to you. The power to hurt is associated with Òmaking someone give it to you.Ó He also asserts that coercion requires finding a bargain. He states that we (US) arrange for a nation to be better off doing/behaving in the way that we want them to and worse off not doing what we want.15 He also state that Òrevenge is one of the few satisfactions that can be savored; and justice can often be construed to demand the enemyÕs punishment.Ó16 This is surprisingly similar to the way in which Tanter characterizes retributive sanctions. He states that sanctions as a tool for punishment is Ògratifying to the sanctioner, because of an American belief that sinners should receive their just desserts.Ó17 Likewise, Shelling describes a need for interest to be adequately projected in order for our message to get acrossed.18 He goes on to assert that if your adversary canÕt hear you or is having difficulty understanding you then your threat will fail.19 He then asserts that it is extremely important to know who is in charge Òon the other sideÓ. We (US) need to know what the leader treasures and fears.20 Rogue Regimes goes even farther by asserting that not only do we (US) need to know our enemies wants and fears but, to be effective, we need to know why they fear what they fear. How did events conspire to make these rogue leaders what and who they are? For example, why are rogue leaders so anti-American? Why are they prone to resort to violence as a way of solving problems? What motivates their policies? Are they motivated by fear and isolation or by what they can gain? This according to Tanter is the way to come to the best conclusion for economic policies towards rogue states. Besides these similar characterizations, Rogue Regimes and Arms and Influence are on other similar ground. I propose that sanctions are more than just economic power, just as the power to hurt is more than military capacity. Sanctions go deeper than import and export laws. The power to hurt is effective because it is symbolic. The use of this ÒpowerÓ symbolizes alot of things to our adversaries and to the world. The use of the power to hurt says something about our commitments. When we express the Òpower to hurt,Ó we are infact demonstrating that we indeed have a keen interest in something. We thus, demonstrate our commitment to a nation or to a cause. We also, through our actions, display our resolve to follow through on our threats. After a demonstration of our capacity to hurt, the real influence is that there is more violence to come if our demands are not met. Just as the power to hurt is symbolic, so are sanctions. I submit that sanctions also symbolize our commitments. Tanter expounds upon an America which is driven by ideals. He states that when evaluating the conduct of other nations and determining whether economic sanctions should be imposed, the US process is Òjump started by our ideals.Ó21 Infact, he goes on to assert that if ideals and interest collide, ideas will eventually win out. He gives an example of the US embargo of Iran. He state that the embargo had a Òsymbolic retributive purpose--to Signal Tehran and the pro-Israel community that wrongs are being righted.Ó22 Thus, sanctions are deeper than economics. Shelling states that it is the Òexpectation of more violence that gets the wanted behavior, if the power to hurt can get it at all.Ó23 I submit that coercive sanctions can be seen in the same light. Sanctions hurt the economy of a nation and they promise continued or escalated action if a nation does not accommodate our demands. LetÕs go even further and suggest that maybe coercive sanctions share common ground with the power to hurt for another symbolic reason. The US has arguably the most sophisticated and effective military in the world. Some would argue that if we wanted to (without taking many factors such as other nations collectively into account), we could take what we desired from each individual nation or could destroy nations if they didnÕt comply. However, with so many forces at work i.e. our ideology, collective action against us etc... or for whatever reason, we do not choose to enforce our wishes in that manner. I submit that coercive sanctions implicitly cause states to recall our massive power to hurt. Coercive sanctions kind of say ÒWe are committed to changing your behavior. At the present time, we choose sanctions as the best way to achieve our objectives. However, donÕt forget that if we really wanted to, we have the capacity; the power to hurt you through more physical means.Ó Separate Criticism Before concluding, IÕd like to point out a criticism of Rouge Regimes which stands apart from my main analysis within the confines of this paper. Rogue Regimes points to a resounding ineffectiveness of sanctions as either retributive or rehabilitate coercion. Tanter readily suggest that because of a lack international consensus on the policy towards the rogue threat and because of diminished capacity for the US to lead in the international realm sanctions as a mode of coercion are becoming increasingly ineffective.24 He thus advocates a more thorough understanding of rogue leaders and rogue states to determine if they are behaving out of a window of opportunity perspective, a basement of fear perspective or both. He goes on to suggest rehabilitate, retributive sanctions or a combination of both type of sanctions as a more effective means of coercion depending upon the rogue stateÕs perspective. IÕd like to point out that Rogue Regimes goes to great lengths to acknowledge that coercive sanctions, whether rehabilitate or retributive, are losing effectiveness either way. Rogue Regimes does an ambiguous job of suggesting a policy which gets around this apparent ineffectiveness of coercive sanctions. If Rogue Regimes asserts that sanctions are not working, or rather, that they are losing their effectiveness, it may be more probative not to use these increasingly ineffective tools as such a main part of the apparent solution. Possibly, a more thoroughly defined account of how Rogue RegimesÕ policy gets around the ineffectiveness of sanctions,(if indeed it does) would be a helpful development for this book. Conclusion When writing this critique, I attempted to apply Rogue Regimes in a manner that was very unique. I wanted to overcome the tendency to simply repeat what I heard in lecture. The most effective means for me to do this was to delve into two different discourses and find similarities and contradictions. I believe that in doing this not only have I obtained a more thorough understanding of the concepts within Rogue Regimes but, have also been able to express similarities and criticisms that I ordinarily would not have truly been able to do on my own. I recognize that many of the ideas expressed within this critique may be stretching things alittle but I do not believe they were stretched to Òthe breaking point.Ó I was not suggesting that Rogue Regimes and Arms and Influence are analogous. I was not overlooking that fact that Tanter expressed policy when Shelling expressed principles. What I was suggesting is that in examining Rogue Regimes, it may be probative to turn things upside down and say Òmaybe they do share some common ground.Ó I believe that I have done just that and at the same time have increased my own understanding by Òleaps and bounds.Ó Hopefully my efforts with regards to the teacher have not gone in vain and thus, this paper helps to expound upon a different perspective. If my discourse has caused you to think of things (just for a moment, even) from a different perspective, then I have accomplished one of my prime goals. 1 Rogue Regimes pg. 20 2 Arms and Influence pg.vi 3 Arms and Influence pg.vii 4 Rogue Regimes pg.15 5 Rogue Regimes pg. 15 6 Arms and Influence pg. 2 7 Arms and Influence pg.2 8 Arms and Influence pg.17 9 Rogue Regimes pg.2 10Rogue Regimes pg.18 11Rogue Regimes pg.28 12Rogue Regimes pg.19 13Rogue Regimes pg.19 14Arms and Influence pg.3 15Arms and Influence pg.4 16Arms and Influence pg.9 17Rogue Regimes pg.16 18Arms and Influence pg.36 19Arms and Influence pg.38 20Arms and Influence pg.175 21Rogue Regimes pg.16 22Rogue Regimes pg.33 23Arms and Influence pg.5 24Rogue Regimes pge.16