On July 6, 1998, Pakistan successfully completed detonation of a nuclear device. IndiaUs reaction was swift, quickly gearing up for an attack on PakistanUs nuclear sites. In the face of the crisis, one which has nuclear, chemical, and biological weaponry potential, the United States and other nations sanctioned both countries, cutting off military and economic aid. The stipulation for waving the sanctions requires both countries to become signatories of the NPT and to exercise greater compliance with IAEA safety procedures. The crisis on the Asian subcontinent proceeds a long line of similar regional conflicts. The response generated by the United States follows historical precedence as well. It continues AmericaUs South Asian policy of curbing the technological growth of the regionUs biological, chemical, and nuclear capabilities, begun in the 1960s. This type of policy has often utilized sanctions and other international pressures to promote cooperation from India and Pakistan in regards to their weapons programs. With the end of the Cold War, the international community has increasingly vocalized the need to reduce the military stockpiles of nuclearized nations and to discontinue the development of weapons globally. The U.S. has a keen interest in such a movement. First, there are strategic interests in promoting world peace and working for international security. These are ideals given shape by the American public and reflected in the policies of government representatives. Secondly, the U.S. has a further interest in returning to the former status quo. In this, the U.S. would like to once again to retain an elite position as a nuclear power, free from the challenges proliferation presents. It is for these reasons that the United States has issued sanctions against India and Pakistan, as they verge on a potentially disastrous war. THE HISTORY OF CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN The Indian colony was granted independence by the British government in 1947. The political scene was dominated by two groups: the Indian National Congress and the All-Indian Muslim League. As independence approached, neither organization could agree on the terms for a constitution or the establishment of an interim government. As a result, the United Kingdom decided to create two states in the place of the former colonial region. Pakistan and India were thus established, with the former consisting of the primarily Muslim districts of Western British India, as well as parts of Bengal, a thousand miles to the east. In August 1947, the two states assumed independence, albeit in the wake of a large and bloody transfer of populations. Almost immediately, the two countries went to war over the Muslim majority state of Kashmir, which lay between them. Pakistan expected the Muslim state to become part of its territory. India, though, refused to accept a further partition of the nation. This was to be only the beginning of a protracted conflict that remains unresolved to the present. India and Pakistan were to fight two more wars between 1949 and 1971. In 1985 and 1991, they came dangerously close to engaging in a fourth. Territorial disputes have been the stated reason for the historical tension between India and Pakistan. Yet underlying such conflicts are various strategic interests that have given further impetus to conflict between the two nations. Hindu and Muslim minorities in each country have decried the treatment they have received at the hands of government, claiming discrimination and blatant oppression. Hindu and Muslim minorities in each country have often been accused of receiving support from the opposing nation during domestic political uprisings. Such activities convince India and Pakistan that the opposing state poses a threat to their domestic stability and can be expected to undermine the religious minoritiesU rights. Outside influences have played a role in exacerbating the regionUs problems. Cold War divisions definitely played a role in polarizing the two nations. India increasingly turned to the Soviet Union for arms and support after a war with China in 1962 ended their former bilateral relations.1 After that time, Pakistan developed a closer relationship with China, sharing a perception of threat from the Soviet Union and India. When the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred, Pakistan then entered into a reciprocal relationship with the U.S.. India was extremely uneasy about the union between China and Pakistan. That unease increased with BeijingUs successful detonation of a nuclear device in 1964. India feared correctly that the military and technical assistance provided by China to Pakistan could eventually extend to the nuclear arena.2 Thus, IndiaUs nuclear program was given a high priority, leading to a successful nuclear test in 1974. It is after this course of events that the spiral model becomes increasingly apparent.3 Pakistan, in response to IndiaUs nuclear successes, focused on the development of its own nuclear program.4 They did not achieve the latterUs former success until world events brought them into close contact with another foreign influence and source of aid, that of the United States. Of final importance in the explanation of Indo/Pakistani tensions is the effect of domestic ideologies. As a consequence of this regional competition, both Indian and Pakistani domestic opinion strongly back the notion that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are necessary to protect national security.5 Indo/Pakistani public sentiments also see the nuclear status of their countries is a source of pride and prestige.6 This attitude is fostered not only by regional competition, but also by the lingering effects of the Cold War era and the Persian Gulf Crisis .7 The international image of national strength is heavily equated with nuclear might and military capability. THE NUCLEAR SCENE IN PAKISTAN AND INDIA It is the regional tensions on the South Asian continent that have spurred the development of nuclear weapons. In particular, the bitter rivalry between India and Pakistan has caused both nations to embark on a spiral model of nuclear proliferation. Since the detonation of IndiaUs nuclear device in 1974, the two countries have been locked in a conflict that seeks to maintain a substantial military threat to the other. The military profile and technological pursuits of both countries are also the cause of U.S. attention. Michael KlareUs Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws identifies India and Pakistan as Rpotential roguesS under the United States PentagonUs definition of potential rogue regimes.8 As the following profiles will show, the military establishments of India and Pakistan are, by U.S. government definition, quite able to pose a future security threat to the U.S.. More importantly, though, is the threat, historically and presently, that they pose to one another. INDIA: The security policies of the Indian nation are based largely on the perceived threat from not only Pakistan but China as well. In 1962, India and China were engaged in a border clash.9 Two years later, the threat India perceived from China was compounded by BeijingUs successful nuclear test. It was this action by their powerful neighbor that spurred IndiaUs pursuit of nuclear capability. Despite improved relations between the two countries in recent years, India still perceives China as a potential aggressor. The tense relationships between India and the nations of Pakistan and China, plus IndiaUs interventionist policies in continental affairs, have fostered heavy investment by the Indian government in defense. Military growth has expanded in the last two decades.10 Presently, RIndiaUs very active nuclear energy development program has enabled it to obtain all of the essential materials and facilities for producing nuclear explosivesS.11 Its advanced nuclear program is accompanied by the necessary facilities to support a complete nuclear fuel cycle.12 The Bhabha Atomic Research CenterUs reactors have produced a stock of weapons-grade plutonium, which is not subject to the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) .13 India also has the capability to produce and reprocess plutonium and enrich uranium.14 It is believed that India holds a sufficient amount of fissile material to create several nuclear weapons in a short amount of time. What discourages such production is IndiaUs current willingness to refrain from nuclear testing. India has a large chemical industry. India is a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). New Delhi has never declared itself to be in possession of offensive chemical weapons, although they produce many dual-use chemicals that could support a chemical weapons program.15 In the area of biological weapons as well, India seems to only have invested resources into the research and development of defensive biological weapons, despite the ability to pursue an offensive program.16 The Prithvi and the Agni, IndiaUs two ballistic missile programs, were designed with extensive technological assistance and parts from Western firms.17 These ballistic missiles programs are now close to becoming self-sufficient. Currently, India relies only slightly on foreign assistance to design and produce its missiles. It has continued to test the Prithvi SRBM and has assigned a 150km version of the missile to an experimental army unit, the 333rd Missile Group. Considerations are now underway concerning the serial production and deployment of the missile.18 The current willingness of India not to engage in nuclear testing does not correlate to an equal willingness to join the nonproliferation movement. Although a signatory of the CWC and the Biological Weapons Convention, India has refused to sign the NonProliferation Treaty or continue negogiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. India is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, although not all of its reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards.19 Notably, the Bhabha Atomic Research Center, which produces the stock of weapons-grade plutonium, is not subject to IAEA safeguards. India is opposed to the NPT, labeling it a discriminatory document. The assertion is that the NPT discriminates in favor of the existing nuclear powers, while leaving non-nuclear powers helpless in the face of potential threats by the former.20 India also argues that nuclear capabilities are a vital tool in their development as a great power; nuclear power acts as a symbol of status, as well as a deterrent to China and Pakistan. Their opposition to the CTBT comes from a similar line of argument. India refuses to sign until there are provisions within the treaty for the destruction of the nuclear powersUs arsenals within a limited time frame.21 Until this occurs, India claims the CTBT is a significant barrier to the nuclear weapons option, an option that remains necessary as long as other nations continue to maintain their arsenals.22 PAKISTAN India has developed a substantial military apparatus, one that Pakistan has viewed with increasing trepidation since their loss of the 1971 war and IndiaUs successful nuclear test in 1974. The Pakistani military effort has been in response to the perceived threat from India, a threat the Pakistanis feel has grown in the last decade with IndiaUs increased hegemonic behavior on the continent. Nuclear weapon capabilities, according to government leaders, are seen as essential to the security of Pakistan.23 Such programs receive a large amount of domestic political and popular support.24 In fact, Pakistan spends a greater percent of its GNP on defense then does India, a fact that is attributable to PakistanUs insecurity over being the lesser military strength.25 Much of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program was benefited by US aid and technical assistance supplied in the decade following the Soviet UnionUs invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Although not directly assisted in the development of such weaponry, Pakistan nevertheless created a Rdiverse, clandestine procurement networkS to support its development effort.26 PakistanUs program can produce highly enriched uranium and can engineer and fabricate technologies, without outside assistance. The countryUs dependency remains on foreign suppliers of sophisticated materials and technical aid that is vital to improving and expanding their program.27 Pakistan now possesses the necessary components to create its own nuclear device and most likely has a sufficient amount of fissile material to allow for the assemblage of nuclear weapons. Currently, the nation is financing the building of a nuclear reactor, one that is not subject to IAEA safeguards.28 This will not be the first reactor outside of the inspection of the IAEA. The current project will provide a substantial weapon-grade plutonium production capability. The chemical weapons goal for Pakistan is to achieve self-sufficient production of precursors. At the moment, the dual-use precursors the Pakistanis have in their possession were obtained from foreign sources.29 In the case of the biological weapons program, the funds and the capabilities are present for Pakistan to research and develop such weapons.30 Despite having an SRBM industry, containing a solid rocket motor production complex and a ballistic missile test facility, Pakistan has produced only a few Hatf-I SRBMs. There are regarded as inaccurate and have a much more limited range compared to their Indian counterparts. Pakistan does not have the history of non-alignment that India does. The nationUs relations with the US have been close for the last two decades. Pakistan has stated its willingness to enter into regional nonproliferation treaties and to sign the NPT and CTBT. What has prevented the governmentUs commitment is the stipulation that in order for Pakistan to make such commitments, India must do the same. Considering IndiaUs resistance to signing the treaties, PakistanUs participation seems very far off. It is also important to note that both nations have a long way to go in adopting export controls in keeping with international guidelines. Not only do these countries pose a nuclear threat independently, they also increase fears about unmonitored proliferation in the international community. In both these areas, the U.S. has continued to seek Indian and Pakistani commitments to security arrangements. HISTORY OF INDIAN, PAKISTANI, AND US INVOLVEMENT For much of the twentieth century, the United StatesUs interests in South Eastern Asia had been minimal. Initially, the U.S. had sought working bilateral relations with both countries. Their efforts did procure economic and military assistance to both India and Pakistan. As a result of the 1965 Indo/Pakistani war, though, military aid was suspended to both countries.31 IndiaUs progressing union with the Soviet Union continued to isolate them from the U.S., as did the Indian governments refusal to join U.S./ Pakistani multilateral security arrangements. Pakistan, too, found disfavor with the U.S. government. The country had acquired sensitive technologies necessary for the enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear material. Under the wording of the Glenn and Symington Amendments, the U.S. was forbidden to continue security assistance to any county in violation of these thresholds. Military assistance to Pakistan was cut off in 1978 and 1979.32 The United States had other reasons for keeping its south Asian presence minimal. The increasing pinch on economic resources and the preoccupation with the Vietnam War did not foster enthusiasms for Third World engagements. Finally, U.S. rapprochement with China reduced the U.S.Us unease about communist hegemony in Asia.33 Content with maintaining a defensive posture in South Eastern Asia and allowing the Soviet Union to act as a security manager for the subcontinent, the U.S.Us terms of low strategic interest in the area remained unchallenged until 1979.34 The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed a challenge to the U.S.Us South Asian policy. The fate of Afghanistan was not the concern as such, for it held little intrinsic value to the U.S.. The importance attached to the invasion were with its effects. What would be the results of the SovietUs aggression for U.S. global interests and the transregional interests of the U.S. and its Gulf allies.35 The U.S. turned to Pakistan, issuing a waiver on the previous ban on assistance. Pakistan was the U.S.Us likely source of allegiance, considering the countryUs strategic location, prior American contact, and IndiaUs support for the Soviet Union. Over 11 year, the United States poured over $7 billion into Pakistan.36 The nation was vital to the U.S.Us backing of the resistance movement within Pakistan. Pakistan also became the organizer of the Third WorldUs voice against the U.S.S.R.. The amicable dealings between the United States and Pakistan between 1979-1990, need to be recognized in light of the Cold War. The assistance in technology and military Pakistani efforts were all factors supporting the U.S.Us successful opposition to the Soviet Union. Once the threat was removed, however, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War, the U.S. greatly reduced its economic involvement with Pakistan and resumed its previous reference point of nonproliferation. By 1990, sanction bad been reimposed against Pakistan for its continued nuclear development. This time those sanctions fell under both the Symington Amendment and Pressler Amendment of 1985. The Pressler Amendment was targeted at Pakistan, stating that assistance, military equipment, or technology could only be provided, sold, or transferred to Pakistan if the president had declared that the country did not possess a nuclear explosive device.37 Although the Clinton Administration has diverted the restrictions of the Pressler Amendment by signing the Brown Amendment, the Symington Amendment remains stubbornly in place as a result of news that China and Pakistan have continued to collaborate on PakistanUs nuclear development. The likelihood of the Symington Amendment being waived is low. The explanation for this is the same as explanation for the likelihood of U.S. sanctions in the future Indo/Pakistani conflict: the United StateUs goal of nonproliferation, disarmament, and a return to the old status quo. THE USUS POLICY OF NONPROLIFERATION The 1965 Indo/Pakistani War did have a detrimental effect on U.S. relations. The American response was to cut off aid and redirect its limited South Asian attentions to other problem areas. The 1970s were not a time of meaningful exchange between India and Pakistan with the U.S.. In the event that an American interest in the subcontinent was pursued, it was in respect to nonproliferation.38 South Asia received attention during the 1970s (before the invasion of Afghanistan) for much the same reason it receives attention now by U.S. policy makers. The issue is the WMD development of India and Pakistan and how such weapons effect the global nonproliferation goal.39 After the fall of the U.S.S.R., the United States became more strenuously committed to curbing nuclear proliferation and deterring the development of WMD. A speech by Secretary Christopher in 1995 affirmed the United StatesUs focus on providing R...American leadership to build a more peaceful, free, and prosperous worldS.40 He cited, ROur global and regional strategies for 1995 comprise the most ambitious non-proliferation agenda in historyS, noting specific steps that would be taken to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.41 American policy makers have utilized bilateral and multilateral agreements to achieve most of their non-proliferation success. Negotiated and/or ratified agreements include the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, global bans on the production of fissile materials, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention. Yet the United States vocalized its commitment to Rback our diplomacy with credible threats of forceS.42 The Persian Gulf serves as an example of just how seriously the United States views its commitment to eliminating a potentially nuclear threat (although this author notes that such actions did not result solely from non-proliferation motivations). The Symington and Pressler Amendments reveal a U.S. determination to deter the production and exchange of weapons of mass destruction. Export controls follow along the same ideological lines. There are laws that punish U.S. citizens or firms for violating export sanctions.43 In 1991, Congress expanded such penalties to include foreign persons whose exports materially contribute to either chemical or biological weapon programs.44 The U.S. government has also used its leading international position to influence its allies policies of production and exchange. The U.S. persuaded Russia to forego the transfer of a cryogenic rocket motor technology to India in 1993.45 Previous South Asian intervention resulted in FranceUs withdrawal of assistance in building a Pakistani reprocessing plant.46 The United States is determined to curb the creation and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They have not hesitated in the past to use sanctions, tactics of persuasion, or even force. There is no reason why they would hesitate to do so in the future. Sanctions, and the stipulations for removal, imposed upon two warring potential rogues serve to bring the United States closer to its goals: non-proliferation, international security, and a return to the old status quo. PROSPECT THEORY: The United StatesUs actions of imposing sanctions against India and Pakistan are best explained by Prospect Theory. In Prospect Theory, an actor frames a situation based on their reference point. This reference point can be related to the status quo or what the actor desires the status quo to be. It anchors the actorUs goals in light of progressing events and decisions. The value of the actorUs desired objective is subjective. To outsiders, the value may seem relatively low but the actor has given it a higher value. This is referred to as the endowment effect. Once an actor has endowed an objective with a specific value, they then defend the effort put into achieving their goals by this perceived high value. Such behavior is called effort justification. In the situation involving India and Pakistan, the actor is the United States. The US desires to maintain the old status quo, one in which only the US and certain powerful allies possess nuclear weapon capabilities. The successful development of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan, as well as in many other rogue nations, has changed the status quo. The US no longer has a monopoly on nuclear power, though they still have the lead in technological expertise and capability. This desire for a return to the old status quo has been shaped into the quest for nonproliferation. Sanctions and export controls imposed by the United States against India and Pakistan, are centered around this goal of nonproliferation. Although the US will hurt its bilateral relations with both nations and could theoretically hinder the success of domestic businesses, such costs remain low.47 Arguably, technological export controls also have a low cost but a high benefit. They allow the American supremacy and control of global markets to continue.48 Without such controls, their position of dominance has a likely chance of being lost. U.S. failure to intervene in a conflict between two historically antagonistic WMD powers, also possesses a much higher risk of loss.49 The US is risk acceptant in order to avoid the loss of their leading position in nuclear weapon capability. Their actions illustrate the theory of loss aversion, by which an actor who sees losses as more salient, will take greater risks in order to avoid loss. The actor will take greater risks in avoiding a loss than achieving a gain. The costs associated with imposing sanctions, although empirically low, would nevertheless still be justified by the effort of diverting a war, attaining nonproliferation agreements from India and Pakistan, and/or reinstating the old status quo. The value of these objectives has been reiterated time and again by the American leadership. It is also reflected in legislation. To other nations, pursuing a position of leadership in nuclear technologies and capabilities would be of little value, particularly because it seems counterproductive to nonproliferation and disarmament goals. But the U.S. has endowed the old status quo with a greater value then other nations possibly would because it formerly occupied the lead. Their prior experience of RownershipS has created a high value for the old status quo. CONCLUSION Conflict on the subcontinent has been prevalent since the independence of India and Pakistan. That conflict caused American sanctions at an early stage, prior to the development of the statesU weapons of mass destruction programs. By the year 1998, the United States will have come even further in its goals of nonproliferation and disarmament. The nations of India and Pakistan will have advanced as well. Their WMD programs will be at a progressive point in their relentless development. The United States was willing to impose sanctions to curb proliferation prior to the Cold War. In the wake of the U.S.S.R.Us collapse, their commitment to nonproliferation and international security has strengthened, while a new goal has shaped the U.S.Us reference point: a return to their position of nuclear technological leadership and control. These objectives have shaped the United StatesUs actions enormously and will continue to do so. Non-attainment of these goals would provide the United StatesUs with serious losses. It could mean the further deterioration of their global role and an increasing risk to national security. 1. Council on Foreign Relations. RA New U.S. Policy Toward India and PakistanS. U.S.A.: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997, pp.10 2. Ibid. This theory postulates a tit-for-tat approach, in that tension escalate as players act in reaction to the other. (Professor Tanter, May 22, 1997 RMidterm Review). 3. Lawrence Ziring, RRisks and Benefits of Nuclear WeaponsS. In India and Pakistan: Issues ofNational Security ,305, 1991. 4. Robin Raphel, Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, RNonproliferation Policy in South AsiaS , May 9, 1995. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. By definition, such nations have sought to become Rmore self-sufficient in military terms, building large military establishments, and/or acquiring the capacity to produce weapons of mass destructionS. Furthermore, they have or have attempted to create nuclear weapons and possess chemical weapons. Klare, Michael. Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995, pp. 150. 8. Office of Secretary of Defense.RProliferation: Threat and ResponseS. U.S. Department of Defense. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1996, pp. 36). 9. Thomas, Raju G.C.. RIndian Security Policy in the 1990sS. In India and Pakistan: Issues of National Security, 111 10. RProliferation: Threat and ResponseS, pp. 36 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid, pp. 37. 14. Ibid., pp. 38. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. RTracking Nuclear Proliferation: Errata and Essential Updates, December 3, 1996S[Online]. June 19, 1997. Available: http://ceip.org:80/pubstrac.htm. 18. RProliferation: Threat and ResponseS, pp. 36. 19. RA New US Policy Toward India and PakistanS, pp. 21. 20. Ibid. 21. The CTBT prohibits its parties from conducting nuclear test explosions of any size and subjects all members to vigorous on-site inspections in order to detect violations. The NPT establishes obligations for both nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states regarding the transfer, manufacture, or acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It allows all parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material ,and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while at the same time prohibiting transfer and acquisition of nuclear weapon capabilities. RProliferation: Threat and ResponseS, pp. 57. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. India allocated 3.0 and 3.8 per cent of its GNP to defense in 1985 and 1987, compared to PakistanUs 6.9 and 7.4 per cent. For 1988, IndiaUs military spending was $10 per capita, while Pakistan spent $26 per capita.) 25. Indian Security Policy in the 1990sS, pp. 111. 26. Proliferation: Threat and ResponseS, pp. 37. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid., pp. 38. 30. Ibid. 31. A New U.S. Policy Toward India and PakistanS, pp. 11. 32. Ibid. 33. Thornton, Thomas. RU.S. Strategic Interests in South AsiaS. In India and Pakistan: Issues of National Security., 36, 1991. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid., pp. 37. 36. Ibid. 37. A New U.S. Policy Towards India and PakistanS, pp. 12. 38. US Strategic Interests in South AsiaS, pp. 37. 39. Ibid. 40. Speech by Secretary Christopher to the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, RPrinciples and Opportunities for American Foreign PolicyS, January 20, 1995. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Office of Technology Assessment. RExport Controls and Nonproliferation PolicyS. U.S. Congress, OTA-ISS-596 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1994). 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid., pp. 51. 46. RRisks and Benefits of Nuclear WeaponsS, pp. 297. 47. The OTA study researched the effects of export controls on the US economy in dollar amounts. It found that the potential impact of export controls was relatively small and had been declining since the end of the Cold War. Recent relaxation of export controls on computers and telecommunications equipment, weak purchasing power of former Communist countries, and the decline in the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, all are factors in the lessening impact of export controls. Furthermore, RThe dollar value of license applications either denied or returned to the applicant without action in 1992 represented only about 1 percent of total US. exports in that year, while the value of licenses actually denied amounted to about one-tenth of 1 percent.S US Congress. RExport Controls and Nonproliferation PolicyS. 48. Ibid, pp. 51. 49. RA New Policy Towards India and PakistanS, pp. 23.