How North Korea Came to Comply with NPT Ric Jenness Spring PS 472 Scenario For the sake of this paper and analysis we will assume that on April 1, 1998 the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea agreed to comply fully with the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT. A treaty that forced North Korea to use nuclear power under international guide lines (see part II). Before 1998 North Korea followed such standards when it felt the desire. This behavior threatened the USG which considered North Korea a rogue and wanted their programs stopped (see part II), But, until collapse, the USG could not get North Korea to comply Who was involved in the decision by North Korea and what historical events and theoretical considerations explain this event? This paper will argue that a convergence of internal pressure in North Korea and external pressure from the international community accounted for this event.The collapse of North Korea alone cannot explain their compliance; not can international pressure alone explain these events. Before North Korea imploded few foreign governments made great efforts to coerce North Korea to follow NPT provisions. Introduction Part I will describe why North Korea collapsed. We will argue that North Korea was blinded by motivated and unmotivated biases that prevented them taking meaningful steps. Biases that reflected North KoreaÕs irrational style of decision-making. A determination to prove the greatness of the Juche doctrine and historical tensions with other states like Japan best explain North KoreaÕs behavior. Before collapse, North Korea was very headstrong and resisted foreign interference in its affairs. North Korea believed it in their best interests, intrinsically and strategically to promote isolation while engaging in destructive behavior. In the face of repeated aggression most neighbors were unwilling to take a strong stand and force Pyongyang to expose their nuclear programs. Part II of the paper (see Renee Hui) will describe why some nations did not think it in their best intrinsic interest to strongly challenge Pyongyang. Primarily due to motivated biases, the governments of Japan and China did not want to see North Korea as a threat for economic and political reasons. This despite the fact that both states were concerned about a nuclearized peninsula and a coercive North Korea. Again, despite the fact that North Korea was very unpredictable and not easily influenced by anyone. Part II concludes that no government alone could cause North Korea to the bargaining table but a collection of East-Asian and Western states could under the right circumstances. Circumstances that altered their priorities and forced them to notice the threat from North Korea. First weÕll view background and the causes of internal pressure which collapsed the state. Internal Pressure The Summer of 1995 brought unusually heavy monsoon rains which caused massive flooding leading to a starved population. Declining sources of revenue exacerbated the problem and emergency aid did not save them. The School of Advanced Military Studies said that North Korea in 1996 fell short of needed grain supplies by nearly two million tons. It is estimated that 2.1 million children and half a million pregnant women went without food.(1) The North Korean economy was destroyed and could do nothing to help its people. The School of Advanced Military Studies also said the North Korean economy neared collapse in 1996. They report that since the collapse of the Soviet Union the North Korean economy has declined from 3-5% annually. Since 1994 the economy has grown yearly by zero percent (2). Lack of hard currency, which China and Russia demanded more and more often in addition to high expenditures on the military are sources of their problems. North Korea consistently spends up to 25% of its GNP on the military. In foreign investment declined when countries like China warned domestic businesses about North KoreaÕs inability to keep financial obligations.(3) North Korea did not cause the floods nor its effects on crops. Those things may have been unavoidable but North Korea did choose its financial priorities that did not include its starving citizens. North KoreaÕs interests can be viewed through their behavior. It shows an irrational decision-making process that resulted in intrinsic and strategic interests which eventually destroyed the country.. North Korea faced internal pressure in the form political turmoil. Since 1991 the state suffered the defection of over 100 government officials. Hyon Song Il is the highest ranking government official to defect. Third secretary at the embassy in Zambia, Song Il said during a press conference that his embassy was so strapped for funds that they were Òreduced to buying second-hand clothes and trafficking in ivory.Ó(4) Furthermore, Asiaweek magazine reported in March of 1996 that Kim Jong-Il had yet to take control over the offices his father had prepared for him. It is not clear Kim Jong-Il is in control of the country in general or the military in particular. He has not yet been named state president or secretary of the communist party though his powerful father has been dead for three years. It is believed that the powerful elite in North Korea who opposed him arranged for KimÕs lack of control over the military.(5) All of North KoreaÕs, problems from economic and political collapse to famine were caused by government decisions. Although government documents from the DPRK cannot be viewed to determine their priorities and processes, historical precedent and theory will show that biases affected choices more than utility calculations. Role of Biases In the book, Psychology and Deterrence, Jervis argues that biases affect decisions leaders make. He says that humans cannot possibly analyze and process all relevant information when making decisions. To get around this problem Jervis says people create short cuts which decrease the amount of information needed to make a decision. A short cut that highlights an actorÕs desires or fears is a motivated bias. The actor sees what they want to see or generally those things that promote their utility. An unmotivated bias occurs when a leader sees a current situation and compares it to a similar event in history. Although the occurrences may be totally different the consequences of the historic event make it ÒpopÓ into ones mind whenever something similar happens. This affects perception and determines which information is important and which is not. Unwittingly, however, a person may ignore pertinent information and make a bad decision. Say you are afraid of small black dogs because one bit you as a child. One day you see an animal that is small and black coming near. You instantly remember the childhood attack, which causes you to sweat and breath heavy. The memory makes you think the dog will attack and you turn to run. Except, you turn into the street and into an oncoming car. While in the hospital, an elderly woman visited holding a small animal and apologized for scaring you. In haste to flee the scene you did not realize the animal was a cat. An old cat, de-clawed and very well mannered. This event demonstrates vividness (a clear image from the past) and its effects over decision-making. Unmotivated biases can cause an overestimation or underestimation of a potential threat. Miscalculation leads to bad judgements and possible losses. Jervis developed his argument in response to assumptions that leaders are rational decision-makers.(6) Rational decisions are made after a goal is set, all reasonable options are weighed, logical steps determined resulting in the selection of the most cost-effective option. Cognitive psychologists argue that people do not always act rationally but allow biases to influence thinking. North Korea is strongly influenced by motivated and unmotivated biases, which may explain why they seemed to make less than optimal policy choices. North Korean Interests Nations have strategic and intrinsic interests that are designed to meet national needs and desires. Jervis says intrinsic interests are tangible.They may include things like military size and capability or threats to the state. He says strategic interests pertain to a stateÕs reputation, which affects their bargaining position, influence and credibility.(7) As stated earlier, Jervis is directly concerned with how states formulate and design their interests. He says analysts must look beyond assumptions of rationality to the fears, motives and desires to truly determine the origin of a states interests.(8)Before discussing biases directly we will examine some of North KoreaÕs intrinsic and strategic motivations. To be self reliant North Korea has developed a large military industrial complex, $5.6 billion of which was spent in 1994.(9) In 1990 North Korea dedicated roughly 134 factories to arms production. They produced Òground service arms, ammunition, armored vehicles, naval craft, aircraft, missiles, electronics and possibly chemical related materials.Ó Production has ranged from armored vehicles to Scud missiles.(10) North Koreas military readiness has been put on display often against its neighbors. In November 1995, North Korea placed nearly 1.5 million troops on the border with South Korea, strengthened its artillery units and stepped-up military maneuvers. These actions not only communicated a threat to South Korea, but to the 37,000 US troops stationed there.Many in South-East Asia are concerned that a desperate D.P.R.K might invade the South. One Japanese intelligence officer said they feared a North Korean miscalculation and the outbreak of war over that winter. North KoreaÕs military buildup has not only caused domestic problems but increased international tension.(11) Besides a large cache of conventional weapons North Korea is believed to be developing nuclear capabilities. Roughly 60 miles from the capital in Yongbyon it is thought that North Korea has two reactors. Able to produce plutonium these factories could produce upwards of 15 pounds a year, Ò...enough for one Hiroshima-size bomb.Ó In the words of former CIA Director James Woolsey on 24 February, 1993 there is a "real possibility that North Korea has already manufactured enough fissile material for at least one nuclear weapon." (12) Like a large military, North KoreaÕs nuclear capability threatens neighbors and makes the region more volatile. In addition to the ROK, North Korean nuclear weapons threaten Japan and could result in a regional arms race among historical adversaries. Some also believe that the intent to obtain nuclear weapons is not only for national security or deterrence, but for coercive purposes. This would mean that North Korea might try to use nuclear weapons to threaten other states in to doing things they would not do on their own. Coercion could be used to blackmail desirable concessions from South Korea, Japan or anyone else. Besides a large military and thirst for nuclear capability North Korea has engaged in international terrorism. In 1987, North Korea is believed to have killed 115 people by blowing-up an South Korean airplane. The same year, North Korea is linked to an assassination attempt on South Korean President Chun Do-WhanÓ; instead it resulted in the death of 21 bystanders. North Korea has also supported other states and organizations that promote terrorism including Iran, Libya and the PLO through sales of military hardware like Scud missiles. In 1987, arms sales to Iran alone were 71% of exports or $2.8 in value. North Korea provided small arms and training to the PLO in the late 70Õs. Also in the late 70Õs North Korea, was training LibyanÕs to fly Soviet provided aircraft.(13) Not to mention that North Korea is a communist state and was an ally and beneficiary of cold war relations with the Soviet Union and a China. Supporting terrorism and terrorists, building a nuclear bomb and supporting a large military may meet the intrinsic and strategic interests of North Korea but they have contributed to the pressure on the country. North Korea has made selling arms to other rogue states (see part II) a strategic interest but maintaining good relations with others rogues was an intrinsic interest. Sales bring outside revenue, which the government sorely needed. North Korea enhanced its image among the rogues by selling arms to them and balking at international standards. Other rogues probably applaud North Korea when it ignored the United States or does something to further weaken the American position. Saddam Hussein was probably impressed with the ways North Korea kept the US off balance and international inspectors out of the country. In addition, outlaw states probably did not interfere in North Korean affairs to affect changes the D.P.R.K did not want to make. They would not oppose North KoreaÕs large military, interfere in North Korean affairs, or demand an end to North Korean nuclear developments and terrorist activity. Many reasons can surely explain why North Korea pursued these goals but one in particular was the Juche. Created by North KoreaÕs most powerful modern leader Kim Il-Sung introduced Juche as a political doctrine to guide his country in 1955. Before itÕs introduction North Korean ideology was determined by Marxist-Leninist thought imported from the Soviet Union and China. North Korea shared communist ideals with the USSR and China but wanted a uniquely Korean expression of the revolution. Kim said Juche was "the independent stance of rejecting dependence on others and of using one's own powers, believing in one's own strength and displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance."(14) Juche helped Kim consolidate power and create a single governing concept. National self-reliance and determination politically and economically are the cornerstones of KimÕs doctrine. It resists external interests and intrusions of other states. Juche did not take hold overnight but today it is a fundamental force shaping North Korean politics domestically and internationally. Sometimes it is hard to distinguish between the influences of Juche and the personal desire of the North Korean leader when making decisions. In any event, keeping outside influence of the country out or under control is a major obstacle to NPT compliance. For the sake of this paper we will assume Juche is the primary force and not personal sentiment as a decisive factor in decision-making. Juche is a nationalistic force that promotes pride and individual discipline. Politically, Juche unifies the North Korean communist party. It also provides the governmental structure and methods for removing political dissidents from influential positions. North Korean wants to promote Juche as an end in itself thus making it a motivated bias. Motivated Bias North Korea was strongly influenced by Juche even when the country was heading toward collapse. As late as 18 June 1997 the North Korean government was still developing it as a usefulness doctrine. One article said, ÒOur socialist ideological position will be eternally impregnable under the revolutionary and principled leadership of Secretary Kim Jong Il....Ó(15) Nowhere in the article is socialism criticized or challenged. Famine and social disintegration are not discussed and ideas for solving the problem do not exist. If the newspaper is any indicator, the government does not want to fully recognize its problems nor the role political ideology has played in creating and sustaining them. Juche is a filter that causes leaders to overlook important information. A rational decision making process is stifled because self-reliance and socialist ideals are most important. As long as the criterion of Juche is met nothing else matters. North Korea did not want to see that its systems were failing and make the necessary changes. Admission of failure would undermine the identity of North Korea and dredge-up old feelings of humiliation inadequacy. North Korea had other options for reviving its economy and even tried new strategies namely liberal economics, which they refused to develop. In a limited fashion capitalism was tried but was never fully adopted. North Korea proved it could attract international investment but would not totally commit. In 1996 the UN promoted a conference in the Rajin-Sonbong province in North Korea near the Chinese border.(17) It was advertised as a free trade zone where investors could locate new businesses. 144 Representatives from around the world including China, the United States, Japan, Europe and East Asia attended. The province attracted a new hotel built by a Hong Kong firm, engaged in a joint venture with China to build a shipping route between Rajin and Pusan and a Singapore firm built a factory for assembling goods for export.(18) Despite this success North Korea never realized it was in their intrinsic best interest to continue developments and gain further international acceptance. Some speculate Juche inhibited foreign investment since it meant opening to the world and to external forces that were not welcome. Too much capitalism meant Juche was a failure and the country was not self-reliant or strong. North Korea also shows that motivated biases are at work in their newspapers where Òfundamental attribution errorÓ is regularly displayed. That is, domestic problems are due to situations but foreign problems are due to some personal inadequacy of leadership. When problems inside North Korea are discussed it is cursory and no fault is directed at the government. But anything outside of the country is fair game for criticism. One article said the country is weakened Òsince the DPRK is temporarily suffering from repeated natural disasters.Ó There is no mention how government policies are addressing the problem or fueling them! While on the other hand, ROK difficulties result from a corrupt government not a situation. The paper said ÒThe chief executive of South Korea is trying to aggravate the tensionsÉin a bid to find a way out of the serious political crisis caused by the "Presidential Election campaign funds" and other scandals.Ó(19) North Korea has a motivated bias not to see the serious limitations of its own government and positive aspects of neighbors. On 18 June 1997 yet another article in the paper describes the ill-intentioned South Korea saying Ò It is clear what the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppets seek. The enemies are thought to believe it is high time they made a forestalling attackÓ while preparation for four-way talks are underway. While in response to a national threat the noble North Korea stands ready: ÒAt this moment when dark clouds of war are rushing toward our motherland and fighting is about to break out, our revolutionary armed forces cannot remain an onlooker to the situation, pinning hopes on dialogue for an indefinite period.Ó Possible explanations for the maneuvers are rejected and no evidence is provided only that such exercises could Ònot be defensive.Ó(20) North Korea justifies its behaviors by seeing what it wants and did not consider alternative evidence. The exercises could have been practice (which they actually were) to keep the military sharp. Maybe they were in preparation for perceived North Korean attack. Whatever the reason, North Korea does not consider alternative explanations or the possibility of benign intentions. By focusing on an adversary the government draws attention away from the problems inside the country or can ignore at them altogether. Because the South Korean ÒwarmaniacsÓ threaten their sovereignty calls go out for unity vigilance. In effect South Korea becomes a scapegoat so North Korea can continue spending money on the military and the nuclear option. North Korea does not want to recognize how bad off the people are only that the crisis is Òtemporary.Ó Reading a North Korean newspaper leads one to believe that the only threat to North Korea is external not internal. They regularly overlook information implicating the latter as their most significant security issue. Unmotivated Bias One reason for North Korean isolation may be due to historical precedents when foreign powers imposed their presence and culture. Historical precedents are unmotivated biases that cause one to compare a past event with a current one. Focusing on the past event blinds the decision-maker to evidence that reveals a difference. This misunderstanding may lead to miscalculation and a bad decision. North Korea has an unmotivated bias towards Japanese colonialism that is blamed for subverting their culture. North Koreans feel humiliated by Japanese dominance in the sixteenth century. Among other reasons, this period accounts for North Korean hostility toward Japan in general and the need for self-reliance in particular. North Korea cannot look beyond its vivid history and analyze a state like Japan any other way. Conclusion In conclusion Ric Jenness explained the conditions under which North Korea will implode. He explained that the collapse of the North Korean regime was due to motivated and unmotivated biases. The biases created and reinforced internal pressure that resulted in political and economical collapse and national famine. North KoreaÕs strategic interest of maintaining good relations among other rogues resulted from external pressures from countries like the United States. Part II of this paper shows how the international community was unwilling to acknowledge North Korea as a threat due to motivated and unmotivated biases and strategic and intrinsic interests. The United States is the only actor that realizes the seriousness of the threat and tried relentlessly to persuade China and Japan. However, neither country recognized the DPRK as a threat until its implosion. After which they had to intervene because their interests had shifted from economics to security. We believe that the implosion is a likely occurrence. However, whether or not the international community will use that opportunity to coerce North Korea to comply with the NPT is unknown. The economic evidence is compelling enough to show that North Korea is teetering on destruction. We concur that China and Japan will finally agree with the United States because both countries are worried about the security issue after the implosion of North Korea. With the fall of the DPRK China and Japan are concerned with whose hands the nuclear devices will fall into. Hence, China and Japan will compel North Korea to either sell them the devices or trade them with other products. We reached this conclusion after an analysis of the Soviet UnionÕs collapse. After the fall of the Soviet Union the United States went through great pains to ensure the security of Soviet nuclear technology. They did this by buying some of it, subsidizing the government, and sending aid to the former USSR. Even though ChinaÕs relationship with Korea is different it is reasonable to concluded they will follow similar steps. Forcing North Korea to comply with the NPT after implosion seems unrealistic. Convincing an ally to comply beforehand would have been easier, whereas now there is no government to communicate with. China may not be familiar with the new government and not have comfortable relations. Any control China may have perceived before disappeared with the collapse of the regime. Thus diplomacy will be abandoned in favor of incentives such as economic assistance through purchasing the weapons or and providing aid. ENDNOTES 1. ÒNorth KoreaÕs Nuclear Weapons Program: US Policy OptionsÓ [online]. CRS Report. United States Congress, 1994. Available: WWW URL: http://www.middlebury.edu/library/crs/crs94-470f.html 2. ÒCatastrophic Collapse of North Korea, Implications for the United States militaryÓ [online]. School of Advanced Military Studies, 1996. Available: WWW URL: http://kimsoft.com/korea/maxwell.html 3. ibid 4. Crowell, Todd. ÒKim's Disappearing Wife, Tales of High-Profile Defections Haunt Pyongyang.Ó Asiaweek [online]. (1996). Available: WWW URL: http://www.pathfinder.com/@@ilWz9gUAZ9fVUmuG/Asiaweek/96/0301/nat1.html 5. ibid 6. Jervis, Robert. Psychology and Deterrence. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985) 39. 7. ibid 8. ibid 9. ÒMilitary Industry.Ó In Country Study/Area Handbook. Library of Congress, 1993. Available: WWW URL: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cs:@field(DOCID+nk0151) 10. ibid 11. ÒNorth KoreaÕs Nuclear Threat: A Test For Bill Clinton.Ó Heritage Foundation, 1993. Available: WWW URL:http://www.heritage.org/heritage/library/categories/forpol/bgu190.html 12. ibid 13. ÒMilitary Industry.Ó In Country Study/Area Handbook. Library of Congress, 1993. Available: WWW URL: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cs:@field(DOCID+nk0151) 14. ÒPolitical Ideology: the Role of Chuch'eÓ [online]. In Country Study/Area Handbook. Library of Congress, 1993. Available: WWW URL: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi- bin/query/r?frd/cs:@field(DOCID+nk0107) 15. ÒSocialist ideological position cemented under party's leadership.Ó Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, 1997. Inernational Relations and Security Network. Available: WWW Error! Reference source not found. 16. ÒDPRK - Rajin-Sonbong DistrictÓ [online]. International Relations and Security Network, 1996. Available: WWW URL: Error! Reference source not found. 17. ibid 18. ibid 19. ÒDPRK ready for final battleÓ [online]. Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, 1997. Inernational Relations and Security Network. Available: WWW URL: Error! Reference source not found. 20. ibid Jenness PS472 15 6/24/97