How the International Community Perceives North Korea Renee Hui Spring/PS472 Tanter For the sake of this paper and analysis we will assume that on April 1, 1998 the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea agreed to comply fully with the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT. A treaty that forced North Korea to use nuclear power under international guide lines (see part II). Before 1998 North Korea followed such standards when it felt the desire. This behavior threatened the USG which considered North Korea a rogue and wanted their programs stopped (see part II), But, until collapse, the USG could not get North Korea to comply Who was involved in the decision by North Korea and what historical events and theoretical considerations explain this event? This paper will argue that a convergence of internal pressure in North Korea and external pressure from the international community accounted for this event. The collapse of North Korea alone cannot explain their compliance; not can international pressure alone explain these events. Before North Korea imploded few foreign governments made great efforts to coerce North Korea to follow NPT provisions. Part I will describe why North Korea collapsed. We will argue that North Korea was blinded by motivated and unmotivated biases that prevented them taking meaningful steps. Biases that reflected North KoreaÕs irrational style of decision-making. A determination to prove the greatness of the Juche doctrine and historical tensions with other states like Japan best explain North KoreaÕs behavior. Before collapse, North Korea was very headstrong and resisted foreign interference in its affairs. North Korea believed it in their best interests, intrinsically and strategically to promote isolation while engaging in destructive behavior. In the face of repeated aggression most neighbors were unwilling to take a strong stand and force Pyongyang to expose their nuclear programs. Part II of the paper (see Renee Hui) will describe why some nations did not think it in their best intrinsic interest to strongly challenge Pyongyang. Primarily due to motivated biases, the governments of Japan and China did not want to see North Korea as a threat for economic and political reasons. This despite the fact that both states were concerned about a nuclearized peninsula and a coercive North Korea. Again, despite the fact that North Korea was very unpredictable and not easily influenced by anyone. Part II concludes that no government alone could cause North Korea to the bargaining table but a collection of East-Asian and Western states could under the right circumstances. Circumstances that altered their priorities and forced them to notice the threat from North Korea. First weÕll view background and the causes of internal pressure which collapsed the state. With the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki the international community was frightened by the future prospect of a similar attack on their own countries. But because atomic energy provided cheap electricity many countries sought it in order to substitute the more conventional forms of energy such as coal and oil. With the number of countries gaining atomic know-how the threat for a nation to divert from altruistic intentions and build an atomic bomb increased. This prompted the United Nations to creat the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1956 in order to help transfer atomic know-how and material for peaceful use and to keep watch after each transfer against possible military use. However, the IAEA did not stop the culminating competition of building better and more bombs between the United States and Russia. This prompted the United Nations to seek the cooperation of the United States, Russia, and other nations of the world to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or otherwise known as the non-proliferation treaty. The NPT focuses on four principles: (1) a country that has atomic bombs will not transfer one, or have control of one. It will not help a country make or get a bomb. (2)A country that does not have atomic bombs will not try to make or get one. (3) No country is limited in peaceful atomic research or production. Countries that have atomic power will help others get it. (4) To get atomic know-how or material, a country must first negotiate and sign an IAEA safeguard agreement. The agreement lets the IAEA inspect and report that know-how and material are not shifted from peaceful us to weapons. The agreement covers all atomic activity under the countryÕs control. On December 12, 1985 the Democratic PeopleÕs Republic of Korea became an official signatory of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Primary inspections by the IAEA of North Korea could not account for all of itÕs atomic material. After this inspection a special inspection was requested on March of 1994 by the IAEA. Not only was the IAEA denied permission but North Korea also threatened to withdraw from the NPT. The following month the DPRK decided not to withdraw. However, this action or rather in-action was an indication that North Korea was not ready to comply with the terms of the NPT. Especially after finally agreeing to allow inspectors into the country, North Korea blocked them out at the last moment. Therefore, due to continued non-compliance of North Korea to the NPT the United States has grown more concerned with methods to acquiesce North Korea to cooperate. The United States has viewed North Korea as threat since the end of the cold war. When the Cold War ended the United States had to reevaluate who its enemies are and North Korea appears on this list of adversaries. The United States call these new enemies Rogue regimes. Tanter describes a rogue as an autonomous state that breaks away from the international pack by not yielding to established rules and practices and is generally uncontrollable. A rogue regime as defined by Professor Tanter is a country that has large conventional military forces, condone international terrorism, and/or seek weapons of mass destruction. As previously explained by Jenness above, North Korea adequately fits the definition of a rogue regime. When making decisions people take short cuts in order to come to a conclusion because there is not enough time to process all of the information. According to cognitive psychologists a heuristic is a pre-conceived notion of looking at the world. A heuristic causes the decision maker to disregard base rates because of the certainty effect. An unmotivated bias is top-down processing, where one sees what s/he wants to see. A motivated bias is bottom-up processing, where someone sees what s/he expects to see. With these heuristics decision makers take short cuts in making a conclusion about something. Sometimes these decisions are biased because of how people perceive the information. For example, historical precedents are an unmotivated bias and has shaped the United StatesÕ interests in North Korea. The United States holds an unmotivated Òcold warÓ bias based on availability towards North Korea because the United States and the Soviet Union began accumulating nuclear weapons after WWII. Because each nation was uncertain of the rivalÕs capabilities an all out arms race resulted. This arms race continued for forty years and caused many people to fear total nuclear destruction. Therefore, the United States can still ÒseeÓ what happened with the Soviet Union and as a result wants to avoid beginning another Òcold warÓ with the DPRK. Because North Korea has nuclear capabilities and is not complying with the non- nuclear proliferation treaty, similar to the USSRÕs non-compliance, the US perceives their action or rather inaction as a threat. Moreover, the United States have both strategic and intrinsic interests in North Korea. During the cold war the United States invested a lot of time and money into preventing the spread of communism for example, the Korean and Vietnam wars. The US was interested in containing the communist states, whereby preventing a domino effect in East and Southeast Asia. The US has a strategic interest to maintain its reputation as a superpower in the world. If the Americans are unable to convince North Korea to comply with the NPT then the United States credibility decreases. With a decrease in credibility the United States would also lose itÕs bargaining power in the international arena. The United States has an intrinsic interest where it does not want other countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, because the United States has motivated biases towards ideals Americans believe that any nation that is communist is automatically a threat. This is due to the fact that Americans expect to see communist states a threat because of the past conflicts they have endured with them in the past, so Americans generalize that all communist states are a threat. Moreover, the United States wants to see North Korea as a threat because it views North Korea as a rogue state. North Korea has weapons of mass destruction, a large conventional military, and supports others terrorist states. For these reasons the United States has been an active actor in attempting to convince North Korea to comply with the NPT. However, the United States has not been successful as a unitary actor in achieving itÕs intentions. The United States have made bargains with North Korea in attempts to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. In 1991, the United States withdrew its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea and agreed to suspend for 1992 the annual ÒTeam SpiritÓ U.S.-ROK military exercises. However, North Korea has failed to uphold its end of the bargain and still has not abided to the provisions of the NPT (Fisher). According to prospect theory it feels worse to lose than it feels good to gain. The United States does not want to utilize military force against North Korea. If the United States attacked North Korea the U.S. is afraid that it will back North Korea into a corner thereby provoking them to attack South Korea out of fear. Furthermore, critical risk is the amount of pain a challenger is willing to accept from the defender before yielding. The United States has a low critical risk because it is not only unwilling to initiate war with North Korea but the Americans also want to avoid an escalated war among other East Asian countries. Before April 1, 1998 the United States, as a single actor, had not been successful in convincing the DPRK to adhere to the NPT. Since 1990 South Korea, Japan, China, and the US have diplomatically collaborated to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. However, the United States is the only actor that perceives North Korea as a threat and is the only nation that has actively pursued to disarm North Korea. Because these other nations do not perceive North Korea as a threat it is hard for the United States to convince them to engage in multilateral sanctions against North Korea. The international community feels it has no reason to intervene because of the potential North Korean markets and because they do not want to perceive the DPRK as a threat. Rather, the international realm is affected by motivated biases that affect their strategic and intrinsic interests which compels them to not want to recognize how big a threat North Korea can be. From a strategic perspective China comprehends the fact that if North Korea has nuclear capabilities it may lead to a military confrontation on the peninsula. Furthermore, it may provoke other East Asian countries to begin developing nuclear weapons. This will divert China away from their number one priority in the country which is to continue their economic modernization. However, Beijing is hesitant to pressure North Korea in fear of provoking a military conflict in its surrounding area. China is also interested in maintaining its influence on North Korea in order to promote peace. For this reason China has been reluctant to sanction North Korea that would cut off Chinese supplies of food, oil and other goods. Even though China has interests in preserving good Sino-North Korean relations some people argue that China has a stronger interest in not alienating important international actors like the United States, Japan, and South Korea. These countries are important to ChinaÕs economic growth because they provide the markets, infrastructure development loans and aid. They believe that if the international community pushed China to enforce sanctions towards North Korea China may feel compelled to comply. However, China has yet to approve international sanctions against North Korea. This may be due to ChinaÕs economic interest in the neighboring region because it has ties between both North and South Korea. China is NorthÕs KoreaÕs major trading partner and in 1993 China established diplomatic relations with Seoul. Due to their renewed relationship China and South Korea are now involved in trade and investment. China exports coal, briquettes, petroleum, and petroleum products to North Korea. In 1989 and 1990 these products constituted 38.4 per cent and 38.5 percent of North KoreaÕs imports. PyongyangÕs share of trade with Beijing has increased due to the fall of the Soviet Union. In 1991 China had roughly ten joint ventures. The largest on is in the Hamhng Rare Earth Separator Plant that has an investment of nearly US $10.25 million. China has also begun trading with South Korea and China will soon be South KoreaÕs number one trading partner. The bilateral trade between the two countries are estimated to grow quickly past $10 billion per year. Due to ChinaÕs intrinsic interest in building their economy they are motivated to not want to see North Korea as a threat. If China acknowledges that North Korea is indeed a threat then the money that can be used towards economic wealth will have to be switched towards building up the military in response to the possible threat. China does not want to divert its attention away from building the economy towards potential threats in East Asia. Moreover, China has a strategic interest in maintaining the communist ideology. Even though China has been economically phenomenal since the opening of their doors to the international business community some may assume that China is beginning to relax on the enforcement of the communist ideology. China has not faltered on preserving its communist ideology. For example, in 1989 China was enjoying an annual GDP growth of nearly 10 per cent, but when the students rallied in Tiananmen Square protesting for reform in the government China did not hesitate to put a quick halt to the demonstrations. Therefore, maintaining the government system is still a priority in Beijing. Especially now with the decline of communism in much of the world China wants to retain as much support of their fellow communist comrades as possible. For this reason China has an intrinsic interest in North Korea remaining a communist nation. Japan is another important actor in the international community that could help convince North Korea to comply with the NPT treaty. Japan has an intrinsic interest in maintaining stability in the region and especially at home. Japan has over 700,000 ethnic Koreans in the country. These ethnic Koreans have ties to the pro-North Korean Chosen Soren, an organization of Korean residents in Japan. Contributions from ethnic Korean to their relatives in North Korea and the Chosen Soren funds add up to over a billion dollars annually. The majority of joint venture deals have been concluded with Chosen Soren firms. In 1991 North Korea had a hundred joint ventures that had a total capital of US $96 million of which 70 percent involved Chosen Soren firms. Furthermore, there has been a long-standing ideological and financial connection between North Korea and the socialist party in Japan. The Social Democratic Party is one of the five major parties in Japan. The SDP holds 15 seats in the House of Representatives and have 22 councilors in the House of councilors. The Japanese government does not want to provoke the Social Democratic Party by complying with the international arena to impose sanctions against North Korea because of the partyÕs strong influence. For example, in May 1994 a proposal by the coalition government to develop legislation that would facilitate JapanÕs role in supporting sanctions or responding to a military contingency such as a naval blockade drew strong criticism from the socialists and threatened to further delays in passing an overdue fiscal year 1994 budget (Cronin). Therefore, to promote political harmony Japan has a motivated bias to not want to acknowledge North Korea as a threat in fear that in doing so it will prohibit the government from functioning peacefully. Trade between Japan and North Korea has not been limited to the Chosen Soren. Japan has historically been one of the three major trading partners with North Korea, following the Soviet Union and China. During the 1980s there were even times when imports from Japan exceeded those from the PRC. Japan largely exports machinery to the DPRK which accounts for 23 percent of the number of exports. Textile fibers and products, base metal and products, chemicals, plastic and rubber products, and electric and transport equipment fill in the rest. Therefore because Japan is motivated by these intrinsic interests to maintain stability in the domestic arena they have a motivated bias to do not provoke the citizens in the country by actually acknowledging that North Korea is a threat. With the declining economy and the mass starvation in North Korea the likelihood of the regime collapsing is great. The country is receiving aid from the international community but that aid is nearly depleted. Kim Jung Il is losing legitimacy within his country because of the starvation and also the publicity over the defection of high ranking officials like Hyon Song Il. Many strategists believe that the regime is close to implosion. If North Korea does in fact implode the international community would have a great interest in deferring a Òhard landingÓ. The United States, China, Japan, and South Korea would all have a role in this changeover and guaranteeing a gradual, nonviolent change designed to bridge the political and economic difference between the two Koreans. . On April 1, 1998 the communist regime of North Korea finally collapses. Each of these four nations have interests in ensuring that North Korea has a soft landing because the collapse of the regime will have a direct effect on these countries. Some people believe that the United States has a special interest in supporting an environment in which the two Koreas peacefully resolve their tensions. This is due to the continuing military presence on the Korean peninsula and the treaty that the US has with South Korea and Japan. The United States also has a strategic interest in maintaining the role as the leader in the region despite ChinaÕs increasing influence. If the US is unable to encourage measures to decrease the inter-Korean tensions the US may lose itÕs credibility as a leader in the region. Moreover, the United States has invested over fifty years in preserving peace on the Korean peninsula therefore the United States has an interest in preventing a violent transition where Korea may again become a battleground for influence among the neighboring regions. This is called effort justification where the more one puts into a task the more important it is to complete it or the more one tries to get obtain something the greater value of the item. Therefore, since the US has devoted 50 years to the Korean cause the value of democracy is great. For instance, in the Vietnam war the United States invested so much time, energy, and money into preventing the communists from taking over. Even though strategist were saying that the US will not necessarily win the war the United ignored them and continued with the war because they had a motivated bias to ignore the facts and continue the battle. With the implosion of North Korea and the USÕ involvement in securing a smooth re-unification with South Korea the United States will finally be able to achieve itÕs intrinsic interest of riding North Korea of nuclear weapons. It will also satisfy the USÕ strategic interest of maintaining their bargaining position in the region with the North Korean demise of the North Korean threat. The United States needs to develop a strategic long-term plan to stabilize and reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula. However, the US can not do this unilaterally. They must gain the support of China and Japan in order to achieve this goal. China will be directly impacted by the implosion of the North Korean regime. This is due to the economic relations China has between both North and South Korea. China also has an interest to prevent refugees from crossing the border to northeastern China. China wants to gain influence in the their neighboring regions and possibly attain its strategic interest of replacing the US as the leader in East Asia. ChinaÕs role as one of South KoreaÕs major trading partners and the decision to resume significant levels of bilateral aid to North Korea suggests that ChinaÕs influence on developments in both Koreass is increasing. In order to increase its influence over the shape of any final settlement between North and South Korea China is trying to balance its political and economic relations between the two. Furthermore, China has an interest in preventing North Korean refugees from crossing into China. This will prompt China to support the fallen regime with food aid and financial aid in order to keep the people in North Korea. China also wants to prevent a Òhard landingÓ for North Korea because it does not want to divert its attention away from economic modernization towards building up a military defense. This shows that China has a motivated bias because they are overlooking these effects from the implosion of North Korea. China should have been proactive in stabilizing North Koran politics and economy but did not because of economic issues. In fact, China only intervenes after North Korea implodes because the event shifts priorities away from economics to security. A shift Beijing knew could have occurred earlier but did nothing to prevent. Before the implosion China did not want to realized that North Korea is indeed a threat because of ChinaÕs intrinsic interest in building its economy. In addition to refugees and markets China should also be concerned over the control of the nuclear programs after the fall of North Korea. China wants to prevent the occurrence of an arms race in East Asia. Japan is another actor who will be affected by the collapse of the North Korean regime. Japan has an interest in also preventing refugees from boarding a ship and entering the country. Therefore, Japan also has the same interest in supporting the former North Korea with financial and food aid. Furthermore because of the strong socialist influence in Japan the government had a motivated bias to not acknowledge that North Korea is a threat. As with China, Japan also has a motivated interest to not perceive North Korea as a threat in order to maintain its economic ties with North Korea. Even though Japan has stated that if necessary they will develop nuclear weapons in response to North KoreaÕs growing capabilities Japan still did not respond until the implosion of North Korea. The implosion of North Korea forced China and Japan to realize that their policies towards North Korea was misguided. Both China and Japan had the necessary information to ascertain the actual threat that North Korea possessed. However, neither took the steps to compel North Korea to comply with the non-proliferation treaty. They reached the conclusion that the United States had been trying to promote all along. The United States understood that North Korea is a rogue regime that needed to be coerced into following international standards. In conclusion Ric Jenness explained the conditions under which North Korea will implode. He explained that the collapse of the North Korean regime was due to motivated and unmotivated biases. The biases created and reinforced internal pressure that resulted in political and economical collapse and national famine. North KoreaÕs strategic interest of maintaining good relations among other rogues resulted from external pressures from countries like the United States. Part II of this paper shows how the international community was unwilling to acknowledge North Korea as a threat due to motivated and unmotivated biases and strategic and intrinsic interests. The United States is the only actor that realizes the seriousness of the threat and tried relentlessly to persuade China and Japan. However, neither country recognized the DPRK as a threat until its implosion. After which they had to intervene because their interests had shifted from economics to security. We believe that the implosion is a likely occurrence. However, whether or not the international community will use that opportunity to coerce North Korea to comply with the NPT is unknown. The economic evidence is compelling enough to show that North Korea is teetering on destruction. We concur that China and Japan will finally agree with the United States because both countries are worried about the security issue after the implosion of North Korea. With the fall of the DPRK China and Japan are concerned with whose hands the nuclear devices will fall into. Hence, China and Japan will compel North Korea to either sell them the devices or trade them with other products. We reached this conclusion after an analysis of the Soviet UnionÕs collapse. After the fall of the Soviet Union the United States went through great pains to ensure the security of Soviet nuclear technology. They did this by buying some of it, subsidizing the government, and sending aid to the former USSR. Even though ChinaÕs relationship with Korea is different it is reasonable to concluded they will follow similar steps. Forcing North Korea to comply with the NPT after implosion seems unrealistic. 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