Rogue Regimes Critique - Tanter vs. Klare

Edward Barshaw
PS-472  Spring 1997



Introduction

       In his book, Rogue Regimes, Professor Tanter defines rogues as "leaders of nations that have large 
conventional military forces, condone international terrorism, and/or seek weapons of mass destruction. 
They include nuclear, biological, and chemical armaments."1  Tanter describes six countries that currently 
hold rogue status in the United States.  These countries are Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea and Cuba.  
All of these countries, with the exception of Cuba, meet the criteria described above.  Cuba is included in 
the list "because of historical tensions" with the United States which cause the U.S. to view Castro as "a 
rogue leader" and "Cuba itself is an outlaw regime."2
       Tanter provides three main approaches to dealing with these Rogues which include: "1) to contain these 
states with economic sanctions and deter or coerce them with threats of force, 2) to embrace them with 
promises of rewards; and 3) to embrace and contain with these sticks and carrots."3 He then suggests that 
the best approach to take will depend on whether the defender, i.e. the United States and possibly its allies, 
desires retribution or rehabilitation.  According to Tanter, if the answer to this question is the former, then it 
is best to contain.  If it is the latter, however, "the approach may be either to contain, embrace, or both."4 A 
fourth approach, proposed by Klare in his book Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws, is rogue 
marginalization.5

Retribution, Rehabilitation, or Marginalization

       Tanter informs the reader that during the development of his book, his graduate students were split into 
two camps when faced with the question of when sanctions should be employed against a rogue nation.  
One camp favored sanctions strictly for their retributive effects while the other camp viewed sanctions as 
desirable only if they were rehabilitative in nature, i.e. sanctions should only be used if they had the desired 
effect of changing the rogue’s behavior.  Tanter writes that these two camps tended to engage in biasing 
behavior that supported their favored approach.  "Retributive students," he writes, "underestimated present 
compliant behavior and focused on prior deeds and the nature of the regime. Rehabilitative students 
overestimated present compliant behavior and discounted prior deeds and the regime’s nature."6
       Tanter suggests that prior to making the decision between whether retributive punishment is called for 
or rehabilitative measures are required, you must first determine whether the actor is motivated by 
opportunity or fear.  He states that "those who favor retribution are ideological and would punish regardless 
of motivation of the challengers. But defenders that support rehabilitation are pragmatic and want to know 
the motivations of the challengers before deciding to embrace, contain, or to pursue both.  Those who 
would punish for retributive justice would do so irrespective of whether an actor’s conduct derives from 
gain or fear. Those who would punish in order to rehabilitate would do so only if behavior stems from net 
gain, i.e., the actor subtracts costs from benefits and is thereby approximately rational." 7
       Tanter falls towards the rehabilitive side of the argument, desiring that unilateral or multi-lateral 
sanctions bring about corrective behavior in the rogue.  If this is not feasible, however, he believes that 
retributive sanctions are justified as punishment for the rogues for what we in the United States viewed as 
bad behavior.  However, if it becomes apparent that strong sanctions would have the undesirable effect of 
decreasing the stability of a region to an unsafe level, Tanter favors a combination of containment and 
embracing. 
        Klare, on the other hand, opposes both military intervention and economic sanctions. In his view, both 
of these actions result in the rogue state feeling threatened.  This tends to increase the likelihood of 
undesired behavior rather than decrease it.  His recommended approach is to engage in rehabilitation 
through rogue marginalization.  This would entail "an effort to diminish these countries’ perceived 
international importance, cut off their access to high-tech commodities, minimize the global media’s interest 
in them, and eliminate any appeal they may have as models for other Third World countries."8
       In essence, Klare appears to suggest that the U.S. act like a teacher in an elementary school whose 
student body is composed of all the other nations of the world, including the rogue states.  Instead of 
sending the kids who misbehave (and endanger the lives of the other kids) to detention hall or sending them 
down to the principal’s office for some good-old-fashioned corporal punishment, Klare suggests that the 
U.S. should instead stop giving these miscreants the attention, albeit negative attention, that they crave so 
dearly.   Klare seems to believe that by saying "Come on France, United Kingdom, Canada and all the rest 
of you, we’re going to ignore little Muammar and Saddam and all their little friends because they are not 
playing by the rules", the world will be able to apply "collective silent treatment" to these rogues which will 
cause them to correct their roguish behavior.  While this analogy may seem a little too strong, it is in 
essence what Klare suggests.  The problem with this solution is that it may work against the class clown 
who is just acting up to get attention, but it will have little effect on the school yard bully who goes around 
beating up the smaller kids and taking their lunch money.        

PERSONALITY, POLITICS, AND POLICIES

       Tanter emphasis four major themes throughout his book Rogue Regimes.  These themes are threat 
perception, opportunities, politics, and policies.  The first two, threat perception and opportunity, are 
intricately related to the personalities of the primary players involved.  Tanter states that in the post-Cold 
War age, there is much debate about the nature of international threats and that there are two major issues 
that characterize this debate.  These are "different perceptions of threat and opportunity among the 
industrialized democracies; and policies that are appropriate for the democracies to meet these perceived 
dangers or opportunities."9
       The personalities and politics involved in development of rogue state polices are extremely important 
because they strongly affect the way that the problem, and potential solutions to the problem, are shaped.  
As Tanter writes, "no one can say that they are completely objective...without misperceptions, prejudice, or 
belief systems, which color their views of the world. This also holds true for political leaders. Despite their 
horrific acts of violence, even rogues are human. Their backgrounds and preconceptions influence daily 
decisions as well as strategic ones. Americans often seek to prevent or punish a rogue leader’s actions 
without even considering the reasons behind the act."10 
       In Rogue Regimes , Tanter analyzes seven leaders: the Ayatollah Khomeni, and President Rafsanjani of 
Iran, Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Muammar Al-Qadhafi of Libya, Hafez Al-Assad of Syria, Fidel Castro of 
Cuba, and Kim Jong-Il of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. According to Tanter, these leaders 
share several characteristics, including "an intricate framework of emotions and experiences, a drive for 
power, and a willingness to use violence to accomplish their goals."11
       In addition to analyzing the personalities of the Rogue leaders involved, Tanter provides insight into 
how basic personality differences between Americans and Europeans are at the core of the alliance’s split in 
opinion over sanctions against the rogue states.  This basic difference in personality accounts for different 
levels of threat perception, which can be attributed to both motivated and unmotivated biases.  "The 
American school perceives high dangers from rogue states and imposes sanctions in order to deter and 
coerce them. The European school does not perceive much of a threat from the same states and resists the 
imposition of trade restraints."12  Tanter goes on to say "Europeans do not view the world in bipolar terms 
and hence are inclined to incorporate all states into an overall trade system. The debate is between 
emotional American idealism and cynical European realism."13
       There is much discussion given to the use of sanctions, either rehabilitive sanctions or retributive 
sanctions, as punishment for wrong doing.  Sanctions are viewed by many, including Tanter, as "midway 
between doing too much, such as sending in the troops, and doing too little, such as making empty 
threats."14  Although the successful use of sanctions for rehabilitation is questionable, they are always 
effective for retribution purposes whose "ultimate goal is to satisfy the desire for payback for previous 
misconduct, rather than to coerce changes in behavior."15
       This point of view leads to a discussion of American ideals, something Klare does not consider in his 
book.  Tanter argues that "American ideals play such a large part in the decision-making process regarding 
the application of sanctions" but that it is "the convergence of idealism with other vectors" including 
intrinsic and strategic interests "that carries weight and causes a change in behavior."16  The criteria for 
entry into the "gallery of rogues" was given above, but Tanter argues that realistically the definition is not 
complete.  He writes "foremost amongst criteria for incorporation into the gallery is a violation of American 
ideals. Strategic and intrinsic interests in geographical regions of the world form a second broad band of 
standards. Lastly, prior commitments to allied states and domestic constituencies are a reason to impose 
sanctions. "17
       Klare does not include the aspects of personality or politics in his book, nor does he examine strategic 
interests or ideals.  By not giving any consideration to the personalities or politics involved in each 
individual situation, Klare lumps all U.S.-Rogue relationships into the same pile and treats them as if they 
were all the same.  Recalling the elementary school analogy above, Klare fails to examine the personalities 
of the participants and thus would apply the same corrective measures to the class clown as the school yard 
bully.  Klare’s lack of consideration of both U.S. strategic interests and American ideals leads him to the 
assumption that the U.S. overstates the rogue threat.  
       Klare not only argues that the U.S. misperceives the threat posed by the rogues, but that the rogues 
misperceive the threat posed by the U.S.  He claims that the rogue states feel threatened by the very 
sanctions and deterrence policies that the U.S. implements.  This, in turn,  produces the exact opposite 
results than are intended, i.e. it actually increases the likelihood and extent of roguish behavior.  His 
argument is a classic example of inadvertent escalation.  By increasing pressure on the rogues, the U.S. 
causes them to feel threatened and as a result they continue to support terrorism, increase their military 
spending and continue to pursue weapons of mass destruction (WMD).18  While this line of reasoning is 
not totally without merit, it is also the same reasoning used by Israel prior to the disastrous Yom Kippur 
War.   

Layout of Paper

       The following six sections summarize the second through the seventh chapters of Tanter’s book Rogue 
Regimes.  These sections represent a boiled down version of Tanter’s chapters and highlight the "essence" 
of his discussion on each rogue nation.  Where applicable, comparisons are made between Tanter and 
Klare.  Less emphasis is given to the sections on Libya, Syria, and Cuba because they are not discussed in 
great detail in Klare and therefore few comparisons can be made. In addition, several of the reoccurring 
themes - threat perception, opportunity, politics, and policies are very similar with those of Iran and Iraq 
and thus warrant less discussion.  Most of the section on North Korea is dedicated to discussion of the 
hawk-dove-owl framework and its application to Tanter and Klare. The final section provides a summary 
and conclusions.   

IRAN

       Due to recent events beginning in the late 1970s, the United States has changed  its perception of Iran 
from that of a friend to that of an enemy. Two competing approaches for dealing with Iran, balance of 
power and dual containment, emerged.  Balance of power consisted of applying the principle "the enemy of 
my enemy is my friend."19  This strategy requires playing Iran against Iraq and insuring that neither would 
have too great of an advantage.  Dual containment, on the other hand, entails containment of both Iran and 
Iraq at the same time.  In either case, both Iran and Iraq "perceive themselves locked in a security dilemma" 
with the U.S. and the U.S. in turn views perceives them as threats.  "Principal sources of American threat 
perception,"according to Tanter "are campaign politics and national security; domestic and bureaucratic 
politics; intrinsic and strategic interests; alliance politics; as well as idealism."20
       Campaign politics and national security strongly affected threat perception in the late 1970s and early 
1980s because they coincided with "dramatic events abroad"including "the aftermath of the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan, fall of the Shah and rise of Khomeni, Americans held hostage in Iran, Iran-Iraq War, East-
West tensions, and stalemate in the Arab-Israel conflict."21 Even decades later, overcoming popular belief 
to the contrary, American polices towards Iran did not take a back seat to big business interests.  Tanter 
argues this point, quite convincingly, by using the unanimous passage of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 
of 1996 through both the House and Senate to illustrate how domestic and bureaucratic policies, combined 
with American idealism, prevails over economic profits.
       Tanter also uses the discussion of Iran to take issue with Klare’s primary argument in Rogue States and 
Nuclear Outlaws that the Pentagon manufactured a rogue threat as a pretext to defend its budget in the post-
Cold War era.  Tanter states that Klare does this "without much evidence" and that "he is on weak ground in 
suggesting that the Pentagon invented the rogue state threat."  He does, however, allow that "Klare may be 
correct that the Pentagon overestimates the Iranian threat somewhat and gains some budgetary advantage; 
he goes too far in stating that the Pentagon "invents" that threat."22  Tanter also highlights one of the 
fundamental concepts that he uses throughout Rogue Regimes, American idealism.  This is something that 
Klare never touches on.  Tanter states that "American Presidents think they have the moral obligation to 
punish wrongdoing."23
       Rogue Regimes also focuses on the interests at stake in the confrontations between the U.S. and the 
rogue states.  These interests are both intrinsic and strategic.  In the case of Iran, the intrinsic interests at 
stake include "American civilians and military personnel in the Gulf" as well as "other inherently valuable 
targets like Western petroleum products transiting the Gulf and other sea-lanes of communications."24  
Strategic interests include "the credibility of the U.S. threat to use military force; the American resolve to 
remain engaged in the world; and the U.S. commitment to defend its friends against its foes."25 
       As stated previously, Klare does not place much emphasis on interests, especially strategic interests.  
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, Klare apparently assumes that the need for the U.S. to 
defend its strategic interests, such as "the American resolve to remain engaged in the world," are not really 
relevant anymore, at least not from a military standpoint.  Klare argues that the U.S. should restructure its 
military from its current levels and instead of maintaining the capability to act unilaterally against a rogue, 
the U.S. should focus on providing military assistance in support of "multilateral peacekeeping operations, 
enforcement of UN arms embargos, and humanitarian aid and rescues."26  By far the largest problem with 
this situation is that UN and multi-lateral strategic interests are seldom in line with U.S.  In order to 
successful defend U.S. interests, the U.S. needs to have the ability to handle the job all by itself. 
       Rogue Regimes highlights the different perspectives of America and its European allies regarding the 
implementation of sanctions, especially the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act.  The act denies "export licenses, 
loans, and credit gaurentees to European and other oil companies investing over a threshold amount - $40 
million per year- in the Libyan energy sector" or Iranian energy sector.27  The European Union was very 
upset by the Act and claimed that the U.S was engaging in extraterritoriality.  Tanter, however, finds no 
basis for this claim pointing out that "the Act is a secondary boycott, i.e., a ban regarding firms that fail to 
comply with a primary boycott like the United States boycott of Iran"28 
       Tanter ends the chapter on Iran by calling for an end to the "inflexible policy of dual containment" 
created by Clinton and a return to the "flexible balance of power approach" followed by Reagan and 
Bush.29  He also states that Iran "is a fitting substitute for the Soviet threat" and that due to its behavior 
"punishment is justified on retributive grounds"30.
       I do not agree with his assessment of the need to return to the balance of power approach.  In my 
opinion, this policy would entail supporting either Iran or Iraq and that would equate to suicide in today’s 
political climate.  In almost any circumstance that I can imagine, it would seem completely unfeasible for 
the U.S. to provide any kind of support to either nation.  Dual containment is obviously not the best 
solution, because it calls for treating both Iran and Iraq as if they were the same, which they are not.  
However, faced with the choice between one or the other, I would reluctantly select dual containment.
      Just prior to the publishing of this paper, Professor Tanter informed the class of the existence of a third 
option, "differentiated containment."  This option, proposed by Brzezinski, Scowcroft, and Murphy, calls 
for a "nuanced containment" policy that is "in tune with America’s long-term interests".31  This policy 
would treat Iran and Iraq differently, allowing the U.S. to "keep Saddam boxed in," "keep the Gulf War 
coalition united" and at the same time construct "creative tradeoffs" with Iran "such as the relaxation of 
opposition to the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for rigid and comprehensive inspection and control 
procedures."32  In an interview with Tanter, he informed me that given the choice between the three, he 
would select differentiated containment, as would I.  This effectively made our previous disagreement 
academic, but since we both reside in academia, I left it in the paper.  

IRAQ

       Iraq  is very similar to Iran in terms of its on-again off-again relationship with the U.S.  Saddam, 
however, pushed the U.S. and the world too far with his act of naked aggression against neighboring Kuwait 
and brought the full wrath of the U.S. lead coalition down upon his country.  Although the players were 
completely different, the overall scenario was not.  Primary sources of American threat perception about 
Iraq are the same as those present with Iran, namely politics versus big business.  Once again, businesses 
loses out to politics and American ideals.   Again, a gulf state threatens American intrinsic and strategic 
interests which are virtually identical to those called out in the section on Iran.
       There are several important differences, however, between Iraq and Iran.  Although the U.S. does not 
now, nor never will, come out and admit this, Tanter states that the overall goal of the sanctions placed on 
Iraq are "designed to overthrow the Saddam regime" and that  "Washington deals with Iran as a nation-state 
irrespective of who’s at the helm in Teheran" but "Washington deals with Saddam as a personification of 
Iraq."33  If Saddam fell, whether as a result of the UN sanctions or on his own, the "the United States goal 
would shift from retribution to rehabilitation."34  Tanter concludes  that "Iraq is a fitting substitute for the 
Soviet menace " and that punishment against Saddam is justified. He also states that since "there are similar 
perceptions of threat and opportunity among the allies... it is easier to fashion joint policy of sanctions 
against Saddam, than for Iran." 35
       The primary emphasis of Klare’s book is not to examine rogue states like Iraq, but a major tenant of the 
book focuses on the Gulf War with Iraq and its implications to current and future U.S. military policy.  
Klare’s major premise is that the U.S. manufactured the Rogue State Doctrine and subsequently magnified 
the threat posed by rogues like Iraq.  Klare sates that "the adoption of the Rogue Doctrine and its 
incorporation into formal strategic doctrine (via the Bottom-Up Review) represents a stunning victory for 
the U.S. military establishment.  Constructed in haste during the fateful months following the Berlin Wall’s 
collapse, the doctrine assure the military steady funding at near-Cold war levels for an indefinite future.  It 
also provides a rationale for the retention of a large portion of the high-tech forces once deployed for 
combat with the Warsaw pact… In justice to history, it should be recalled that the Rogue Doctrine received 
an enormous boost from the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.  From the military’s point of view, the 
doctrine had many attractive features - but it would not have generated the support it did in Congress 
without the timely emergence of a genuine renegade to lend plausibility to what had been a hastily 
manufactured concept."36  In short, the Pentagon manufactured the threat to provide a rationale for 
continued funding of the military "at near-Cold War levels" and was lucky enough to have an actual threat 
emerge that fit the bill.
       It is ludicrous to assume that the U.S. manufactured the rogue state threat.  Threats from these nations 
existed prior to the end of the Cold War, only the U.S. and its allies were not focused on them due to the 
existence of the overriding Soviet threat.  With the world divided into East and West, not only were rogue 
state threats less of a concern, the probability of rogues causing significant trouble was less.  In the bipolar 
world of the Cold War, disputes among nations tented to invite a strong reaction on the part of the United 
States and the Soviet Union.  The 1967 Six Day War in the Middle East is a prime example.  Neither 
superpower would tolerate a loss of one of their "allies", and so even small disputes had the potential to 
ignite much larger military intervention.
       In short, the U.S. has always been aware of the very real threat that rogue nations pose to their intrinsic 
and strategic interests.  Prior to the end of the Cold War, however, the Soviets were more often than not 
seen to be behind any aggressive action on the rogues part.  Now, with the old Soviet Union gone, the threat 
from rogues still exists, only Ivan is not pulling the strings anymore.  This, in fact, tends to increase the 
chance of deterrence failure.  Hence the rogue threat has actually increased, not decreased as Klare would 
suggest.

LIBYA

       Tanter describes Libya and its leader Muammar Qadhafi as a "Rogue  Elephant" that has broken away 
from the herd of the international community.  He calls Qadhafi "a  Machiavellian leader out for gain, 
deserving of United States sanctions and undeserving of American empathy."37  This leads directly to 
Tanter’s assessment that "with respect to Libya, therefore, the answer to the question whether to contain or 
embrace is straightforward: Containment and perhaps confrontation are options to pursue."38
       Sources of American threat perception focus primarily on the interaction of politics and business 
interests.  The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 described earlier is the current U.S. policy in place 
against Libya.  In addition to the U.S. imposed Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, there are also UN imposed 
sanctions imposed on Libya.  These sanctions, UN Resolution 748 and UN Resolution 883 are "designed to 
induce the government of Libya to hand over the suspects implicated in the airline bombing over Lockerbie 
Scotland."39   The objective of the U. S. and UN sanctions is to force Libya "to cease its subversive 
behavior towards neighboring countries that are friendly to Washington, to terminate its sponsorship of 
international terrorist organizations, and to end the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, with particular 
reference to chemical armaments."40
       The U.S. has strategic interests at stake with its confrontation of  Libya including  "a strategic interest 
in making sure that it is unchallenged," maintaining freedom of the seas and opposing subversion, terrorism 
and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).41   Libya is a third example of the triumph of 
politics and ideals over big business interests as exemplified by the passage of the Iran and Libya Sanctions 
Act.  Tanter states that the key  reason for this "is that ideals and domestic politics reinforce foreign policy 
and national security concerns. Strategic interests of anti-subversion, counterterrorism, and non-
proliferation are more than just interests; they are ideals as well."42 
       Tanter closes the section on Libya by restating that Libya "is a fitting substitute for the Soviet bear" and 
that although"it  is difficult to fashion policies that are appropriate to change the regime’s behavior or to 
punish it for misbehavior...punishment is justified on retributive grounds."43

 SYRIA

       Syria does not fit into the same mold as Iran, Iraq, or Libya.  Syria finds its way onto the list of rogues 
for several reasons.  It has hegemonic plans regarding Israel and is especially contentious over the Israeli 
occupied Golan Heights which was captured by Israel in the  Six-Day War in 1967.  Syria is also guilty of 
spreading weapons of mass destruction (WMD), however, the U.S. has not been nearly as vocal 
condemning them as they have others, especially Libya.  A third reason Syria finds itself on the list is its 
participation in drug trafficking.  
       However, because the U.S. wants Syria to be involved in the Middle East Peace Process with Israel, 
there is a tendency for American officials to engage in "wishful thinking" regarding Syria and underestimate 
the Syrian threat.  As evidence of this, Tanter notes that both the Reagan and Clinton Administrations failed 
to mention Syria on their lists of outlaw states.  Even though American officials hesitate to publicly name 
Syria as a rogue state, it is officially classified as a state that supports international terrorism. 
       As a result of this official rogue status listing, U.S. sanctions are imposed on Syria.  This is done under 
a number of acts, including Section 6 of the Export Administration Act, and the 1989 Anti-Terorism and 
Arms Export Act.  All in all, "American sanctions against Syria include bans on economic assistance and 
military sales, controls on dual-use equipment that could support terrorism, or military activities, and 
prohibitions on U.S. government support for multilateral economic assistance." 44
       American threat perception of Syria once again is strongly influenced by bureaucratic and domestic 
politics, like all three of the previous cases.  In Syria’s case, however, there are no notable big business 
economic interests to overcome and therefore "there is little indication of opportunities foregone as a result 
of maintaining a sanctions against Syria."45  Tanter concludes that the U.S. perceives Syria as a threat  but 
does not perceive Syria as equivalent to the Former Soviet Union.

CUBA
	
       As mentioned at the beginning of the paper, all the states listed in Rogue Regimes met the criteria 
established for entry into the "Rogue’s Gallery" except one, Cuba.  Cuba no longer has the intention or the 
capability to spread its revolution abroad, it does not actively condone international terrorism, and although 
it was the subject of an extremely tense U.S.-Soviet showdown over WMD during the Cuban Missile 
Crises, it has not engaged in any WMD activities or proliferation since.  
       Why, then, is it on the list?  The answer, as Tanter so eloquently states, is that Cuba committed the 
"sin" of  dancing "with the Soviet devil".46  In an era when the U.S. was certain that communism was 
taking over the planet, Castro drove that fear home.  Not only was this "contrary to manifest destiny and the 
Monroe Doctrine" as Tanter points out, but it brought communism to America’s doorstep and threatened to 
create a domino effect throughout Central and Southern America via export of the Cuban revolution.47
       Even though those days are long gone and the Soviet bear that propped up Castro is no more, America 
still punishes Cuba because of its communist Castro regime.  This punishment is highlighted by the passage 
of the Helms-Burton Act. These sanctions punish "foreign executives and their families who benefit from 
property the Cuban government confiscated from American citizens, principally Cuban-American exiles."48  
Europe and Canada consider Helms-Burton to be illegal under international law and are planning to air their 
case before the World Trade Organization.  Helms-Burton is a stringent set of sanctions that could very well 
cause Cuba to destabilize to the point of chaos.   
       Tanter concludes that "Castro is a rogue leader, but Cuba is not a rogue state" and that "punishment can 
only be justified on retributive grounds, but the cost of continued retribution against Cuba may be higher 
than the domestic political gain."  In short, "American sanctions against Cuba may have to end."49
		
North Korea

     North Korea is one of the most well known of the rogue states and it is one of the most likely spots 
where U.S. military intervention may occur in the near future.  North Korea fits  the criteria for rogue status 
in its desires to absorb South Korea and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), primarily 
nuclear weapons.  National security and alliance politics form the main element of U.S. threat perception.  
Strategic interests in North Korea is simply America’s commitment to an ally, namely South Korea.  
Intrinsic interests include American civilian and military personnel in northeast Asia.  
       Tanter begins his final chapter with a classification of what he terms hawks, doves and owls.  This 
hawk-dove-owl framework is required to answer the primary question he poses, namely what policy should 
the U.S. pursue in the short term given a likely implosion or explosion?  The four options he considers 
include containing (deterring) North Korea, embracing it, both containing and embracing, or gradual 
withdrawal.  
       The hawks, Tanter writes, "favor policies designed to deter and coerce" and they claim that  "disastrous 
outcomes like wars are due to a vacuum of power and/or an absence of commitment.  Wars are the result of 
power-hungry, error-free, cold-hearted mercenaries who are not held in check by capability and 
commitment."50 The policy hawks suggest is "peace through strength"51  Doves, on the other hand, 
"presume that threats to deter and coerce often provoke an already agitated leader to retaliate."  Unlike 
hawks, they adhere to the view that war "is not due to an interest vacuum or an absence of commitment" but 
instead " is a result of fear-driven, mistake-ridden, risk-prone paranoids."  From the dove’s standpoint, 
"American threats for deterrence actually provoke an imperiled state like North Korea to risk preemptive 
attacks or preventive wars."52
       Tanter further divides the hawks into two schools, one that favors deterrence and one that favors 
comeuppance.  Both call for the U.S. to take a hard line with rogues in general and North Korea in 
particular, but they differ with respect to their approaches.  In the case of North Korea, however, "there is 
little distinction between deterrent and compellent hawks in practice."  Deterrent hawks "suggest a policy of 
threats to prevent North Korea from acquiring weapons of mass destruction" while compellent hawks, 
which "exist only in principle," suggest "a policy of threats to coerce North Korea to cease pursuing its 
nuclear weapons program or to dismantle that program."53  In either case, in order to effectively deter 
North Korea, the U.S. requires a military presence in South Korea.  "The bottom line," writes Tanter, is that 
in order "to deter the North from undertaking aggression against the South, Washington needs to augment 
American combat forces in the Korean Peninsula."54
       Just as hawks are split into two schools, active and passive, so to are the doves.  Libertarian doves take 
the passive, hands-off approach.  "They are unwilling to take actions to avert conflicts" and "place their 
faith in the long-term balance of political and economic power to avoid unwanted escalation."  According to 
Tanter, this variant of dove is actually "coming into vogue" in this era of the "politically correct".55  Given 
their passive dove stature, it is not surprising that they "suggest that Washington should withdraw all 
American forces from South Korea over a four year period, offer to transfer to Seoul whatever conventional 
armaments it desires to purchase, and announce an intention to terminate the United States-South Korea 
mutual defense treaty by the end of the century."56  Activist doves differ from their libertarian brothers in 
that they "prefer to avoid preemptive strikes and preventive wars regardless of the cost. They prefer a policy 
of accommodation, irrespective of motivation" while "libertarian doves advocate a hands-off approach, 
regardless of the risks of inaction."57
       Although they are different in almost all aspects, hawks and doves share some common ground.  They 
both utilize the "billiard ball" or "black box" approach to characterizing people.  Both assume that "it is 
unnecessary to inquire as to their incentives, motivations, and fears; it is enough to assume that they are 
more or less rational."58  This is where they differ from owls.  According to Tanter, "owls believe that 
behavior is a consequence of the policies of an external, status quo power and the internal nature of a 
challenger. In this respect, owls attribute both compliant and roguish behavior to internal predisposition as 
well as prior reinforcements or punishments from the external environment."59
       In comparing the three with respect to threat perception, Tanter states that hawks tend to "magnify 
threats and rely too much on force as a means of conflict resolution", doves tend to "underestimate dangers 
and overemphasize diplomacy" and owls tend to "seek valid estimations of threat and may advocate a 
balance of force with diplomacy."60  Of the three, however, owls tend to be "theoretically valid but 
pragmatically bankrupt" and thus policy is almost exclusively determined by either hawks or doves.61
       Tanter has described himself in class as "an owlish-hawk".  Even without this admission, it is very easy 
to examine his book Rogue Regimes and come to this very same conclusion. He advocates 
containment/deterence of North Korea and takes a hard line retributive sanctions approach towards the 
leading rogues Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.  His only "soft-line" approach, if you can even call it that, is 
towards Cuba, which he feels is being pushed to the brink of disaster by the Helms-Burton Act.  
       He makes a point of dedicating a significant portion of his book to the examination of the personalities 
and backgrounds of the leaders of the rogue sates in question.  Why would he do this unless he thought that 
this information was important in understanding where these leaders stand, how they tend to act, what things 
motivate or frighten them, and what biases they may be susceptible to?   It is worth noting that since he has 
actually served as a policy maker, it would appear that he has the ability to subdue his owlish side when 
necessary and thus not be guilty of being "pragmatically bankrupt."  Tanter’s answer to the question posed 
at the beginning of the section combines the views of an owlish-hawk with "the grand bargain".  He "seeks a 
valid estimation of the threat" and advocates "a balance of force with diplomacy," but ties any reduction in 
punishment to actual concessions by the North. 

Summary

       In summarizing Tanter’s views expressed in Rogue Regimes compared with those of Klare, it is 
instructive to apply some of the same principals that Tanter uses in his book, especially the emphasis on 
personality.  Every individual has his own "filter" through which they see the world and Tanter and Klare 
are no exception.  The existence of potential motivated and unmotivated biases that affect an individual’s 
perceptions can be inferred by examining an individual’s background, interests, affiliations and prior 
actions or stands they have taken.  For this reason, a short section of this summary will be devoted to 
examining the backgrounds and other factors that may account for potential biases on the part of both 
Tanter and Klare
       Ray Tanter currently holds the position of Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan.  
He also had the distinction of serving on the "senior staff of the National Security Council at the White 
House, 1981-1982."62  His affiliation with a Republican White House indicate his political lean is probably 
to the right.  In fact, in discussion with him, he will tell you straight out that he is a Republican who holds 
conservative, "hard-line" views with respect to international affairs, but is socially "less conservative". 
       From his writing, we know that Tanter favors taking a hard-line approach when dealing with rogue 
states, but he is not an ultra-hard-line fanatic.  He desires sanctions to be rehabilitive in nature, when 
possible.  However, when rehabilitation is not a realistic option, he favors retributive sanctions over no 
punishment at all.  Tanter champions the "grand bargain" or quid pro quo approach for rogue policy 
whereby honest, incremental concessions by the rogues are met with incremental reductions in punishment.  
In this way, relief from punishment is tied directly to the rehabilitive behavior that the U.S. is trying to bring 
about and the onus on ending the sanctions is on the rogue, not the U.S.  He is an "owlish-hawk" who, as 
previously mentioned, takes a hard-line sanctions approach towards international outlaws, but only under 
conditions where the rogues are judged to be acting rationally. His emphasis on many of the tenants of 
Prospect Theory account for his owlish label while his belief in the importance of American ideals, the need 
for the U.S. to pass moral judgment on the rogues, and the necessity of America to defend her strategic 
interests brand him a hawk.
       Michael Klare is a different kind of a bird, literally and figuratively, than Tanter.  Klare is a libertarian 
dove to Tanter’s owlish-hawk.  He holds the title of Professor of Peace and World Security Issues at 
Hampshire College.  He is affiliated with an organization, The Nation,  that publishes a periodical that has 
"vigorously opposed the formation of the Monroe Doctrine" and "took a stand against the Persian Gulf 
War."63  Klare advocates greatly reducing U.S. military capability and calls for the current U.S. Rogue 
Doctrine to be replaced with ‘Rogue Marginalization".  His beliefs on reduction of U.S. unilateral military 
involvement in favor of increased UN involvement rings of "hands-off" libertarianism.  
       In addition to their very different personalities and perspectives on politics and policy, comparison of 
their two books yields another major difference.  While Klare focuses primarily on the use of government 
documents to produce "evidence" to support his argument, Tanter, in true owlish fashion, examines almost 
every aspect of a given U.S.-Rogue situation, applies it to his analysis, and uses it to draw his conclusions.  
He places great emphasis on the personalities involved, not just the rogue leaders, but also those at decision 
making levels within the U.S. government.  He provides interesting anecdotes and recounts actual meetings 
he attended with high level officials during the early 1980s, giving the reader the opportunity to be "a fly on 
the wall" in the White House during international policy making sessions.
       Tanter also includes insights into the effect that politics, both domestic and bureaucratic, had on U.S. 
rogue state policy.  Primary emphasis was placed on the interests at stake, both intrinsic and strategic, and 
the strong effect that American idealism had on the decisions to punish the rogues for their actions.  The 
introduction of idealism and interests was of major importance to Tanter’s arguments.  In every case, 
American ideals were instrumental in explaining why punishments, usually in the form of sanctions, were 
imposed on the rouge states.  In every case, with the possible exception of Cuba, American intrinsic and 
strategic interests, primarily strategic, were at stake.
       Fundamentally,  Klare and Tanter’s differences can be boiled down to one issue.  In Rogue States and 
Nuclear Outlaws, Klare writes that General Colin Powell is utterly convinced, regardless of what happens to 
the Soviet Union, that "we have to put a shingle outside our door saying  ‘Superpower Lives Here.’"64  If 
you agree with this point of view, as Tanter and the author do, then you almost certainly have to disagree 
with Klare’s assumption that the Pentagon has overstated the threat.  If the US is to remain a superpower, 
for its own good and the greater good of the world, then near current force levels are required to protect 
U.S. strategic interests from rogue threats.  If you don’t take this view, which Klare apparently does not, 
then it is easy to see why you would think that the force structure is inflated.  





 Endnotes

1. Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes (Unpublished), 2.
2. Ibid.
3.Ibid., 3.
4.Ibid.
5. Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).
6. Tanter, 6.
7. Ibid.
8. Klare, 219.
9 Tanter, 83.
10. Ibid., 17-18.
11  Ibid., 18.
12. Ibid., 41-42.
13. Ibid., 43
14. Ibid., 48.
15. Ibid., 59.
16. Ibid., 62.
17. Ibid., 77.
18. Klare.
19. Tanter, 85.
20. Ibid., 93.
21. Ibid., 110.
22. Ibid., 122.
23. Ibid., 123.
24. Ibid., 129.
25. Ibid., 131.
26. Klare, 228.
27.Ibid., 160.
28.Ibid., 153.
29. Ibid., 159.
30. Ibid., 123.
31. Brzezinski, et.al. "Differentiated Containment", Foreign Affairs, May/June 1997, 29.
32. Ibid., 
33..Tanter, 221.
34. .Ibid., 220.
35. Ibid., 221.
36.Klare, 204-205.
37. Tanter, 224-225.
38. Ibid., 225.
39. Tanter, 293.
40. Ibid., 238.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., 298.
43.Ibid., 312.
44. Ibid., 346.
45. Ibid., 359.
46. Ibid., 369.
47. Ibid.
48.Ibid., 384.
49. Ibid., 387.
50. Ibid., 391.
51. Ibid., 392.
52. Ibid., 395.
53. Ibid., 399.
54. Ibid., 402.
55. Ibid., 403.
56. Ibid., 406.
57. Ibid., 460.
58. Ibid., 411.
59. Ibid., 412.
60. Ibid., 415.
61. Ibid., 416.
62. Ibid., 75-76.
63. A Complete History of The Nation.  Internet Site: 
http://www.thenation.com/static/about/magazine/history/lng_hist.html 
64. Klare, 11