Matt Weller PS 472 Professor Tanter 6/20/96 The United States and the Agreed Framework with North Korea The United States and North Korea have been antagonists towards one another since the Korean War. These two nations have had very few diplomatic contacts since the conclusion of the War in 1953. The United States and North Korea hold entirely different positions in today's global society. However, these two nations have been brought together in recent years in an attempt to resolve crucial issues to the future peace and prosperity of the Pacific Rim. North Korea was the classic example of a nation that was engulfed into the bi-polar world that the Cold War created. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea has lost the protection and subsidization that Soviets provided. North Korea's strong alliance with China has even suffered in recent years as China embraces the profits of the global economy. This has left North Korea alone and isolated in an ever increasing interdependent global society. Senator Craig Thomas, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, described North Korea as "becoming increasingly isolated, paranoid, and violent. If any country has come to epitomize a rogue regime, it is North Korea."1 The DPRK and other nations that resemble North Korea have replaced the Cold War containment philosophy with a new Defense Department policy called the "Rogue Doctrine." North Korea ideally fits the Pentagon's characteristics of a rogue state. A rogue state is a nation that has a large, modernized military; North Korea has an army of 1.1 million men with modernized weapons provided by the former Soviet Union and China. A rogue state seeks weapons of mass destruction; the DPRK had a nuclear program prior to the Agreed Framework and the CIA has testified that North Korea could possibly have one or two nuclear weapons.2 Finally, a rogue has hegemonic inclinations toward other nations in their region, or pose a threat to U.S. interests; North Korea has repeatedly threatened South Korea and their above characteristics are a threat to Asian security and prosperity, which is one of the most important areas in the world to the United States.3 North Korea's threats, actions, and capabilities have caused the international community to focus its attention upon the situation on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has pushed brinkmanship to the limit, not only South Korea and other Asian nations, but also the United States. The United States is an active and important actor in the security and prosperity of East Asia. When North Korea has flexed their muscles in recent years, specifically with their nuclear program, this has caused the United States to attempt to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula. After a summer of near brinkmanship in 1994, because of the nuclear policies that the North were following, the United States took a pivotal step forward in trying to reduce the tensions in East Asia by agreeing to negotiate with the North over their nuclear program. The U.S. Government on October 21, 1994, signed the Agreed Framework with the DPRK. The Agreed Framework is a document between the two nations that has halted the North's nuclear program. In return the USG, South Korea, and Japan have made concessions to the North Korean Government. The main provisions of the Agreed Framework are: _ halts North Korea's nuclear program especially its facilities for separating weapons-grade plutonium, and all nuclear fuel-related facilities; _ requires North Korea to return to full compliance with its obligations under the NPT and IAEA safeguards agreement; _ provides alternate energy in the form of heavy fuel to compensate for the loss of nuclear energy; _ calls for the formation of an international consortium to provide two proliferation- resistant Light Water Reactors (LWR) to replace the more dangerous graphite-moderated facilities; _ neutralizes the threat posed by the spent nuclear fuel already in North Korea by removing the nuclear fuel from North Korea for disposal in a third nation; _ requires dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities; _ process of normalizing diplomatic and trade relations between the DPRK and the rest of the world in incremental steps as the Agreed Framework is implemented, and; _ encourages the restoration of dialogue between North and South Korea with the objective of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and, ultimately, establishing a more permanent mechanism of peace on the Peninsula.4 This paper will examine the Agreed Framework by asking the question: Why did the United States commit to the Agreed Framework with North Korea? THEORETICAL ORIENTATION The United States pursued the Framework with North Korea to attain tangible results such as peace and security not only on the Peninsula, but also in the East Asia. However, the theoretical concepts, such as deterrence, brinkmanship, and rationality played an equally important role as underlying reasons to the USG commitment to the Agreed Framework. Rationality Rationality of actors is a crucial concept in security affairs because it provides a base for the other concepts to build upon. Rationality in the case of North Korea is difficult to determine, because of the nation's isolationism and the inconsistent actions of its leaders, specifically the Supreme Leader of the DPRK. This intern causes a tenuous situation for the US Government to initiate actions that will either persuade or threaten North Korea, because the United States cannot accurately measure North Korea on the rheostat of rationality. Since other nations cannot measure their rationality, North Korea is at an advantage in security affairs. The benefits that the DPRK receives from its irrationality are described by Thomas Schelling when he writes "Another paradox of deterrence is that it does not always help to be, or to be believed to be, fully rational, cool-headed, and in control of oneself or of one's country."5 From the United States perspective this is an accurate description of North Korea because their actions seem to rank low on the rheostat of rationality. For example, in the summer of 1994, the North Koreans were pushing the international community, especially the United States, when the DPRK was in direct violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which it is a member. The North would not permit the International Atomic and Energy Agency to inspect their nuclear facilities, nor would they comply with NPT regulations. The United States then issued the threat of trying to impose United Nations' economic sanctions against the North for non-compliance. The North Koreans responded with their own threat that economic sanctions would be viewed as an act of war against the DPRK and they would respond by placing Seoul in a "ring of fire."6 North Korea issued these threats knowing that by attacking Seoul they would also be attacking the United States. The United States has 37,000 troops on the Peninsula and South Korea is one of America's strongest allies. President Clinton has confirmed the reliability of the United States to defend the South in an act of aggression form the North by saying America has "an unyielding commitment to South Korea's security."7 The USG has made their own threat exceptionally clear, that an attack on the South would in President Clinton's words "[North Korea] would pay a price so great that the nation would probably not survive as it is known today."8 The USG did not ignore the North's threats. Secretary Perry recommended to the President that as the US continues to push for U.N. sanctions, that the US must increase its military forces on the Peninsula to prepare for a possible North Korean invasion.9 North Korea followed the American lead by not retreating from their own threat, despite the threats by the President Clinton. The DPRK must be viewed as acting irrational in this game of threats, since the US, based on their military capabilities, would defeat the North in a military conflict. Therefore, North Korea is acting at a relatively low-point on the rheostat of rationality, because of the policies it continued to pursue. The United States have made their policies and threats clear that they will defend the South against Northern aggression. Even though the North could cause massive destruction in the South with a preemptive strike, their military capabilities are not powerful enough to withstand the type of mobilization that the United States featured in the Gulf War. President Clinton has said "I know of no one who seriously believes that the United States and the Republic of Korea would be defeated in a war of aggression by North Korea if they were to attack."10 North Korea may seen irrational in the eyes of the United States, however, North Korea may perceive their own rationality very differently. North Korea may have felt that American credibility and resolve toward a possible conflict with the North was indeed lower than what American rhetoric would have the North believe. North Korea was willing to teeter on the edge of brinkmanship because of their perceptions of the United States. The DPRK may have thought that the risks were too great for the United States to push the North into acting upon their irrational threats. Thus by acting irrational the North forced the USG into the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework benefits North Korea more so than the United States. The North receives better nuclear technology, diplomatic contacts with West, reduced economic sanctions, and other benefits because their tint of irrationality was enough to make the US commit to a Framework that they should not have to accept if the North would have abided by the NPT that they had originally signed in 1985. Now that the United States has rewarded the North, the USG has lost their credibility in being able to persuade the North in the future. Once the US rewarded North Korea, they will have to continue to give rewards to the North to attain their compliance. Deterrence Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula has been the main strategy of the USG since the conclusion of the Korean War. The policy of deterrence has played a crucial role in maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula. Why then has deterrence not been a strong enough policy in forcing the DPRK into complying with the NPT and IAEA inspections? Deterrence obviously failed in preventing North Korea from trying to develop nuclear weapons, since the US succumbed to accepting the Agreed Framework. What needs to be analyzed is why the United States deterrence policies have not been successful? The US military capabilities are by far the most powerful in the world. The US armed forces can go anywhere in world to fight a war. North Korea has been one place where US military experts believe that there is a strong possibility for military confrontation due to the DPRK's rogue state behavior. North Korea's large military force and its potential nuclear capabilities make them a significant threat to peace and security in Asia. Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord stated "the Korean Peninsula is rightly considered perhaps the most serious risk of full-scale conflict involving US troops"11 since it is the "most heavily armed real state in the world today."12 Therefore, since the United States recognizes the threat that the North Korean military and possible nuclear capabilities pose to US interests in Asia; why hasn't the deterrence policies the United States have followed been successful in stopping the North's drive toward brinkmanship with their military and nuclear program? Why was United States is the most powerful nation in the world forced to resort to rewarding the DPRK with the Agreed Framework, when the DPRK was not complying with their membership responsibilities as a signatory of the NPT? Why were capabilities not enough in deterring the North from pursuing a nuclear program? Deterrence goes beyond capabilities, because in the present international situation no foreign power could threaten to destroy the United States in a conventional war. However, many nations threaten US security interests such as the rogue states. North Korea poses the largest threat because of the United States alliance with South Korea and since the US has 37,000 troops on the Peninsula. North Korea knows that an attack on the South would without doubt cause the Americans to enter into the conflict; based on the simple fact that US troops would be at danger and it would be unlikely that a DPRK invasion would not produce American causalities. However, when dealing with the North's nuclear program, capabilities do not play as significant of a role. More attention is focused to other aspects of deterrence policy such resolve, and threats. American resolve toward the Korean nuclear situation has been relatively low. The US Government can argue that by having US troops on the ground in Korea for over 40 years and the fact that the US has gone to war already with North Korea are indications of American resolve. These actions are a show of resolve on America's behalf, but this resolve is not a powerful deterrent in forcing North Korea to comply with the NPT. US resolve did not go very far once the North threatened the loss of peace on the Peninsula if the America continued to pursue U.N. sanctions. North Korea was in violation of the NPT, instead of showing resolve and pushing for sanctions to make the DPRK come into compliance with the NPT, the Clinton Administration pandered to the North's threats and agreed to negotiations. The United States did not show enough resolve toward the North Korea. The US was not willing to push the envelope of brinkmanship and to test North Korea's threat, even though the US military capabilities far outweighs the North's military might. The credibility of North Korea's threat has a significant effect on why the US committed to the Agreed Framework. Because North Korea in the eyes of the USG ranks low on the rheostat of rationality, North Korea's threat against Seoul if economic sanctions were imposed was perceived much differently by the US, than how President Clinton's threat of absolute destruction was perceived by the DPRK. North Korea must perceive President Clinton and the Government as rational actors. Information is easier to access and the United States must attempt to act rational in dealing with rogue threats such as North Korea because of their powerful position in world affairs. However, since rationality is a problem for US government officials to determine with the DPRK, it made their threat that much more credible with the United States. Following the North Korean threat against Seoul, Secretary Perry recommended to the President that the US should send more troops and better equipment to the Peninsula, because the US could not ignore North Korea "rhetoric."13 The USG followed the advice of the Secretary. The US sent improved technological equipment such as Apache helicopters and Patriot Missiles to the Peninsula and began to mobilize 10,000 additional troops before the two nations began to negotiate the Agreed Framework. Secretary Perry said during his testimony in front of the Senate Armed Forces Committee that the threat posed by the North in June 1994, left the US with two options "which is either going to sanctions and augmenting our military forces, or sitting down and trying to negotiate a different agreement with a very uncertain outcome."14 Thus, the North Korean threat forced the US into negotiating with North Korea to settle the questions regarding the DPRK's nuclear program. The US is the much more powerful nation in this situation, however, deterrence based on capabilities was not enough to deter North Korea from pursuing their proliferation policies. The US did not so the resolve necessary to force the North Koreans conform with the NPT. Finally, President Clinton's powerful threat did not carry the same weight that the North Korean threat did, because the USG lacks the irrationality that North Korea maintains and that Schelling views as important in making deterrence work. North Korea was willing to "rock the boat" of brinkmanship with the United States. The DPRK's brinkmanship overtures were successful in forcing the USG to reward the North Koreans with the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework should not have been necessary, if the North would have followed the rules of the NPT. However, once the North began to expand their nuclear program, the United States deterrence policies failed. The United States lacked the resolve necessary to see if the North would follow through on their threat to destroy Seoul, even though the American threat of total destruction of North Korea was a more realistic threat due to US military capabilities and American loyalty to defend South Korea. North Korea gambled with their threat and won. The United States perceived the DPRK's threat as credible and did not have the resolve to punish the North for this threat and for breaking the NPT. Therefore, the United States committed to the Agreed Framework because its policy of deterrence failed in preventing North Korea from producing nuclear weapons as well as allowing North Korean threats to dictate American foreign policy. North Korea was willing to take the United States to the brink and succeeded. Brinkmanship The brinkmanship actions that North Korea pursued in the Summer of 1994, can be analyzed in two different fashions: the DPRK was acting out of a window of opportunity; or they were operating from a basement of fear. How one perceives where North Korea was operating from determines the type of policy that the United States should have pursued. North Korea in recent years has suffered harsh realities in the Post-Cold War era. They have been left isolated, on the brink of economic collapse, have gone through a change in leadership from Kim Il-Sung to his son Kim Jong-Il, and a flood has put more pressure on an economy that already has a difficult time producing enough materials for its people. Such reasons make it is easy to place North Korea in a basement of fear. Robert Manning, a Senior Fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute, describes North Korea's actions in recent years by writing "that Pyongyang's least likely response when pressed into a corner is to make the concessions demanded; its most likely response is to lash out in a paroxysm of national pride."15 If the United States believes that North Korea was acting from a basement of fear, then the USG followed the correct policy by backing off of the North Koreans prior to negotiations for the Agreed Framework. Thus, to decrease the threat of the North from taking military action against the South, agreeing to negotiate about the North's nuclear program and eventually signing the Agreed Framework was in the best interest of the United States and stability in Asia. The Agreed Framework allowed North Korea to begin to move out of the basement and reduce the threat of armed conflict on the Peninsula. However, everybody does not believe that North Korea was acting from the basement, instead they were acting from a window of opportunity prior to the Agreed Framework. General Gary Luck, Commander in Chief of both the Republic of Korea and United States forces in Korea, is the strongest advocate in believing that North Korea was indeed behaving from a window of opportunity. During his testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Committee, General Luck described how over the last decade North Korea took advantage of subsidization of weapons and funds from China and Russia. That the DPRK's military capabilities have increased; their army has grown by over 200,000 men; they have a forward deployment of 65 percent of their forces an increase by 20 percent; they have had a growth in their artillery capabilities; and they have modernized their army. General Luck argues that during this time period, 1994 to 1995, North Korea had maximized their capabilities and had provided enough second-guessing about their nuclear program, to make their position within the window reach its apex. However, the General thinks that over the next few years North Korea's window will decline and shut, because of the decline in their Gross National Product, aging military equipment, populace discontent, and questions about the leadership of the nation.16 Therefore, if the United States perceives North Korea to be in a window of opportunity, then by rewarding the DPRK with the Agreed Framework the United States pursued the wrong policy. If a nation is acting out of a window of opportunity, the United States in this case should pressure the North Korean, instead of rewarding them for breaking the NPT and threatening South Korea. This situation of whether North Korea was acting from a basement or a window seems to be difficult to determine for the United States. However, whichever form of brinkmanship North Korea is acting upon, they have been successful. North Korea's tint of irrationality and their ability to push American deterrence without causing the United States to act militarily or with sanctions. North Korea has succeeded in compelling the United States to reward them with the Agreed Framework. North Korea will receive two new Light-Water Nuclear Reactors, heavy fuel, liaison offices with the United States, and a reduction in economic sanctions for the simple reason that they were able to push America into rewarding them for non-compliance with the NPT. Now that the United States has reward North Korea, the US will have to continue to reward North Korea in the future to force the North into complying with US policy goals. The United States committed to the Agreed Framework because it could not use theoretical concepts to persuade North Korea to comply with nuclear standards that the United States wanted. While the USG looks unsuccessful at this juncture, the Agreed Framework did provide intrinsic benefits for the United States in dealing with North Korea and providing peace and stability in the region. INTRINSIC BENEFITS OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK The intrinsic benefits of the Agreed Framework look beyond the theoretical concepts to explain why the United States agreed to the Frameworks. The United States government believes that the Agreed Framework provides many benefits for the United States and its allies in Asia, as well as for North Korea. The tangible reasons the USG gives for signing the Agreed Framework are: security on Korea Peninsula, which also provides security for the region; to stop North Korea's nuclear program and any future nuclear proliferation; to halt an arms race within the region; the economic importance of the Pacific Rim for the United States; begin to normalize diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea; re-establish North-South dialogue with the eventual goal of a peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Security in Korea and the Region The United States regards the Agreed Framework as the first step to reducing tensions on the Peninsula. The reduction of tension on the Peninsula will then transpire to the rest of the region. Security, peace, and prosperity are the most important goal of the Framework. America recognizes that security in Asia, and specifically in Korea, as crucial to the United States interests. President Clinton commented on the Framework document by saying "There is nothing more important to our security and to the world's stability than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. And the United States has an unshakable commitment to protect our ally and our fellow democracy, South Korea."17 Secretary of State Warren Christopher reiterated this point by stating that "Regional security, ultimately, is what the Agreed Framework is designed to protect. Continuing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, in turn, have been a threat to security and prosperity throughout Asia -- the world's most dynamic economic region."18 The importance of maintain security and stability in East Asia has been a mainstay in American foreign policy since the end of World War II. American interests will only continue to grow in this region, thus making security and prosperity that much more important. Halting North Korea's Nuclear Program and Non-proliferation The second major goal of the Agreed Framework was to halt North Korea's nuclear program. The United States was successful in accomplishing this goal to a certain extent. The Framework freezes North Korea's existing gas-graphite nuclear reactor immediately. Construction on two other more powerful reactors have been stopped. These two reactors if completed would have been capable of producing hundreds of nuclear weapons. All of the spent fuel produced by the existing reactor will be removed from North Korea to a neutral third party. North Korea's nuclear capabilities will be replaced by Light-Water Reactors, which are considered more proliferation-resistant than North Korea's previous gas-graphite reactors. The Agreed Framework makes North Korea comply above and beyond the requirements of the NPT and IAEA. Ambassador Robert Gallucci, who was the chief negotiator with North Korea, said "The program will no longer exist. That's extremely important from our perspective."19 Assistant Secretary of State Lord highlighted the Agreement by saying "When fully implemented, the Framework will lead to the dismantlement of the DPRK nuclear program and the threat that it poses. These dramatic changes make the Agreed Framework one of the most significant recent accomplishments in American foreign policy."20 However, the Agreed Framework bypasses two primary points that will allow North Korea to pose a nuclear threat to the region for another few years. First, the transfer of the 8,000 fuel rods sitting in cooling ponds will not be transferred from the DPRK for up to five years. These fuel rods are dangerous because they can be reproduced into weapons grade plutonium. The other problem with the Framework is that North Korea does not have to accept its second major obligation of allowing inspection of undisclosed nuclear sites, which could hold weapons grade plutonium or nuclear arms for up to fives years.21 Therefore, while the United States believes that it has successfully halted the DPRK's nuclear program, problems still remain with North Korea's unknown nuclear capabilities. Economic Reasons East Asia has been a dynamic and powerful element in the ever increasing global economy. Therefore, the threat posed by the North Korean nuclear program goes beyond maintaining peace and security, but includes the importance of maintaining economic prosperity. Economic prosperity is not only vital for Asian nations, but the United States economy has prospered because of the dynamic economic growth in this region. Secretary Perry emphasized the importance of America's military commitment to the region and to its US allies as the foundation for the economic growth in East Asia since the end of the Second World War. Trade between Asia and the United States is over $370 billion - 40 percent greater than the amount of trade between the US and Europe. Millions of jobs in America are dependent upon the trade relations with this region. Dr. Perry concludes the economic importance of this region by stating "The markets created by this region's economy play an essential role in sustaining U.S. economic health."22 Arms Race One of the most defining parts of the Agreed Framework is the prevention of an arms race within the Pacific Rim. This has been an overlooked point within the USG. Only Secretary Christopher addressed the importance of this highly destabilizing event. If North Korea would have been able to continue to proliferate, Japan and South Korea would have produced their nuclear weapons to deter an attack from North Korea. This type of arms race could be disastrous for the region. Secretary Christopher expressed his concern over an arms race in the Pacific by saying "Left unchecked, North Korea soon would have been in a position to produce hundreds of kilograms of plutonium for nuclear weapons- -and to provoke a destabilizing arms race in northeast Asia."23 Normalization of relations between the United States and the DPRK By beginning the slow process of normalization between the two nations, the United States hopes to gain many advantages from reducing tensions between North and South to trying to account for over 8,000 MIA's from the Korean War. The Agreed Framework calls for the establishment of liaison offices in the respective capitals. Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas Hubbard believes "these offices themselves will give us opportunities to press issues of concern to us, as we've said, like missiles and terrorism and human rights."24 While some of the frost appears to be thawing between the US Government and the North Korean Leaders, the fact remains that South Korea is our ally on the Peninsula. North Korea has been trying to squeeze the South Koreans out of the situation by expressing interest and pushing for bilateral talks with the United States in regards to issues of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. Winston Lord calls this approach "absolutely unacceptable...that it is up to Koreans - - both North and South - - to create a stable peace in Korea."25 By opening liaison offices in North Korea, the United States is seeking to resolve issues that exist between the two nations. These offices do not exist for the North Koreans to bypass the South in attempting to achieve peace and security with the support United States. North-South Dialogue Finally, perhaps the most important aspect of the Agreed Framework is the call for dialogue between the two nations that occupy the Korean Peninsula. Policy-makers view serious North-South dialogue as "integral to the Framework, and essential to its success."26 The United States would not have signed the Agreed Framework without receiving a commitment from the North to participate in North-South discussions. Deputy Assistant Secretary Hubbard called North-South dialogue "a deal-breaker" and he notes that the North Koreans realized its importance.27 The United States ultimate goal for North-South dialogue is that it brings about a peaceful reunification of the two nations. United States officials believe that only reunification can bring long term peace and stability to the peninsula. That the longer the two nations remain on the brink, the more chances there will be for a major conflict that would without a doubt involve the United States. However, US officials do not want to see the type of reunification that is similar to the reunification process that occurred in Germany. Hubbard said "Few South Koreans would welcome an East German-style collapse of the northern regime." South Korea wants a slow convergence between the two nations and their completely different systems, that would evolve to resemble the Republic of Korea as it is today.28 An implosion of the North Korean economy and government would be the worst scenario for trying to reunify the two nations. A North Korean implosion would force the DPRK into a basement of fear, which would probably cause the leadership to attack the South, thus destabilizing the Peninsula. When the ashes would finally clear South Korea would be forced to integrate the two nations immediately; this would force the South to absorb the population of the North which is twice as large, this would be a very difficult and destabilizing task. Reunification of the Korean Peninsula is the long-term goal of America. Winston Lord states that "US policy seeks to achieve a durable peace and to facilitate progress by the Korean people toward achieving national reunification."29 The United States would not commit to the Agreed Framework without North-South dialogue in the Agreement. Whether the Agreed Framework will be a vital step in the process of achieving the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula has yet to be determined, only time will tell. CONCLUSION The United States committed to the Agreed Framework for the reasons that were presented in this paper. The American government viewed the North Korean nuclear program as threat not only to Asian security, but also to the United States. The United States and the Pacific Rim's interdependence upon each other is crucial for prosperity in both areas. North Korea's nuclear program threatened that prosperity. That threat was so large that the United States was willing to reward a North Korean regime that was in direct violation of an international treaty, in which they were a member. That threat perception of North Korea possessing nuclear arms and the threat of North Korea harming the prosperity of not only South Korea, but the entire region forced the United States to commit to the Agreed Framework. The United States was extremely reluctant to press North Korea to the brink, because the United States could not measure North Korean rationality on the rheostat. Since the United States is unwilling to take North Korea to the brink and force North Korea to act upon their own threats, this intern forces the United States to retreat from their positions of deterrence and coercion. Neither of these concepts work in an international crisis, if the actor, the United States, is fearful of their results. The United States lacked credibility with the North Koreans, because the United States rationality determines their response. North Korea realizes that America's high level of rationality will force them to reward before they will punish a rogue state, like North Korea. Perception of threat in this case is very important. North Korea perceived President Clinton's threat with little fear, because North Korea controlled America's threats. If North Korea attacked the South, then North Korea probably would not exist in its present form; but North Korea had to make the first move for the United States react militarily. However, the longer the North remained on the brink and their threats were perceived as dangerous to the security of the region by the United States, the more the United States would view DPRK threats as credible and their position on the rheostat of rationality decreases in the eyes of American policy-makers. North Korea controlled the game during the tenuous Summer of 1994. The North realized that if they appeared close to going over the edge, that the United States would pull them back because the United States did not want the stability and prosperity of the region to be shaken. This, I believe is the reason why the United States committed to the Agreed Framework. The status quo level of tensions in the region allows for great economic prosperity. North Korea can "rock the boat" but they cannot tip the boat, because the United States will intervene to prevent a collapse of the status quo. The Agreed Framework is not a document that the United States wanted to sign. North Korea's actions of brinkmanship, threats, and apparent lack of rationality caused the United States to negotiate this Framework. North Korea took the United States to the brink of war. The United States pandered to the North Korean's threats and provided a solution to maintain the status quo. Maybe North Korea's irrationality was indeed rational.