I. THEORETICAL ORIENTATION For thirty-four years the United States government has imposed an economic embargo against the Republic of Cuba. These sanctions were established during the Cold War, when Cuba acted as a puppet-state for the USSR and as a tool for Soviet expansionism. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union has forced Fidel Castro's regime to change its behavior. Cuba's economic troubles impedes it from being a force for the spread of communism, and Cuba no longer provides the United States' greatest enemy with a convenient location right in the US's backyard. As Cuba's behavior has changed so has the United States' treatment of Cuba, but not in the way one might expect. In recent years, the United States government has actually strengthened the economic embargo against Castro's regime. This action raises the question that we hope to answer: Why has the United States government maintained and even enhanced the economic embargo against Cuba in the forms of the Cuban Democracy Act and the Helms Burton Act, even though the collapse of the Soviet Union has forced Cuba to change its behavior? Before beginning an analysis of the United States Government's policy regarding Cuba, it is important to understand the theoretical framework through which we will examine the actors in this case. We must understand and define several theoretical paradigms that have played a significant role in determining US policy. The concept of rationality is essential in examining states' relations towards each other. The dictionary definition of rationality is irrelevant in determining its significance to international politics. For our purposes, a rational actor is one who, while acting in the national interest, chooses "the most efficient choice- that alternative that promises the highest expected value".1 Rational procedure includes identifying options, estimating the likelihood of possible consequences of these options, considering cost, benefit, and likelihood of success. A rational decision maker will then choose the alternative that promises either the highest benefit or the lowest loss. Questions of morality play no part in calculations of rationality. The rationality of an individual is independent of any personal values that the actor may hold, and the most efficient choice may be achieved by any means necessary. Several theorists have examined psychological constraints on rationality, which prevent actors from making purely rational decisions. These psychological theorists mainly serve only to refute earlier theories of international politics, so they are irrelevant when it comes to determining policy. However, these psychological theories help explain why decision makers often act in a less than efficient manner. Misperception is the greatest constraint on rationality. Actors make their decisions based on their perceptions of the interests and resolve of other states. When they misperceive another states behavior, their reactions in response to that stimulus is likely to be irrational. Biases, in turn, are responsible for the majority of misperceptions. Biases help to explain how a decision maker can perceive stimuli incorrectly. An unmotivated bias is a shortcut to rationality that occurs when an actor doesnUt fully evaluate all of the information available to him, instead misperceiving the signals he receives as fitting into whatever behavior he had previously expected. This is apparent in Neville Chamberlain's decision to appease Hitler before World War II. The overwhelming belief was that World War I could have been avoided, and this biased Chamberlain when he formulated his policy towards Hitler. His perceptions were influenced more by recent experience than by an in-depth examination of the situation at hand. Motivated bias occurs when an actor misperceives signals so that they may coincide with whatever behavior the actor had hoped to see. A decision maker acting under a motivated bias will ignore information that doesn't coincide with the behavior he hopes for while paying special attention to information that does support his desired world view. An example of this is the decision by the Japanese Government to attack Pearl Harbor. The Japanese believed that this attack would not result in American involvement in the war, despite all evidence to the contrary.2 Another critique of rational actor theory is found in the explanation of bureaucratic politics. While rational actor theory holds that a unitary decision maker acts in the perceived national interest, bureaucratic politics sees a series of players that compete over how to define the national interest. Each of these players seeks to maximize their personal interests. Bureaucratic players see different faces of issues and different ways to resolve value conflicts. A state can use two different methods to influence another state's behavior; persuasion and strategy. Of these, persuasion is the more desirable and also the most difficult. The purpose of persuasion is for a state to convince another state that it is in its best interest to behave in a way that the first state finds desirable. The persuader cannot manipulate the circumstances that may influence the other state's behavior. Persuasion does not involve the cost of providing a reward or imposing a punishment, but it does involve the cost necessary to fully understand the values, goals, and desires of the persuaded state. Strategy, on the other hand, involves influencing a state's behavior either through the promise of reward or the threat of punishment. Either of these actions involves cost, but they do not involve the search for information about the values and motives of another state's decision makers. Strategy may take the form of deterrence or coercion. Deterrence occurs when a state seeks to prevent another state from taking an action. Coercion seeks to compel another state either to take an action or undo prior actions. Finally, we must discuss the interests that guide a states actions. These interests may be either strategic or intrinsic. Robert Jervis clearly defines the differences between the two in Psychology and Deterrence, saying "Intrinsic interest refers to the tangibles at issues and their worth, while strategic interest includes the bargaining reputation, the resolve, the credibility, and the prestige" of the state.3 For a great power, strategic interests are of greater importance than intrinsic interests. II. LOGICAL STRUCTURE Before examining the United States Government's policy towards Cuba today, it is important to understand how the relationship between the two countries has evolved since the Castro regime seized control in 1959. The relationship began positively when Castro declared himself against communism during an April visit to Washington, but this hopeful beginning deteriorated rapidly. Castro became the leader of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform, an institution which was responsible for the seizure of US properties in Cuba. These uncompensated seizures remain a point of contention between the two nations, and are addressed explicitly in the Helms Burton Act. Castro used these seizures to deter the United States from intervening in Cuba, seizing another industry whenever he became displeased. In June of 1960 Castro seized the remaining US oil companies in Cuba, and the US embargoed Cuba on October 12. The embargo was revised February 3, 1962, and still exists today.4 Castro also earned the enmity of the US Government through his close relationship with the Soviet Union. In February 1960 the two countries formed a trade agreement that tied Cuba to the USSR economically and politically. This reinforced US fears of Castro's communist leanings. Cuban-Soviet relations reached an alarming crescendo in 1962 during the Soviet missile crisis, when Castro advocated Soviet missiles being placed in Cuba. Castro further lost favor with the United States when he began to support revolutions in both Africa and Latin America, often with Soviet support. In 1974 President Ford explored the possibility of improved relations with a supposedly reformed Cuba. This possibility was erased when Castro, with the aid of the Soviets, placed 40,000 ground troops in Angola. President Carter tried to improve relations with Castro a few years later, but this process was halted when Castro sent 15,000 troops to Ethiopia. He went on to bring together various guerrilla factions in Nicaragua, Salvador, and Guatemala. In 1980 Castro allowed 125,000 immigrants to flee to the US, including thousands of criminals and hundreds of mentally ill.5 The arrival of the Reagan administration in 1980 marked the beginning of modern US policy towards Cuba. Reagan was strongly anti-communist and held a bipolar view of the world. Determined to be tough on communism,the administration's policy was geared towards strengthening the embargo.6 From 1960 until 1989 the effects of the US embargo on Cuba were not strongly felt because Cuba's trade relationship with the USSR covered the brunt of it. The Soviet bloc accounted for 85 percent of Cuba's foreign trade until 1989, and Cuba received 18.5 billion dollars in economic aid from communist countries, compared to only 710 million from Western countries. The Soviet Union provided Castro's regime with a costly social safety net that allowed Cuba to expend between 22 and 24 percent of its Gross Social Product on education, health, and social security. However, there is now evidence that "the safety net has eroded".7 With the collapse of the USSR has come the collapse of the Cuban economy. Cuba's economy has become "severely depressed as the result of its own inefficiencies and the loss of massive amounts of economic aid from the former Soviet Bloc".8 Economic problems were inherent in the Cuban system, but years of aid from the USSR sufficiently covered up this problem. In 1994 Cuba's total output was only half as much as in 1989. In the same period, Cuba's imports declined from $8.1 billion to $1.7 billion, with oil imports falling from 13.3 million tons in 1989 to 6 million tons in 1992. In 1993 Cuba had an external debt of $7.8 billion with exports registered at $2.3 billion. Cuba remains in default on most of its debt obligations.9 This economic decline has had a powerful effect on life in Cuba. The shortage of fuel has resulted in the shutdown of industrial plants, while tractors and trucks lie idle. Unemployment has risen from six percent in 1988 to somewhere between ten and eighteen percent in 1992. Key drugs are in short supply, there is a lack of parts for medical equipment, and a deterioration in food supply has led to increased malnutrition. In 1994 a higher world price for sugar and nickel resulted in a slight increase in export earnings despite lower production of both, yet it does not seem that this slight upswing will stabilize Cuba's economy.10 Castro claims that Cuba's economic problems arise from a "special period" that all of the world is going through.11 Acting under the premise that special times call for special measure, Castro has undertaken a series of limited internal economic reforms to arrest the decline of Cuba's economy. In October 1994, the Cuban government attempted to stimulate food production by permitting the sale of any surplus production (over the state quota) at unrestricted prices in designated markets. Similar, smaller markets were established in December of the same year. Castro has also allowed dollars to circulate in Cuba and permits strictly limited self employment. These government measures have influenced an appreciation in the black market value of the peso from 100 pesos to the dollar in September 1994 to forty pesos per dollar in 1995.12 In an effort to adapt to changing internal and external conditions, Cuba has also begun an aggressive search for foreign investment. This search revolves around the belief that branches of Cuba's economy could be sufficiently jump-started through associations with "international enterprises possessing capital, technologies, access to markets, and broad experience in the new conditions of the world economy in which Cuba has had to develop in the past few years".13 The collapse of the Soviet Union has thus forced Cuba to change its behavior beyond Cuba's ceasing to act as a Soviet puppet state. Cuba's depressed economy no longer provides the means to penetrate other nations politically and militarily. The United States was initially concerned about Cuba's foreign policy, but now Castro's goals abroad have taken a back seat to Cuba's internal domestic problems. Castro, who earned the US's enmity by jumping through windows of opportunity in undertaking action with the USSR, is now trapped in a basement of fear. The Cuban economy is so depressed that a powerful blow to it may result in a total collapse and an implosion of CubaUs entire economic and social order. Before examining the reasons for the US Government's strict sanctions against Cuba, it is important to understand how the US enhanced the embargo in the forms of the Cuban Democracy Act and the Helms Burton Act. One section of the CDA strengthens the US embargo against Cuba by closing a loophole that existed in the 1963 trade restriction. This loophole allowed foreign subsidies of US businesses to trade with Havana, resulting in 1991 US-Cuba trade totaling $700 million. The CDA prevents US trade with Cuba by preventing a vessel which enters Cuba for the purpose of engaging in trade from loading or unloading any freight in the US within 180 days after leaving Cuba.14 This comprehensive embargo has been criticized by the UN and many of the United States' allies, yet it is an effective illustration of the US policy, which is "to maintain firm pressure on the Cuban Government for peaceful change by denying legitimacy and resources to the Castro regime through tough economic sanctions".15 The second part of the CDA also attempts to strengthen the US Government's economic stranglehold on Cuba by sending the message to the United States' allies that they should take part in the sanctions against Cuba. The CDA includes a provision that will aid the US in deterring other nations from dealing with Castro, urging the President to "make clear to other countries that, in determining its relations with them, the United States will take into account their willingness to cooperate" with US policy.16 Other sections of the Cuban Democracy Act don't relate specifically to the embargo, but we will see later their significance to US policy towards Cuba. One goal of the CDA is to increase contact with the Cuban people. One means of achieving this is through enhanced communications, including telephone, mail, electronic mail, and fax connections. The purpose of this effort is to increase the flow of information between Americans and Cubans, thus breaking the regime's monopoly on information. The US government also may reach around the regime through the use of humanitarian donations to the Cuban people. The CDA allows for "donations of food... [and] exports of medicines or medical supplies, instruments or equipment" from nongoverment organizations in the US to nongovernment organizations in Cuba. However, the federal government must provide a license to a humanitarian organization before such donations may be made. Finally, the CDA provides for aid from the US to Cuba in the event that a transitional government without Castro in power is established in Cuba.17 When Cortez landed in the New World, he destroyed all of the ships in his fleet. This was a powerful demonstration of resolve, as Cortez relinquished the option of retreat. This lesson is at the heart of the Helms Burton Act, also known as the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which was signed into law March 12, 1996 in reaction to the Cuban Government's shootdown of two unarmed civilian planes. This act makes permanent the 34 year old economic embargo against Cuba, which previously had to be renewed each year. Helms Burton ensures that only when "a democratically elected government in Cuba is in power; [shall] the President... take steps to terminate the economic embargo".18 President Clinton was granted a waiver of several months during which he may recall the act before it is enacted. However, once this period has passed, the US will have burned its bridges behind it, abandoning any possibility of ending the embargo before a democratic Cuban Government is in place. The US will have made the ultimate display of resolve by relinquishing the option of quitting. Helms Burton takes the CDA policy which concerns encouraging other nations to join in the sanctions a step further, aiming specifically at Castro's efforts to obtain foreign investment. This action also deals with the $6 billion worth of certified US property claims that Castro has seized since taking power.19 The Helms Burton Act increases the economic pressure on the Cuban Government by discouraging foreign investment in confiscated US properties. The act accomplishes this by giving Cuban Americans and other US citizens the right to file suit in US courts against foreign firms and individuals "trafficking" in these confiscated properties.20 This provision of the Helms Burton Act has been criticized sharply in the international community, because it affects third parties and "seeks to apply the laws of the United States extra-territorially".21 Nevertheless, the act is expected to have some effect in discouraging investment in Cuba, thus disrupting one of Castro's major steps in rebuilding the Cuban economy. We now understand what the Cuban Democracy Act and the Helms Burton Act are, and how they have altered US policy towards Cuba. Now it is important to ask; why is this the United State's policy? The obvious answer is the one every public official gives when questioned on the matter; the United States hopes to bring an end to Castro's totalitarian rule by democratizing Cuba. White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry detailed the United States' hopes for Cuba, saying: We want to see Cuba commit itself to human rights,to a better quality of standard of life for the citizens of Cuba. And we want to see them make the commitment that every other nation in this hemisphere has made towards democracy and towards market economics.22 The United States points to Castro's poor human rights record as a main reason for seeking his removal. As Chief of State, Head of Government, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and Commander in Chief of the armed forces, "Castro exercises control over all aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations".23 The Ministry of Interior, which is the main instrument of totalitarian control in Cuba, investigates and suppresses organized opposition to Castro and the Communist Party. The government continues to restrict political and civil rights, including freedoms of speech, press, association, assembly, religion, and movement. Because of these restrictions, as well as the absence of free elections, the Cuban people are unable to contest governmental abuse.24 The US embargo against Cuba is a form of coercive diplomacy, as continued punishment is threatened in an effort to compel Cuba to alter its behavior. However, US strategy in this case differs from the norm in that the sanctions are not issue-specific. Rather than seeking to get Cuba to take a particular action, the United States' aim is to upset Cuba's entire social, political, and economic system. The decision to continue coercive diplomacy is also unusual because it is extremely unlikely that Castro would yield to such coercion, as this would result in his own loss of power. The US Government is aware that Castro will not voluntarily step down, so it has fashioned an unusual strategy that follows the tenets set forth in the CDA to reach around the government and communicate directly with the Cuban people. It is clear how the United States hopes to gain the support of the Cuban people through increased communication and humanitarian donations. It is not so clear how the economic embargo, which apparently hurts Cubans, will help foster anti-Castro sentiment among the citizens of Cuba. The answer lies in the limited reforms that Castro has enacted to help stall Cuba's plummeting economy. Cuba's economic problems are largely a result of its own internal system, but: While the inherent inefficiencies of CubaU socialist economy alone would be enough to bring about the system's eventual economic collapse, a large influx of hard currency from the US could allow the regime to resist change and stay afloat for years longer.25 The Cuban Government has been forced to enact these reforms by its economic difficulties, and the US embargo aided the Cuban economy in reaching this critical point sooner rather than later. Castro's reluctant reforms have given the Cuban people newfound, albeit limited, experience with a free market. The slight removal of governmental involvement in business actions has helped loosen the government's hold on the people, "fostering more independent thought that could produce a stronger constituency for change".26 The regime's economic stress has also made it more difficult to exert its control throughout the island, and organizations that have survived decades of repression are now better able to communicate and deal with ordinary Cubans. But is giving Cuban citizens a small taste of freedom enough reason for pushing the embargo? Also, is the US policy truly coercive diplomacy? The Helms Burton Act promises to end the embargo when Cuba's behavior meets US requirements, but government officials seem extremely aware that "There is no sign that the Castro regime is prepared to make any significant concessions to democracy".27 Castro has not enacted any political opening to parallel the economic changes he has permitted. United States' policy towards Cuba is not aimed at a specific issue, rather attempting to bring down Castro's entire regime. Also, US sanctions are not being reduced as Cuba makes positive strides. Ironically, the US Government is ignoring aprovision of the Cuban Democracy Act that promises "to be prepared to reduce the sanctions in carefully calibrated ways in response to positive developments in Cuba".28 US policy is clearly a distortion of coercive diplomacy, so we have not fully explained the reasons for the maintenance and enhancement of the embargo. Sanctions can serve two main purposes, either rehabilitation or retribution. In cases of rehabilitation, "sanctions target specific behaviors in a rogue state, such as support for terrorism or pursuit of nuclear capabilities".29 A strategy is formulated to change this specific behavior. Originally the US embargo against Cuba was an example of rehabilitative sanctions, as it concentrated on changing Cuba's opportunistic behavior in allying with the Soviet Union. This is no longer the case, as there is now no specific issue at hand, and sanctions are not reduced with positive steps. However, the US Government does take steps to make the sanctions appear more rehabilitative than they actually are. The Department of State included Cuba on its 1995 list of states that sponsor terrorism, even as it acknowledged that "Cuba is no longer able to actively support armed struggle in Latin America or other parts of the world because of severe ongoing economic problems".30 The Helms Burton Act also contains provisions opposing the construction of a Juragua nuclear power plant, but this recent development canUt be considered a factor in the 34 year old embargo.31 The persistence of the sanctions despite the change in Cuban behavior is indicative of retribution. Retributive justice is at work when "the main purpose of the sanctions is to oppose a regime or to right a wrong".32 The US doesn't hide its desire to bring down the Castro regime. The Helms Burton Act explicitly states that the removal of Castro is the only way that the embargo will ever end. The ultimate purpose of the sanctions is to inflict hardship on Castro's regime, weakening and isolating it economically. The history of US-Cuba relations shows how Castro earned the enmity of the United States and the sanctions transformed from rehabilitative to retributive. Originally the US hoped for good relations with Castro's Cuba, but this was changed when Castro was courted by the Soviet Union. Sanctions were imposed to change CubaUs behavior, as Castro turned his nation into a Soviet puppet-state and tool of communist expansionism. Many of Castro's actions since that time were virtual slaps in the US's face. Castro's uncompensated seizures of American property and his role in the Cuban Missile Crisis, events of more than thirty years ago, are specifically addressed in the Helms Burton Act. Every time the US has considered lessening the sanctions Castro has undertaken aggressive action, either placing 40,000 troops in Angola, bringing together guerrilla factions in Nicaragua, Salvador, and Guatemala, or allowing hundreds of thousands of Cuban immigrants, including criminals and the mentally ill, to enter the US. Castro's actions have earned him the enmity of the United States Government and assured that the embargo will continue as long as Castro is in power.33 Yet another reason that the US has maintained the embargo lies in the matter of strategic interests. Recall that strategic interests, those that deal with a state's reputation, are of utmost importance to a great power. The US developed its embargo 34 years ago, and it has transformed from rehabilitative to retributive, yet one thing has remained the same; it has never been successful. Ironically, this failure assures that the embargo will continue. Resolve is one of the most important issues in international relations, even more important than capabilities, as "issues are decided not by who can bring the most force to bear... but by who is eventually willing to bring more force to bear".34 Any United States' strategy will have greater success if the other state perceives the US as having resolve, the tenacity to see things through to their bitter end. Though other nations have criticized US policy towards Cuba, these policies are often established with the perceptions of those other nations in mind. If the US were to admit failure and give in to pressure it would show a lack of resolve. States in the future affected by an unmotivated bias would draw upon recent history in formulating perceptions, and the US wants these states perceiving it as having great resolve rather than giving in at the first signs of difficulties. The Helms Burton Act is specifically aimed at reinforcing US resolve, as resolve cannot be questioned if the option of ending the embargo is removed. This serves two purposes, by displaying US resolve to other nations and by ensuring that US resolve does not deteriorate. Helms Burton acts as a defense against future decision makers who may not see the benefits of maintaining the embargo. Senator Helms has warned President Clinton against using the waiver process that Clinton negotiated into the act.35 Enacting this waiver would backfire by showing a lack of resolve, exactly the opposite of the act's intended purpose. We have seen how the original purpose of a policy may be distorted over time. The sanctions against Cuba were originally passed on national security grounds, as the US hoped to prevent Cuba from aiding the USSR and spreading communism. These problems are no longer a concern to the US. But legislation that was passed on national security grounds has been retained and expanded for yet another reason; domestic political purposes.36 Anti-Castro Cuban exiles have had great success lobbying American politicians to expand the embargo and increase pressure on the Castro regime. The Cuban American National Foundation is the most powerful and largest Cuban-American organization in the United States and the largest Cuban exile organization in the world. Over 250,000 families have contributed to CANF since its inception, and 54,000 send donations every month.37 CANF is headed by Jorge Mas Canosa, "considered by many... to be a principal architect of the hostile, uncompromising approach toward Fidel Castro that [guides] Washington".38 Mas founded CANF in 1981 at the behest of the Reagan administration, and since that time his organization has fulfilled its founding principle of establishing "broad bipartisan consensus on US policy towards Cuba" by "[building] bridges and channels of communication with Democrats as well as Republicans, and with the Executive as well as the Legislative Branches".39 CANF is linked to the Free Cuba Political Action Committee by overlapping leadership. The President of the Free Cuba PAC, Domingo Moreira, is on CANF's executive board. According to Federal Election Commission records, the Free Cuba PAC has contributed over $1 million to candidates for President and both houses of Congress in little more than a decade. Moreira estimates that the directors and trustees of CANF have contributed triple that amount under their own names. Recent FEC reports show that the Free Cuba PAC has given more than $175,000 to candidates for Congress in 1993 and 1995, paying special heed to members of Congressional committees that deal with foreign relations.40 The goal of these Cuban American lobbyists is a free Cuba without Castro in power. For this purpose they have urged and supported stronger sanctions, "[maintaining] a relentless call for political, economic, and moral pressure on CastroUs regime until his unconditional withdrawal from power".41 Influential Cuban exiles have played a large part in the actual development of anti-Castro legislation, as Mas joined forces with other exile millionaires the Fanjuls and the Bacardis in creating the Helms Burton Act.42 Senator Helms has been an ardent supporter of Mas, and pledged at an April 1995 rally "IUm going to do everything I can to make sure the United States stands with you".43 The great influence that lobbyists have been able to exert on US policy towards Cuba is testimony to the bureaucratic tendencies of United States politics. Each of the players in the bureaucracy seeks to maximize their personal interest, so they would be susceptible to the influence of lobbyists. The players see different faces of issues and different ways to resolve value conflicts, so bureaucratic politics are also evident in the differences between Congress and President Clinton on the Helms Burton Act. The bill was passed by the House on September 21, 1995 and passed by the Senate on October 19 of the same year.44 However, Clinton refused to sign the bill until CastroUs shootdown of two American aircraft on February 24, 1996 forced him into enacting these tougher sanctions against Castro. The bureaucratic aspects of US politics stand in stark contrast to totalitarian Cuba, where Castro is the unitary actor. Castro acts as President of the Council of State and President of the Council of Ministers. His Cuban Communist Party is the only legal political entity in the nation, and "Castro personally chooses the membership of the select group which heads the party".45 When the US Government considers Cuba's reaction to its policy, it must consider Castro's reaction. Knowledge of the man, his beliefs and value system, are essential in formulating US perceptions of Cuba. Persuasion is the most effective means of changing a states behavior, yet the US does not engage in this practice with Cuba. This is because the United States Government is well aware that Castro's personal value system would nullify any attempt at persuasion. Given the dire economic strain that Cuba is suffering, the best interest of the nation would appear to be adopting a new economic and political system. However, the dismantling of the totalitarian system would almost definitely bring an end to Castro's reign. Motivated biases permit Castro to perceive the world in such a way that his remaining in power and the continuation of communism is best for Cuba. First is Castro's view that Cuba's economic problems are not the fault of its own inefficient economy, but rather a result of a "special period" that is affecting the entire world "except for the superprivileged minorities that flaunt power even in the developed capitalist countries".46 Believing that the communist system is not the problem, Castro asserts that "capitalism is fated to devour itself.... Capitalism is obliged to grow nonstop. If the growth stops, it is a catastrophe".47 The US government is aware of these constraints on Castro's rationality. It is also aware that Castro will not give in to US coercive diplomacy because it would result in his loss of power. The United States thus aims its strategy at the Cuban people, realizing that change will not come from Castro himself, but rather from the gradual deterioration of the Cuban political and economic systems. We have established several reasons for the United States' maintenance and enhancement of the embargo against Cuba in the forms of the Cuban Democracy Act and Helms Burton Act. The US's past history with Castro has led to a policy of retribution aimed at opposing the regime by maintaining economic pressure on it. Strategic interests prevent any relaxing of the embargo because it would weaken perceptions of US resolve. Domestic interests in the form of lobbyists have led players in the US bureaucracy to push for stricter legislation. And Cuba's economic difficulties, which are aggravated by US policy, have forced Castro into enacting limited economic reforms, giving the Cuban people a greater degree of freedom and fostering change. Now that we understand US policy, it is time to criticize it. Is the policy that the US Government has enacted the best means of achieving the United States' goals in Cuba? III. CONCLUSION The United States desires the collapse of Castro, not the collapse of Cuba. The major problem with US policy lies in this distinction. The US enhances its embargo because it wants to increase pressure and further isolate the Castro regime. At the same time, the US Government knows that Castro will never willingly give in to sanctions. Though the US has targeted the Castro regime, any economic pressure put on the regime is necessarily placed on Cuba itself. However, the US GovernmentUs insistence on tightening the embargo implies that it is acting under a motivated bias that permits it to believe that Cuba will last longer than Castro under the pressure of the sanctions. Cuba's deteriorating economic system has left it in a vulnerable state. With the economy in such a perilous circumstances, "the death or departure of Fidel Castro... would place the system he created on new and possibly unstable ground".48 Under these circumstances, the removal of Castro may instigate an implosion of Cuba's internal system. If the death or removal of Castro does not occur soon, Cuba's rapidly disintegrating economy may cause it to implode while Castro is still in power. Obviously the total collapse of any nation is not in the United States' interest, but the close proximity of Cuba makes this possibility exceptionally undesirable. Such an implosion would result in an unprecedented wave of immigrants hitting the US shores. The United States' options in this situation are limited. Lifting or weakening the embargo is not in its interest, as it wants to continue to maintain pressure on Castro while avoiding a weakening of resolve for the benefit of other states' perceptions. The United States best option lies in maintaining firm pressure on the Castro regime while allowing the Cuban economy to cling to some modicum of stability until a time, probably after the death of Castro, when there will be a greater possibility of change. Unfortunately, the very purpose of the embargo is eliminate Cuba's ability to cling to its present system. Recall that "the inherent inefficiencies of Cuba's socialist economy alone would be enough to bring about the systemUs eventual economic collapse, [but] a large influx of hard currency from the US could allow the regime to resist change and stay afloat for years longer".49 The CDA and the Helms Burton Act tightened the sanctions, thus decreasing the amount of time that the Cuban economy may stay afloat. The CDA does this by closing a loophole that allowed American businesses to do business with Cuba, while Helms Burton impedes Castro's attempts to seek foreign assistance. If these acts were never passed, US resolve would never have been questioned. The embargo would be maintained and Cuba would still struggle economically, though it would have options that numbed this suffering. But now the US has erased these options and increased the pressure on the Castro regime for a dubious purpose. Castro will not step down before the Cuban system totally collapses. If the economy continues to deteriorate, the death or removal of Castro and the ensuing political collapse may result in Cuba's implosion. If the United States had not passed these acts and ignored loopholes in the embargo, Castro's regime would have been more likely to cling to power. Castro's eventual death would then provide the opportunity for a reassessment of policy and a possible strengthening of economic sanctions. A leader who has just come into power would not be as reluctant to give up his power if it is in the national interest. This possibility is strengthened by the fact that anyone coming into power in Cuba would not immediately assume power as absolute as Castro's. This policy would involve waiting for several years without decisive action, but the embargo has already been around for 34 years. It is not advisable to engage in rash action that may work against the purposes of a policy that has existed for decades. In practical terms it is pointless to discuss what the US should have done. Of greater importance is how it should alter its current policy. Unfortunately, the Cuban Democracy Act and the Helms Burton Act have already been signed into law. It is true that Clinton may still invoke the waiver process on Helms Burton, but doing so would destroy the very resolve that Helms Burton was established to display. This might be for the best in the Cuban situation, but it would also have a detrimental effect on how other nations may perceive US resolve in future situations. For the same reason the US cannot be lax in enforcing the provisions in both acts, including the lawsuits permitted by Helms Burton. There is little for the US Government to do now except hope that Cuba does not collapse, survives the death of Castro, and makes it to a time when lasting change may be possible and the decades-old embargo may achieve its purpose of a free and independent Cuba. APPENDIX 1 Tanter, Raymond "Rational Decision-Making: Efficiency of Choice and Reasonableness of Estimates". September 11, 1995. 2 Tanter, Raymond "Fourth Wave Deterrence: Psychology of Deterrence". October 5, 1994. 3 Jervis, Robert, Lebow, Richard, and Stein, Janice (eds.). PSYCHOLOGY AND DETERRENCE. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1985. 4 Sakey, Marcus "A Thousand Ways of Wounding: Cuban Democracy and the American Government". December 5, 1995. 5 Cuba Freedom Pages, http://www.jmbco.com/ 6 Cuba Freedom Pages 7 Statistical Web Sites, "Testimony: Hon. Mark L. Schneider, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere". 8 CIA World Factbook, http://www.ic.gov/94fact/country/63.html 9 CIA World Factbook 10 CIA World Factbook 11 University of Texas record of Castro's speeches. Castro, Fidel. January 29, 1994. 12 CIA World Factbook 13 Cuba, University of Texas. Draft of a Law on Foreign Investment, http://www.cubaweb.cu/invertir/flaim.html 14 Cuban Democracy Act, http://www.icanect.net/~canfnet/cnaf-lib/torricel.txt 15 Department of State Foreign Affairs Network, Testimony of Alexander Watson, gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/OF-1%3A12453%3A95/03/16%20Testimony%2C%20Wat 16 Cuban Democracy Act 17 Cuban Democracy Act 18 Helms Burton Act, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:HR00927 19 Department of State Foreign Affairs Network, Testimony of Edward Casey, gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/OF-1%3A12453%3A95/06/30%20Testimony 20 Helms Burton Act 21 Cuba: Hardening of the Blockade, http://www.web.apc.org/sugarworker/industry/co960331.html 22 White House Virtual Library: Press Briefing By Mike McCurry, March 12, 1996. 23 US State Department: Cuba Human Rights Practices, 1995, gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/OF-1%3A23367%3ACuba 24 Cuba Human Rights Practices, 1995 25 Testimony of Alexander Watson 26 CIA DCI Speech: "Worldwide Threat Assessment". 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