Kristin McLean "Washington's Green Light to Tehran for Arms to Sarajevo via Zagreb?" Unpublished Paper Prepared for Political Science 472, the University of Michigan, (Spring 1996). PROBLEM: Why did the USG give the "green light" for Iranian arms to be sent to Bosnia by way of Croatia, and what are the implications for peace in the Balkans? The collapse of Yugoslavia was foreshadowed in 1987 when Slobodan Milosevic came into power. He desired to create a communist-nationalist, Serbian hegemon over Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (recognized as nations in 1992), through a policy of repression and ethnic cleansing. Needless to say, this idea was not supported by Milosevic's "future" subordinates. They resolved not to remain in a Yugoslavia under his regime. Thus, Yugoslavia disintegrated and a war began between the Muslims, Croats and Serbs in June 1991. In September of 1991, the international community decided to impose a U.N. arms embargo on these countries (Resolution 713) to subdue the strife and prevent the deaths of those caught in the cross fire. But, this left the Serbs with an unfair advantage, because the weaponry from Josip Broz Tito's Yugoslav army remained with them. Meanwhile, the Bush administration was against intervention, even though the secret service knew that 95% of the Serb's heavy arms could be quickly destroyed. The N.S.A. had satellite cameras pointed at Bosnia, and the Pentagon had sent its espionage planes to assess the situation. One diplomat was quoted as saying, "Our views came from Belgrade. Croats were regarded as dangerous pub's trouble-makers and Muslims as mystics." The war continued, lives lost. Pressures for intervention from the U.S. allies began to mount during the Clinton Administration. The U.S. Congress voted twice to lift the embargo- once in January of 1994 by an 87 to 9 vote and again in August of 1995, but the USG was not supportive of a unilateral lift. They said that it would antagonize the U.S. allies (namely Britain and France), endanger the U.S. military stationed in the region, and weaken the sanctions against nations like Syria, Libya and Iraq. Hence, why was the green light given? Bosnia had many friends in the Islamic community who were willing to send them arms. They were desperate. In early April of 1994, the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman asked Embassador Peter Galbraith whether the U.S. would object to Iranian arm's shipments to Croatia. Without consent from Congress, the response from Clinton: "no instructions." The U.S. would have rather seen the arms supplied by a friendlier country, but the U.N. arms embargo was still in effect. At the time, the feeling was "just as a drowning person cannot be particular about who has thrown him a life jacket, a dying nation, a nation under death siege, as Bosnia was at that time, cannot be particular about who gives it arms." As a result, when the arms actually went into Bosnia, National Security Advisor Tony Lake said that the U.S. was "standing mute". But, the decision to send "no instructions" gave rise to different misperceptions, thus hampering the concept of a unitary actor in decision making. Misperceptions are factors interfering with an intended stimulus reaching its receptor. The receptor may engross in wishful thinking if the message is misperceived, because the receptor's needs may be influencing their perceptions. The result may create a motivated bias (seeing what one wants to see). First, "no instructions" is a diplomatic code for "no response". This reply was sent, because the USG neither approved nor objected to the shipments; but it did not want to say "no", given the present conditions. However, Tudjman was confused by the answer and asked Galbraith and Charles Redman (then chief negotiator in the Balkan crisis) what it entailed. The instructions were the same. Then, on May 6, 1994, Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott told Galbraith that the Administration did not want a word of giving the "green or amber light" to Croatia to get out. The U.S. devised this system of diplomatic signaling in mainly red and amber lights with a damage limitation function in mind. Professor Raymond Tanter says that they are unlikely to be effective and may result in misperceptions. But, a light , be it "go" or "caution" was not directly given. There is a difference between "no instructions" and a "green light". Nonetheless, Galbraith replied that anything less than a flat out "no" will be perceived by Croatia as a green light, no matter how it is worded. In this case, Croatia had a motivated bias, because it is seeing what it wants to see in the instructions. However, Congress claims that it knew nothing of this "covert" operation, thus thwarting a decision made by a unitary actor. Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole says that, yes, Congress knew about the shipments to Iran, but they did not know that the President and his advisors had given the "green light". He argues that this type of decision did not allow for doubts to be heard. Because Congress was not involved in the decision making, bureaucratic politics was used. Bureaucratic politics relaxes the assumption of a unified actor with a single overarching interest. Both parties, Clinton and Congress, perceived Serbia's threat on Bosnia. But, they saw different approaches to solving the problem. Clinton wanted to send the "green light", Congress wanted to lift the embargo altogether. Therefore, Clinton perceived the U.S. national interest as appeasing the allies and keeping troops out of Bosnia, where Congress simply wanted to balance the weapons capabilities as a way of maximizing organizational and personal interests. Because there was a lack of shared values, this facilitated the use of bureaucratic politics explanations. But, it also gave Congress a false impression of U.S. policy and the belief that the Administration could not find a practical way to help the Bosnians. In response to Dole's allegations, Clinton defends that no laws were broken in giving the "no instructions" reply. President Bush had vetoed an intelligence bill when he was in office that said that the President did not have to inform Congress of an action that Congress requested or that they took no action on. In other words, the President was not obligated to report what other countries were doing. Rep. Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut defends this view in a May, 9 Senate record. He says that the instructions did not constitute an action, and that the intelligence information was available to the pertinent committees, the leaders of Congress and their staff . Mainly, many Democrats believe that these accusations are no more than an election year "witch hunt." Clinton was informed of Bosnia's weak condition that spawned the arms trans- shipment request. He then argues that he was faced with a military urgency to make a decision. But, this apparent haste could have created a motivated bias for Clinton, thus lowering the rationality of the decision. Motivated biases, according to Robert Jervis, arise from agitations from conflicts. They affect threat perception, because they depend on one's needs to see an adversary as a threat, to decipher what kind of threat it is and the best way to handle it. Motivated biases may over or underestimate threat perceptions. Clinton may have believed that the exigency surrounding the situation was more than it was, causing him to see what he wanted to see. Therefore, he will face a high price in the future as reality shapes and defeats policy. Thomas Schelling would argue that haste has a detrimental influence on decision making. In fact, it is the greatest source of danger, because one may not be able to assess the potentially destructive power of the decision and the risk of waiting to be sure that the its urgency actually exists. Although, Clinton could argue that an actual lifting of the embargo would take U.N. approval and time. He could not wait to act, because it might be too late. Schelling might also say that the circumstances surrounding Clinton's decision made it seem as if he had no other choice but to respond the way that he did, like throwing the steering wheel out in a game of chicken. But, Patrick Morgan may argue that this decision making environment actually goes against rationality. It would seem that Clinton would be trying to suspend his capacity for a rational choice, or claim that it does not exist, or that Bosnia's rational appraisal of the situation was so incomplete that it too was deceived about the actual magnitude of the threat. Nevertheless, many argue that it was the best decision. Peter Tarnoff (Undersecretary of State for political affairs) said that it was the best option, at the time, to help the Bosnians fight Serb aggression while not disrupting America's delicate diplomatic arrangements in the region. For one, Britain and France said that they would withdraw their forces from the area if the U.S. lifted the embargo, because they did not see the conflict as a direct threat to their national interests. "Bosnia is not worth one British life..we should be getting out straight away," comments conservative member of Parliament, Terry Dicks. They would rather have seen a firmer commitment from Clinton and reinvigorated peace talks. One British minister described the notion of armament as "pouring petrol on a raging fire", because they believed that this decision would actually escalate the killings. Other than possible retaliation from the allies, there were reasons why the U.S. did not just lift the arms embargo in tandem with Congress's vote, which could have avoided some of the decision's repercussions. First, it would require a tremendous commitment, both militarily and financially, for the U.S. Remember, the U.S. was against intervention in the first place. For example, the U.S. did not send preventative troops and had refused to match 6,000 French parachutists in the region. The U.S. claimed it would be too expensive and nothing of this sort had been done before. The C.I.A. exclaimed that 100,000 soldiers would be needed to simply secure the Split-Sarajevo Corridor. The armed forces would also be required to deliver the weapons, putting them in harm's way. Once the arms were delivered, it would be U.S. responsibility to train the Bosnians to overcome the Serb superiority. Furthermore, being that the allies said they would evacuate if the embargo were lifted, the U.S. would have to take over much of the humanitarian aid and make up much of the ground troops. More importantly, the U.S. could have set a precedent for ignoring U.N. resolutions, had the embargo been lifted. As a result, Talbott argues, nations like Iran may decide to even provide troops to Bosnia, increasing the Iranian presence in Bosnia. Nonetheless, other proposals of intervention (besides armament) were researched, but rejected. General Colin Powell locked them in a drawer and said, "I wage war in the desert, not in the mountains." Michael Klare could argue that this situation was likely to happen, because the Serbs do not really seem to be a strong, rogue elephant. A rogue state is anti-Western, involved in illegal arms activities and poses a threat to U.S. international security. Furthermore, even though intervention was not desired in the first place, Powell's successful two-war strategy in the desert (Iraq) might not apply to the mountains (Bosnia). The U.S. also did not have strong trade or political connections with Bosnia, like the strong oil dependency was on Kuwait . Therefore, Clinton gave the "green light". It can be argued that he made this decision from a "basement of fear." If this is the case, Clinton greatly perceived a threat of Serb forces on the Muslims. By giving the "no instructions" reply, he was trying to minimize his losses, because he was afraid that Bosnia might fall, or that more U.S. troops would be needed to intervene. Clinton would be more afraid to lose than to win, because people usually weigh losses more heavily than gains. In hindsight, then Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrook said that he did not think that the Muslims would make it through a third winter. Gorazde (a town in Eastern Bosnia that was formerly a U.N. safe area) was nearly overrun, and the defenders were practically out of bullets. Sarajevo was also surrounded. The Serbs had cut off their electricity, water and food. Over half of the population had fled their homes. They could not return, because irate Serbs are blocking them with sticks and rocks. More importantly, one official said, "the great fear in the State Department was that if the war was one sided, America would get drawn in. So the task was to stop it from appearing one sided." Clinton may have wanted to even out the capabilities to deter and persuade the Serbs from further use of force. Deterrence is the process where a defender seeks to get a potential adversary not to take an action. First, the concept assumes that the adversary's intentions will be self-evident. The defender can judge these intentions, and the adversary's military capabilities, to foretell the influence of perceptions on the possibility of deterrence. Therefore, Clinton's decision was an act of "coercive diplomacy". Bosnia is now armed in order to make Serbia believe that Bosnia can stand firm, and has the power to fend off attack. Success would end in Serbia's retreat. Morgan adds that the persuasiveness of the message about counter capabilities determines deterrence success or failure. This deterrence mechanism will work if Bosnia's Critical Risk (ratio of one's rewards versus the likelihood that one will stand firm) is higher than Serbia's credibility of challenging deterrence, and Serbia regresses. Bosnia would also be establishing commitment by using the arms, communicating to the Serbs that they have no other options. These actions would be like posting a sign reading "Beware of Dog", because Bosnia would be convincing Serbia of their willingness of intent to defend their commitments. But, according to Janice Stein, the inheriting of additional military capabilities will not be enough in the long run, if Serbia is frustrated or is highly motivated. One French official agreed, and said that it was a big mistake to think that the best way to keep peace is to create military balance. He advised to take away the Serbs' guns. Deterrence will also fail if Serbia interprets Bosnia's acquisition of arms as proof of their own weakening resolve, especially if Bosnia's resolve is not yet credible, or if the discrepancies between the two forces are all encompassing. Persuasion, as opposed to strategy, could also be used as a deterrence method, because Serbia's proverbial "black box" is open. The U.S. knows what the Serbs' interests are- Serbia also wants to minimize their losses and uphold the government that they are dying for. More importantly, persuasion can be used because the U.S. is not actually providing the arms. Therefore, the Serbs may eventually believe that it is in their best interest to retreat, because they are not being offered carrots or threatened with sticks by the USG. Persuasion will provide to be cost effective in the future as well. The Serbs will feel compelled to retreat again and again by an action that threatens to hurt them. Costs, on the other hand, will mount with promises and threats. Strategy is also doomed to failure in the long run, and once it is used, persuasion is impossible. An underlying reason that the U.S. would not use a strategy approach is that they wanted the war to end with no "winners", the U.S. did not want to single out Serbia for blame. But, an end to the war can not happen until Serbian offensive stops and believes that Bosnia will not give up. On the other hand, Clinton could have been acting from a Rwindow of opportunityS when he made his decision. For various reasons, he has been accused of not showing resolve and commitment in regards to Bosnia. For example, France talks about U.S. "spinelessness" in policy making. Schelling says that a commitment should acquire political involvement. Yes, few knew about the decision, but the President and Congress did not act as a unitary actor, as aforementioned. Schelling also states that diplomacy can either strengthen or weaken commitments. But, Clinton failed to strengthen his assurance to Bosnia in this sense, when he sent Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Bosnia to listen and not to persuade to end the strife. Critics argue that Clinton would rather appear weak in Bosnia, than risk diverging from his domestic agenda. However, Richard Lebow would say that Clinton needs to act tough if he is concerned with the U.S. international reputation in the context of unresolved domestic problems. Because these accusations can be damaging, Clinton wants to show the Republicans, and the Americans when election day comes around, that he did not sit by idly and watch Bosnia dismantle. Clinton also needed to show credibility. The best way to do this, according to Morgan, is to join one's reputation to the commitment. Clinton accomplished this when he said that the U.S. has moral, strategic and military interests in Bosnia. But, Bush Administration officials claim that Clinton has made his own reputation assailable by making this statement. Lebow, in the end, claims that one of the weaknesses influencing foreign policy is a paranoia for credibility, because one may feel as if he is always on the defensive. Lebow also says that if the challenge is of important interest or the commitment is likely, then military preparations are made to show resolve. This was Clinton's situation given the arms embargo and his desire to help the Muslims. Furthermore, the President did not want to keep troops in Bosnia any longer than needed. He wants to remain true to his promises to the them. On March 28, 1996, Rep. Ike Skelton (from Missouri) wrote a letter to Clinton in response to a New York Times article that said U.S. forces should stay in Bosnia for longer than a year. He claims that this mistake would discredit the administration's word that the forces would only be there for that specific length of time. Clinton responded that the IFOR ( NATO's peacekeeping implementation force) mission should indeed conclude within this time frame. Christopher agrees, and says that if it should take longer, then maybe peace can not be achieved. Moreover, Skelton argues that it would "break the faith" of the Americans stationed there and confront what the American population was told. Nevertheless, the Muslim-Croat Federation seems unsteady. If forces remained in the region, and the Federation was still dismantled, then troops would undoubtedly be committed to stay for possibly five or ten more years. Mr. Skelton is afraid of taking an "autonomous risk", according to Stein. He does not want to lose control of the decision to bring the troops home as the conflict escalates. The main point of this argument was made by Major General William Nash (Commander of the American troops), the burden for peace is "on the shoulders of the folks who live there." Schelling argues that words are cheap, but actions can not be denied. It appears that Clinton has drawn a "conventional limit" concerning the presence of the forces. The line has been drawn- the troops will deploy in one year. This makes it even more difficult for Clinton to escape his commitment to the troops, because he has attached his honor to it. But, making a decision from a "basement of fear" or a "window of opportunity" may be potentially dangerous for Clinton. He may be acting firmly just to escape his opponents' criticism and to "save face". "Face" is one's reputation combined with the expectations of others. He is challenged with either setting his priorities on domestic problems versus the assumption that domestic peace and prosperity depend on using U.S. power overseas to mold a more amiable international system. Some reasons include his indifferent attitude toward international affairs, his hesitancy to design strategies, effectively state policies or encourage faith. On the other hand, according to Richard Lebow, domestic pressures should not be taken into too much account when forming foreign policies, because they may only be slightly similar to the needs of the nation. Nonetheless, Clinton defends that his decision brought about the peace talks that led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords on November 21, 1995. The accords affirmed a commitment to cease the war, giving fifty-one percent of the Former Yugoslav Territory to Bosnia-Herzegovina and the remaining to Serbia. On February 20, 1996, Clinton said that there has been considerable advancement in the area since Dayton. "The cease fire is holding. The zones of separation are in place. And in Sarajevo, once a dying city haunted by snipers and shells, the markets are filled.. Sarajevo has come back to life, with a future for all of its people." Yet, other sources claim that the Bosnian and Muslim Governments are not complying with Dayton. One reference says that the opposing forces are using the supposed cease fire as an occasion to rest and rearm. There is no indication of trying to live in ethnic harmony. For example, the Muslim government allowed gangs to coerce the Serbs who had stayed in Bosnia, to leave. One Serb General (Zdravko Tolimir) purposefully did not show up to a meeting with other military leaders from Bosnia and Croatia to discuss the end of Serbia's boycott of such meetings. Bosnia also had not expelled the Iranian forces that supplied them with arms, and there is a fear of the continuing spread of influence. When Clinton first gave the "green light", consequences for peace in the area were soon to follow. Rep Lincoln Diaz-Balart of Florida posed the question in a congressional meeting, did the White House permit a mortal enemy of the U.S. to establish or inspire a military presence in Europe? In this question, the "mortal enemy" is Iran. According to Klare, Iran is a rogue state. He says that the Iranian, authoritarian leaders have expressed ill will towards the U.S. It has built up large military foundations that have been deemed as threatening by other nations. Iran is also suspected of trying to obtain nuclear weapons technology and is currently replacing aging weaponry. Moreover, they have been trying to strengthen their regional power in countries, such as Bosnia. Holbrooke says that he knew that the Iranians would try to buy political interest by using arms aid, but the decision was a calculated policy based on choosing between bad options. Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration admits that it gave little consideration to the spread of Iran's presence as a result of the trans-shipments. Lebow would say that policy makers are influenced more by the short term costs of a decision, rather than their dimensions. The weight placed on the short term consequences also rises as the difficulty in determining the likelihood of longer-term costs does. As a result, it seems as if the Iranians are in Bosnia to stay. On the lighter side, some indications include the construction of a new Iranian embassy in Sarajevo and the opening of an Islamic Cultural Center. The mujjahids can also stay in Bosnia as civilians. They will be considered Bosnians who were formally in Islamic units, if they commit to Bosnia-Herzegovina units. The theory is that the ideological and religious differences will be subdued in three years, and the state will become depoliticized. Furthermore, Iran has announced its intrinsic, economic interests in Bosnia. The Iranian Roads and Transportation Minister Akbar Torkan said that both Bosnia and Croatia have high economic potentials. While the war has taken its toll on these countrys' economies, Bosnia's situation improved last year after a visit from Iran's First Vice-President Hassan Habibi. In 1995, the three nations also discussed a joint oil venture. ship and locomotive building, and establishing a transit route for trade with Central Asia through Iran. More importantly, Habibi said that Iran was willing to offer technological and economic expertise, as well as information, to their "friendly brother". After the "green light" was given, small teams of Iranian military advisors arrived in Bosnia to teach them how to use their new weapons. Sixty tons of explosives and raw materials for weapons were sent within days. Advisors were also sent to train the Bosnians to use the anti- tank missiles and help with logistics and weapons factories. Others have been thought to run a "terrorist training school" disguised as a secret intelligence agency outside of Sarajevo. As it stands, some administration officials admit that the Iranians in Bosnia are one of the biggest threats facing American ground troops. As the shipments were occurring, U.S. officials in Croatia became aware that Iranian sponsored terrorists were stalking them. The "terrorists" were reportedly taping embassy personnel, and their families, and seemed ready for attack. There is also a worry about a supposed chemical weapons presence. Iran is already suspected of possessing this type of warhead. But, NATO has found bombing devices in shampoo bottles and toys, along with videos about how to high- jack a vehicle on the highway and kill its passengers, at their base. Thus, in hindsight, it seems as though Clinton's decision to give the "green light" was not a rational choice. His inability to show resolve early on allowed the conflict to escalate to a point that required a hasty decision . As a result, the decision was made without weighing in all of the consequences. He should have realized that no policy could have magically curbed Serb aggression without risking American lives. Therefore, he should have had a clear- cut set of objectives that would not have allowed for certain events to shape policy. If this had been the case, then the allies and Congress would have understood U.S. goals and not have felt betrayed by the decision. He could have also demonstrated his resolve by sticking with the objectives. Otherwise, others would interpret U.S. goals for him, which may result in misperceptions and a lack of confidence in Clinton's policy- making abilities. Also, in order for prospects of peace to have come about earlier, Clinton should have talked tougher, with more authority and credibility. He should not have been timid in his policy- making, because this reflects poorly on the U.S. as well. He should have been willing to take this sort of political gamble, burning the bridges behind him, thus forcing him to make good on his promises. The main interests in the region were humanitarian- to save lives and deter the Serbs from spreading the war. But, Clinton also claimed strategic interests- the U.S. (and his) reputation. He should not have put the U.S. image on the line if he did not have the resolve to come through. He should have stated earlier that a combination of these interests were going to direct and shape the means of achieving realistic goals. Clinton should also have understood that one of the Muslim goals was to regain territory that they had formerly occupied. In order for continued strife to have been avoided, despite a peace settlement, the U.S. should have persuaded the Muslims out of this goal. Because these paths were not followed, Clinton could not act as a unitary actor with Congress and the American public. Even though he claims that his decision, which was actually a decision of inaction, brought about a "cease fire" in the Dayton Peace Accords, neither party seems to be abiding by it. More importantly, his desire to keep U.S. troops out of the conflict has back fired. The embargo has been lifted, and the allies are upset anyway. Five months after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, American officials tried to persuade the allies to support an equip and train program in Bosnia. Their European allies are not convinced that a $500 million program to balance the military forces and deter factions from restarting the war is the right decision. They think that it will do more harm than good. "The Europeans think that if you are madly trying to stamp out a fire, then the last thing you should do is put more fuel on it. The Americans believe that if a big guy is beating up on a little guy, they should give the little guy a bigger stick." European diplomats argue that the arming may even be misperceived by the Serbs as a "green light" for future conflict. Therefore, Clinton should have learned from this experience that it is important to communicate effectively with not only one's allies, but with one's Congress as well. He may not be given the opportunity for a second chance. If he had established his resolve, goals and an effective decision making process from the start-then many would not remember his inability for policy-making come election time, many lives could have been spared, and many of the financial repercussions could have been avoided. This work is Copyright 1996, Kristin McLean in its entirety.