US Foreign Policy towards the Rogue State of Cuba The aim of this paper is to explore the historical and theoretical dynamics of US-Cuban relations, focusing on the years of Fidel Castros reign. In particular, an orientation of this subject will be directed towards understanding why the US has not only maintained, but increased economic sanctions against the former (although claimed non-aligned) soviet satellite, Cuba. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, why has the US continued a policy of economic sanctions against Cuba? I. Theoretical Discussion Of foremost concern in this paper is the definition of a rogue state. In order to understand the dynamics of US-Cuban relations, it is necessary to, first, comprehend the context of the situation. The definition of a rogue state relates to the involvement in any or all of the following activities: the support of international terrorism, involvement in the international drug trade, and the development of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical) WMDs. In the post-Cold War years, any state involving itself in the above activities becomes perceived as a member of the rogue states by the USG, and relations with them are handled accordingly. . Rogue Doctrine of the US views rogue states as a threat to world order. The activities of rogue states are perceived to be threatening and aggressive to their less powerful neighbors, inhibiting towards the spread of democracy, and contrary to the norms against nuclear and chemical weapons proliferation.1 Due to this high threat perception, the US imposes a policy of trade sanctions or seeks military action against the aggressive rogue state.2 The main policy tool of the US in dealing with rogue states has become economic sanctions. With the threat of nuclear weapons and military action often left unfitting, trade restrictions have filled this void in foreign policy. Although rogue actors are becoming less concerned with the elements of successful deterrence (resolve, risk calculations, and relative capabilities), the changing world order has increased the importance of sanction in coercive policies. In this manner, the limited cognitive structures of rogue states has become a difficult challenge to implementing successful policy. Economic sanctions refer to nonmilitary, punitive actions by one nation against another nations production and distribution of goods and services. Economic Sanctions can take two forms: rehabilitative or retributive. Rehabilitative sanctions focus on an undesirable behavior and seeks to end them. An example of this type of sanction would be an embargo against a country that seeks to develop nuclear weapons. This type of sanction would not be lifted until the targeted country ended its nuclear weapons program. Retributive sanctions seek to right a wrong. This type of sanction does not seek to change a policy, but rather punish a given action. Economic sanction work on the basis of deterrence and compellence. The threat of economic sanctions often deters states from embarking upon undesirable courses of action. In addition, economic sanctions in place demonstrate the US resolve in dealing with future aggressors. In this manner, sanctions are seen to be a creditable force from the threatening stage on, due to the above example. Economic sanctions can, also, function as a means of compellence. When economic sanctions are enacted, they initiate an action towards the intended target that can be repealed upon the desired response. In this way, undesirable actions can be remedied even after their occurrence. At the root of deterrence and compliance is the Rational Actor Theory. This theory assumes that an actor will choose the option that maximizes expected gain when possible or minimizes expected losses. Following this is Prospect Theory, where actors are said to be basically loss avoidant, and will not focus on maximizing their gains but minimizing their losses. In relation to economic sanctions, leaders will not seek gains if the costs are perceived to be higher. However, if the situation is set up in a way that the actor only perceives fear and loss, they will not comply. Due to the circumstances surrounding the relationship between the US and Cuba, economic sanctions have become the main policy tool in trying to obtain desired Cuban behavior. The use of these sanctions is the result of an interwoven history between the two countries. The troubled relationship between the US and Cuba is mainly the result of conflicting precedence. With a great deal of misperception and opportunistic policy on the part of both countries, the troubled situation between the two nations still remains far from resolved. Set in the framework of history and geopolitics, the fact that the US and Cuba would someday clash, appears to be the inevitable result of two colliding systems. II. Brief History of a Colliding US-Cuban Future Cuba: colony, sugar, revolution Cuba is an island in the Caribbean basin. Discovered on Columbuss first voyage in 1492, Cuba became a long lasting Spanish Colony. The Spanish established a typical export-oriented society on the tropical American island. Although the economy of Cuba initially languished under the rigid mercantilist policies of the Spanish crown, the nineteenth century ushered in dramatic change. The reforms of Charles III (1759-88) provided the opportunity for Cuban growth. After this, Cuba became an agricultural phenomenon. Initial effort towards coffee production gave way to the cultivation of tobacco. Cuban tobacco became a major crop by the mid-century, and it maintains a favorable reputation today. However, the product that would most profoundly effect the Cuban economy, society, and history would be sugarcane. Sugarcane would become Cubas most important source of wealth. By 1860, nearly a third of the worlds sugar supply came from Cuba. Although sugar exports would generate tremendous revenue for the colony and crown, the sheer amount of energy required in the sugarcane cultivation resulted in a nightmarish slave trade. Between 1800-1865, more than 600,000 Africans were brought to Cuba in chains. Slavery lasted until 1886, longer than anywhere else in the Americas except Brazil. Cubas economic development followed the typical Latin American example: a monocultural, slave-based, single-export dominated agricultural society. Cubas history differed, however, on its long continuation as a Spanish colony. The first major uprising, Ten Years War (1868-1878), was a failed attempt at independence, as it proved unable to gain elite support and was crushed by Spanish troops. But Spains political control of the island was slowly beginning to erode as the US invested more heavily during the following 1880s. The close proximity of Cuba to the US, and its distance from Spain, influenced strong bonds to develop between the US and Cuba. Initially, these ties formed out of economic interest. The booming sugar industry of Cuba offered many financial opportunities. In fact, US economic interests increased so greatly during these years that numerous offers to purchase the island were advanced, but refused by the Spanish. Regardless of formalities, Cuba was being drawn more and more into US orbit, and many prominent Cubans were beginning to strongly favor annexation. Equally strong were US expansionist sentiments fuel by Manifest Destiny and growing importance of the Monroe Doctrine. Conditions developing both inside the US and Cuba were rapidly bringing the two nations closer. A new revolt broke out in 1895, and it was only a matter of time before the US was drawn into the conflict. Aside of the economic incentives for involvement, a new link was forming between the US and Cuba. Journalists, religious and other community leaders began to demand US recognition of the anti-Spanish rebels, and voiced support for Cuban independence. The expansionist urge in the US became a duality of those who sought to benefit economically and those who saw a mission to politically help the Cubans. This foreshadowed the beginning of future conflicting motives for involvement in the island. After the mysterious explosion of the USS Maine in April 1898, a hesitant President McKinley was forced into action by public outcry. Congress promptly declared war on Spain, and the ill-equipped Spaniards lost in a humiliating defeat. In December 1898, the result of the Spanish-American war, Spain was forced to grant Cuba independence.3 US: from the Monroe Doctrine to the Platt Amendment US relations in Cuba had not always been one of political entanglement. Before the Monroe Doctrine, and even sometime after it, the US remained relatively neutral in the affairs of other states in the Western Hemisphere. For example, from 1826-1845 there exist numerous accounts of US officials expressing their concerns that Spain should retain Cuba.4 Sometimes the direct cries for US protection from European influence was blatantly ignored.5 Even the first debates (1857-1858) about purchasing Cuba made no references to the Monroe Doctrine.6 These issues were examined from a pragmatic stance that made no reference to any particular US policy regarding the Western Hemisphere. This politically neutral policy was soon to change. The Monroe Doctrine developed from a message the President sent to Congress on December 2, 1823. ...The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered subjects for future colonization by any European power...... We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledge, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.7 The above message was not originally intended to be a Doctrine, but rather a powerful policy stance. The first usage of the message in policy matters referred to it as the principles of President Monroe. This latter developed into the declaration and then to the dignified appellation and finally the Monroe Doctrine.8 The Monroe Doctrine became the foundation for US involvement in the Western Hemisphere. Its overall message detailed the US view of any foreign invasion or influence in the Western Hemisphere to be seen as a direct threat to US national security. In the future, the Monroe Doctrine would be the justification for any US involvement in the Western Hemisphere; arguing that the Western Hemisphere was the US sphere of influence. The US believed that it had adequate reason for intervening in the affairs of Latin America, this proved especially true in Cuba. By 1901, US officials began to exercise the power derived from the Monroe Doctrine, and sought to demonstrate this resolve to the world. On January 9, 1901, Secretary Root wrote: We now have, by virtue of our occupation of Cuba and the terms under which sovereignty was yielded by Spain, a right to protect her which all foreign nations recognize. It is of great importance to Cuba that that right, Resting upon the treaty of Paris and derived through that treaty from the sovereignty of Spain, should never be terminated by should be continued by a reservation, with the consent of the Cuban people, at the time when the authority which we now exercise is placed in their hands. If we should simply turn the government over to the Cuban administration, retire from the island, and then turn round to make a treaty with the new government, just as we would make treaties with Venezuela, and Brazil, and England, and France, no foreign State would recognize any longer on our part to interfere in any quarrel which she might have with Cuba, unless that interference were based upon an assertion of the Monroe Doctrine. But the Monroe Doctrine is not a part of international law and has never been recognized by European nations. How soon some one of these nations may feel inclined to test the willingness of the United States to make war in support of her assertion of that doctrine, no one can tell. It would be quite unfortunate for Cuba if it should be tested there.9 With the same spirit of American prowess in the Western Hemisphere, General Wood called the Constitutional Assembly of Cuba together on November 5, 1900, and delivered the following: It will be your duty, first, to frame and adopt a Constitution for Cuba, and, when that has been done, to formulate what, in your opinion, ought to be the relations between Cuba and the United States. The Constitution must be adequate to secure a stable, orderly, and free government. When you have formulated the relations which, in your opinion, ought to exist between Cuba and the United States, the Government of the United States will doubtless take such action on its part as shall lead to a final and authoritative agreement between the people of the two countries to the promotion of their common interests. All friends of Cuba will follow your deliberations with the deepest interest, earnestly desiring that you shall reach just conclusions, and, that by the dignity, individual self-restraint, and wise conservatism which shall characterize you proceedings, the capacity of the Cuban people for representative government may be signally illustrate. The fundamental distinction between true representative government and dictatorship is that in the former every representative of the people, in whatever office, confines himself strictly within the limits of his defined powers. Without such restraint there can be no free constitutional government. Under the order pursuant to which you have been elected and convened, you have no duty and no authority to take part in the present government of the Island. Your powers are strictly limited by the terms of that order.10 The US through successive actions began its commitment for future involvement in the affairs of Cuba. From the terms of which kind government to establish to the final authoritative approval, the US began its precedence in Cuba. Eventhough the Cubans were given instructions make their own government based on democracy, the final authority of approval was US. The final right to intervene in Cuban affairs was actually written into the new Cuban Constitution, the Platt Amendment. Although this inspired Cuban protest, the US forced its incorporation to ensure the US envisioned path of democracy. The Platt Amendment gave the US the right to oversee the Cuban economy, veto international commitments, and intervene in domestic politics at the US discretion. The US set a precedence in Cuba for a US inspired democracy. From the very beginning, the US stated their role in the island, and predicted future involvement. This would become much more than simple economic interest, as the US would desire a democracy in a country close to the US Southern border. From the Monroe Doctrine to the Platt Amendment, the US expressed commitment to an active role in the Cuba. The US demonstrated this resolve in the Spanish-American war, and set future concerns to follow the same. Most importantly was the US perception of just involvement, that US involvement in Cuba was not a mere guise for financial profits. The US viewed itself as morally dedicated in bringing about democracy in the island of Cuba. III. Failed Expansionism Makings of a Revolution Under US military occupation, Cuba began its troubled independence. The first goal of the US, however, would be the establishment of democracy before renewed investment in the island. The first US action was to disband the rebel army in an effort to prevent future opposition to democracy. Although the US main effort focused on democracy, the overall US view of the time perceived political, economic, and moral issues to be interconnected. Accordingly, schools and hospitals were built in addition to roads and mills. It was hoped that a viable infrastructure and economy would facilitate a successful new democracy. After three invasions of the island, the US goal of Cuban democracy began to seem impossible. The first president, Tomas Estrada Palma (1902-1906), acquired a second term through election fraud. The subsequent riots brought the second US occupation from 1906-1909. Then gain in 1917, the US was forced to occupy the island because of corrupt Cuban politics. The well-deserved Cuban reputation for corrupt politics undermined the US vision of a Cuban democracy. Because of electoral fraud, rioting, and overall political corruption, the US came and went from the island hoping to have restored permanent order each time. Debate during the time accused Cuba of lacking a democratic spirit that the US was morally obligated to export. In the economic capacity of importing and exporting, the US and Cuba were integrated partners. The US became the main purchaser of 75-80% of total Cuban sugar produced. The 1903 Trade Agreement cut 20% off sugar tariffs for Cuba in exchange for the same off American goods. However, favorable policy strained domestic politics in the US. A considerable lobbying battle was waged between the Cuban importers and investors on one side against the US beet sugar producers and investors on the other side. This rivalry jeopardized the main product and source of revenue that Cuba depended upon. And it represented a serious threat to Cubas main industry, sugar. The collapse of the world economy in 1929 brought serious hardship to Cuba. In addition to the already depreciating sugar prices, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 further injured Cubas main source of revenue. It was during this time that the Cuban politics became the most brutal in the nations history. This would negatively influence the coming communist dictator, Fidel Castro. During his formative political years, Castro would formulate a mental model connecting democracy to US imperialism and political corruption. The first of many manipulating dictators was Gerardo Machado. After his 1925 election, he used his powers to ensure an unbeatable position at the ballot box. The activist President Roosevelt took a more critical stance towards Machado than previous US Presidents had towards Cubas dictators. In August 1933, a general strike was waged against the dictator. The strike gained support from radical students to embittered elites. A frightened Machado fled the country, and a Cuban Army NCO, Sergeant Fulgencio Batista, assumed control. Batistas initial leftist stances frightened the US. But Batistas lust for power and wealth consumed him, and his frighteningly communistic beginnings evaporated. This situation can be linked to the misperception of Castros intentions by the US. Most Latin American dictators used populist means to obtain support that were quickly abandoned for the quest of wealth and power. It is doubtless that US officials falsely believed that Castro would follow the same path Batista had only twenty-five years before. As Batista turned away from communism incentives were added, the Platt Amendment was repealed for the Good Neighbor Policy. The US sought to end the big-stick policy that had characterized the US involvement in Latin America. In addition, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1934 passed by Congress established a favorable 28% quota for Cuban sugar that lasted (mostly unchanged) until 1960. This was then augmented by the Jones-Catigan Act that guaranteed favorably high prices for Cuban sugar. Although favorable trade policy maintained friendly relations between Batista and the US, Batista did not extend the same friendliness to his own nation. With the threat of swift US intervention withdrawn, Batista ruled his own Cuba harshly. Whether Batista or a Batista controlled puppet-president, corruption and oppression scared Cuban politics. The deplorable conditions of Cuba caused tremendous political stability. Violence plagued the nation. It would only be a matter of time before revolution would upset the order and involve the economically attached US. Betrayal The most prominent Cuban revolutionary was Fidel Castro, the son of a successful Spanish immigrant. Born in 1927, he rejected a life of privilege for the violence of Cuban politics. At a time when the students were the most abrasive towards the Batista regime, Castro was another pistol brandishing student-revolutionary. At the start, however, Castro had always distanced himself from the communist student parties and groups, favoring nationalism instead. In 1953 on July 26, Castro led 165 students in an attack against an army barracks. The rebellion quickly quelled, and one of Castros first attempt at revolution earned him fifteen years in jail. After serving only eleven months, he was released and fled to Mexico to regroup. In 1956, Castro returned to Cuba to continue where he left off. In coordination with other anti-Batista groups, Castro landed on the island with 82 men to join the what turned out to be a failed uprising, and got lost. Retreating into the Sierra Maestra, he was forgotten until discovered by Herbert Matthews, a New York Times journalist. Matthews articles during 1957 railed the Batista regime, and inflated Castros prestige as a nationalist reformer. Castro gained instant international status, and Batista lost even more creditability. An attrition style of revolutionary warfare slowly wore down Batistas forces, and resulted in harsh reprisals. The Eisenhower Administration was continually forced to re-evaluate relations with Batista due to the terrible atrocities committed by Batistas counterinsurgency efforts. Early in 1958, the Eisenhower Administration worn down by continual domestic pressure to back away from the Batista regime began to abandon the failing regime. On March 14, arms destine for Batista were held at the docks in New York. By mid-1958, the US completely abandoned the Batista government, while other American sources delivered support and arms to Castro. State Department William Wieland, in charge of the Caribbean department, early in 1957 originally stated: I know Batista is considered by many as a sonofabitch....but American interests come first... at least he is our sonofabitch. Latter that year he stated to the Ambassador to Havana: You are assigned to Cuba to preside over the downfall of Batista. The decision has been taken that Batista has to go.11 In less than a year, the US stance toward Batista radically changed. Support was shifted to the assumed Cuban nationalist reformer, Castro. From the State Department to the CIA, Castro was believed to be the viable option in Cuba, and support flowed accordingly.12 Dramatically on New Years Eve 1958, Batista fled Cuba, and Castro filled the political vacuum. But the believed Cuban nationalist showed different colors once in power, surprising former US supporters. The leftist situation of Castro assumption of power did not evaporate as it had during Batistas beginnings. As the US witnessed, the situation went from bad to worse. Originally only the Commander-in-Chief of Cuba, Castro immediately manipulated his way to total control of Cuba within months. Revolutionary courts tried and execute hundreds during this time, and relations with the US began to sour. In April 1959, Castro went to New York to address the United Nations. While there, Castro projected an image of a nationalist reformer opposed to foreign intervention, but not a communist. Regardless of the speech in New York, Castros domestic policy demonstrated the opposite. Castros Agrarian Reform Law of May 17, 1959 began the expropriation of all farms over 1000 acres. In addition to this first step toward communism, Castro positioned a communist, Nunez Jimenez, to operate the department of agrarian reform. By the end of this year, Castro no longer hide his anti-American feelings. In a dispute over oil refinery, Castro had nationalized American oil refineries. In response, President Eisenhower suspended the sugar quota. By 1960 Cuba was a communist country in everything but name. Castro had placed communists in all important positions of government, nationalized the economy, swung to the Soviet bloc, established a totalitarian regime, and launched an egalitarian socioeconomic policy. When Castro declared his position as a dedicated Marxist-Leninist in December 1961, the event seemed very anachronistic. IV. Cold War Foreign Policy in Action: Castro vs. US After Castros announcement that he was a committed Marxist, a tremendous shift in world power occurred. Cuba, an island at points no more than forty miles from the US border, became a Soviet satellite. This abrupt transformation from a dependent ally into a Soviet satellite shook the US establishment. Castro owed much of his success to US support. Castro had benefited from the assistance of the US State Department to the CIA. And this radical change angered many, that has in no doubt inspired much of the harshness that continues to characterize US-Cuban relations. Many within the US urged for an immediate US invasion of Cuba. However, in the tradition of Caribbean politics, an exile force was decided upon instead. A proposal supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA called for the use of 12,000 armed Cuban exiles, the Cuban Liberation Corps, to land at Cubas Bay of Pigs. Originally approved by Eisenhower, Kennedy allowed the plan to go ahead on 17 April 1961. The result was a disastrous failure. The Bay of Pigs disaster provided Castro with the excuse to consolidate his power, and elevated tensions between the US and Cuba. In addition, the Bay of Pigs gave Castro the needed evidence for a stance against US imperialism and aggression, a theme that is still in use today. In 1960, Khrushchev had threaten the use of nuclear weapons in the defense of Cuban socialism. In October 1962, Khrushchev decided to install nuclear weapons facilities directly on the island of Cuba. An unprecedented challenge, the USSR already had long range missiles on Russian soil. The placement of additional missiles in Cuba upset the delicate nuclear balance. Kennedy demanded the immediate withdraw of the nuclear missiles, and sent battleships to quarantine the island. Khrushchev complied, but only after agreements had been made. One of the most important agreement made during the Cuban Missile Crisis, in relation to the US-Cuban future, was a US promise to never militarily invade Cuba. Although Khruchshev has been criticized for his irrational decision to place nuclear missiles, the USSR gained more than it lost in the initial bargaining with the US. From the Cuban Missile Crisis on, the main US tool against the communist-dictator Castro has been limited to economic sanctions because of the above promise to end the crisis. Of other importance during the crisis was the fact that Castro was never consulted at any stage of the negotiation. In Castros desire to be free of US dependence, he became linked to the Soviet Union. The reality of the Cuban economy is that its single-export weakness makes it dependence prone. By the mid-1960s, Cuba had only substituted a US for a Soviet influenced economy; and the economy of Cuba became fully integrated into the Soviet bloc. Many of the problems burdening Cuba today are a result of that choice made thirty-five years ago. The chaotic economic condition of Cuba today is the corresponding result of the Soviet blocs failure and Cubas dependence on the Soviet bloc. This has been further complicated by Cubas role as the Soviet Unions mercenary. In the exportation of Revolution, Castros regime has been permanently branded as a supporter of international terrorism, and is now burdened with the rogue nation status. In short, Castros Cold War opportunism has led him into the present basement of fear. V. The Economic Sanctions In 1962, the US imposed an embargo on Cuba. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations issued by the USG on 8 July 1963 in accordance to the Trading with the Enemy Act still remain relatively unchanged today; administered by the Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control. The Kennedy Administration set up the embargo because of the following reasons: 1. Confirmed reports received by the Kennedy Administration that Castro was establishing a totalitarian regime in alliance with the Soviet Union. 2. Castros nationalization of all private property, including that of the Cuban nationals as well as that of US citizens and corporations as well as that of nationals and corporations from other countries. 3.Castros indiscriminate support for violent revolution throughout the Americas.12 The embargo has come to affect all US citizens and resident aliens. It restricts all US organizations, businesses, branches, and subsidiaries, as well as, people and organizations physically within the US. The logic of the embargo is to deprive Cuba of any hard currency to gain desired behavior out of economic necessity. This applies to the main intention to undermine the power of Castro in order to foster democracy. The embargo is mainly enforced unilaterally by the US with the support and criticism of other nations abroad. In the post-Cold War years, the embargo has effectively ended Castros support of international (earlier literature refers to revolution) terrorism, but has done little to threaten Castros own power or foster democracy. And it is believed that the only reason Castro has ended his policy of international terrorism is because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and lose of financial support. Otherwise, there is little to note in any real change in Castros attitudes. The second piece of US embargo legislation is the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act. Passed through Congress and signed by the former President Bush, this piece of legislation has, also, been accepted by President Clinton. This act places increased pressure on other countries to avoid economic contact with Cuba, forbids and subsidiaries to do business with Cuba, and disallows any ships that have been in Cuban ports to enter US ports for eighteen months. The third piece of Cuban embargo legislation is the Helms-Burton Bill or Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995. This piece of legislation seeks to even further isolate Cuba economically. However, adds numerous provision to promote communication between Cuba and the outside world as well as add conditions for the end of the embargo. This is hoped to give the Cuban population foreign contact about the benefits of democracy as well as the conditions for obtaining democracy. So far economic sanctions have not ended Castros communist-dictatorship or brought democracy to the island. Economic sanctions have ended Castros military involvement, but not democracy. VI. Conclusions Main Reasons for Sanctions The main reason for continued and increased economic sanctions imposed on Cuba today arises from two key factors. The foremost factor is a historical precedence of US involvement in Cuba augmented by the domestic pressure of Miami-based Cuban exiles. The second factor is the fact that economic sanctions are the only viable tools available for US coercive policy against Cuba. Aside from the other dynamics of the situation, these two forces almost exclusively serve to maintain the aggressive stance towards Castros communist dictatorship. The US has a long history of Cuban involvement. For almost a century, the US has been dedicated to the establishment of democracy on the island. The past failures of this desire has only motivated the US to struggle harder for future success. With the collapse of communism, the last vestige of Soviet influence serves as an annoying reminder. Cuban democracy has become a principle rather than a strategic policy. Soviet influence created a vigilant stance toward the Cold War Cuba, but a long desire for democracy overrides the above factor. Due to promises made during the Cuban Missile Crisis and accepted norms, the US is not able to invade Cuba. This limits the actions the US can use against Cuba. Currently, economic sanction have become the main tool of steering Cuba towards democracy. Additional Factors Eventhough the Cold War is over, the leftover game schema of friends and foes still plays an important role. Many of the rogue nation today were the Cold War enemies of old. The aggressive, anti-democracy habits of these nations has not changed with the new world order. Continued misbehavior complimented by the past role of Cold War foe facilitates an easy continuance of hostile perceptions of todays rogue nations. In this capacity, Castros Cuba has done little in the way of public relations to engender a better world reputation. Furthermore, the face of power has not changed since the beginning of troubled US-Cuban relations. Castro has become the perennial weed of dictatorship plaguing the Cuban island. And the continued exposure of his name and face to the subject of Cuba only reminds US officials of a troubled past. Castro has become unforgettably linked hostile US-Cuban relations. Opinions It is my opinion that a delicate situation exists in Cuba. This is a situation with the potential for political implosion or military explosion. What can only be hoped for is a peaceful transition from Castros tyranny to democracy. Should Castro be hugged or Slapped is a difficult question. When an actor is in the basement of fear, they should be hugged to prevent an implosion or explosion. In contrast, when an actor is opportunistic, they should be slapped to stop and punish unacceptable behavior. But what is Castro? Castros Cold War behavior was undeniable opportunistic. Castro wanted total control. He skillfully substituted the US for the USSR in his dependent economy, and was able to rule virtually unrestrained. His politics have always been those of flexible manipulation. Even a close friend stated that Castro was, a power-hungry person, completely unprincipled, who would throw in his lot with any group he felt could help his political career.14 Castros chameleon-like politics even made it difficult to realize the coming communist-dictatorship. Many argue that Castro is presently in the basement of fear. By definition, a basement of fear regards a totally closed system. For example, the nations of North Korea and Albania that neither accept or send diplomats. Castro, in contrast, does travel. He is frequently visiting Europe to attract commerce, and continues to address the United Nations. It is my opinion that Castro is on the stairs into the basement of fear that has a window of opportunity. Europe does not favor sanctions. They prefer to embrace wrong doers, and hope for improved behavior through cooperation. It is certain that Castro knows this, and is currently using it to his advantage. However, times are hard for Cuba, and there is little doubt that this is pressuring Castro. Therefore, it is difficult to label Castro with a inflexible definition. To do so would compromise the ability to deal with him successfully. Castro needs to be slapped and hugged at the same time. It is in the best interests of the world community for a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. This requires a firm policy of letting Castro know that his days of tyranny are over. This firmness can only be accomplished with sanctions. However, Castro need to be reassured to prevent an implosion or explosion. In this manner, Castros fears need to be addressed, but not capitulated to. The aging Castros grasp of power is coming to an end, and sound policy is required to ensure a peaceful transition when the time comes.