1. U.S.. Policy Towards North Korea, US Department of State Foreign Affair Network, via UIC (Internet) Original Text Quote: In accordance with the terms of the Agreed Framework, in January 1995, the U.S. Government responded to North Koreas decision to freeze its nuclear program and cooperate with U.S. and IAEA verification efforts by easing economic sanctions against North Korea. Four areas were specified. -Authorized transactions related to telecommunications connections, credit card use for personal or travel-related transactions, and opening of journalist offices. --Authorized DPRK use of U.S. bank system to clear transactions not originating or terminating in the United States. Unblocked frozen assets where there is no DPRK government interest. --Authorized imports of magnesite, a refractory material used in the U.S. steel industry. North Korea and China are the worlds primary sources of this raw material. --Authorized transactions related to future establishment of liaison offices, case-by-case participation of U.S. companies in the light water reactor project, supply of alternative energy, and disposition of spent nuclear fuel as provided for by the Agreed Framework, in a manner consistent with applicable laws. 2. Greenhouse, Linda., U.S. eases trade limits on North Korea for first time since 1950, New York Times (Late New York edition), Jan. 21, 1995 3. Bailey, Russell N., Development Through Coercion, Term Paper Fall 1995, PS472, University of Michigan, Dec. 1995. 4. Mifflin, Houghton., American Heritage Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Electronic Reference Shelf, University of Michigan Library, University of Michigan (Internet) 5. Jervis, R., Lebow, R.N., & Stein, J.G., Psychology And Deterrence, pp.18, 1985, The Johns Hopkins University Press 6. Ibid. 7. Tanter, Raymond, Prospectus for Rogue Regimes, May 14, 1996. (Internet) 8. Ibid. 9. Nuclear Non-proliferation, US Department of State Foreign Affair Network, via UIC (Internet) 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. Original Text Quote: The Agreed Framework calls for the following actions: --North Korea agreed to freeze its existing nuclear program under enhanced IAEA safeguards. --Both sides agreed to cooperate to replace the DPRKs graphite-moderated reactors for related facilities with light- water (LWR) power plants. --The two sides agreed to move toward full normalization of political and economic relations. --Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. --Both sides agreed to work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Smooth Implementation of the Agreed Framework was obstructed initially by North Koreas refusal to accept South Korean-designed LWR model reactors. U.S. and DPRK negotiators met for three weeks in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and on June 12, 1995 reached an accord resolving this issue. North Korea agreed to accept the decisions of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) with respect to the model for the LWRs, and that KEDO would select a prime contractor to carry out the LWR project. The KEDO Executive Board announced on June 12, 1995 that it had selected the South Korean-designed Ulchin 3-4 LWR as the reference model for the project and that a South Korean firm would be the prime contractor. The South Korean prime contractor would be responsible for all aspects of the LWR project including design, manufacture, construction, and management. In the Kuala Lumpur Accord on the Geneva Agreed Framework, the DPRK also agreed to negotiate directly with KEDO on all outstanding issues related to the LWR project. The U.S. also seeks progress from North Korea in the following areas: North-South dialogue; credible condemnations of terrorism, return of the remains of U.S. military personnel missing in action during the Korean War, and greater respect for human rights. The U.S. has also expressed concern about North Koreas export of ballistic missiles and related technology, and the North Korean conventional military threat. The United States recognizes that the future of the Korean peninsula is primarily a matter for the people of Korea to decide. The U.S. Government, therefore, believes that a constructive and serious dialogue between the authorities of South and North Korea is necessary to resolve the issues on the peninsula, and that concrete steps to promote greater understanding and reduce tension are needed to pave the way for reunifying the Korean nation. The U.S. Government remains prepared to participate in negotiations between North and South Korea, if so desired by the two Korean Governments and provided that both are full and equal participants in any such talks. 14. U.S. Policy Towards North Korea, US Department of State Foreign Affair Network, via UIC (Internet) 15. The Price of Nonproliferation, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 51:27-9, Jan./Feb. 1995, via University of Michigan Digital Library Core Journals Project. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Lord, Winston, U.S. Policy Toward The Korean Peninsula, Address to The Korea/United States 21st Century Council, Feb. 8, 1996, via UIC (Internet) 21. Lord, Winston, U.S. Policy Toward The Korean Peninsula, Testimony , House Committee On International Relations, Sub Committee on Asia And The Pacific, Mar 19, 1996, via UIC (Internet) 22. Davis, Lynn E., Non-proliferation Priorities for 1995, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 6:192-4, Mar 13, 1995, via University of Michigan Digital Library Core Journals Project. 23. Christopher, Warren, A Comprehensive Strategy for Halting North Koreas Nuclear Program, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 6:54-7, Jan. 30, 1995, via University of Michigan Digital Library Core Journals Project. 24. Perry, William J., Alliance Forged in War, Tempered By Regional Challenges, U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Issues, Volume 10, Number 100, pp.. 26, 1995, via Internet. 25. Stone, Jeremy J., Testimony of Jeremy J. Stone, Congressional Record, Nov. 25, 1991, (Internet) Original Text Quote: We have to Recognize that there is every reason to believe that the North has an ongoing bomb program and that it will deal with inspections exactly as the Iraqis have-by stalling, dissembling and trying to hide whatever they can. 26. Ibid. Original Text Quote: With the all-important exception of the nuclear bomb program, all things considered, the DPRK regime is probably better dealt with, at this stage, by enhancing contacts, openness, and sun- shine than by embargoes, boycotts and hostility. 27. Snyder, Scott, A Framework For Achieving Reconciliation On The Korean Peninsula, Asian Survey, 35:699-710, Aug. 1995, via University of Michigan Digital Library Core Journals Project. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Kim, Samuel S., North Korea: Brinkmanship, Breakdown, and Breakthrough, 35:13-27, The Regents of the University of California, 1995 31. Steven, Greenhouse, Administration Defends North Korea Pact, New York Times (Late New York Edition), A6, Jan. 25, 1995 Original Text Quote: Defense Secretary William J. Perry disclosed today that the United States had considered and dismissed the idea of bombing a nuclear reactor in North Korea in 1994 to cripple its ability to develop nuclear weapons. Perry, who spoke before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, defended Americas nuclear agreement with North Korea against a wave of Republican attacks. 32. Tanter, Raymond, Fourth Wave Deterrence: Psychology Of Deterrence, Confer note, University of Michigan, May 20, 1996 33. Kim, Samuel S., North Korea: Brinkmanship, Breakdown, and Breakthrough, 35:13-27, The Regents of the University of California, 1995 34. Tanter, Raymond, Prospectus for Rogue Regimes, May 14, 1996. (Internet)