1 WHY DID THE U.S.G. EASE THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA IN JANUARY 1995? PREPARED BY SIMON LEE FOR THE PS 472 SPRING TERM Introduction In January 1995, the U.S. Government announced that several trade restrictions imposed on North Korea would be eased in accordance to the Agreed Framework 1. This U.S. decision is viewed as an action taken to further improve the U.S.-DPRK relations, and to insure that North Korea will continue to fulfill its promise on the Agreed Framework 2. Besides, the easing of economic sanctions also signaled the U.S. intention to relief tension on the Korean Peninsula. Although there are critiques conclude that the U.S.G. actually failed in achieving its goals in the Agreed Framework 3, it is still important to ask why the U.S.G. agreed to ease the sanctions on North Korea. This paper will firstly analyze the U.S.-DPRK relations in the 90Õs, and explore the goals and objectives of the U.S.G. on the Korean Peninsula, then examine the U.S. perspective, and finally relate the goals and objectives to the U.S. perspective and to draw the conclusion for the reason why the U.S.G agreed to ease the sanctions. Theoretical Orientation Before going on to the analysis of the U.S-DPRK relations, it is important to discuss some theoretical concepts which are used in this paper. The one of the key concepts is perception. Perception is the resultant product of neurological processes of information 4. Perception is an important concept because decision making depends on the perceived situation instead of the actual one. Therefore, the U.S. Government decisions toward North Korea depend on the perceived situation in North Korea, which may or may not be the actual situation When study about perception, it is worthwhile to know about the concept of biases. According to Robert Jervis in his book ÒPsychology and DeterrenceÓ, misperception may arise from either motivated biases, which is affect-driven, or unmotivated biases, which is purely cognitive driven 5. Owing to the special situation of the North Korea regime, the U.S.G. official calculation about North Korea is mostly done by extrapolating and drawing interferences regarding the past actions or using circumstantial evidence as information about the country. Therefore, it is very difficult for the U.S.G. official to predict the NorthÕs behavior and so it is probable that the U.S.G officials would misperceive the situation if they subject to either or both the biases during the processing of the information 6. Thirdly, it is useful to distinguish the difference between strategic interests and intrinsic interests when evaluation the U.S. goals and objectives on the Korean Peninsula. Strategic interests are more intangible in nature, such as prestige and reputation. On the other hand, intrinsic interests are benefits in real term. Moreover, according to Professor Raymond Tanter, larger powers like the U.S., would concern more on the strategic interests, while the smaller states would place a higher priority on intrinsic interests. Therefore, knowing the nature of U.S. interests on the Korean Peninsula enable us to understand the U.S. goals in the Agreed Framework. Lastly, the concepts of retribution and rehabilitation are introduced here. An retributive action is an action taken to punish a regime and is not intended to served as a means of changing the nature of the regime 7. On the other hand, rehabilitation is an action taken in response to a particular transgression, and it is served as a means to correct certain behaviors of the targeted country 8. A Brief History On The US - DPRK Relations On December 31, 1991, the Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Joint Declaration) ,which forbade both sides to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons, and forbade the possession of nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities was signed by both the North and the South 9. Later on January 30, 1992, North Korea also signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) which allows IAEA inspections to begin in June 1992 9. In March 1992, the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) was established in accordance to the Joint Declaration, yet progress on implementation of the bilateral inspection regime halted due to disagreement on some main issues 10. The disagreement on the inter-Korean nuclear inspection regime led to the reinstatement of the U.S.-ROK Team Spirit military exercise for 1993. On the other hand, North Korea, in January 1993, refused IAEA access to two of its suspected nuclear waste sites, and announced its intent to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in March 1993. These two decision by the North Korea government worsened the situation on the Korean Peninsula. In response to the NorthÕs actions, the U.S. held political level talks with North Korea in June 1993, and reached to a joint statement on the basic principles for continuing US - DPRK dialogue and the suspension on North Korea withdrawal from the NPT 12. Nevertheless, the negotiation deadlocked again and in the spring 1994 another crisis arise when North Korea unloaded fuel from its 5MW reactor. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visited North Korea and arranged another round of talks which began in the July 1994. On October 21, 1994, the talks was concluded by the U.S-DPRK ÒAgreed FrameworkÓ (or Geneva Agreement) 13. According to the Agreed Framework, North Korea agree to stop all the construction of the 50 and 200 MW reactors and ultimately dismantle all the reactors. Besides, the existing 5 MW reactors are not to be reloaded and eventually to be dismantled, and have the spent fuel from these reactors shipped out the country. Furthermore, North Korea agree to remain a party to the NPT, and thus, must fully disclose it past nuclear activities and cooperate with the IAEA whenever necessary. In return to these, North Korea will receive support in acquiring light-water reactors (LWR) in place of the dismantled reactors. Besides. the U.S. will supply heavy oil fuel as interim energy source until the LWR is fully functional. Also under the terms of the Agreed Framework, the North agree to resume its dialogue with the South. On the other hand, the U.S. promise to adopt careful measures to establish a more normal relations with North Korea. As a result, on the January 20, 1995, the U.S.G. announced that it would allow direct telephone calls between the two nations and permit credit card transaction in North Korea. Besides, import of magnesite from North Korea is authorized. And the most important, transaction related to future establishment of liaison office, construction of LWR, shipment of fuel for alternative energy and disposition of spent nuclear fuel is authorized in a manner consistent with applicable laws 14. The Pluses and Minuses On The Agreed Framework Closing Down Of The Facilities According to the Agreed Framework, North Korea will end its gas-graphite reactors and close all its associated reprocessing plate. And hence, forecloses the possibility that North Korea might build a large supply of weapon-grade plutonium. If the all the reactors are functional, North Korea can produce 200 kg a year, which is enough to produce about 40 nuclear weapon a year . On the other hand, it is suspected that North Korea might already have enough plutonium it need to produce one or two nuclear weapon, which is sufficient to threaten the South Korea and Japan 15. Provision Of Light-Water Reactors Another agreement made is that U.S. will seek international support to provide North Korea with two 1000 MW LWR in place of the dismantled reactors. It is generally believed that LWR is more proliferation-resistant than the gas-graphite reactors 16. Besides, the fuel for LWR is enriched uranium oxide which is comparatively difficult for North Korea to manufacture and it is expected that North Korea will have to rely on foreign supply of the fuel. By controlling the amount of the enriched uranium supplied, U.S. can have a higher control on the North Korea inventory of radioactive substance. Moreover, by restricting the provision of the fuel, U.S. can have better control on the behavior of the North Korea. Furthermore, through the provision of the LWR designed by the South, cooperation between the North and the South is enhanced, and hence prepared for the future dialogues between the North and the South. Storage And Disposal Of Spent Fuel In 1994, North Korea possess about 50 metric tons of spent fuel which is sufficient for producing five nuclear warheads. North Korea has agreed to have the spent fuel rods eventually removed and shipped to other country for reprocess after the implementation of the LWR. This arrangement, therefore, reduces the stock of plutonium North Korea has for producing nuclear warheads 17. However, such an arrangement is can only be made after there is a nation which agrees to handle the unstable fuel. Besides, the unstable spent fuel is difficult to store, and hence may need immediate reprocessing 18. Moreover, all these arrangement can only be made after the construction of the LWRs are finished, and hence, created a possibility that the North may use the time to reprocess the spent fuel. Verifying North KoreaÕs Capability IAEA inspection of the frozen nuclear facilities ensure that reopening of any of one of these reactors and reprocessing plants will be detected. Nevertheless, the situation is complicated by the possibility that the North may disguise the past activities and destroy important information about its nuclear capability. Furthermore, the North may already maintain a certain amount of plutonium inventory thatÕs hard to detect 19. U.S. Goals on the Korean Peninsula In a speech addressed to the Korea/United States 21st Century Council, on February 8, 1996, the assistant Secret of State for the East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Winston Lord clearly stated that the key objective of U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula is to continue to preserve the security and peace in the region by ensuring non- proliferation 20. In the conclusion of the testimony he made to the Sub Committee on Asia and the Pacific under the House Committee on International Relations , on March 19, 1996, Winston Lord again stated non-proliferation is the prime factor affecting the regional stability 21. Besides, at a State Department Briefing, February 28, 1995, the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security stated that the U.S.G will seek to have indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT 22. Therefore, it is clear that the primary goal is to prevent the proliferation, and it make no exception on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, in a statement made by the Secretary of State, Christopher, on January 24, 1995, the goals in crafting the Agreed Framework is stated: Ò......to stop the NorthÕs existing nuclear program; to devise a larger strategy that would address the threat posed by the NorthÕs missile program and conventional weapons build- up; and to reduce tensions on the region by bringing North Korea out of its international isolation and into the broader community of nations.Ó 23 The U.S. goals on the Korean Peninsula is consistent with the assumption that a larger power like the U.S. is more concern about their strategic interests. In fact, as the Secretary of Defense Perry stated in his remarks to the Council on Korean Security Studies, Washington, Oct. 26, 1995, the alliance between the U.S. and South Korea is aimed to counter the threat from the North. In this article, Perry actually points out the important of the U.S. credibility in defending its allies. 24 In a nut shell, the U.S. goals in the Agreed Framework can be summarized by three key points. Firstly, it is the U.S. first priority to halt the nuclear program in North Korea and so to ensure a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. Secondly, U.S. will seek to reduce tension between the U.S. and North Korea and between the North and the South. Thirdly, U.S. will make its best effort to initiate dialogue between the North and the South and so to further guarantee the regional security. The U.S. Perspective On North Korea As mentioned in the Theoretical Orientation section, U.S. decisions depend on its perception on the North. To understand the reason why the U.S. set the specific goals and hence led to the measures taken against the North, the U.S. perceptive on the North needed to be studied carefully. Information Available Information of the North regime is extremely scarce, the ability to analyze the political factors in Pyongyang, hence, was inhibited by its limited data available. As a result, only circumstantial evidence can be deduced from the available facts. In the testimony to the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs under the House Committee on Foreign Relations, on November 25, 1991, Jeremy J. Stone, the President of the Federation of American Scientists, made the Òtwenty-odd conclusionsÓ about the behavior of North Korea. In general, Stone outlined the unstable situation in North Korea and the potential threat to the South and Japan. Under the section of Nuclear Problem, he specifically made the point that North Korea had a program towards acquiring nuclear weapon 25. Besides, in the conclusion, Stone suggested that U.S.G should engage in non-military action that would not threaten North Korea, it is highly possible that threat will result in retaliatory actions by the North to the South, and may led to full-scale war 26. The testimony by Stone is an very good example of how the U.S.G officials perceive the North. Under the given information about North Korea, U.S.G. officials generally have a perception that North Korea is hostile and unpredictable. Furthermore, the internal instability due to the succession also drew much attention from the U.S. policy maker. Firstly, after the President Kim Il Sung died on July 8, 1994, Kim Jong Il did not make any regular public appearances until the early 1995. However, it is apparent that someone was making rational decisions for the country. The negotiation in the mid 1994, the acceptance on the final iteration of the Agreed Framework, and the release of Chief Warrant Officer Bobby Hall are all indications of a consistent policy 27. Secondly, the North Korean economy continues to suffer from severe food production shortage. Pyongyang inability to finance the purchase also indicated by the grain deal at that time 28. In addition, the world political environment also aided the U.S.G. official to predict the NorthÕs behavior. Facing the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union, survival of the regime became the primary goal for the nation 29. Moreover, the North Korean regime have shifted away from an emphasis on Marxism-Leninism to the principle of Juche 30. From Kim Jong IlÕs new treatise, ÒSocialism Is ScienceÓ, which is an open manifesto on how not to repeat the German way in unification and Chinese way on open market reforms, it is obvious that the North is still fear about the possibility that the From all the facts faced by the U.S. decision maker, conclusion that the North was under extremely dire situation. And it was very likely that the collapse of the North would bring disastrous result to the entire Korean Peninsula. Possible Unmotivated Biases Resulted The situation perceived by the U.S.G. official is heavily influenced by the predisposition. Availability plays an important role here. As the U.S. policy makers decide on the strategy towards the North, they will first consider the factors that are the most available and to them. As discussed in the previous section, information on the North is available occasionally. However, the information that draws most attention is mostly about threat that arise from the unstable situation in the North. Thus, U.S.G. officials will under the influence of unmotivated biases that make them tends to favor policy that is aimed to stabilized the situation. Secondly, the predisposition that North behavior will retaliate to the South is so strong that no one would doubt about it. Together with the effect of the availability mention in the previous paragraph, North Korea is portrait as an actor acting out from the basement of fear, which minimizing lost would be its the primary objective. As Army gen. Gary Luck, commander of the U.S. troops in South Korea commented to the Armed Service panel, U.S.G officials believes that further pushing the isolated North Korea may result in the North strike out and war. Thirdly, the economic situation in the North made the decision makers in Washington believe that the North will comply under the strong economic incentives. Yet, it is also under the effect of availability as the U.S.G may match up their options with the economic situation in the North and thus result in the misperception that North Korea will agree on the terms provided. Analysis On U.S. Strategy On January 24, Defense Secretary William J. Perry disclosed that the United States had considered and dismissed the idea of bombing a nuclear reactor in North Korea in 1994 to cripple its ability to develop nuclear weapons 31. The fact that U.S. dismiss the use of force to cripple the NorthÕs ability to develop nuclear weapon can be explained by the fact that the U.S.G official perceived North Korea as an highly unusual and unpredictable country and fear of the possible retaliation the North will carry out on the South. According to literature of Deterrence Theory, a country under high threat perception is more unpredictable in itÕs behavior, and further exertion of threat is not appropriate as it may force the country to make the move that will bring mutual disaster 32. In fact, the severe domestic situation enhanced the image that North Korea is acting out from the basement of fear Besides, Pyongyang demonstrated that sanctions would be accepted as a declaration of war. In facing the all the possibilities on the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. opted for the second best options, negotiation with North Korea, instead of further tighten the sanction on the North 33. Furthermore, after the initial of the Agree Framework, the only task left to the U.S. is to ensure the North will keep its promise to dismantle the nuclear facilities and to open up dialogue with the South. Yet, as the option of using economic sanctions as a threat is forgone, the only option available to the U.S. is to provide incentives. Besides, the U.S.G. credibility on threat is in fact eroded by the agreement on provision of the LWR 34. On the other hand, the long standing U.S. economic sanctions on the North are becoming more and more inappropriate. The economic sanctions were imposed in response to North Korea invasion of the South in 1950, and are obviously retributive rather than rehabilitative. Moreover, the fact that U.S. include North Korea in the list of states sponsor terrorism indicates that U.S. sanctions policy to the South is retributive. Due to the potential danger of exacerbating fears by continuation of sanction, the U.S. decide to remove the sanction. Conclusion The U.S. decision on easing of the economic sanctions can be viewed as the best alternatives to the U.S.G officials. On one hand it serves as an incentive to ensure the North will keep the promise to dismantle the worrisome nuclear facilities. On the other hand, the sanctions removed as they are becoming inappropriate, and from the U.S. perception, may increase the risk on the Korean Peninsula.