North Korea: Development through Resolve Overview At present, two of the greatest threats to security in East Asia are a possible confrontation between North and South Korea1 and the possible existence of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula2 . Since the end of the Korean War approximately forty five years ago, the north has survived primarily on the concept of juche or self-reliance regardless of international guidelines whereas the south has opened up its doors and complied with international standards. The USG has adopted South Korea as one of its vital interests in the Asia-Pacific region and has aided in the progression of the south's economic, political, and social organization while imposing economic sanctions on the north and its Communist based regime. The US has taken the lead with the current situation in the Korean peninsula by trying to decrease the nuclear threat posed by North Korea and has made efforts at reconciliation between the two Koreas by trying to pursue four way peace negotiations between the two Koreas, China and the US. Interestingly, the north has declined four way peace talks in favor of two way peace talks between Washington and Pyongyang. Likewise, the US has declined the north in that request by stating that its main goals are to end the threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula3 and unify the two Koreas. Recently, the north has violated the Armistice established after the Korean War in many incidents stating the Armistice to be a "worthless piece of paper" 4. The north has also in the past made attempts to withdraw itself from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and refused International Atomic & Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of all nuclear facilities indicating a buildup of nuclear weapon's activity on the peninsula. This paper will seek the answer to the question as to why has the USG tried to pursue four way peace talks between the two Koreas, China, and the US despite North Korea's recent violations of the Armistice Agreement established after the Korean War and despite the north's recent activities concerning nuclear proliferation. In seeking an answer to this question, it should be noted that US foreign policy toward North Korea seems to waiver in that the USG has not displayed enough resolve as to going about accomplishing the desired goals, the end of the nuclear threat and the reunification of Korea. At present, it seems as though the USG has for the most part, decreased the credibility of its threat by wavering in its foreign policy and by allowing the north to exhibit characteristics of brinkmanship toward the south. Uncertainty and a lack of knowledge on the part of the USG seems to have given North Korea the opportunity to exhibit typical characteristics of the rogue elephant, "wandering out of control, meriting isolation, and deserving punishment"5 . This paper will seek to address US foreign policy toward the rogue state of North Korea and seek to determine whether or not this approach has been successful. Theoretical structure-Rationality In order to understand the decision making process and the way in which leaders go about deciding on certain issues, rationality must be defined and the assumptions concerning rationality must be laid out from a theoretical orientation. If leaders are to be held responsible for their actions, they must be capable of rational action. Thus, the importance of rationality lies in the fact that it is the pre-requisite for responsibility. Decision makers diagnose problems, draw inferences, examine alternatives, and make choices through mechanisms that bear little resemblance to comprehensive rationality. If a leader does not act in the most efficient means to achieving the desired goal with the highest utility, either highest possible benefits or lowest possible loss, then he is not thought to be rational. Decision makers need ideally to identify options, estimate likelihood consequences of options, consider cost, benefit, and likelihood of success, trade off expected cost and benefit to establish the expected value. From this process, the decision maker is to select the option which promises the highest gain or lowest loss. Rational procedures should yield the expected value maximizing outcomes over the long run.6 Thus, on the "rheostat of rationality", it is plausible to state that some decision makers are more rational than others or less rational than others. It is also plausible to state that some decision makers are irrational. To determine whether or not a decision maker is rational or irrational, one must look into psychological factors and constraints which indicate what actually takes place in the "black-box" or mind of a decision maker. Information needs to be collected so as to understand or literally put yourself in the shoes of the decision maker. Decision makers tend to have many pre- existing tendencies which lead them to act in certain ways making efforts at deterrence difficult. Often times, these pre-existing tendencies stem from biases, misperception, past events, and a disregard for search or the information gathering process. In general, the more these pre-existing manners are prevalent in the decision making process, the less likely it is that a decision maker will act in a rational manner because these tendencies will be likely to undermine the analytical decision making process. In contrast, the more analytical the decision making process can be characterized, the more rational that process is likely to be. It should also be noted that the rationality of an individual is independent of the values they may hold and pursue.7 Thus, evil and good are relative terms to the notion of rationality and irrationality and do not hold meaning in the decision making process. Deterrence and Coercion The discussion on rationality is essential to the idea of deterrence in that deterrence would not even be remotely possible if it could not be determined that decision makers act in a rational manner. Assuming that rationality is the pre-requisite for responsibility, one could then rationalize the possible outcomes of a decision and proceed to deter from those inferences. Deterrence is the process whereby the defender gets the initiator to maintain a certain status quo or prevents the initiator from changing their behavior. Coercion is the process whereby a defender forces the initiator to change unacceptable or destructive behavior or undo prior actions8. Critical to the success and failure of deterrence and coercion is the idea of intentions and motivations (resolve). Elements such as resolve to use one's capabilities plays an important role in deterrence theory because capabilities without resolve are like paper tigers, lots of teeth, but no follow through" 9. Often times, it is not the capabilities which are potentially threatening, but the perception of intention and motivation to use those capabilities which are threatening and which aid in the process of deterrence. Thus, misperception also plays a significant role in determining to what extent rationality is present or not with regards to the decision making process and to what extent deterrence will be likely to succeed or fail. Critical to the notion of misperception is the idea of threat credibility and critical risk. Often times, fear with the addition of a credible threat leads to compliance, the desired goal in deterrence. Misperception interferes with the rational thought process of the decision maker by allowing the decision maker the opportunity to overestimate or underestimate the threat. The critical risk (CR) is a party's willingness to endure loss and failure before they yield. Threat credibility is the initiator's perception of the legitimacy of the threat posed by the defender. If the defender's CR is higher than the initiator's threat credibility, than deterrence will likely succeed for the defender will not perceive a great threat and will be willing to fight for what he stands for. If on the other hand, the defender's CR is lower than the initiator's TC, then deterrence will likely fail for the initiator will perceive its threat as great 10. Decision making involves a reduction in uncertainty and the simplification of complexity 11. There exists certain constraints on rationality which affect the decision making process and which hinder attempts at deterrence by increasing uncertainty. Once again, the "black box" of the decision maker has to be opened so as to be able to determine not only rationality, but also the most efficient methods of deterrence to use with regards to that specific rational. In order to understand the importance of the bargaining process, persuasion and strategy must also be defined and distinguished. Persuasion, by definition, is the bargaining process by which one party gets another party to take an action because it is in that party's best interest to do so. Persuasion involves no promises, no threats, but most importantly, no control over the other party's decision. For persuasion to be implemented successfully, the initiator must ask questions to obtain relevant and important information about the interests of the other party. In the long run, persuasion is more likely to succeed than strategy because a party is acting in their best interest without regards to punishments or rewards. Often times, though persuasion is the ideal method, people do not have the time or patience to seek knowledge as to the status of the other party. Strategy, on the other hand, is the bargaining process whereby one party tries to get, either through the use of rewards or punishments, the other party to take a specific action. Strategy therefore involves costs and requires a constant monitoring of the situation with positive and negative consequences. When rewards and punishments are under one's control, then strategy is being implemented. Once strategy is used, it is difficult to revert back to persuasion because rewards are tempting. Also, strategy requires that threats of punishment be constantly administered so as to keep an actor in check. Relevant Background Information With the theoretical orientation provided above, it is now possible to outline recent acts by the NKG which have indicated attempts at brinkmanship. These acts of brinkmanship or acting from a standpoint of the "rationality of irrational behavior"12 show how the NKG has undermined the threat posed by President Clinton by not only violating the Armistice Agreement established after the Korean War, but by also failing to adhere to international guidelines for the inspection of undeclared nuclear facilities. A conscious effort on the part of the NKG at displaying acts of brinkmanship have greatly hindered the peace and stability process and has allowed the NKG, through a manipulation of the deterrence process, to receive many concessions from the US. It has become apparent that achieving peace on the Korean peninsula will require more than just "proposed" peace talks. On October 17, 1994, the US and North Korea reached an agreement on the text of a framework document on North Korea's nuclear program. The importance of the Agreed Framework document lays in the fact that it would "reduce the threat of nuclear (weapon's capabilities) in the region." 13 Prior to reaching this agreement, the US had since the 1980's been concerned about North Korean development of nuclear weapons. Coupled with North Korea's refusal to allow IAEA inspections of all its nuclear facilities and its attempts to withdraw from the NPT in 1993, these acts indicated a nuclear weapons buildup enhancing the threat to security on the peninsula. As Secretary of Defense William J. Perry described in a speech addressed to the Pacific Basin Economic Council on May 22, 1996, the 1994 Agreed Framework was reached through a policy of coercive diplomacy. This coercive diplomacy constituted a combination of diplomacy and defensive measures. Diplomacy was implemented in the form of threats posed by the governments of the US, ROK, and Japan to impose economic sanctions if the DPRK did not halt its nuclear production and also in the form of promises of commercial power if the north did comply. Simultaneously, defense measures, or efforts to boost military forces in the region were also implemented. In this way, the Agreed Framework document acted as an initial means for the securing of future peace and stability in the region. Since the signing of the Agreed Framework nearly two years ago, the north has displayed characteristics of brinkmanship toward the south. Recent violations of the Armistice Agreement established after the Korean war by North Korean military have raised tensions on the border with the south. Whether or not these actions may have had any resolve to use capabilities is questionable. What is certain is that the effect of these incursions has led to an exacerbation of fears in the south and the perception of a threat in the form of a possible invasion by the north. The north has, through acts of brinkmanship, built a threat to the security of the Korean peninsula by acting in what may appear at first glance to be irrationally. Whether or not this threat is credible is yet another matter. Some have associated the north's actions as ones stemming from a "basement of fear", while others have indicated the north's actions as ones arising out of a "window of opporunity". Regardless, the north has succesfully kept the USG from determining what actually takes place in the "black box" of the DPRK. The rationality of irrational behavior has aided the north by confusing the south and the US and by keeping the USG from implementing its foreign policy objectives with regards to the north. While the Agreed Framework was agreed upon by both parties suggesting successful deterrence on the part of the USG, recent violations (stated below) of the Armistice has left the North Korean issue in a state of uncertainty. On April 4, 1996, Pyongyang stated that it would not carry out its duties under the truce agreement that created the 2.5-mile Demilitarized Zone along the North-South border following the war, and its troops and vehicles would no longer carry distinctive markings. The next day, April 5, approximately 120 North Korean soldiers with weapons including 82-mm recoilless rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and light and heavy machine guns, marched into the DMZ. On April 6, approximately 260 North Korean military personnel, carrying four 82-mm recoilless rifles and five machine guns, entered the Panmunjom border crossing area in nine trucks. On April 7, more than 100 soldiers entered into the DMZ in 12 trucks. On April 19, two North Korean patrol boats briefly crossed what South Korea calls its "Northern Limit Line" and sailed away after warning messages from Southern naval patrol boats. On May 17, seven armed soldiers briefly crossed the military demarcation line in Panmunjom but retreated when Southern troops fired warning shots. On May 23, South Korea stated that North Korean ships had entered into South Korean waters. The boats fled after warnings from the South Korean naval forces.14 U.S Foreign Policy Objectives President Clinton, in a speech addressed to the National Assembly of the Republic of South Korea on July 10, 1993, stated four main objectives concerning the Asia-Pacific region as an outline for US foreign policy. In dealing with this region, the USG has looked to continue American military commitments, has pursued stronger efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mad destruction (WMD), has looked for new regional dialogues on the full range of common security challenges, and looked to support democracy and more open societies throughout this region 15. Winston Lord, assistant Secretary of State, stated three broad approaches that would be taken in foreign policy measures toward the DPRK: first, the implementation of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework; second, the reduction of tension on the Korean peninsula through the substantive north-south dialogue; third, the opening of increased contacts with North Korea in the form of liaison offices in both nations 16. These objectives aid in understanding US strategic and intrinsic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Strategic interests have been stated as the spread of democracy and the continued presence of US leadership in the region (prestige). Intrinsic interests have primarily focused on the south's continued economic growth and prosperity over the last few decades. Thus, President Clinton stressed the idea that the best way for the US to deter regional aggression, perpetuate the region's economic growth, and secure US maritime and other intrinsic interests was to remain an active presence in this region.17 Implications In light of US foreign policy discussed earlier, the USG has tried to pursue four way peace negotiations with North Korea for the above mentioned four reasons. The USG has gone about doing this by implementing the strategy of deterrence, diplomatic persuasion, and coercive diplomacy. James Laney, US Ambassador to South Korea, stated, "Since deterrence alone does not address the factors that most threaten stability on the peninsula today, it must be augmented with confidence building assurances and positive inducements to cooperation." (Reuter Seoul, South Korea) The US has looked to reform the north's behavior from an isolated Communist regime to a more open and Democratic nation thereby deterring the north from exhibiting harmful and disruptive behavior. This action can be seen more as a confidence building assurance than a punishment for the US has looked to aid North Korea in their current crisis. The problem is that the north has viewed this as a display of imperialism thereby creating great misperception in the eyes of Pyongyang. The USG has also used deterrence in the form of a "trip wire" (approximately 37000 American troops stationed in the south and near the border) to deter a possible second invasion by the north. This trip wire, along with President Clinton's threat of a possible destruction of the north in the case of an invasion has deterred the north from any further military acts of aggression toward the south. The USG has shown much resolve on this issue of a possible second invasion by the north and at present, it seems apparent that the north will cooperate with US demands. In terms of diplomatic persuasion, the US and ROK have made it clear that it would be in North Korea's best interest to comply with the Armistice. Winston Lord stated, "This (restoring military communications in Panmunjom so as to ensure that the Armistice is maintained) is in Pyongyang's interest as well as that of other interested parties."18 By convincing the north that it is in their best interest to comply with the Armistice, the US and ROK are allowing the north a certain degree of freedom of choice. Either the north can choose to accept the Armistice and have future aspirations at improving their own situation or they can choose to continue incursions on the DMZ and feel the possible burden of continued sanctions which can be retributive and which can impose punishment on certain behavior. As indicated earlier, coercive diplomacy was also implemented in the form the Agreed Frameworks document. President Kim of the ROK states, "I think that if we do our best to persuade North Korea that it is in their best interest to faihfully implement the contents of the agreement, I think that in fact, we can see a good result." (White House, July 27,1995) Indeed, this policy of coercive diplomacy has succeeded; the end of the nuclear threat on the peneinsula has been achieved. The strategy of coercive diplomacy has allowed the US to protect its interests with regards to the peninsula and has proved to be a successful attempt at the deterrence of nuclear weapons. The proposed four nation peace talks aimed at a peace accord to replace the truce which ended the Korean War though seems very difficult to achieve in terms of deterrence and persuasion. Given the current economic, political, and social situation in the north, which has not yet recovered from the malnutrition incurred by devastating floods last year (1995), North Korea may be tempted to lash out militarily against the south to draw attention away from domestic ills. In an effort to ward of this perceived danger, one approach has stated that the US and South Korea should lower their rhetoric and redouble efforts to reassure the north that it can "survive, compete and even prosper if it accepts a recent offer to take part in four party peace talks."19 In reassuring the north that it can prosper if peace is agreed upon, the USG has looked to persuade the north that it is in their best interest to comply. This form of persausion has looked to reduce any misperceptions that the NKG might hold toward US actions. With regards to the four way peace talks, the US has not been successful because the north has simply been unwilling to cooperate, delaying the situation. As stated earlier, the US has taken the lead in the situation on the Korean peninsula for the past forty five years. With regard to US intentions, President Clinton stated that the USG was seeking to prevent aggression, not initiate it. This, he stated, could only be done through certifiable compliance 20. The USG has recommended sanctions in the event that the north does not cooperate with the NPT and the IAEA inspections stating that vital international interests to security are at stake. The USG has also for the past forty years maintained a steady policy of deterrence by maintaining troops in the ROK. Given these conditions and assuming that this has been a rational procedure initiated to deter, it should be possible for the US to deter North Korea in any disturbing actions that they might take. However, this has not been the case. North Korea has not fully complied with US requirements in that the north has failed to acknowledge the south in the same manner that it has obliged the US. Pyongyang in "Continuing to make conventional and military threats against the south while at the same time trying to court US favor do(es) not seem to be actions stemming from a coherent foreign policy (and) beg the question as to who is the rational actor in the north." (Major David S. Maxwell) Thus, it is difficult to determine what state, basement or window, the north is currently in. The economic and political situation in the north suggests that it is acting from a basement of fear while military actions on the DMZ and with regards to nuclear proliferation indicate actions taken from a window. This uncertainty hinders USG attempts at deterrence by complicating the rationality behind the decision making process of the NKG. Furthermore, with regards to the proposed peace talks, the existence of this uncertainty dictates the situation at hand. Conclusion The answer to the question why has the USG tried to pursue four way peace talks with the DPRK despite their recent violations of the Armistice and issues concerning nuclear proliferation is that the USG has tried, within the context of its foreign policy, to ensure vital US interests remain intact and unharmed permanently on the peninsula. They have gone about doing this by the process of deterrence. Three resulting actions have come about by the particular strategy the USG has implemented to deter. First, North Korea has displayed brinkmanship; this is evident by their recent violations of the Armistice, their withdrawal attempt from the NPT, and their refusal of IAEA inspections of nuclear facilities. Second and related to the first, these displays of brinkmanship have allowed North Korea to receive many concessions detailed in the Agreed Framework document. Lastly, deterrence has been successful to a certain degree. The threat of nuclear capabilities and the possible second invasion of the south by the north has also been quelled. What has not been resolved is the issue of north-south dialogue. The US has not been successful in "persuading" the north to come to agreement with the south. The question remains, is this a successful attempt at deterrence? If yes or no, of what? This does not seem to be a successful attempt at deterrence because when viewed from the US perspective, unless the Korean peninsula is stable and secure permanently with democracy present throughout, vital US interests will never be completely safe. What has gone wrong in the deterrence process? In large part, the USG has held misperceptions as to the credibility of the North Korean threat. It seems apparent that North Korea is more near a basement of fear, but trying to act as if they are in the driver's seat and acting from a window of opportunity. Also, lack of resolve is present on the part of the USG. This is indicative of trying to pursue peace talks because that is the only way to permanently ensure the safety of vital US interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Regardless of how the NKG may rationalize their actions, the USG must look to build not only its threat credibility, but also their resolve on all issues concerning the Korean peninsula. By establishing resolve for its overall foreign policy, the US will create not only a credible threat to Pyongyang , but will also create fears in the eyes of Pyongyang thus making compliance more achievable. North Korea has slowly, but surely drawn attention away from the US threat by playing a cat and mouse game and exhibiting brinkmanship. Deterrence has worked to prevent the spread of nuclear proliferation and a second invasion of the south, but no progress has been made in the relations between the north and south, one of the stated goals of US foreign policy. Until relations between the south and north are improved, there can be no true progress as to the termination of the threat on the Korean peninsula and there can be no assurance that vital US interests will be preserved. Thus, the USG has taken the stance that relations between the north and the US should run parallel to relations between the north and the south. The US has stated, "The ROK has the lead; the US will remain in a supportive role."21 This ensures that the ROK will act to further not only its own interests, but also those of the US. The north, as well as the south, will continue to spread propaganda thereby increasing misperceptions and uncertainty in their respective countries. For North Korea, the situation will, in all likelihood, deteriorate with the progression of time. Thus, the situation can only be worsened as fears are exacerbated and threats are misperceived. Before the conflict escalates to a point where implosion or explosion might hinder US strategic and intrinsic interests, the US must show resolve and implement a fool- proof policy of deterrence by being unrelenting in its foreign policy goals; ultimately, the USG must decide whether or not conceding benefits to the north is helpful in furthering north-south relations. SIPRI yearbook, Bates Gill, The Divided Nations of China and Korea: Discord and Dialogue White House press release, President Clinton, July 27, 1995 White House press release, President Clinton, Oct. 18, 1994 Reuters-Tokyo-May 24, 1996 Tanter- Prospectus for Rogue Regimes Tanter-not1-Sept. 11, 1995 Ibid Tanter-not8-Sept 21, 1995 Tanter-Prospectus for Rogue Regimes Tanter-not8-Sept 21, 1995 Tanter-not3-Sept 13, 1995 Bailey, Russell-Fall 1995 White House press release-President Clinton-Oct 18, 1995 Reuter-Seoul, S. Korea-May23, 1996 Fundamentals of Security for a New Pacific Community-President Clinton-July 10, 1993 US Department of State-Winston Lord on Policy Toward Korean Peninsula-March 19, 1996 President Clinton-July 10, 1993 Ibid Reuter-Washington-May 28, 1996 Ibid US Department of State-Winston Lord-Feb 8, 1996 Dean Kim June 20, 1996 PolSci 472 Prof. Raymond Tanter