Arifa Khan June 20, 1996 Poli. Sci. 472 Professor Tanter Spring Term Paper Pakistan and Nuclear Proliferation Since the end of the cold war, international diplomacy has taken on new dimensions, constantly warping and changing to fit the needs of the nation-states. The roles of these states have changed drastically due to the absence of a bipolar political system. The United States has emerged from the cold war as the undisputed superpower and hegemon. As a result it has forged upon the task of shaping a new world order, projecting its ideals and demands upon the world. With the absence of the USSR as the natural enemy a new sort of enemy has arisen, upon which the US focuses its attention. That new enemy, for all intensive purposes is the rogue state. According to Klare, rogue states are characterized as states involved in illicit proliferation and activities which endanger regional and U.S. security. Several states exist as relics of the cold war, however, the emergence of third world countries as potential threats to U.S. security has widened the pool of what are considered rogues. It is upon these states precisely that the US has aimed its nuclear non-proliferation regime. One of the states rising on the list of rogues is Pakistan. Klare describes proliferation as an insidious and growing threat to national and international stability. It is for this very reason that since the end of the cold war Us military planners have posted a new enemy type: aggressively minded third world powers armed with nuclear and/or chemical weapons. Pakistan fits such a description perfectly, and as a result the US hastened to implement a non-proliferatoin regime in that region and throughout the world. For one reason or another, however deterring Pakistani proliferation has produced very few results. The purpose of this paper is to try to understand that if Pakistan is trying to obtain nuclear capabilities, why does it do so despite US attempts to implement a nuclear non-proliferation regime. At the core of Pakistans antagonism towards the US lies its ongoing conflict with India. Since the partition of India in 1947 into Pakistan and India, neither country has been on friendly terms. Perceptually, a security dilemma occurs when decision makers overrate the advantages of the offensive, the magnitude of power shifts, or the hostility of others. In the case of India and Pakistan, a security dilemma erupted due to mutual distrust, bias, and misperceptions. Such factors have lead to the escalation of hostilities and in tree instances, even to war. In class we often discussed the rationality postulate and the deterrence theory. Professor Tanter made the point that the more an actor incorporates a cognitive thought process in decision making (such as biases, misperceptions, and faulty information) the lower that actor resides on the rheostat of rationality. In the case of Pakistan, one must strongly consider the notions of biases and misperceptions in its decision making regarding India while ascertaining its rationality. The purpose of this paper is to understand the reasons why Pakistan continues to attempt to obtain nuclear arms despite US government (USG) attempts at imposing a nuclear non-proliferation regime. The answer obviously lies in Pakistans need to deter India. Before any discussion of deterrence can be undertaken, however, some approximation if Pakistans rationality is of paramount importance. As previously mentioned, the more an actor incorporates cognitive thought processes in decision making, the lower that actor resides on the rheostat of rationality. One of the most important cognitive predispositions influencing deterrence is that of unmotivated biases. Biases arise because the problem of dealing with complex and ambiguous information leads people to adopt short cuts to rationality that simplify perceptions in order to make more manageable the task of making sense out of environments. Both Pakistan and India have often chosen paths of action in which neither has really taken the time or the effort to learn about one another. As a result, since the partition in 1947 there have been three wars fought between the two countries. Since the first war in 1948, both sides have never eased on their distrust and misperception of each other. These predispositions a well as the beliefs of both Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Jawarhalal Nehru, the prime ministers of Pakistan and India, respectively, during the time of the partition strongly reinforced each other, making their influence especially potent. Such beliefs and predispositions have remained constant throughout the last fifty years and have never wavered in Pakistan and Indias perceptions of each other. Robert Jervis contends that, The decision maker who thinks that the other side is probably hostile will see ambiguous information as confirming this image. (5) Pakistan, of course, has only known relations with India in a negative context and so it automatically perceives any ambiguous overtures made by India as hostile. For decades India and Pakistans confrontation has been part of the wallpaper of world affairs. Many Pakistani and Indian diplomats would point out how well-intentioned proposals have failed because both countries can not seem to get over their biases. Jervis also states that, People are strongly influenced by events that are recent that they or their country experienced first hand events that occurred when they were first coming into political awareness. The partition and it effects upon both Pakistani and Indian decision making goes without saying despite the convalescence of 50 years since the event. The deep rooted hostilities between the two countries has always been a hallmark of the tensions between India and Pakistan. In order to understand the relationship between both countries a it exists today, one must delve into the past almost fifty years ago. Historical Background The entire conflict is rooted in the colonial history of the subcontinent. Prior to 1947, India was under imperial rule by the British Crown. At the time of British withdrawal from the subcontinent two competing visions of state creation animated the nationalist political leadership. One vision, championed by Jawarhalal Nehru, was secular and democratic claiming that India, despite it diversity, could remain unified. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, challenged Nehrus vision of a unified subcontinent. Jinnah contended that the Muslims of the subcontinent constituted a nation separate from the rest of (Hindu) India, with a distinct religious heritage and markedly different social customs. He also argued that the Muslim minority would be discriminated against in a predominantly Hindu state. Despite various last minute efforts by the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, as well as the British government, continued unity of the subcontinent proved unattainable. As British withdrawal approached, a complex formula was created for the division of the area. Contiguous Muslim-majority states under the direct rule of the British Crown would become Pakistan, with the boarder states of Punjab and Bengal being divided. The problem arose with the disposition of the princely states. Independent, the rulers of these states recognized the British Crown to be the paramount power in South Asia. That power, however, collapsed with British decolonization. Lord Mountbatten, under pressure from Nehru and others in the Indian nationalist movement, dashed their hopes. In the closing days of British rule he insisted they could not declare independence but must join either India or Pakistan. All acceded in due time except for the state of Kashmir. Kashmir posed a unique problem. Led by a Hindu monarch but composed of a predominantly Muslim population, Kashmir was contiguous to Pakistan. Prior to the Partition, however, Nehru and Mountbatten, who enjoyed a close friendship, redrew the lines of demarcation so that lands that were contiguous to Pakistan and successfully sealed India from any access to Kashmir fell to India instead. Nehru himself was a Kashmiri and was loathe to give up his home land. Six months before the deadline of the partition, Nehru secretly sent Indian army troops into Kashmir, manipulating and coercing the Maharajah. A few months later Pakistani troops disguised as tribesmen joined local Pathan tribes and attacked some of the Western boarder areas of Kashmir, inciting an insurgency. Already in an untenable position, the Maharajah took the only route open to him: accession to India. As an Urdu couplet aptly puts it, In the depths of history there have been instances when moments committed a mistake, and centuries got punished. When Mountbatten accepted the document of accession in October 1947 he stated that, As soon as law and order have been restored....the question of the states accession should be settled by reference to the people. Complicating matters was the existence of nationalistic groups within Kashmir either wanting to remain with India, accede to Pakistan, or to gain independence. Kashmir, however, was never allowed the right to self determination and Pakistan continued to incite insurgency in Kashmir. India, at the same time, never held the promised plebiscite, exacerbating tensions even more. The following year, in 1948, Pakistan, acting out of a window of opportunity invaded Kashmir and managed to capture and occupy one-third of the state, calling it Azad (free) Kashmir. Indian troops were able to stop the attack in time to preserve power over the remaining two-thirds of the region. In October 1948 a United Nations resolution was passed demanding that a plebiscite be held in that region. Once again, that plebiscite was never held. The failure to diffuse the crisis in Kashmir has had important consequences for India and Pakistan as well as that region and the rest of the world. For Pakistan, a continuing insurgency and repressive Indian policies in Kashmir have provided a constant temptation to intervene in Kashmir, further contributing to already tense Indo-Pak relations. India, at the same time, refuses to let go of Kashmir, afraid that other secessionist movements within India might follow suit. The Kashmiri conflict is at the core of the India-Pakistan conflict. The resultant security dilemma is a direct result of the conflict and is a source of tension for the entire world.h From Friendly State to Bear The 1950s marked the beginning of the cold war era. The US, from the 1950s until the 1980s had equipped its military for one all consuming mission: to deter Soviet aggression in Europe and throughout the world. Many states were caught up in the struggle between the USSR and the US for one reason or another. Some had come to see themselves as threatened by other rising powers in their vicinity and sought to align themselves with the West or the East as a means of support. India, soon after the partition, was courted by Moscow and quickly aligned itself with the USSR, which provided India with military aid and funding. The US quickly sought Pakistani allegiance as well for it was seen as an important barrier to the spread of communism and because of its strategic location. In essence, Pakistan became Americas ally in the clandestine war against the Soviet Union. As early as 1950, the Pakistani government had effectively ceded remote areas of its northern provinces to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA.) It was from Northern Pakistan that the NSA eavesdropped on the Soviet Nuclear facilities in Kazakhstan and it was Pakistan that provided secret bases for US U-2 spy flights. Pakistan also served as a key jumping-off point for intelligence gathering and anti-Soviet activities by the CIA. Pakistan was rewarded for its support with large amounts of American military and economic aid. In 1959 the US formed a bilateral agreement with Pakistan relating to protection form aggression from a communist or communist-dominated state. In the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the US formally recognized Soviet forces occupying Afghanistan and that it was in the interest of both nations to maintain friendly ties. The act further went on to say that It is in the mutual interests of the United States and Pakistan to avoid the profoundly destabilizing effects of the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices or the capacity to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear devices. (See appendix a) American strategists had viewed states such as Pakistan not as autonomous threats to U.S. security, but rather as pawns in the cold war struggle for power and influence in vital third world areas. So long as these states were seen as potential allies in the competition with the USSR, the US actually sought to strengthen rather than limit their growing capability. From 1950 to 1990, under the Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance programs, the US sold or gave more than $168 billion worth of arms and military equipment to the third world states. Because of its strategic location and friendly stance, Pakistan had been a major beneficiary of US military aid, provisioned under part C of the Foreign Assistance act. (See appendix a) Pakistan began to develop nuclear weapons capability following its crushing defeat in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war and the establishment of Bangladesh. During the late sixties and early seventies Pakistan was having its own problem with nationalist separations groups when East Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh, wanted to secede from Pakistan. Many of the refugees from East Pakistan began to poor into India. The Indian government, feeling overburdened by the sudden influx of refugees tried to hurry the partition by sending insurgents into East Pakistan. Finally when these tactics ceased to work, India invaded East Pakistan and went to war with Pakistan. Miscalculations of Indian capabilities as well as misperceptions of Indian resolve conspired to deal Pakistan a devastating defeat. Realizing that they needed greater capabilities, Pakistan embarked upon its agenda of obtaining nuclear arms. This agenda became increasingly important, when in 1974, India exploded a nuclear bomb. Pakistani leaders, thwarted in their efforts to obtain plutonium reprocessing facility from France, decided to pursue an alternative route to nuclear weapons- the use of high speed centrifuges to produce highly enriched uranium. Using technology illicitly obtained from Western Europe, they established and enrichment facility at Kahuta. Pakistan is also believed to have received considerable assistance from and existing nuclear power, in this case China. According to Reagan administration officials, China assisted in the development of the Pakistani uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta, and also provided Pakistan with the blueprints for a nuclear weapon, relieving the Pakistani of the need to conduct nuclear rests in order to confirm the validity of their weapons design. The Chinese are also thought to have provided Pakistan with sufficient HEU to produce two nuclear weapons. Although the Chinese have denied that they aided Pakistan in this manner, President Reagan cited such assistance as reason for delaying an important nuclear trade agreement with china in 1984. Why does China supply Pakistan with military aid? There is a Chinese proverb that says My neighbor is my enemy, and my neighbors neighbor is my friend. In 1966 there were several skirmishes over the disputed territory of Ladakh, in the northeastern tip of India. These skirmished eventually erupted into war. By aiding Pakistans fight with India, China could divert Indias attention from that region. As a result, Pakistan and China have maintained close military ties, particularly with the exchange of destructive technology. China views India as its adversary in the quest to dominate Southeast and Pakistan is its buffer. A Unitary Actor? The term actor, for the purposes of this paper, is defined as a group of individuals working together towards a common goal. Institutions may be actors, if they work as unitary actors which are defined as those possessing a clear focus and sending forth only one set of signals or information for observers. A non-unitary actor by contrast, is one that broadcasts multiple signals due to internal strife or lack of organization. Pakistan was able to continue with its nuclear agenda throughout the cold war without any remuneration because the USG, for all intensive purposes, failed to act as a unitary actor in its policy towards Pakistan. By all accounts, the Reagan administration possessed sufficient intelligence on the Pakistani nuclear effort to conclude that Pakistan had achieved its goal- the production of deliverable weapons. The Reagan administration, in fact, had dramatically aided Pakistan in its pursuit of nuclear capabilities. President Reagan and his national security aids saw Pakistan as a logical ally in the US proxy war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Driving the Soviets from Afghanistan was considered far more important, in terms of deterrence, then exacting laws against proliferation against Pakistan. The Reagan administration ignored Pakistans flagrant proliferation agenda throughout the mid nineteen-eighties as Pakistan assembled its nuclear arsenal with the aid of many millions of dollars worth of restricted high-tech materials bought inside the United States, which was a direct violation of the Foreign Assistance Act. Some astute lawmaker within congress, acting separately of the Whitehouse, saw the rising problem of proliferation in third-world countries. Congress made breaking the law more costly in 1985, when it passed the Solarz Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (the amendment was proposed by former representative Stephen J. Solarz, Democrat of New York) providing for the cutoff of all military and economic aid to purportedly non-nuclear nations that illegally export or attempt to export nuclear-related materials from the US. A second and more important law passed later that year, known as the Pressler Amendment (for Senator Larry Pressler, Rebublican of South Dakota) and also affected the continuous flow of hundreds of millions of dollars annually in American aid to Pakistan. No assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan, pursuant to the authorities continued in this chapter or any other act, unless the President shall have certified in writing to the Speaker of the Hose of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign relations of the Senate during the fiscal year in which assistance to furnished or military technology or equipment is to be sold or transformed , that Pakistan possesses a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed United States assistance will reduce significantly in risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device. October 1, 1985 (see appendix a) The prescribed certification, however became farcical in the last years of the Reagan Administration. The Whitehouse, excluding its own illegal aid of Pakistan, never passed the information of Pakistans capabilities and acquisitions to Congress because the Reagan Administration obviously feared that the legislators, who had ruled for the Solarz and Pressler amendments would cut off funds for the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, A turn of events that Reagan was determined to prevent, as it would have subordinated the secret US effort to aid the Afghani Mujahideen. Accordingly, the Whitehouse, under both Reagan and Bush repeatedly certified to Congress that Pakistan did not possess a functioning nuclear device, thereby permitting the continuation of US military assistance. Only in 1990, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, did the US suspend its certification of Pakistani non-proliferation. Pakistan was no longer useful to the US at the end of the cold war, terminating the importance of Pakistan to the US as a barrier to communism. Pakistans nuclear agenda, under the new world order of non-proliferation, could no longer escape scrutiny. Why Pakistan is a Rogue State After 1990, the US no longer had any strategic interests in Pakistan because the threat of the Soviet Union and communism to the security of the United States was gone. In class Professor Tanter defined a rogue state as any state involved in terrorism, drug trafficking, or nuclear proliferation. Pakistan, although it has no to date admitted it, has been trying for several years to attain nuclear capabilities. According to Klare, Pakistan is not a rogue per se, but is described as an emerging regional power with hegemonic aspirations and an interest in the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. In 1990, the Pakistanis were believed to have possessed the materials and the components for six to ten nuclear weapons. It was then that President Bush decided to withhold certification and thereby the flow of military aid. Since 1990, the US and Pakistan have repeatedly clashed over nuclear proliferation. Despite denials by Pakistan of any possession of nuclear arms, government officials, including Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, have adamantly refused to suspend Paksitans nuclear program. A 1994 US proposal that Pakistan freeze its nuclear arsenal at its current levels in return for resumption of US aid was rejected by Islamabad because the proposal did not call for a similar cap on the Indian nuclear arsenal. Pakistan, however did not have to rely on aid from the US. Pakistans rapport with China provided it with considerable arms and technology. In 1993, sanctions were logged against Pakistan after it tried to purchase M-11 ballistic missiles from China. The fact that the US already had tense relations with China only deepens the growing sentiment within the USG that Pakistan must be stopped in its quest for nuclear arms. As recently as February of 1996, China sold magnets which could be useful in sensitive nuclear weapons related equipment. Pakistan has also relied on black-market of sensitive materials and technology. According to officials, Pakistan obtained significant Western technology for its uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta, including an entire facility for converting uranium powder into uranium hexaflouride, the easily gasified material used for gas centrifuge method enrichment. Understanding Pakistans propensity to be a major threat to world security is vital to understanding the US perception of Pakistan as a rogue. Conflicts which start as border and irridentist disputes between neighboring groups and tribes such as the conflict dating back to the partition of India, still engulfs the disputed territory of Kashmir. A war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir could trigger the use of nuclear weapons and/or lead to a major regional conflagration, which is why the US must be alert to the nuclear programs of both India and Pakistan. Less importantly, but nevertheless a factor, is the fact that Pakistan is a Muslim country and its proximity to Israel, whose foreign policy is closely aligned with that of Israel. The security dilemma that exists between India and Pakistan has the potential to escalate into nuclear war. It is for this reason that the US must pay attention to proliferation in this region. It is also for this reason that Pakistan is considered a rogue state. Both India and Pakistan realize that a balance of power can only be achieve by attaining sufficient capabilities for both offensive and defensive purposes. The Importance of the Security Dilemma Unyielding deterrent policies may be stabilizing when they defend a balanced status quo, because they induce caution in those who would overturn the balance. Given Indo-Pak relations and capabilities, such a balance is extremely fragile. Perceptually, security is the overriding goal of states, but the choice of strategy for achieving it may be influenced by perceptual biases. Technology, relative power, and the intentions of others may all be misperceived. The contest for gaining superior technology acquired particular intensity in the post world war II era because of the potency of the weapons involved. The mere possession of these weapons, given their immense destructive force, was thought to confer power and prestige on their owners. Furthermore, by constructing their military strategies around nuclear weapons, the US and the Soviet Union signalled to all other countries that membership in the class of majorpowers was limited to state possession of such weapons. Weapons seeking states have been spurred by a number of motives. Aside from the desire to gain entry into the exclusive ranks of major powers, many have felt threatened by superpowers already in possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD.) In this case, there was something of a domino effect. India sought such weapons at least in part because China, an adversary during the sixties, was building them. Pakistan felt compelled to acquire nuclear weapons to offset the advantage of its arch enemy, India. In 1990, the perceptual biases of both India and Pakistan as well as the acquisition of both countries of WMDs very nearly escalated into nuclear war. The confrontation had its beginning in a large scale Indian military exercise, code named Brass-Tacks, that started near the end of 1986. Rajiv Gandhi was Prime Minister of India and there was a new and aggressive army leader, general Sundarji. Gandhi and Sundarji agreed to stage the largest military exercise in modern Indian history, involving all branches of the armed forces and as many as four hundred troops, starting in December. The exercise would take place not in Indias far north, where the always tense state of Kashmir is located, but in the desert area of Rajastan, a few hundred miles from the Pakistani border, which, a the Pakistani government was sure to note, was and ideal location from which to launch a cross border operation into the Pakistani state of Sindh that could cut Pakistan in half. Another feature of the exercise was a decision by General Sundarji to integrate Indias special weapons, including tactical nuclear into day-to day field maneuvers of the troops. American analysts concluded that the Indian operations, which at their height involved more than a thousand armored vehicles, was as large as some exercises carried out by NATO in Europe. President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, who was also the army chief of staff viewed the Indian maneuvers as a direct threat and ordered his armored units to move to the front, where by mid-january, the two armies stood within firing range along an extended border area. At the height of the buildup, the Indian army leadership decided to provide full-scale briefings to the Indian media about the Brass-Tacks exercises in which General Sundarji declared that they were non-provacative. There had been no public discussion of the huge troop movements until then, and the crisis abated. Several previously mentioned theories can be applied to this event in during the conflict between Pakistan and India. Some sources of perceptual bias can either exacerbate or alleviate security fears, depending on the circumstances of the case. For example, superficial lessons of the last war may strongly bias perceptions of the offense-defense balance, but they can cut in either direction according to the nature of that war. The actions taken by India were seemingly of a defensive nature. Jack Snyder had stated that states are rarely willing to restrain military preparations that would benefit them if war broke out in order to reduce the chance that the other side will attack out of the fear of being struck. The defensive measures taken by India were easily perceived by Pakistan as having overt hostile overtures because of its vast experience with such military build up along borders which had previously implied Indian poise to attack. Lessons people learn are usually oversimplified and overgeneralized. Had India not publicized its military exercise, the result could very well have war because of Pakistans mispersception of Indian motives brought on by unmotivated biases. After all, the decision maker who thinks that the other side is probably hostile will see ambiguous information as confirming this image. The security dilemma that exists between the two countries is centered around their biases of each other which only exacerbates security fears. It is for this reason that the security dilemma continues to thrive. Why US Deterrence is Failing Having understood the importance of the Security dilemma in that region and the reasons why it has not diminished, we must return to the underlying question of why US attempts at implementing a nuclear non-prolifertion regime has failed so far. In order to do so many events and scenarios must be taken into account. The foremost reason why deterrence is failing is because in Pakistans eyes, India poses a tremendous threat to Pakistani security, and, in its own defense, it feels it must increase its capabilities. There is, however, and emotional side in this conflict in the form of resentment from Pakistan towards the US because of what it perceives as unfair US policies towards Pakistan. While Washington on occasion has been forceful in oppressing the proliferation activities of certain countries, it often has tolerated or ignored those of others. As a result, some weapons seeking states such as India and Pakistan have made great strides in the pursuit of WMDs. A prime example of the clash of priorities can be found in the US response to Pakistans nuclear weapons program. In April 1979, after acquiring clear evidence of the Pakistani nuclear effort, the Carter administration suspended military aid to Pakistan, as mandated by the 1976 Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. However, when Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan in December 1979, Congress overruled the Symington Amendment and allowed $3.2 billion in sales of American arms to Pakistan. Only in 1990, after the Soviets had completed their pullout from Afghanistan and the Pakistanis had succeeded in producing operational nuclear devices, did President Bush acknowledge Pakistans nuclear weapon status and imposed a belated cutoff in military assistance. Understandably, Pakistan feels that the Pressler Amendment is a discriminatory device used only against Pakistan in South Asia. In a statement about Pakistans stance on nuclear proliferation, it was established that The discriminatory Pressler Amendment has failed to promote US non-proliferation goals in South Asia. With the application of Pressler only on Pakistan, there is no incentive for India to agree to any regional non-prlifertion framework. Form New Delhis perspective, the denial of American assistance and arms to Pakistan is a favorable development and by refusing to cooperate at the regional level, the Indians have a virtual veto on the overall context of Pakistan-US relations. The reality of the situation has forced the US to review its policy and modify the Pressler amendment because such tactics were simply not working. As previously mentioned, a 1994 US proposal that Pakistan freeze its nuclear arsenal at current levels in return for the resumption of US aid was rejected by Pakistan because it was asked to make a unilateral concession not matched by India. Only as recently as 1995 has the US realized that it must deal with Pakistan in a manner equal to that of its dealing of India. Since April 1995 There has been a great recognition of Pakistans position in congress as well as the administration. On April 11, 1995 President Clinton himself stated that the goal of nonproliferation needed to be persued at a regional level and therefore the Pakistan specific Pressler Amendment needed modification. the president declared that withholding the military equipment that Pakistan contracted and paid for before the implementation of the Pressler Amendment in October 1990 was unfair. The Brown amendment, signed into law on February 12, 1996 envisaged the flow of all forms of economic assistance to Pakistan, and a one-time release of $368 million in military equipment that had been ordered by Pakistan prior to the October 1990 aid cutoff to that country when the Pressler Amendment was triggered. Many of the laws passed by the US in regard to Pakistan were made with the REHABILITATIVE tact for they were issue specific, dealing only with Pakistani acquisition of WMD and the technology to build them The Administrations efforts, however, tended to focus primarily on Pakistan rather than India or China. The lack of symmetry, of course, was heavily criticized by Pakistan and was a source of contention which prompted Pakistan to resist any non-prolifertion attempts. US non-proliferation legislation has focused on the transfer of nuclear materials and technology, but no on their indigenous development. In order to adequately establish its non-prolifertion regime in South Asia, the US must attempt to understand the security needs of both Pakistan and India. In other words, the US must use persuasive rather than strategic tactics. Persuasion is defined as an occasion when a party (parties) provide information in order to sway the other(s) to arrive at an acceptable alternative or policy decision. The US must provide both India and Pakistan with the information as to why it is in their interest to dismantle their nuclear capabilities. If achieved, Pakistan and India attain peace while the US may implement its nonproliferation regime peacefully, bringing the US one step closer to shaping a new world order. Deterrence through rehabilitative tactics to date has not worked. Persuasion by pointing out benefits should have been the tactic used by the US in regards to Pakistani nuclear proliferation. Conclusion There have long been grounds for concern that war between India and Pakistan could break out. As one US expert stated, both nations have moved to military doctrines of offense-defense, in other words, a strategy of preemption. The Indian defense strategy is oriented towards carrying the war into the Pakistani homeland. It is also configured toward promptly suppressing Pakistani air defense capabilities and the early acquisition of air superiority and in the future could even incorporate the use of nuclear weapons. In India does no succeed in quelling disturbances in Kashmir and the Pakistani leadership continues to aggravate the situation, war could take place as a consequence of inadvertent escalation. Given the existence of preemptive doctrines and a tense atmosphere along the border, a minor skirmish could well escalate into a larger war that neither side envisaged. Such a possibility is especially likely in South Asia, where civilian communications, not to mention military ones, are less than thoroughly reliable, increasing the probability of escalation due to misperception and miscalculation. In 1990, Indias military training exercise operation Brass-Tacks almost led to war because of poor communications and mutual misperception of intent, only after substantial high-level diplomatic contacts were mutual tensions eased. It is in the interests of the US to prevent the outbreak of another war in South Asia. At a time of declining regional tensions, a war on the subcontinent would divert US attention from on going attempts to shape a new world order. Another Indo-Pakistani war would almost inevitably lead to the overt nuclearization of the subcontinent. A private US study group, Asia Society, released a report calling for a new approach to the problem of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Both India and Pakistan, it says, should retain their option to build nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. And the US best hope for progress on non-proliferation lies in the encouraging reapproachment between them, and particularly in efforts to ease the Kashmiri conflict. Although the US used rehabilitative and strategic means to stop proliferation in South Asian the result has been increased proliferation instead. The US should take the stand that there must be some sort of resolution in regards to the Kashmiri conflict. Without such a resolution, neither Pakistan or India will make any attempts to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT.) For this to occur, the US must pay the cost of information and seek to understand the indigenous roots of the conflict. It is imperative to understand the cognitive thought processes of both countries. Pakistan will never give up its quest for nuclear capabilities as it feels it must deter India because it feels to much of threat to its security from India. Any hope of a resolution in the Indo-Pak conflict lies in the understanding and persuasion on the part of the US. Whereas Pakistan might have been acting out of a window of opportunity, it is now acting out of a basement of fear. To much cornering and scrutiny by the US at this stage of events could send Pakistan over the nuclear edge.