Jonathan Freeman 6/19/96 Political Science 472 International Security Affairs Why did the United States agree to enact the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavian states when the US government ideologically identified with Bosnians and Croatians and when the policy helped the Serbians? Introduction On June 28, 1991, when the standoff between the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and breakaway states of Slovenia and Croatia, the entire Balkan region was thrown into the bloodiest war since World War II.[1] Almost overnight the international community was entrapped in a dizzying quagmire of internal politics and hatreds in a small corner of the world that was supposedly preparing itself for the grandeur of democracy.[2] The result of the indecisiveness and ambiguity of the international community was four long years of rape and slaughter that only now, with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in Paris on December 14, 1995, seems to possibly have achieved lasting peace. Throughout the process of bringing peace to the former Yugoslavian states, the United States was roundly criticized, both domestically and internationally, for not taking a leadership role as the worldUs only superpower. One of the policies the United States continually struggled with its support for the unilateral arms embargo against the republics. By supporting United Nations Security Council Resolution 713, the US was actually aiding the Serbians because the Serbians had access to most of the arms from the former communist nation.[3] However, at the same time, US rhetoric led the international community to believe the US ideologically identified with the plight of the Bosnian Muslims and Croatians.[4] The question, then, must be asked as to what factor(s), both internally and externally, contributed to this seemingly contradictory policy towards the Balkan conflict. Theoretical Discussion The major reason that the Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs ignored the demands of the United Nations is that the UN had a lack of threat credibility. Thomas Schelling, the author of Arms and Influence, describes threat credibility as being a measure of how serious the challenger takes your capabilities and your willingness to use them. RIt is tradition in military planning to attend to an enemyUs capabilities, not his intentions...deterrence is about intentionsQnot just estimating enemy intentions but influencing them. The hardest part is communicating our own intentions.S[5] After the Serbs continued their military campaign, without regard to pressures being brought to bare through arms and economic embargoes the UN had the opportunity to impose the will of the international community by force . However, the majors powers in the UN, chiefly the Americans, British, French, and Soviets, could not reach consensus of action except to agree that none wanted to send any ground troops to the region. Therefore, the UN was unable to enforce any level of deterrence. Unlike the Persian Gulf Crisis, where there was a clear international intrinsic interest in the region, such as oil, the crisis in former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia lacked the intrinsic interests of Kuwait. Yugoslavia did not have a large economy, nor did anything get produced in the Balkan state that would provide kind of intrinsic, tangible, value, only strategic interests existed that had no direct tangible value existed. Because of those vital oil interests in the Persian Gulf, 1990 saw a quick and decisive reaction from the other members of the international community. However, in the Balkan Conflict the interests had clearly changed. For the US, because of the unstable domestic state of affairs in Russia, the Balkan Conflict was left to maintain moral leadership in the world. The EuropeanUs strategic interests were maintaining security in their backyard thereby insuring containment of the conflict and smaller risk that one of them, the Europeans, would be drawn into the conflict. However, both groups continued ignoring the cries for help in the Balkans. RThis is a mainly a moral question,S said former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on the David Brinkley show in the summer of 1992, RWe are seeing things that are just about the worst of Stalin and Hitler. Humanitarian aid is an insufficient response...I canUt understand why there is any further delay in taking much firmer action.S[6] As early as 1989 the US sought Rto persuade Europe to greater responsibility for its own security ....S[9] Meaning that it was EuropeUs responsibility to take the lead regarding its own individual regions problems. An excellent example of a region taking responsibility, is the Persian Gulf War, though the US led the Coalition Force; the Arab nations provided the groundwork, in terms of land, temporary supplies, and an understanding of the region, without which the crisis would have possibly taken as long as the Balkan Conflict to end. The Persian Gulf War also brought another factor that contributed to the lack of resolve felt by the major powers in particular the US, notably that after the conclusion of the successful campaign, which made leaders hugely popular, the populous desired their governments to focus more internally on domestic problems. Many of those governments that had contributed to the Persian Gulf victory were up for re-election, thereby creating a domestic environment that would be unsympathetic if their governments became involved in an escalating conflict without foreseeable end or valued international interest. Resolve on the part of the US was further weakened by two other factors: fear of the Balkan Conflict becoming another Vietnam [7] and an interagency debate on the proper approach to the crisis.[8] When the US has debated military action since the end of Vietnam in 1975, there has been increased concern about how much US intrinsic interests are at risk when a conflict arises. At the beginning of the Balkan Conflict, it was felt by the Bush administration that this was a European problem and therefore the British and French should take the lead in formulating the policy for the region. The interagency debate never became public, though there many speculations of one, until mid October of 1992 and was admitted to be between, and going on within, the Departments of Defense and State.[10] Because of these overriding factors, the US never developed the resolve to create a clear and concise intervening policy toward the Balkans until the conflict had escalated to the point where political pressures forced action from the US. Background The other challenge for the Western powers and Russian was a general misunderstanding of the cultural relationship in Bosnia which seemed to ignite the war. Fears and hatreds so vividly expressed during the four year war had had hundreds of years to develop and be nourished. In the past century there had four other Balkan Wars, one of which proved to be the catalyst for World War I.[11] There was an impression by the UN that it could repeat its general game plan of deterrence used with regard to Iraq and have the same success. Because of these cultural misunderstandings of the policy makers at the UN, however, coupled with luke warm US support, the Balkan Conflict raged unchecked. Prior to the fall of the Communist Empire from late 1989 and on into 1990, there existed a delicate balance of power between the three ethnicityUs of Yugoslavia; a balance enforced by the communist dictator, President Josip Broz Tito. Tito held Yugoslavia together Rby a complex balancing act in the international arena and a mixed economy and political system that provided governmental protections of social and economic equality and of shared sovereignty among its many nations.S[12] When Tito died in May of 1980 and then with the breakup in 1990 it was only a matter of time before another conflict broke out in the Balkans. Without TitoUs sensitive understanding of the depth of the divisions or the strictness of a secular communist state, old feelings and grudges were bound to resurface. When the Communist Party collapsed in January of 1990, this led to multi-party elections within the individual republics. Those elections gave Croatia and Slovenia the opportunity to begin efforts to break away from Yugoslavia and seek recognition from the West, creating tensions between the other individual republics. Those tensions continued to escalating when on May 15, 1991 Serbia voted against allowing Stipe Mesic, the former prime minister of Croatia whose turn it was by constitutional law to nominate the President of Yugoslavian. Mesic was a controversial candidate because in he had campaigned on Croatian independence and formal breakup of the six Yugoslavian republics.[13] With the repudiation of their candidate, the Croatians and Slovenians directly brought up a referendum on their independence and with the approval of their citizens, excepting those Serbs who boycotted both elections, both nations declared their independence from the formal Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on June 28, 1991. Immediately following the declaration, the federal government, now only represented by a large majority of Serbs, sent the army to deal with the breakaway republics. Though the Slovenians faced a short ten day standoff, the Yugoslav National Army began the war in Croatia that lasted until signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. At this point, the European Community began an arms embargo and freezing EC aid to Yugoslavia, which was quickly endorsed by the Bush administration. Bush, along with the Europeans, wanted a quick ending or at least a containment of the conflict. Constant efforts were made throughout the summer by the EC and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to begin a peace process to the Balkan Conflict but to no avail. On the 25th of September, France introduced a resolution to the UN Security Council under auspices of Chapter VII of the UN charter. The resolution (UNSCR 713) called for a unilateral arms embargo on Yugoslavia that also urged the warring factions to abide by their cease-fire agreements that each faction was continually ignoring. The arms embargo did little to deter any of the factions but in conjunction with the economic sanctions that soon followed began to cripple the economies of each country. None of the European nations wanted to commit any ground troops except for a UN peace keeping operation and even, then Britain was wary about making any commitments. The war continued to rage without any signs of easing up, the UN Security Council passed new resolutions creating a protection force (UNSCR 752) called UNPROFOR and created economic sanctions (UNSCR 757). The international community had made a few failed attempts at creating a peace process but always there was a withdrawal by one of the three warring nations. In August of 1992, Democratic Presidential candidate Governor Clinton called on the arms ban to be lifted. At the time according to the Congressional Arms Committee Chairmen, Senator Nunn of Georgia and Representative Aspin of Wisconsin, stated their belief that the Bush Administration had Rnow essentially adopted the TClinton policyU toward the Balkan crisis.S[14] This was the beginning of USUs dissatisfaction of the results of the arms embargo. In October, the UN Security Council passed a resolution (UNSCR 781) to ban all military flights within the air space of Bosnia-Herzegovina. President Bush, showing US resolve for the first time since the conflict began, declared that the US is will to enforce the ban if requested by the UN Security Council; Bosnian Serbs immediately grounded all of their military aircraft. With the election of Clinton, a self-styled domestic leader, many around the world grew deeply concerned that America would turn inward to focus on domestic problems at a time when US leadership was crucial to the world.[15] Soon after the election, the UN General Assembly passed, with US support, a resolution (A/Res 47/121) calling for the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. The vote, in which the Europeans and Russians abstained, created bump in US relations with the Europeans, who desired a containment of the conflict, and Russians, who ethnically identified with the Serbians.[16] On February 10, 1993, when the Clinton Administration offered a clear and coherent strategy on Balkan Conflict, the Europeans and Russians both gave a sigh of relief that the lifting of the arms embargo was not on the list. Though the Clinton had not modified its position to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia, there continued to be opposition from the Russians and Europeans, and as result the US focus less on lifting the arms embargo and redoubled its efforts to create an achievable peace process that garner support from international community.[17] Implication on Policy In 1989, while the conflict in the Balkans was brewing once again, the Bush Administration made firm decision that its foreign policy would not be based on the US becoming the moral policeman of the world. The Bush Administration made a clear and substantial in NATO, the UN, and other international organizations that it would be allowing the Western European nations take the lead when deal with crisis situations in the European sphere of influence. When the Balkan Conflict began getting out of hand during the summer of 1991 and the Europeans were floundering for a cohesive policy, Washington sent out half-hearted statements of support for EC and CSCE proposals but never took any initiative. By the Fall of 1991, when the arms embargo was proposed, the only thing that seemed clear about US policy toward the Balkans was opposition to the recognized oppressor, the Serbians and Bosnian Serbs. The US had been consistent in supporting European effort and by the time the French proposed the embargo in September, the US supported the proposal out of habit without much thought as to the effects the policy would have on the oppressed republics in the region. In mid 1992, the US began to realize that it had made a mistake by supporting the arms embargo. With the Serbians gaining ground everyday, Americans began to wonder how exactly the Bosnians and Croatians were being helped by the embargo. The US media, by this time, had done a super job in portraying the plight of Croatians and Bosnians that the American people were clearly supportive of the two countries which were seen seekers of democratic independence and being oppressed by a stronger and more violent Serbian nation. Toward the end of his administration Bush had come around to Clinton method of thinking that we were aiding the Serbs by not arming their opposition which the US had clearly identified more with, and began working to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnians. The opposition from US allies to lifting the arms embargo was from the Europeans side a stated belief, at least publicly [18], that the arms embargo would provide containment for the conflict. The other challenge to US policy was an evolving partnership with the Russians. Russia has a long history of supporting Slavic nations, Serbia in particular . Because of this history there was a fear within the US bureaucracy that lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnians would allow the pro-nationalist and anti-Yeltsin political forces within Russia to press for a lifting the arms embargo on the Serbians. Thereby allowing the stage to be set for another Vietnam since both the US and Russians had willingness and the capabilities to provide their prospective, ideologically identified with nation, arms and the training to utilize them. Along with these international roadblocks, there were domestic pressures being placed on the Clinton Administration that were aiding the inconsistent policy toward the Balkans. With the passage of bills as late as August 1995, Congress was insisting the arms embargo on Bosnia be lifted in accordance with Article 51 of Chapter VII of the United Nations charter, which gave a nation the right to defend itself from an attack. In addition, the bureaucratic debate between the Departments of Defense and State continued, with DOD maintaining the absence of any intrinsic interests and DOS stating that the US had a strategic interest in continuing its role as a world leader and therefore would be required to commit ground troops. The departments came to a consensus, during the end of BushUs term and the beginning of ClintonUs, when both agreed the in order maintain the USUs position in the international community it would be appropriate to send troops to the Balkans only in the event that cease-fire had been agreed to by all sides and that military force would only be utilized for a peace keeping operation.[19] These challenges created an opportunity for the US to lead the peace process in the Balkans. This opportunity grew as the war continued on and the UN negotiators continually came up empty handed due to the three factions walking away from the negotiating table. In 1995, Secretary of State Christopher and Undersecretary Holbrooke led the Contact Group (French, British, Germans, Russians ,and the Americans) and brokered negotiations that eventually led to the Dayton Peace Accords (UNSCR 1031) and the Clinton Administration finally grew into the task of leading the international community Conclusion The effectiveness of the arms embargo and economic sanctions was mixed. While no one can deny that there was a containment of the conflict, the amount of widespread suffering that the embargoes caused to the civilians of each of the warring nations was unnecessary to say the least. While the United States and the Clinton Administration can bask in world adoration for having created peace four years too late, the Balkan Conflict should serve as very important lesson to the US. When the UN clearly lacked the ability, the Europeans lacked the leadership and the resolve, and the Russians (Soviets at the time) busy in their domestic political difficulties, the US could and should have stepped up to the plate. The Bush Administration, along with the rest of the international community, miscalculated the will and resolve of the individual actors involved in this conflict. Meanwhile, when the Clinton Administration took the reigns of the US government, there should have been less political posturing and tiptoeing on crucial issues. The conflict should not have continued because the US had no vital interests until the situation exacerbated to the point where USUs interests became remaining a leader in the international community. Future US policy toward the Balkan nations will depend on whether the Dayton Peace Accords are adhered too or not. In addition, it will behoove Serbia to respect the Peace Accords and not continue pursuing Milosevic policies of Rethnic cleansingS to achieve a greater Serbia. End Notes 1. Sir Russell Johnston, The Yugoslav Conflict-Chronology of Events from 30th May 1991-8th November 1993 (Paris: Assembly of Western European Unions, 29th November 1993) p. 1 2. Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institute, 1995), Introduction 3. National Foreign Affairs Training Center: U.S. Department of State, A ReaderUs Guide: Conflict in the Balkans. Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1996. p. 8. 4. John M. Goshko, RU.S. Role in Balkans Played Down,S Washington Post, 11 September 1992, a28. 5. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p.35 6. Gary Lee and Edward Alsh, RU.N. Accord on Bosnia Aid Near,S Washington Post, 10 August 1992, a1. 7. Rueters News Service, RCampaign T92: Transcript of the First Presidential Debate,S Washington Post, 12 October 1992, a16. 8. Jackson Diehl and Barton Gellman, REnforcement of Bosnia TNo-FlyU Zone Weighed,S Washington Post, 14 October 1992, a25. 9. Woodward 1995, 157-8. 10. Deihl and Gellman 14 October 1992, a25. 11. National Foreign Affairs Training Center: U.S. Department of State, 1996 p. 13-17. 12. Woodward 1995, 22. 13. Woodward 1995, 142-5. 14. Gary Lee and Edward Alsh 10 August 1992, a1 15. Jim Hoagland, RLooking Ahead: At Home and Abroad,S Washington Post, 8 November 1992, a1. 16. From News Service, RU.N. Assembly Backs Force in Bosnia,S Washington Post, 19 December 1992, a13. 17. U.S. President, Veto Message, RReport of the Disapproval of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995QMessage from the President.S Congressional Record (11 August 1995), p. S12326. 18. In regards to what the Europeans believed privately, there are speculations among the Islamic community that Europe realized it was tacitly aiding the Serbians in hopes that the Bosnians would fall, thereby preventing the creation of an Islamic state in Europe. Alaattin Akdemir, dir. RBitter Taste of Peace: Bosnian RetrospectiveS Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Association. 1 January 1996. 19. Sir Russell Johnston, 1993, p. 21. Additional Sources 1. How the War Started. Submitted by Nalini Lasiewicz. www.cc.caltech.edu/~bosnia/doc/start.html 2. Chronicle of a Punishment. www.yugoslavia.com 3. Facts about Serbia. www.yugoslavia.com 4. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein. Psychology and Deterrence. With contributions of Patrick M. Morgan and Jack L. Snyder. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 5. Michale Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Oulaws: AmericsaUs Search for a New Foreign Policy (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995). 6. Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin Books, 1992). Appendix A. CHAPTER VII ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION Article 39 The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 40 In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making there commendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures. Article 41 The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. Article 42 Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. Article 43 1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. 3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. Article 44 When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces. Article 45 In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. Article 46 Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. Article 47 1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament. 2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work. 3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently. 4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees. Article 48 1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine. 2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members. Article 49 The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council. Article 50 If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems. Article 51 Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. B. United Nations Security Council Resolution 713 S/RES/713 (1991) 25 September 1991 RESOLUTION 713 (1991) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3009th meeting, on 25 September 1991 The Security Council, Conscious of the fact that Yugoslavia has welcomed the convening of a Security Council meeting through a letter conveyed by the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the President of the Security Council (S/23069), Having heard the statement by the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, Deeply concerned by the fighting in Yugoslavia which is causing a heavy loss of human life and material damage, and by the consequences for the countries of the region, in particular in the border areas of neighbouring countries, Concerned that the continuation of this situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, Recalling its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, Recalling also the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, Commending the efforts undertaken by the European Community and its member States, with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to restore peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia, through, inter alia, the implementation of a cease-fire including the sending of observers, the convening of a Conference on Yugoslavia, including the mechanisms set forth within it, and the suspension of the delivery of all weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia, Recalling the relevant principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and, in this context, noting the Declaration of 3 September 1991 of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that no territorial gains or changes within Yugoslavia brought about by violence are acceptable, Noting also the agreement for a cease-fire concluded on 17 September 1991 in Igalo, and also that signed on 22 September 1991, Alarmed by the violations of the cease-fire and the continuation of the fighting, Taking note of the letter dated 19 September 1991 to the President of the Security Council from the Permanent Representative of Austria (S/23052), Taking note also of the letters dated 19 September 1991 and 20 September 1991 to the President of the Security Council from respectively the Permanent Representative of Canada (S/23053) and he Permanent Representative of Hungary (S/23057), Taking note also of the letters dated 5 July 1991 (S/22775), 12 July 1991 (S/22785), 22 July 1991 (S/22834), 6 August 1991 (S/22898), 7 August 1991 (S/22902), 7 August 1991 (S/22903), 21 August 1991 (S/22975), 29 August 1991 (S/22991), 4 September 1991 (S/23010), 19 September 1991 (S/23047), 20 September 1991 (S/23059) and 20 September 1991 (S/23060), from respectively the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands, the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia, the Permanent Representatives of Belgium, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Charge d'Affaires a.i. of Austria, and the Permanent Representative of Australia, 1. Expresses its full support for the collective efforts for peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia undertaken under the auspices of the member States of the European Community with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe consistent with the principles of that Conference; 2. Supports fully all arrangements and measures resulting from such collective efforts as those described above, in particular of assistance and support to the cease-fire observers, to consolidate an effective end to hostilities in Yugoslavia and the smooth functioning of the process instituted within the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia; 3. Invites to this end the Secretary-General to offer his assistance without delay, in consultation with the Government of Yugoslavia and all those promoting the efforts referred to above, and to report as soon as possible to the Security Council; 4. Strongly urges all parties to abide strictly by the cease-fire agreements of 17 September 1991 and 22 September 1991; 5. Appeals urgently to and encourages all parties to settle their disputes peacefully and through negotiation at the Conference on Yugoslavia, including through the mechanisms set forth within it; 6. Decides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise following consultation between the Secretary-General and the Government of Yugoslavia; 7. Calls on all States to refrain from any action which might contribute to increasing tension and to impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict in Yugoslavia, which would permit all Yugoslavs to decide upon and to construct their future in peace; 8. Decides to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved. C. United Nation Security Council Resolution 752 S/RES/752 (1992) 5 May 1992 RESOLUTION 752 (1992) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3069th meeting, on 15 May 1992 The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991, 721 (1991) of 27 November 1991, 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991, 727 (1992) of 8 January 1992, 740 (1992) of 7 February 1992, 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992 and 749 (1992) of 7 April 1992, Expressing its appreciation for the reports of the Secretary-General of 24 April 1992 (S/23836) and 12 May 1992 (S/23900) pursuant to resolution 749 (1992), Deeply concerned about the serious situation in certain parts of ion the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and in particular about the rapid and violent deterioration of the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Recalling its primary responsibility under the Cherter of the su United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, Recalling also the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of u, the United Nations, and the continuing role the the European Community is playing in achieving a peaceful solution in Bosnia-Hercegovina, as well as in other republic of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Having considered the announcement in Belgrade on 4 May 1992 described in paragraph 24 of the report of the Secretary-General of 12 May 1992 concerning the withdrawal of Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) personnel from republics other than Serbia and Montenogro and the renunciation of authority over those who remain, Noting the urgent need for humanitarian assistance and the various appeals made in this connection, in particular by the President of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Deploring the tragic incident of 4 May 1992 which caused the death of a members of the European Community Monitor Mission, Deeply concerned about the safety of United Nations personnel in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1. Demands that all parties and others concerned in neral Bosnia-Hercegovina stop the fighting immediately, respect immediately and fully the cease-fire signed on 12 April 1992, and cooperate with the efforts of the European Community to bring about urgently a negotiated political solution respecting the principle that any change of borders by force is not acceptable; 2. Welcomes the efforts undertaken by the European Community in the framework of the discussions on constitutional arrangements for Bosnia-Hercegovina under the auspices of the Conference in Yugoslavia, urges that the discussions be resumed without delay, and urges the three communities in Bosnia-Hercegovina to participate actively and constructively in these discussions on a continuous basis as recommended by the Secretary-General and to conclude and implement the constitutional arrangements being developed at the tripartite talks; 3. Demands that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia-Hercegovina, including by by units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) as well as elements of the Croatian Army, cease immediately, and that Bosnia-Hercegovina's neighbours take swift action to end such interference and respect the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina; 4. Demands that those units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and elements of the Croatian Army now in Bosnia-Hercegovina must either be withdrawn, or be subject to the authority of the Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under effective international monitoring, and requests the Secretary-General to consider without delay what international assistance could be provided in this connection; 5. Demands also that all irregular forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina be disbanded and disarmed; 6. CAlls upon all parties and others concerned to ensure that forcible expulsions of persons from the areas where they live and any attempts to change the ethnic composition of the population, anywhere in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, cease immediately; 7. Emphasizes the urgent need for humanitarian assistance, material and financial, taking into account the large number of refugees and displaced persons and fully supports the current efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to all the victims of the conflict and to assist in the voluntary return of displaced persons to their homes; 8. Calls on all parties and other concerned to ensure that conditions are established for the effective and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance, including safe and secure access to airports in Bosnia-Hercegovina; 9. Requests the Secretary-General to keep under active review the feasibility of protecting international humanitarian relief programmes, including the option mentioned in paragraph 29 of his report of 12 May 1992, and of ensuring safe and secure access to Sarajevo airport, and to report to the Security Council by 26 May 1992; 10. Further requests the Secretary-General, having regard to the evolution of the situation and to the results of the efforts undertaken by the European Community, to continue to keep under review the n possibility of deploying a peace-keeping mission in Bosnia-Hercegovina , under the auspices of the United Nations; 11. Demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully with UNPROFOR and the European Community Monitor Mission, and respect fully their freedom of movement and the safety of their personnel; 12. Notes the progress made thus far in the deployment of UNPROFOR, welcomes the fact that UNPROFOR has assumed the full responsibility called for by its mandate in Eastern Slavonia, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure that UNPROFOR will assume its full responsibilities in all the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) as soon as possible and to encourage all parties and others concerned to resolve any problems remaining in this connection; 13. Urges all parties and others concerned to cooperate in every way with UNPROFOR in accordance with the United Nations Plan and to comply strictly with the Plan in all its aspects, in particular the disarming of all irregular forces, whatever their origin, in the UNPAs; 14. Decides to remainactively seized of the matter and to consider further steps to achieve a peaceful solution in conformity with relevant resolutions of the Council. D. United Nations Security Council Resolution 757 S/RES/757 (1992) 30 May 1992 RESOLUTION 757 (1992) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3082nd meeting, on 30 May 1992 The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991, 721 (1991) of 27 November 1991, 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991, 727 (1992) of 8 January 1992, 740 (1992) of 7 February 1992, 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992, 749 (1992) of 7 April 1992 and 752 (1992) of 15 May, Noting that in the very complex context of events in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia all parties bear some responsibility for the situation, Reaffirming its support for the Conference on Yugoslavia, including the efforts undertaken by the European Community in the framework of the discussions on constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and recalling that no territorial gains or changes brought about by violence are acceptable and that the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina are inviolable, Deploring the fact that the demands in resolution 752 (1992) have not been complied with, including its demands: - that all parties and others concerned in Bosnia and Herzegovina stop the fighting immediately, - that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina cease immediately, - that Bosnia and Herzegovina's neighbours take swift action to end all interference and respect the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, - that action be taken as regards units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the disbanding and disarming with weapons placed under effective international monitoring of any units that are neither withdrawn nor placed under the authority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, - that all irregular forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina be disbanded and disarmed, Deploring further that its call for the immediate cessation of forcible expulsions and attempts to change the ethnic composition of that population has not been heeded, and reaffirming in this context the need for the effective protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including those of ethnic minorities, Dismayed that conditions have not yet been established for the effective and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance, including safe and secure access to and from Sarajevo and other airports in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Deeply concerned that those United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) personnel remaining in Sarajevo have been subjected to deliberate mortar and small-arms fire, and the United Nations Military Observers deployed in the Mostar region have had to be withdrawn, Deeply concerned also at developments in Croatia, including persistent cease-fire violations and the continued expulsion of non-Serb civilians, and at the obstruction of and lack of cooperation with UNPROFOR in other parts of Croatia, Deploring the tragic incident on 18 May 1992 which caused the death of a member of the ICRC team in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Noting that the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally accepted, Expressing its appreciation for the report of the Secretary-General of 26 May 1992 (S/24000) pursuant to resolution 752 (1992), Recalling its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, Recalling also the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, and the continuing role that the European Community is playing in working for a peaceful solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in other republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Recalling its decision in resolution 752 (1992) to consider further steps to achieve a peaceful solution in conformity with relevant resolutions of the Council, and affirming its determination to take measures against any party or parties which fail to fulfil the requirements of resolution 752 (1992) and its other relevant resolutions, Determined in this context to adopt certain measures with the sole objective of achieving a peaceful solution and encouraging the efforts undertaken by the European Community and its member States, Recalling the right of States, under Article 50 of the Charter, to consult the Security Council where they find themselves confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of preventive or enforcement measures, Determining that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in other parts of the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia constitutes a threat to international peace and security, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Condemns the failure of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), to take effective measures to fulfil the requirements of resolution 752 (1992); 2. Demands that any elements of the Croatian Army still present in Bosnia and Herzegovina act in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 752 (1992) without further delay; 3. Decides that all States shall adopt the measures set out below, which shall apply until the Security Council decides that the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), have taken effective measures to fulfil the requirements of resolution 752 (1992); 4. Decides that all States shall prevent: (a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution; (b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or aircraft or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for the purposes of such activities or dealings; (c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft of any commodities or products, whether or not originating in their territories, but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and foodstuffs notified to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (991), to any person or body in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products; 5. Decides that all States shall not make available to the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or to any commercial, undustrial or public utility undertaking in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to those authorities or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies wihin the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and foodstuffs; 6. Decides that the prohibitions in paragraphs 4 and 5 above shall not apply to the trans-shipment through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of commodities and products originating outside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and temporarily present in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) only for the purpose of such trans-shipment, in accordance with guidelines approved by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991); 7. Decides that all States shall: (a) Deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory if it is destined to land in or had taken off from the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), unless the particular flight has been approved, for humanitarian or other purposes consistent with the relevant resolutions of the Council, by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991); (b) Prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, the provision of engineering and maintenance servicing of aircraft registered in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or operated by or on behalf of entities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or components for such aircraft, the certification of airworthiness for such aircraft, and the payment of new claims against existing insurance contracts and the provision of new direct insurance for such aircraft; 8. Decides that all States shall: (a) Reduce the level of the staff at diplomatic missions and consular posts in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); (b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the participation in sporting events on their territory of persons or groups representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); (c) Suspend scientific and technical cooperation and cultural exchanges and visits involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 9. Decides that all States, and the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or of any person or body in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution and related resolutions; 10. Decides that the measures imposed by this resolution shall not apply to activities related to UNPROFOR, to the Conference on Yugoslavia or to the European Community Monitor Mission, and that States, parties and others concerned shall cooperate fully with UNPROFOR, the Conference on Yugoslavia and the European Community Monitor Mission and respect fully their freedom of movement and the safety of their personnel; 11. Calls upon all States, including States not members of the United Nations, and all international organizatins, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the date of the present resolution; 12. Requests all States to report to the Secretary-General by 22 June 1992 on the measures they have instituted for meeting the obligations set out in paragraphs 4 to 9 above; 13. Decides that the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) shall undertake the following tasks additional to those in respect of the arms embargo established by resolutions 713 (1991) and 727 (1992): (a) To examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 above; (b) To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 4 to 9 above; (c) To consider any information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the measures imposed by paragraphs 4 to 9 above and, in that context, to make recommendations to the Council on ways to increase their effectiveness; (d) To recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the measures imposed by paragraphs 4 to 9 above and provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member States; (e) To consider and approve the guidelines referred to in paragraph 6 above; (f) To consider and decide upon expeditiously any applications for the approval of flights for humanitarian or other purposes consistent with the relevant resolutions of the Council in accordance with paragraph 7 above; 14. Calls upon all States to cooperate fully with the Committee in the fulfilment of its tasks, including supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee in the pursuance of the present resolution; 15. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council, not later than 15 June 1992 and earlier if he considers it appropriate, on the implementation of resolution 752 (1992) by all parties and other concerned; 16. Decides to keep under continuous review the measures imposed by paragraphs 4 to 9 above with a view to considering whether such measures might be suspended or terminated following compliance with the requirements of resolution 752 (1992); 17. Demands that all parties and others concerned create immediately the necessary conditions for inimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other destinations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport and respecting the agreements signed in Geneva on 22 May 1992; 18. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to use his good offices in order to achieve the objectives contained in paragraph 17 above, and invites him to keep under continuous review any further measures that may become necessary to ensure inimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies; 19. Urges all States to respond to the Revised Joint Appeal for humanitarian assistance of early May 1992 issued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF and the World Health Organization; 20. Reiterates the call in paragraph 2 of resolution 752 (1992) that all parties continue their efforts in the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia and that the three communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina resume their discussions on constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina; 21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and to consider immediately, whenever, necessary, further steps to achieve a peaceful solution in conformity with relevant resolutions of the Council. E. United Nation Security Council Resolution 781 S/RES/781 (1992) 9 October 1992 RESOLUTION 781 (1992) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3122nd meeting, on 9 October 1992 The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, Determined to ensure the safety of humanitarian flights to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Noting the readiness of the parties, expressed in the framework of the London Conference, to take appropriate steps in order to ensure the safety of humanitarian flights and their commitment at that Conference to a ban on military flights, Recalling in this context the Joint Declaration signed at Geneva on 30 September 1992 by the Presidents of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and in particular paragraph 7 thereof, Recalling also the agreement reached on air issues at Geneva on 15 September 1992 among all the parties concerned in the framework of the Working Group on Confidence and Security-building and Verification Measures of the London Conference, Alarmed at reports that military flights over the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina are none the less continuing, Noting the letter of 4 October 1992 from the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council, Considering that the establishment of a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes an essential element for the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Acting pursuant to the provisions of resolution 770 (1992) aimed at ensuring the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1. Decides to establish a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this ban not to apply to United Nations Protection Force flights or to other flights in support of United Nations operations, including humanitarian assistance; 2. Requests the United Nations protection Force to monitor compliance with the ban on military flights, including the placement of observers where necessary at airfields in the territory of the former Yugoslavia; 3. Also requests the United Nations Protection Force to ensure, through an appropriate mechanism for approval and inspection, that the purpose of flights to and from Bosnia and Herzegovina other than those banned by paragraph 1 above is consistent with Security Council resolutions; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on a periodic basis on the implementation of the present resolution and to report immediately any evidence of violations; 5. Calls upon States to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to provide assistance to United Nations Protection Force, based on technical monitoring and other capabilities, for the purposes of paragraph 2 above; 6. Undertakes to examine without delay all the information brought to its attention concerning the implementation of the ban on military flights in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in the case of violations, to consider urgently the further measures necessary to enforce this ban; 7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. F. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/121 A/RES/47/121 91st plenary meeting 18 December 1992 The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina The General Assembly, Having considered the item entitled "The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina", Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, Reaffirming its resolution 46/242 of 25 August 1992, Recalling all the resolutions adopted by the Security Council regarding the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other parts of the former Yugoslavia, Appreciating all the ongoing international efforts to restore peace in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly those efforts being pursued by the United Nations, the European Community, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Commending the untiring efforts and bravery of the United Nations Protection Force in securing relief operations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the efforts of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relief and humanitarian agencies, and expressing its condemnation of the recent attacks on the United Nations Protection Force in Sarajevo by Serbian forces resulting in loss of life and injuries to some of its personnel, Taking note of the report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia dated 6 November 1992, in which he stated, inter alia, that "ethnic cleansing" did not appear to be the consequence of the war, but rather its goal, Taking note also of the report of the Special Rapporteur dated 17 November 1992, in which he stated, inter alia, that another factor which had contributed to the intensity of "ethnic cleansing" in areas under Serbian control was the marked imbalance between the weaponry in the hands of the Serbian and the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Gravely concerned about the deterioration of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina owing to intensified aggressive acts by the Serbian and Montenegrin forces to acquire more territories by force, characterized by a consistent pattern of gross and systematic violations of human rights, a burgeoning refugee population resulting from mass expulsions of defenceless civilians from their homes and the existence in Serbian and Montenegrin controlled areas of concentration camps and detention centres, in pursuit of the abhorrent policy of "ethnic cleansing", which is a form of genocide, Strongly condemning Serbia and Montenegro and their surrogates in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for their continued non-compliance with all relevant United Nations resolutions, Deeply regretting that the sanctions imposed by the Security Council have not had the desired effect of halting the aggressive acts by Serbian and Montenegrin irregular forces and the direct and indirect support of the Yugoslav People's Army for the aggressive acts in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Recalling that the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has accepted the constitutional principles proposed by the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Convinced that the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina warrants the implementation of decisive actions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to oblige Serbia and Montenegro and their surrogates in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions, Reaffirming the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and the right of all Bosnian refugees to return to their homes in conditions of safety and honour, Reaffirming also that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Chapter VII, Article 51, of the Charter, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security, Determined to restore peace in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as to preserve its unity, sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity, 1. Reaffirms its support for the Government and people of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in their just struggle to safeguard their sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and unity; 2. Strongly condemns Serbia, Montenegro and Serbian forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for violation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and their non-compliance with existing resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as the London Peace Accords of August 1992; 3. Demands that Serbia and Montenegro and Serbian forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately cease their aggressive acts and hostility and comply fully and unconditionally with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, in particular resolutions 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992, 757(1992) of 30 May 1992, 770 (1992) and 771 (1992) of 13 August 1992, 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992 and 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992, General Assembly resolution 46/242 and the London Peace Accords of August 1992; 4. Demands that, in accordance with Security Council resolution 752 (1992), all elements of the Yugoslav People's Army still in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be withdrawn immediately, or be subject to the authority of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under effective United Nations control; 5. Demands also that, in accordance with Security Council resolution 752 (1992), all elements of the Croatian Army that may be in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that are already not operating in accord with the authority of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be withdrawn immediately, or be subject to the authority of that Government, or be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under effective United Nations control; 6. Supports the consideration by the Security Council of the immediate enforcement of Council resolution 781 (1992) banning all military flights over the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 7. Urges the Security Council, within its responsibility to maintain international peace and security, to again call upon the Serbian and Montenegrin forces to comply with all relevant resolutions and to bring to an end the aggressive acts against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to implement and enforce all existing resolutions with respect to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia and, specifically, further to consider measures, including the following, on an urgent basis, but no later than 15 January 1993: (a) In the event that Serbian and Montenegrin forces fail to comply fully with all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to authorize Member States, in cooperation with the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to use all necessary means to uphold and restore the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; (b) To exempt the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the arms embargo as imposed on the former Yugoslavia under Security Council resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991; 8. Also urges the Security Council to consider taking measures to open more airports/airfields for international humanitarian relief flights, to pursue emergency airdrops as a stop-gap measure and to study the possibility of and the requirements for the promotion of safe areas for humanitarian purposes; 9. Further urges the Security Council to consider what resources may be required to improve the implementation of all relevant resolutions, and calls upon Member States to notify the Secretary-General regarding the availability of personnel and materiel to assist and facilitate in this effort; 10. Urges the Security Council to consider recommending the establishment of an ad hoc international war crimes tribunal to try and punish those who have committed war crimes in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina when sufficient information has been provided by the Commission of Experts established by Council resolution 780 (1992) of 6 October 1992; 11. Requests the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to conclude expeditiously the work of the Working Group on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to report on the reasons for the lack of progress and to submit proposals to overcome obstacles in the fulfilment of their mandate by 18 January 1993; 12. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly by 18 January 1993 on the implementation of the present resolution; 13. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to continue the consideration of this item.