On August 2nd, 1990, the Iraqi Army, upon the order of its leader Saddam Hussein, invaded its much smaller and weaker neighboring country of the south, Kuwait. With its abundant oil deposits, Kuwait lived as one of the wealthiest nations in world. However, possessing almost no military in relation to Iraq, Kuwait was overrun and seized in less than twenty-four hours1. Immediately following the invasion of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 660 which formally condemned the Iraqi invasion and demanded the complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces2. Furthermore, President Bush signed Executive Order 12722 on this date, which imposed economic sanctions and a Òcomplete trade embargoÓ against Iraq3. As Iraq ceased to obey UNSC Res. 660, a new resolution was established on August 8th, 1990 by the United Nations, Resolution 661, which required Òthe imposition of a wide-ranging assets freeze and trade embargo on IraqÓ, coinciding with the Executive Order President Bush had signed six days prior4. President Bush would go on to sign Executive Order 12723, which froze all Kuwaiti assets in order to prevent Iraqi interference, and additionally Executive Order 12724 on August 9th, 1990, which imposed additional economic sanctions upon Iraq5. One day prior, the United States, fearing additional Iraqi advances, would receive permission from the Saudi Government to deploy its forces on Saudi soil6. The 82nd Airborne Division, a light infantry unit, would arrive quickly to the Gulf, however, in the words of Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, in the case of a further advance they would be merely ÒIraqi tank speed bumpsÓ7. Luckily, especially for these soldiers, Saddam held his advance to only the southern Kuwaiti border. During the next few months, the Americans would join forces with various other countries, such as Britain, France and Syria, to form a Multi-national Coalition dedicated to the opposition of the Kuwait invasion. On November 8th, President George Bush would announce the augmentation of US troops, from 300,OO0 persons to 540,0008. As an offensively capable force assembled to the south of Kuwait, the possibility of further conflict loomed larger. Sending a message of extreme sincerity, the UNSC adopted Res. 678, on November 29th, which issued an ultimatum of January 15th, 1991 as a deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait9. In total, 795,000 Coalition troops assembled around the Persian Gulf, accompanied by 230 warships, and over 2400 aircraft10. As the deadline approached, US Secretary of State James Baker met with Iraqi Prime Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva, Switzerland in order to find a possible diplomatic solution to the crisis11. The talks failed. On January 12th, the US Congress passed a Joint Resolution supporting UNSC Res. 67812. With a clearly superior force poised to attack him, added with the implementation of economic sanctions against his economy, Saddam chose not to leave Kuwait. As the deadline came and went, war became eminent. And on January 16th, the US and Coalition forces began the removal of the Iraqi Army from Kuwait. This campaign was code named ÒOperation Desert StormÓ13. This paper will seek to answer the question as to Òwhy the United States initiated Operation Desert Storm instead of opting to continue economic sanctions?Ó. As stated before, this paper will determine the rationale behind the United StatesÕ decision to initiate Operation Desert Storm. In order to fully comprehend the sequence of events engulfing this course of action, political theory will be discussed at various points in order to analyze pertinent events, but more importantly the decision-making process. For example, subsequent to the initial Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2nd, both United States and United Nations passed similar measures, UNSC Resolution 660 and Executive Order 1272214, condemning the aggression. These measures would represent the CoalitionÕs first implemented policy of containment, which will be discussed more in-depth shortly. Defined in political theory terms, containment can be described as an subsequent action, resulting from an prior act of undesirable behavior or activity, which seeks to limit, contain, and ultimately isolate an aggressive state. In this case, the undesirable activity can be represented as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Additionally, the action seeking to limit, contain, and ultimately isolate, is represented through the initial UNSC Resolutions (660, 661) and Executive Orders (12722-24) issued by President Bush. As provided in the example above, this paper will seek to explain the events surrounding this case study via similar theoretical explanations including terms such as: containment, deterrence, coercion, intrinsic and strategic interests, critical risk, threat credibility, rationality, cognitive restraints, unitary actors, bureaucratic politics, and ultimately levels of analysis. With the paperÕs conclusion, a clear understanding behind the development of US policy will be ascertained. Before analyzing the initial containment policy adopted by the Bush administration during the Gulf Crisis, it is useful to discuss the various types of interests the Bush Administration, and additionally Saddam, would eventually seek to preserve and enhance. When a given nation decides upon a foreign policy, certain interests or values are of immense influence. First, intrinsic interests15 can be described as ÒtangiblesÓ such as land, men, port access, air fields, oil fields, etc. However, on the other hand, strategic interests16 exist as well. These interests are not as clear-cut as an intrinsic interest might be, and their proper description could be sufficient through the label of ÒintangiblesÓ. Examples of strategic interests could exist in pride, morality, and threat credibility. At this point, it would also be beneficial to discuss the possibility of intrinsic interests and strategic interests overlapping one another. In other words, sometimes when evaluating or analyzing a specific event, the possibility of an interest possessing both intrinsic and strategic values is quite legitimate. For example, in the case of Iraqi aggression, the UNSC responded by adopting Res. 661, which implemented economic sanctions and a trade embargo. While the sanctions were aimed at denouncing Ònaked aggressionÓ17 (strategic interest), they also prevented the Iraqi army from attaining additional weapons or warfare (intrinsic interest). As mentioned previously, the initial policy of the Bush Administration could be characterized as one of containment. At the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States did not possess any type of military force capable of preventing SaddamÕs troops from advancing further than simply the boundaries of Kuwait18. Realizing this vulnerability, the Bush Administration sought to act quickly in an effort to contain. According to Secretary of State, Richard Cheney, if Iraq would have been allowed to continue their offensive another 200-250 miles, then the US would not have had access to many of the Òair fields and port facilitiesÓ that were so instrumental later in Operation Desert Storm19. Additionally, the Bush Administration, in the wake of SaddamÕs conquering of a twenty percent share of the worldÕs oil deposits via Kuwait20, logically sought to prevent further such acquisitions. Fortunately, according to Wafic al Samarrai (Head of Iraqi Military Intelligence), who has recently claimed that Saddam did indeed have intentions of seizing Saudi oil fields21, the policy of containment succeeded on preventing additional oil deposit and other intrinsic amenities that would have been gained with such an advance. However, the decision to limit the Iraqi advance within the borders of Kuwait resulted not only out of intrinsic interests within the region, but also out the consideration of imperative strategic interests as well. One day after the invasion of Kuwait, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft advised President Bush of the enormous consequences the prior days events could inflict on the national security of the United States. While Scowcroft believed that the presence of valuable oil deposits Ògave enormous urgencyÓ to US action, he ultimately believed that the prospect of such a Ònaked aggression against an unoffending countryÓ transformed the invasion from a just concern over merely petroleum, to a much larger agenda22. The significance of this event in terms of answering the question as to why the US eventually initiated Operation Desert Storm may not seem relevant on the surface, however, it was this foremost shift of concerns from intrinsic values to strategic values that would shape the Bush AdministrationÕs push for the eventual removal of the IraqiÕs from Kuwait. More clearly, BushÕs National Security Council met in an emergency session on August 4th at Camp David. A priority was agreed upon at this meeting to seek Saudi permission for the deployment of US troops, which was given the now famous code name ÒOperation Desert ShieldÓ23. Subsequently, Cheney and Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf were immediately sent to meet with King Fahd, the Saudi Head-of-State, in order to achieve such a goal. However, as a surprise, at least to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, Secretary of State James Baker, and Gen. Schwarzkopf, all who have recently admitted to such a reaction, President Bush had decided to indeed focus on the removal of Iraq from Kuwait, rather than merely defending the Saudi border, as his number one priority24. If BushÕs policy was shaped by the preservation of intrinsic interests such as port facilities, air fields, and Saudi oil fields, then Operation Desert Shield would have been sufficient to achieve the administrations goals. Obviously, President Bush, as he left Camp David on August 8th,25 placed American morality, and future credibility in the Persian Gulf as his most immediate and dominating concern. When President Bush returned from Camp David on August 8th, he was greeted on the White House Lawn by a horde of reporters. As the President walked to his residence, he was bombarded with questions such as, ÒWhat are going to do, and what is your reaction to the invasion?Ó26 Even though the US would not even receive permission from King Fahd to deploy troops in Saudi Arabia until later that day, and even though the only agreement reached among the members of the National Security Council at Camp David a few days earlier was to block a further Iraqi advance, President Bush responded with shocking phrase, as Powell now openly admits, ÒThis will not stand!Ó ÒWhat wonÕt standÓ, the reporters insisted. ÒThe invasion of Kuwait. This will not stand.Ó And in the words of Colin Powell, this phrase signified that Bush had Òcrossed the riverÓ, and that he, Powell had just Òreceived a new mission ... and thereÕs no question that [Bush] will do what is necessary to get the Iraqis out of Kuwait.Ó27 When President Bush announced that the Iraqi aggression Òwould not standÓ, a fair assumption can be made that this marked the point in the conflict where the administrationÕs policy shifted from only containment. At this juncture, it now becomes relevant to discuss the terms deterrence, and more importantly, coercion. In general, both can be described in terms as possessing some relation to containment, however, they both seek to attain alternate goals. Deterrence, an extremely complicated concept, can be described as action which seeks to prevent a aggressor from taking a certain course of unwanted action. Deterrence can be achieved through various avenues, such as the installation of fear, terror, threat of pain, violence, etc28. In speaking of a deterrence example, it would be a fair assumption that Iraq failed in deterring the US from inflicting pain via Operation Desert Storm, because this unwanted action, at least on the part of the Iraq, was not prevented or deterred. Coercion, on the other hand, is a concept whereby an actor seeks to force a defender to take or reverse a prior action29. Deterrence is initiated by the defender, who seeks to prevent a certain action, while coercion, is initiated by the aggressor, who seeks to reverse a prior action taken by the defender. Furthermore, to deter or assure involves the continuation of existing behavior, whereas to induce or compel, involves deals with the alteration of a behavior. An example of coercion, which will be elaborated on in detail shortly, exists in the United StatesÕ attempt to force an Iraqi removal from Kuwait. A final point concerning the terms of deterrence and coercion revolves around their respective difficulty. In an order from least difficult to most, theorists tend to support the sequence of: assure, deter, compel, and induce30. When President Bush declared, Òthis will not standÓ, it can be noted that his policy shifted from the more plausible approach, to deter Saddam from further advance, to a more difficult policy, to induce Saddam to leave Kuwait. As the Bush Administration shifted to a policy of coercion, the conflict clearly began to take on a new meaning. In a logical sense, one could assume that at this point in the conflict, whether or not Saddam misread US intentions before the invasion of Kuwait, he would now understand that a much larger force was positioning to reverse his prior action. Saddam, thinking with a clear head would undertake actions to prevent an American beating? Absolutely, wrong. Even SaddamÕs Head of Intelligence, Samarrai, admitted to have had insisted to his leader that any type of military confrontation with the US would be undesirable, if not disastrous. Samarrai was cognizant of the technological superiority held by the Americans that would later devastate the Iraqis, but Saddam would have no part of such a belief. Moreover, SaddamÕs perception of the credibility of a US threat was almost non-existent. He would carelessly tell Samarrai, ÒPerhaps they attack and perhaps they will not.Ó31 On the other side of spectrum, the United States was quickly enlarging its military force. As mentioned previously, President Bush, on November 8th, announced the decision to increase US forces in Saudi Arabia from the initial defensively-postured base force of 300,000, to a offensively capable force of 540,00032. Additionally, the United States military transported their most sophisticated weaponry to the Gulf Region including such systems as the F117 Stealth jet fighter, Tomahawk Cruise Missiles, and Apache Helicopters33. As far as an air war was concerned, the US was prepared with over 600 aircraft34. Enough to convince Saddam to withdrawal? Evidently, not. Logically, one must ask, in respect to the overwhelming mismatch in capabilities between the US and Iraq, why would Iraq not be compelled to leave Kuwait? Was Saddam unaware of the build-up occurring to the south of Kuwait? According to Samarrai, the problem was not in lack of information, but rather in the interpretation of the available information. According to Samarrai, Ò[Iraqi] intelligence reports were perfect.Ó However, SaddamÕs interpretation of the ÒperfectÓ intelligence, in respect to the Gulf WarÕs eventual outcome, was certainly imperfect. When Samarrai reported that the Coalition forces possessed 600 war planes, Saddam responded, ÒNow the allies have 600 aircraft and we have 600 aircraft, so we will fight them.Ó When Samarrai revealed that the US was armed with F117 Stealth fighters, planes which are supposedly undetectable by radar, Saddam responded, ÒThis--what have you read in the papers--can be seen by our shepherds.Ó In response to Samarrai warnings concerning cruise missiles, Saddam declared, ÒWe will blind it. We will suppress its course. It will mislead, it will miss-hit its target.Ó Wondering how Saddam intended to execute such a plan, Samarrai asked, ÒHow do we do that?Ó Saddam responded, ÒWe will fire mud and water to the screen of these radars that are leading these cruise missiles.Ó And finally, upon receiving intelligence reports on the Apache HelicopterÕs ability to hit six targets simultaneously, and from a long distance, Samarrai contends that SaddamÕs advice in stopping such a machine was, ÒOh no, donÕt bother. This is just a myth.Ó 35 Despite recent evidence that the Tomahawk cruise missile system and F117 Stealth fighter only hit their target at a 60 percent success rate36, it would be an accurate observation that SaddamÕs predictions were extremely distant from what transpired in reality. By the time the Coalition forces began their ground offensive on February 24th, over 60,000 combat sorties37, individual combat missions, had been flown. Even more impressive, during this time period the Iraqis were only able to shoot down under twenty aircraft, and according to the Pentagon description of the initial bombings, Òthe simultaneously suppression of so many vital centers helped cripple IraqÕs air defense system, and seriously began to disrupt the lines of communication between Saddam Hussein and his forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations.Ó38 . In general, in light of the final outcome, Saddam predicted incorrectly. With benefit of hindsight, it is simple for historians to point a finger at Saddam and question his judgment. To understand that Saddam perceived the US threat incorrectly is simple, however, to understand ÒwhyÓ the misperception occurred can achieved through the application of theory looms as a much more difficult task. Thus, a discussion of rationality becomes imperative. In order to establish an effective definition for rationality39, one must consider several factors. First, it would be ludicrous to assume that given person is completely rational, 100 percent of the time. Therefore, since people arrive at decisions with different levels of rationality, we can describe this concept in terms of existing on rheostat. More clearly, the higher rationality an actor possesses when formulating decisions, the higher that actor will exist on the rheostat of rationality. In terms of low rationality, the lower the actor will appear on the rheostat40. Additionally, in terms of deterring or coercing an actor low on the rheostat, a fair assumption that they would be harder to assure, deter, compel, or induce, would be inaccurate. This is not always the case. A more effective perception of oneÕs ability to alter action could be more efficiently ascertained through the knowledge of anotherÕs value of gains and losses. At this point a discussion of threat credibility and critical risk41 become useful. When does an actor know when to yield, and when does an actor know when to stand firm? In terms of theory, the decision as to oneÕs course of action is determined by the calculation of oneÕs critical risk. Critical risk, or CR, is the ratio of oneÕs payoffs compared with the credibility that the opposing side will stand firm. This ratio leads to several options. For this particular case study, an understanding of CR in terms of coercion, which is represented through the CoalitionÕs desire of getting Iraq to undo its invasion of Kuwait, is most important. According to theory, and also logic, if the CR of an initiator, which is the US in this case, is greater than the credibility of the defender, Iraq, it should succeed in undoing. On the other hand, if the CR of Iraq was higher than the credibility of the US, then this theory would dictate that Iraq stand should stand firm. As one takes a step back, a relates the previous discussion to the actual course of events surrounding the Gulf War, a conclusion can be reached that this theory failed to apply. In terms of credibility, the US possessed a much higher level in relation to IraqÕs CR. However, in contrast to the aforementioned theory, Iraq, the defender, did not undo its action. Saddam misperceived the US threat, a threat which was even documented through UNSC Resolution 667. This misperception, a result of Saddam irrationality (e.g.. mud and water will jam radar), proves that the deterrence and coercion theory is psychologically bankrupt. Threats were sent by the US and United Nations, and they were even received by SaddamÕs Head of Intelligence Wafic Al Samarrai. But as far being received by Saddam, this was evidently not the case. Thus, the next step will be to pinpoint the breakdown in communication. Economic sanctions failed to undo the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait before the set deadline of January 15th. One of the reasons this coercion failed resulted from an unmotivated bias42 on the part of Saddam Hussein. An unmotivated bias can be defined as an cognitive, or psychological, restraint that pushes a decision- maker to only see what he/or she expects to see. In this particular case, Saddam Hussein expected the United States to incur a fate similar to Vietnam, an expectation which artificially lowered the United StatesÕ credibility of issuing a threat in the mind of Saddam. According to Samarrai, Saddam believed that the Òlesson of Vietnam was very harsh on the US administration.Ó Moreover, Saddam considered the Vietnam War Òan outright defeat, militarily and politicallyÓ for the US. Saddam felt that if the Vietnamese soldiers Òproved to be so efficientÓ against US troops, then the same would be possible in Kuwait. Samarrai would insist that Vietnam was a completely different set of circumstances, as he compared the heavy vegetation cover dominant in Vietnam, with open desert setting of the Middle East. Cognizant of the impending air war, Samarrai would correctly predict the eventual Iraqi defeat, even before the first shot was fired. In retrospect, SaddamÕs insistence on an expected outcome probably paved the way for the validation of this prediction. Ironically, Saddam was correct in his assumption that the memory of Vietnam weighed heavily in the minds of Bush administration, a point which will be discusses more thoroughly in a second, however, he miscalculated the possibility that the lesson would force the US to prevent the same mistakes from happening again. An interesting question exists in, Òwhy was the Bush administration able to expel the ÔghostsÕ of Vietnam?Ó. Saddam thought the memory of Vietnam would cripple the BushÕs AdministrationÕs ability to gain public support for military action. However, it would be the lessons of that war which would direct, and ultimately give an urgency to the Bush AdministrationÕs decision making process. From a military standpoint, the Pentagon believed the policy of ÔincrementalismÓ, or gradual build-up, allowed the North Vietnamese to maintain their fighting resolve and effectiveness for a substantial amount of time. Furthermore, this policy permitted civilian decision makers to ÒhandcuffÓ the military from pursuing their goals43. Military leaders claim that if they had been given more freedom during the Vietnam war, they would have been able to able attack vital enemy targets, and bring the war to an end on successful terms.Ó44 Whether or not the PentagonÕs rationale was accurate may be insignificant from a decision-making standpoint, however, itÕs influence on proving Saddam Hussein wrong, and insuring American success, is undeniable. According to Gen. Powell, the AmericanÕs were not willing to make the same mistakes twice. When the President made the decision on October 30th to augment the US forces into an offensive posture, even though the formal announcement was not made until the November 8th, there was nothing incremental about it. Revealing his thoughts on BushÕs policy, Powell contends that, Ò[he] left the meeting after that with a firm decision, no question about it, that sanctions had about three months left to produce a result and if they did not produce a result in three months [the US] was going to war.Ó45 PowellÕs assumption was not unfounded. During this October 30th meeting, Bush had agreed to send 240,000 troops, including six carrier battle groups, each group consisting of several dozen ships, and the US 7th Corps out of Germany, which constituted the two heaviest armored divisions in the American Army46. According to Deputy National Security Advisor during the Bush administration, Richard Gates, his response to the build-up was, ÒI donÕt think that perhaps since Vietnam or earlier we had ever assembled six battle carrier groups for anything, and it was just incredible force.Ó The Vietnam analogy gives us an excellent understanding on why the threat credibility of the United States was low in the eyes of Saddam. Also, as proven, the analogy presents a better comprehension of the impetus behind the Bush AdministrationÕs implementation of such a huge force. However, the Vietnam analogy, while providing a reasoning behind the size and make-up of the American Military build-up, does not fully address the sense of urgency felt by George Bush in reversing the Iraqi invasion. Not surprisingly, Saddam Hussein was not the only decision maker whose rationality was compromised by historical analogies. On August 8th, the same day that President Bush declared, ÒThis will not stand!Ó, on the White House Lawn, he delivered an extremely revealing speech to the nation. This speech presented the first instance in which George Bush relates Iraqi aggression to the Nazi blitzkrieg of the 1930Õs. ÒIraqi tanks stormed in blitzkrieg fashion through Kuwait in a few short hours ... but if history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement does not workÓ, scolded Bush during this poignant speech47. Not only was this speech a clear indicator that a policy of containment would be unsatisfactory in the mind of Bush, but it would also represent a clear indication of his impatience towards a non-military reprisal. According to Scowcroft, one of BushÕs closest friends at the time, the President was reading a book about World War II in the initial days following the Iraqi invasion. Moreover, it would be this book, which moved the President greatly, in the eyes of Scowcroft, that would inspire the President Bush references and analogies of Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler48. BushÕs mindset, upon hearing stories of human atrocities that were being committing by the Iraqis in Kuwait, became devoted to the single purpose of preventing a World War II scenario from occurring once again. When one recalls the previous discussion of SaddamÕs inability to receive American threat credibility, it becomes quickly evident that the possibility of either side backing down during Operation Desert Shield would be simply impractical. In the previous two analogies, Vietnam and World War II, it was proven that both President BushÕs and Saddam HusseinÕs rationality was compromised. Their reliance on historical analogies, which is commonly used by decision- makers as a cognitive aid, undeniably helped shape their thinking in some respect. At this point, it becomes useful to discuss one other type of cognitive aid, ideology, used by Saddam and Bush, because of its instrumental part in the decision-making process49. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, following the failed peace talks in Geneva on January 9th, 1991, described his sense of the Iraqi people in that, ÒThey believe in God and in fatality you see, they believe that when there is a fate you have to face whether you are going to win or lose and you have to believe in God, you have to believe in yourself, you shouldnÕt panic from the powerful whether itÕs a person or a state.Ó50 AzizÕs comments are quite revealing. First, when he mentions God, it can clearly be assumes that he speaking ideologically. Moreover, when Aziz refers to the Iraqi people as being driven by a sense of ÒfateÓ, one can reasonable conclude that if this was indeed the case, diplomatic or military coercion could have been practically impossible. If the Iraqi people, or at least the ones who support Saddam, felt as if they were destined to fight America, then as Aziz said, a stateÕs power should not, and ultimately did not, force them to undo a particular action. In this case, the action is represented by invasion of Kuwait. Reiterating this notion of an unavoidable fate, Aziz recently responded to the question of whether or not Iraq thought it could take on the United States by asserting, ÒYou will either be hit inside your house and destroyed, economically and militarily. Or you will go outside and attack the enemy in one of his bases. We had to do that, we had no choice, we had no other choice.Ó51 If Saddam truly believed that he had no other choice but to occupy Kuwait, and this belief was ideologically influenced, then how could one possibly expected him to leave before January 15th, or ever? In terms of theory, the higher oneÕs thoughts are influenced by ideology, the lower one exists on the rheostat of rationality52. In the case of Saddam Hussein, this belief is absolutely true. As mentioned previously, Saddam Hussein was not the only leader whose decisions were shaped by ideology. Whereas Saddam refused to undo a previous action, the Coalition, most notably English Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, vehemently refused to allow the previous action to stand. President Bush and Margaret Thatcher met with each other in Aspen, Colorado on August 2nd, the same day of the Iraqi invasion53. Scowcroft described the initial reaction between Bush and Thatcher as, ÒI wish I could remember the first words because it was like two soulmates finding each other. They found from the very first words that they were exactly on the same wavelength.Ó54 This common wavelength can be described as complete, and utter contempt against Saddam. ÒDictators must be stopped. They must not able to march into other peoplesÕ territory, rule their lives, take away their whole mode of existence and just get away itÓ55, said Thatcher concerning the consensus reached in Aspen. This statement is extremely powerful. From an ideological sense, it would be a reasonable conclusion that the policy to eject Saddam from Kuwait was agreed upon the very first day of the invasion. Moreover, it seemed unlikely that this hardened policy to stand firm would ever be compromised. As mentioned previously, the more ideology influences decision-making, the lower the decision-maker exists on the rheostat of rationality. Therefore, the possibility that the Bush Administration arrived at its policies as result of weighing costs and benefits could be quite distant. Indeed, it would be other factors, cognitive and strategic, that would ultimately shape policy in Gulf War The evidence has shown, that although intrinsic interests constituted some of the considerations made when decision-makers were deciding on what course of action to choose against SaddamÕs invasion, strategic interests were the more deciding factor. When asked whether oil was at the heart of the Iraqi invasion, Scowcroft has recently replied, ÒNo, at the heart was naked aggression against an unoffending country.Ó56 But then why did a much more powerful Coalition fail to coerce Saddam into reversing his invasion of Kuwait? Why did Saddam choose to fight a much more formidable foe? As stated before, according to coercion theory, if the critical risk of the initiator, the US in this case, is greater than the credibility of the defender, Iraq, then it should do or undo. However, as the evidence has shown, this theory failed to apply. Saddam chose to fight a more formidable foe because he did not see the threat against him as credible. This misperception proves that coercion/deterrence theory is psychologically bankrupt because decision makers, especially those who are the least cognizant of reality, can not act rationally. As a result of these psychological restraints, decision-makers seek aids to determine policy. In this case, the decision- makers sought historical analogies and ideological perspectives in order to arrive at their decisions. When their policies differed, conflict became inevitable, and it climaxed with the outbreak of Operation Storm. At this point, we have established why Operation Desert Storm was unavoidable. However, we have not yet totally answered the question as to, ÒWhy did United States initiate Operation Desert Storm.Ó We have answered why the Bush administration sought this course, but we havenÕt answered how the United StatesÕ policy came to life. Moreover, the evidence has proven that psychological constraints prevent deterrence/coercion theory from applying practically to this case. However, a practical explanation for the United StatesÕ policy of initiating Operation Desert storm is still needed. It is the contention of this paper that the ultimate policy enacted during the Gulf War resulted from a bureaucratic process57. While psychological factors immensely effected decision makers rationale on an individual level, policy was not conceived until the streams of national, and international opinion co-incided, or crossed with those decisions. Before jumping into a discussion concerning bureaucratic politics, it is extremely important to define the term unitary actor58. A unitary actor signifies a country where policy is the result of a single coherent voice. An example of a unitary actor could appear in Adolf Hitler. On the other hand, a non-unitary actor implies a country whoÕs policies are a result of the deliberation of several actors. An example of this would be United States, where policy stems from a combination of many sources, including Congress, the President, his Cabinet, and the Supreme Court. Because within systems characterized as non- unitary actors policy is conceived out of bureaucratic process, the term bureaucratic politics serves as a viable description. In order to fully comprehend a decision of great magnitude, such as the decision to initiate Operation Desert Storm, one must focus on the means by which a decision was derived. More clearly, decisions concerning international policy are born not out of random, unrelated events, but through a combination of realizations and judgments made on the individual, national, and international levels. When a question asks, Òwhy did the United States initiate Operation Desert Storm instead of opting to continue economic sanctionsÓ, logically, one must not only understand why certain individuals arrived this decision, but also how the decision was reached from a national and international sense. These different levels of analysis will ultimately hold the key for solving the mystery of any decision. The first level of analysis59 to be addressed will be the individual level. In the interest of brevity, one could not possibly discuss the rationale behind ever person that had at least some influence over the final outcome. Many people, as easily recognizable as George Bush, Saddam Hussein, and Margaret Thatcher, all the way to down to the obscure field generals and colonels who fought the war, played some role in determining policy. In retrospect, the main portion of this paper to this juncture, has dealt with the decision-making occurring at the most significant points, such President Bush, his administration, Margaret Thatcher, and Saddam Hussein. For this section, again in the interest of brevity, will we focus on a specific case study. Arguably, one the most influential decisions made at the individual level existed in Colin PowellÕs. As Chairman, Joint Chief of Staffs, Powell held the highest position in the American Military during the Bush Administration. His decision to ÒevictÓ Iraq out of Kuwait did not come as easy as it did for President Bush and Prime Minister Thatcher. For example, immediately following the invasion, when President Bush was already well into his thought process, one which viewed Saddam as a ruthless dictator that had to stopped, he would continue to ask Powell for Òmilitary optionsÓ. Powell, wondering what the PresidentÕs intentions were, would reply, ÒMilitary options to do what?Ó60 Powell admits that he possessed no inclination into which direction Bush would head regarding policy, until after the ÒThis will not standÓ comment occurred. Oddly enough, this comment came as a shock to Powell, even though he had just spent the previous weekend with President Bush at Camp David discussing future policy for Iraq. Additionally, Powell had a much more difficult time in accepting the prospect that sanctions were not going to work. He was fearful to enter a Òwar with an unknown consequencesÓ, and the general favored giving Òsanctions as much of a ride as was politically possible.Ó61 Powell, who openly accepts the label of a ÒreluctantÓ warrior, has recently claimed that he did not endorse a plan to evict Saddam from Kuwait until October 30th. This date marks the meeting in which President made the decision to augment the US forces in Saudi Arabia. However, when the decision was made to send those additional troops, Powell finally realized that Òit was clear that sanctions were not going to workÓ62. In addition to decision making process occurring at the individual level, national politics also played a significant role. The level of analysis encompassing the national scene is just as large and diverse as the individual level. For example, many factors, not just simply one isolated factor, contributes to the eventual development and implementation of a policy. Some of these factors in the United States include: public opinion, which is an immensely complex concept on its own, Congressional politics, constitution law, and election years63. Again, in the interest of brevity, a case study involving the US will be explored in order to provide an effecient example of the national levelÕs influence in initiating Operation Desert Storm. As the deadline of January 15th set forth in UNSC Resolution 687 approached, Òconsiderable concernÓ spread through Congress as to what course of action President Bush was planning to take64. Some this concern was suppressed when Bush ordered some of AmericaÕs most powerful fighting units out of Europe after November 8th, but still, with the presence of a Democratic Congress, combined with a Republican President Bush, many believed that Òpolitics as usualÓ created a debate in Washington65. According Andrew LeydenÕs article on Operation Desert Storm, ÒOn a daily basis, many of the rank and file Congressmen took to the floor to denounce the administration for not seeking a diplomatic solution.Ó66 The meeting of Secretary Baker with Iraqi Prime Minister Aziz six days before the UN deadline in Geneva, Switzerland on January 9th, 1991 most likely resulted from split in support Bush was receiving at home. Ironically, the highly irrational Iraqis, as proved earlier, even possessed an opinion regarding this meeting. ÒI knew that it was public relations. That [Bush] wanted to tell Congress, ÔLook, to the end I tried to find a diplomatic settlementÕ, so that he could get more votesÓ67, says Aziz on the Geneva meeting. Finally, with GenevaÕs failure to find a diplomatic solution, the PresidentÕs request for a joint resolution supporting UNSC Res. 687 was debated. The resolution, which was not a declaration of war, did fall under the laws of the US that are outlined in the War Powers Act. On January 12th, 1990, Congress finally voted. The resolution passed 52-47 in the Senate, and in the House, 250-18368. Secretary Baker has recently declared that, ÒWe would not have won the vote without GenevaÓ69. Furthermore, referring again to the Leyden article, the vote was Òregarded as the key vote in conduct of the Gulf crisis and many Members of Congress are likely to be held accountable for the way their ballot.Ó70 In light of the air campaign that started on the 16th, this sequence can definitely be considered one of the most important on the national level. Finally, the case that will be discussed concerning the international level of analysis will deal with the formation of the Multi-national Coalition. As a point of reference, the mere presence of an international organization, such as the United Nations, legitimizes the possibility of an international level of analysis71. In terms of this paper, during the time period falling between IraqÕs invasion of Kuwait, and the eventual outbreak of hostilities to reverse that invasion, many internationally-oriented decisions were produced. Whereas some of these decisions during the Gulf Crisis occurred through the passage of legislation via UNSC Resolutions, others appeared through gradual growth of the Multi-national Coalition Force that would eventually evict Saddam from Kuwait. For example, while the US contributed to the bulk of the military force in Saudi Arabia (540,000 persons), additional forces of 245,000 were deployed as well72. In hindsight, many officials have stated that the formation of a Coalition has proved to have been one of the most significant aspects of Operation Desert Storm. According to Secretary Baker, this was the first instance in which the United States did not have to assume the full financial burden of its wars73. Furthermore, Baker saw the immense necessity of gaining allies not only from the West, but also the Arab World. ÒWe also recognized the importance of doing this in a way that it was not seen to be America and the West against the Arab world and that it was not seen to be a cowboy operationÓ, says Baker of the diverse forces that were assembled. Arguably, the most important ally the US acquired during the Gulf Crisis was Saudi Arabia. Reflecting his thoughts at the moment when Secretary Cheney and Gen. Schwarzkopf traveled to Saudi Arabia in order to receive permission of US troop deployment from King Fahd, Gen. Powell reveals that, ÒIf [the Saudis] didnÕt give us that permission and we couldnÕt defend Saudi Arabia, then we wouldnÕt be able to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait.Ó74 When one considers the premise that the highest ranking military official at the time of the Gulf Crisis cited the necessity for agreement between two countries as an utmost priority for the eventual outcome of the conflict, it becomes quite clear the implications the international level of analysis played in developing policy. In an effort to ultimately understand how the bureaucratic politics model answers the question of, Òwhy did the United States initiate Operation Desert Storm instead of opting for the continued use of economic sanctionsÓ, one must look towards the levels of analysis. Earlier, in great detail, this paper focused on reasoning behind both US and Iraq policies during the Gulf Crisis. However, as was also mentioned previously, the answers to these questions failed to provide a practical explanation for the start of Operation Desert Storm. Imagine the three levels of analysis as being represents by a match, a piece of wood, and finally oxygen. Any one of these items alone could not do much, but when combined to achieve a similar goal, a fire could be born. The individual level of analysis, the match, was ignited through the complex process of decision making. This decision- making process, although imperfect with respect to the presence of irrationally, sought coercion, the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, as its main goal. Thus, the fire was lit. But the fire could not live without wood, or in this case, the national level. However, as the nations within the Multi-national Coalition decided on their respective domestic levels that an Iraqi withdrawal was needed, as was the case in the United States on January 12th, the wood was lighted by the match. But still the fire could not be sustained. Finally, on January 15th, the UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal passed. The Coalition, much to disappointment of Saddam Hussein, stood firmly on the southern border of Kuwait. Because the leaders of the Coalition would not be willing to wait for economic sanctions to run their course, Operation Desert Storm began at 7:00 EST, January 16th, 199175. With oxygen sustaining the fire on the wood, which was lit by the match, a huge fire roared through the desert night. Operation Desert Storm had begun. 1Leyden, Andrew. ÒNo-title, subject desert shieldÓ. (via internet). (via internet 1996rd GatesÓ. http://www.nd.edu/%7Ealeyden/shield.html) 2Sanction News Briefing, November 1995. ÒIraqÓ (Clifford Chance via internet http://www.cliffordchance.com/sn_k02.htm) 3Ibid, Clifford Chance 4Ibid, Clifford Chance 5Ibid, Clifford Chance 6ÒInterview with Gen. Colin PowellÓ. Frontline-Decision Makers. January 9-10, 1996. (via internet http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/1.html) 7ÒInterview with Gen. Norman ScwarzkopfÓ. Frontline-Decision Makers. January 9-10, 1996. (via internet http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/schwarzkopf/1 .html) 8Ibid, Powell. 9Ibid, Clifford Chance. 10Klare, Michael. ÒRogue States and Nuclear OutlawsÓ New York: Hill and Wang, 1995, pg. 88-89. 11Ibid, Leyden. 12Ibid, Leyden. 13Ibid, Klare, pg. 57. 14Ibid, Clifford Chance. 15ÒIntlÕ Security AffairsÓ. University of MichiganÓ Class Notes, Spring 1996. Instructor, Professor Raymond Tanter. 16Ibid, IntlÕ Security Affairs. 17ÒInterview with Brent ScowcroftÓ. Frontline. January 9-10, 1996. (via internet http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/scowcroft/1.ht ml) 18Ibid, Powell. 19ÒInterview with Richard CheneyÓ. Frontline. January 9-10, 1996. (via internet http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/cheney/1.html ) 20Ibid, Powell. 21ÒInterview with Wafic Al SamarraiÓ. Frontline. January 9-10, 1996. (via internet http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/samarrai/1.ht ml). 22Ibid, Scowcroft. 23Ibid, Powell. 24Ibid, Powell. 25Ibid, Powell. 26Ibid, Powell. 27Ibid, Powell 28Ibid, IntlÕ Security Affairs. 29Ibid, IntlÕ Security Affairs. 30Ibid, IntlÕ Security Affairs. 31Ibid, Samarrai. 32Ibid, Klare, pg. 53. 33Ibid, Klare, pg. 68-69. 34Ibid, Samarrai. 35Ibid, Samarrai. 36Ibid, Klare, pg. 72. 37Ibid, Klare, pg. 61. 38Ibid, Klare, pg. 59. 39Ibid, IntlÕ Security Affairs. 40Ibid, IntlÕ Security Affairs. 41Ibid, IntlÕ Security Affairs. 42Ibid, IntlÕ Security Affairs. 43Ibid, Klare, pg. 51. 44Ibid, Klare, pg. 52. 45Ibid, Powell. 46ÒInterview with Richard GatesÓ. Frontline. January 9-10, 1996. (via internet http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/gates/1.html). 47Speech by George Bush 8/8/90 (via internet) 48Ibid, Scowcroft. 49Ibid, IntlÕ Security Affairs. 50ÒInterview Tariq AzizÓ. Frontline. January 9-10, 1996. (via internet http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/aziz/1.html). 51Ibid, Aziz. 52Ibid, IntlÕ Security Affairs. 53Ibid, Scowcroft. 54Ibid, Scowcroft. 55ÒInterview with Margaret ThatcherÓ. Frontline. January 9-10, 1996. (via internet http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/thatcher/1.htm l). 56Ibid, Scowcroft. 57Ibid, IntlÕ Security Affairs. 58Ibid, IntlÕ Security Affairs. 59Ibid, IntlÕ Security Affairs. 60Ibid, Powell. 61Ibid, Powell. 62Ibid, Powell. 63ÒIntroduction to American PoliticsÓ. The University of Michigan: Fall Ô94. LecturerÓ Professor John Kingdon. 64Ibid, Leyden. 65Ibid, Leyden. 66Ibid, Leyden. 67Ibid, Aziz. 68Ibid, Leyden. 69ÒInterview with James BakerÓ. Frontline. Jaunray 9-10, 1996. (via internet http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/baker/1.html). 70Ibid, Leyden. 71ÒIntroduction to World PoliticsÓ. The University of Michigan: Fall Ô95. Lecturer: Professor Organski. 72Ibid, Klare, pg. 88. 73Ibid, Baker. 74Ibid, Schwarzkopf. 75Ibid, Klare, pg. 58.