Professor Raymond Tanter Political Science 472 Spring, 1996 Preface Everyone in the world watches the booming Asian economies with wonder when those of the industrialized nations are struggling with recession. It is a fact that the East Asian economies are becoming a bigger and bigger share of the world economy. And China is at the center of this economic boom, its economy has been growing at an average of more than 9% since Deng's reopening policy in 1978. At that rate, GNP doubles every eight years. Jim Rohwer, chief Asia economist of CS First Boston in Hong Kong and author of the recent book "Asia Rising," estimated that in the year 2025, if the average Chinese reaches the income level of the average Taiwan Chinese today, China's economy will be by far the largest in the world. It will be one and half times the size of the U.S. economy and 75 to 80 percent that of the American, Japanese and Western European economies combined. The fact that China is major power in the post Cold War world is widely recognized by the decisionmakers in United States. As stated in fact sheet released by the Bureau of Public Affairs, China is not only the world's most populous nation and the third-largest in land mass, it has the largest standing army. Even after a 25% reduction in its armed forces in the late 1980s, it still has 3 million men and women in arms. Not only does China have nuclear weapons, it also possesses ballistic missiles, including ones capable of reaching the United States. It is a growing military power, and plays a key role in regional stability. As one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China has veto power over Security Council resolutions dealing with key multilateral issues, including peacekeeping and the resolution of regional conflicts; and China is undergoing extraordinary economic growth and promises to be a preeminent economic power early in the next century. There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that the government and the people of China is taking the Taiwan issue seriously. Taiwan has been regarded by both Chinese leaders and its citizens as an inalienable part of China. Since 1950, Taiwan has been seen in the P.R.C. as a sensitive issue, touching on core notions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and feelings of nationalism. For the decisionmakers of China, eventual reunification of the motherland is an imperative. Hardliners and moderates in the leadership may disagree on any number of questions, but they are of one mind when it comes to sovereignty over Taiwan; there is no room for compromise. It is a matter of national pride and ironclad policy developed as a result of the indignities China suffered during the colonial era: land seized, concessions demanded, policies dictated --all by the West and Japan. Thus it should be no surprise that any suggestion of Taiwanese independence is not acceptable. They hope to achieve unification peacefully, but, there should be no doubt that, if necessary, they will fight to attain this goal. In light of the fact that China is being considered crucial by the U.S. decisionmakers; that they have no doubt in China's resolve to unify Taiwan, it is of interest to analyze the underlying logic in United States' reaction to China's military exercise and missile testing in March of this year. The core question that this paper attempts to answer is, "Why did the United States send two aircraft carrier groups near Taiwan, but stop short of crossing the Taiwan Strait when China was conducting its military exercises?" Theoretical Framework In attempting to answer the above question, three decisionmaking models --the rational actor model, the interbranch politics model, and the bureaucratic politics model will be used to analyze U.S. decision. The rational actor model enables us to explain the U.S. decision by examining U.S. foreign policy values and objectives. The other two models lead us to opening the "black box," or looking into U.S. policymaking processes by which institutions are related to each other, to explain the policy outcomes. These two models differ from the rational actor model in two major respects. First, they break down the concept of the state as a unitary actor in foreign policymaking by probing into government institutions within the state. The interbranch politics model views the executive and the legislative as two governmental institutions with distinct predispositions in pursuit of foreign policy. The bureaucratic politics model sees foreign policy as the political result of the interaction of different agencies pursuing their bureaucratic interests and preferences. The Rational Actor Model This model essentially assumes that a nation is a rational, goal-seeking, utility maximizing, and unitary decisionmaker. It assumes that there is some shared goal or national interest for the decisionmaker to obtain. The rational actor will develop alternatives and choose the one that maximizes the shared national interest. The rational actor can be defined as those key politicians and bureaucrats in the executive branch, including the president, who are more likely to take a national view as they respond to the parochial concerns of the nation. It is necessary to first identify U.S. policy objectives in order to use this model. There were three broadly shared policy objectives with regard to China. The first was to develop a strategic cooperation. The second was to stabilize Asian affairs. Better Sino-U.S. relations could serve as a balance of forces in Asia favorable to the U.S. and its allies in the region. The stabilization of the Korean peninsula was one of the top priorities. The last is to gain political and economic benefits. A good relationship would benefit the U.S. with regard to environmental protection, population control, and arms sales. Apart from these objectives, U.S. decisiomakers also viewed maintaining Taiwan's political stability and economic prosperity as part of U.S. Asian policy objectives. From this, it is only natural to raise the question of whether the U.S. pursues its foreign policy in a rational way. In answering this question it is important to note that policymakers have certain parameters in defining policy objectives. They are much less intuitive and more calculative in determining policy priorities. In the conduct of national foreign policy, national survival and strategic interests necessarily preempt other policy objectives. In this regard, the question at hand is: Has the U.S. responded to China missile testing in a rational way? The Bureaucratic Politics Model The bureaucratic politics model makes some major assumptions. First is the assumption that different governmental institutions constrain bureaucratic players with different institutional interests and preferences. This means that the behavior of the bureaucratic player is restrained and therefore can be predicted by their organizational roles. The second assumption is that players see the stakes involved in a situation according to their own interests. In Allison's words, "Where you stand depends on where you sit." Consensus building, compromising, bargaining, and negotiating are the mechanisms of decisionmaking. Concisely, foreign policy is the outcome of a bargaining process structured by bureaucratic resources and interests. The power of this model lies in its penetrating and enduring insight that "foreign policy is often more the product of dysfunctional decision making process than of a rational assessment of various objectives." Foreign policy is said to be national policy; thus foreign policy objectives should be national objectives. But, very often in pursuit of foreign policy objectives, the rationality is deflected or refracted by bureaucratic fissures resulting from organizational interests and biases as well as by the bureaucratic decisionmaking process. In this respect, politics and process help explain foreign policy. According to this model, two propositions can be deduced. First, that U.S. China policy can be explained and predicted by bureaucratic players positions and preferences within the bureaucracy and their interactions. Second, incoherent, uncoordinated China policy outcomes can be the result of the pulling and hauling of bureaucratic politics. In applying the bureaucratic model to our question, several questions need to be addressed. The first question is who created the policy: the State Department, the Defense Department, or the National Security Advisors? How was the policy made: by bargaining, compromising, or conforming to the president's directives? What are the resources and interests of the bureaucratic players in the area of China policy? Under what circumstances does the president affect the bureaucratic policy process? The Interbranch Politics Model The interbranch politics model assumes that U.S. foreign policy is the "resultant of a sometimes subtle or tacit, sometimes forceful or conflictual, and always interactive process between the Executive and the Legislative branch of government." The interactive process can best be understood from the perspectives of "two institutions with distinct sets of institutional biases or predispositions." These biases are responsible for each branch ranking its foreign policy objectives differently. In U.S. China policy, the executive is likely to put greater weight on policy goals stressing strategic, regional, and other international interests, whereas the Congress is likely to put more weight on policy objectives that carry more domestic implications--policies that are more compatible with political interests(partisan or electoral), ideology(liberal or conservative), and values (social or cultural). Some of the conclusions that can be drawn from the interbranch politics models that is of interest to our main question are: 1) That U.S. China policy in regard to Taiwan can be explained by the pulling and hauling of politics between two government institutions: Congress pulling toward an issue-specific, short-term China policy, and the executive stressing long-term strategic cooperation with China. 2) That the more the executive consults with Congress on China policy, the more likely it is for the executive to obtain congressional approval of its China policy initiatives. 3) That the success of China policy depends on the combination of presidential influence, leadership skills, and the strength of the president' party in Congress. Historical Perspective Since the Administration of Franklin Roosevelt, U.S.-China relations have produced some of the most contentious issues and acrimonious partisan debates in American foreign policy. During the Cold War, U.S. policy debate concerning Taiwan focused on how best to support the security of the island. In the 1970s, when U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China was improving, the debate centered on what's the best way to increase U.S. ties to Beijing on the one hand, while maintaining U.S. support for "old friends" in Taiwan on the other. In the 1990s, U.S. policymakers continued to work to establish a proper balance between U.S. relations with Beijing and unofficial U.S. relations with Taipei. Strong American supporters of the Nationalist government, encouraged by that government's vigorous public relations efforts, remained an important and well-organized force in American politics. Generally, they see that U.S. interests are best served by following policy options that support the concerns of the Nationalist administration in Taiwan. Specifically, they want the U.S. to support Taiwan's efforts in raising its international profile. They also want the U.S. to supply more advanced weapons and in larger quantities to Taiwan. A contrasting set of policy choices has come from Americans concerned with sustaining and developing economic, political, and military ties with the PRC. They argued that U.S. interests are best served by avoiding actions regarding Taiwan that they judge would provoke a negative mainland response. Consequently, they advocate strict adherence to U.S. commitment to reduce arms sales to Taiwan as stated in the 1982 Joint Communique between the U.S. and China. Current Perspective Currently, the official U.S. China policy concerning Taiwan, as expressed in the three joint communiques with the PRC and as described by Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs is as follows:--The United States recognizes the Government of the PRC as "the sole legal Government of China." --The U.S. acknowledges the Chinese position that "there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." In 1982, the U.S. assured the PRC that it has no intention of pursuing a policy of "two Chinas' or "one China, one Taiwan."--The U.S. has consistently held that resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter to be worked out peacefully by the Chinese themselves. Despite the officially stated U.S. China policy, the Congress is mostly pro-Taiwan, as Taiwan's image with the American public and Congress has been boosted by its becoming a democracy. On May 19, the House voted 369-14 for a non-binding resolution calling on the U.S. to make clear to China that an attack on Taiwan will not be tolerated. Specifically, the resolution called on the administration to help defend Taiwan against an attack by the mainland. Last summer, House Speaker Newt Gingrich went so far as to propose recognizing Taiwan as a free country and telling the Chinese "they have to live with the reality that the people of Taiwan are free and deserve it." Though he quickly backed down. Earlier, congressional support for President Lee forced the White House to issue him a visa for his "unofficial visit." Some members of Congress advocate a policy of containment. "Both Senator Edward Kennedy and Senator Jesse Helms are in a pro-Taiwan mode," says a senior U.S. official, "the former because of China's human rights record, the latter because Taiwan is the last anticommunist country in the world." The containment forces are convinced China is a bully that needs to be disciplined, not indulged. They urge that the U.S. get tough and stop acquiescence. In contrast to the hardline position taken by members of Congress toward, state department officials such as the Secretary of State Christopher are more pragmatic and analytic in their thinking. He has stressed that the U.S. decisionmakers' need to think in Chinese perspective when evaluating Chinese actions. Specifically, he said, "We have to keep in mind what's happening in China. It is a massive country, and it's in the process of a massive transition to a free-market economy. It is also undergoing a leadership transition." He also stated that the U.S. should not focus solely on the differences between the two countries. He listed a number of areas where both countries have in common and pointed out other important areas where China has cooperated with the U.S. He pointed out that the Chinese cooperated with the U.S. in dealing with the Korean nuclear threat. He also stressed that in many areas, such as a comprehensive nuclear test ban, American interest calls for China's cooperation. His main point is that China is strategic weight of enormous size, and the U.S. has to treat it that way. The Secretary of State's viewpoint was echoed by Winston Lord in his statements before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He stated that "It is critically important, as we consider China's position from a security perspective, to have a clear view of China's own priorities. Its number one priority is economic development. This has been the driving idea dominating Chinese politics and Chinese life since the late 1970s." In pursuing this economic goal, Lord concluded, the Chinese requires a peaceful international environment. Various examples were cited in support of this conclusion. Lord further concluded that the policy of comprehensive engagement, which assumes neither Chinese aggressiveness nor Chinese benevolence, should be continued. He stated that the U.S. must continue to pursue constructive relations with China, and to show firm resolve whenever necessary. More concisely, the U.S. should seek to act in concert with China where there is agreement, foster greater consensus where the picture is mixed, and prevent or minimize conflict where the two disagree. Comprehensive engagement, sums up Secretary of Defense William Perry, "does not mean that the U.S. will acquiesce to Chinese actions with which we disagree. But we will not try to isolate China over these issues. You cannot isolate a country with more than a billion people." A containment policy such as the one the U.S. used to hem in Moscow, says Perry, "could actually undermine our security, because a China that feels encircled is quite unlikely to cooperate on vital U.S. security interests. Containment could push China to accelerate its defense modernization, thus contribute to a regional arms race and increasing the likelihood of military conflict in hot spots like Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, the Korean peninsula." Last year Joseph Nye, who was then Assistant Secretary of Defense, warned, "If you treat China as an enemy, China will become an enemy." A ranking Administration official suggested that not a single friend and ally would join the U.S. in such a strategy. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's Senior Minister and an astute analyst of the region, takes the point further: "The last thing Asia wants is containment. First, it will not succeed. Second, you will have absolutely no influence on how China and its attitudes develop; it will be hostile and xenophobic to the West, and that's no good for us." Conclusion By analyzing the available first hand government documents and secondary reports, it is clear that the U.S. decision to send two aircraft carriers to Taiwan during China's military exercise in March could be best explained by using the rational actor model. It was a strategic decision proposed by the Secretary of Defense William Perry and confirmed by President Clinton after consulting with Secretary of State Warren Christopher and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake. There was no evidence that there was any explicit disagreement between the different departments. Thus, the bureaucratic model is not applicable in this case. Also the Congress, as evidenced by its decision to pass only non-binding resolutions, in effect defer the decisionmaking role to the Executive branch. Thus, the interbranch model does not explain the decision either. After coming to this conclusion, it is time to analyze what was American goal in sending its aircraft carriers near Taiwan and whether the goal had indeed been achieved. Officially the goal, as stated by Lord, was to reassure U.S. allies that the U.S. have a big stake in the stability and peace of that region. But Defense Secretary Perry was more blunt. He said that the United States sent the two aircraft carrier groups to remind Beijing that America is the dominant power in the region. If this show of capability was intended at emboldening China's Asian neighbors, then U.S. should be disappointed. No country in the region has criticized China and most of South-East Asia has striven to sound neutral. Thailand's foreign minister went so far as to ask "When a country conducts military exercises on its own territory to deter its province from breaking away, would you oppose it?" In Indonesia, there has even been some criticism of American actions. In this respect, then, the policy has not been successful. The official reason given is only part of the explanation. What was not spelled out was United States' fear that an actual armed conflict might result from either misperception or miscalculation. In such a case, U.S. would be in a dilemma. If it were to get involved, the cost might be prohibitively high; if it were to distance itself from the conflict, it would lost a considerable amount of prestige. Thus, even though it was perceived by everyone that China's intention was to influence Taiwan's presidential election, and more fundamentally, to restrain Taiwan's international activities; that neither Taiwan nor the PRC wants a military confrontation, the U.S. still decided to bring in the two aircraft carrier groups in order to minimize the inherent risk in China's use of live ammunition exercises and missile tests. By introducing an added element of risk, the U.S. hope that the Chinese decisionmakers would be more careful in trying to avoid accidents during the course of the military exercises. The fact that it was proven later that no accident had occurred means that the policy was successful. It is appropriate now to address the implications of the Taiwan Strait Crisis. To the decisionmakers in China, it means that they should take U.S. into account if they want use force against Taiwan. But this does not mean that they will not pursue reunification by force even when faced with U.S. intervention. To the decisionmakers in U.S. it means that the U.S. should be more careful when formulating its China policies relating to Taiwan. This crisis has shown U.S. how sensitive the Chinese are to the question of territorial integrity. The U.S. could never have foreseen that the granting of a visa to Lee Teng-Hui would invoke such a strong response from China. The final conclusion is that the U.S. needs to reshape its own approach to China. China is not just a naughty boy, violating trade norms here and human rights there. China is not Haiti or Bosnia, places where America's involvement may be desirable but is ultimately optional. China is not optional. China is a growing world power, potentially the largest of all. Thus, ways must be found to bring it into the international community and induce it to abide by the rules. That is the challenge that the Taiwan Strait crisis has brought into the limelight. THEORETICAL CONCEPT GLOSSARY DETERRENCE: Action taken to force a party to maintain a certain behavior or prevent them from changing their behavior. IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF DETERRENCE THEORY: CAPABILITIES: The inherent ability (usually military or economic) to force a party into an acceptable position or behavior. COMMITMENT/RESOLVE: The demonstrated or perceived willingness to use one's capabilities. "BLACK BOX": The leader or decision maker's psyche. Preexisting tendencies that may lead him/them to act/react in a certain way. PROSPECT THEORY: Leaders/decision makers pay more attention to losses than gains. LOSS AVERSION: Leaders/decision makers weigh losses more heavily than gains. DETERRENCE BY THREAT: Articulated threat of punishment after warning: "Do Not Enter... Violators will be shot!" ANALYTICAL DECISION MAKING: Decision making process that is inherently more rational in nature because, to a large extent, unnecessary and faulty information and biases are excluded from the process. Option(s) adopted are arrived at through assignment of relative values. COGNITIVE DECISION MAKING: Decision making process that is inherently less rational in nature because factors such as past experiences, misperceptions, disregarded or omitted critical information and inherent biases influence the outcome (decision). UTILITY FUNCTION: The relative prioritization of a set of a decision maker's values. STRATEGIC INTERESTS: Intangible interests such as prestige, threat credibility, resolve, nationalism, and ideals. INTRINSIC INTERESTS:Tangible interests such as natural resources, territory and economic interests.