CHRISTOPHER BARRETT POLITICAL SCIENCE 472 DR. TANTER JUNE 20, 1996 RIGHT POLICY, RIGHT TIME, WRONG COUNTRY THE POLITICS OF DETERRENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST One of the basic tenets of a civilized country is to avoid conflict with other nations. In this modern age, when the stakes in the geo-political poker game have been anted up in light of nuclear proliferation, the absolute costs of conflict are too high for the rational country to risk any great loss. The game is way beyond the penny ante stage now. In order to deter any such conflict that may arise, a country has numerous variables to decipher for the protection of its people. In the case of the foreign policy of the United States government (USG), at times the variables have been misinterpreted and the consequences miscalculated. In the minds of some deterrence theorists this misinterpretation and miscalculation has lead directly to a deterrence breakdown and consequently to confrontation with other countries. The policies that the USG enacted under the Reagan administration offers up great debate as the covert dealings of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council and, some allege, President Reagan and President Bush themselves may have lead to the Gulf War of 1991. Why did the foreign policies of the Reagan and Bush administration fail in deterring Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein from invading Kuwait in 1990? Was the conflict really failed deterrence or just a failure to properly deter? And, finally, if the foreign policies of these two administrations was truly botched and deterrence efforts broke down, was the Gulf War then avoidable? REWARDS AND PUNISHMENT For deterrence to work, so the classical theory of deterrence goes, the credibility of a state is vitally important. A country deterred is a country who believes that any egregious action undertaken will result in some penalty, in short the end payoff outweighs the total cost of an action. On the other hand, a country persuaded must believe that an avoidance of such an action will be in their best interest. Such a system of strategic rewards and punishments and mutually beneficial persuasion is at the very core of deterrence theory. Also at the basis of deterrence is the notion of the power to hurt. The country with such power has the ability to offer a strategic system of punishment and reward based on a) the power of the reacting country and b) the credibility of the reacting country to react in the first place. The difficulty here is establishing that much needed credibility. In the case of the United States, the resolve or credibility necessary to effectively deter another country from enacting a policy that the USG does not want SHOULD be apparent, however to some countries that is obviously not the case, for if it were, the USG would have no need to enter into a conflict with any other country. The power of the USG to hurt seems obvious. The industrial-military complex built by the USG during the Cold War has given the USG an unprecedented place in the geo-political specter of foreign affairs. And the experience of the USG in worldly intervention in Korea, Vietnam and (very nearly) Cuba should have established the USGs credibility and resolve. Yet, the USG is still forced to confront Iraq during the Gulf War. Now, the question is: where does the breakdown of credibility begin? For the credibility of the USG to fail one of two things must happen. First, an actor must underestimate the resolve of the reactor. Or, second, the actor must overestimate the power of there own forces in counteracting the reactors forces. For either of these two occurrences, misinterpretation of intents, credibility and the power of the reacting country is evident by the acting country. The misinterpretation of another countrys actions, resolve or power to hurt is possible through an unmotivated or a motivated bias. For the country to act on an unmotivated bias, their rationality is lessened by expecting to see something that is not as it appears. For the motivated bias to occur, the country in question strains to see something that is simply not there. While terribly abstract concepts in theory, the practical application of biases in deterrence was an important step in understanding the seemingly irrationality of a countrys actions. Why would a country undertake a confrontation that they could not possibly win if not for a motivated bias? The answer is that they greatly overestimated their power to hurt. They WANTED to believe that they could inflict harm and conceivably win a confrontation with a stronger foe. In the case of the USG and Iraq, Iraq had an unmotivated bias towards the USG. At the time of the Kuwait invasion by Hussein, many questioned the rationality of Iraqs leader. Many questioned how he could do such a thing. Surely he knew that swift and furious punishment was awaiting him should he invade Kuwait. But, did he really? One must keep in mind that in 1980 invaded another Arab neighbor, Iran, and the USG covertly armed them. If the USG offered up a reward for the Iraqis once before when invading a country, one could infer the same treatment on August 2, 1990 when Kuwait was invaded. The reason that the USG did not treat Hussein to a reward is the basis of an unmotivated bias. Hussein could very well have expected the USG the react differently than they did. That is to say, Huissein could have expected the USG to have no problem with the invasion of Kuwait. The USG certainly set such a precedent in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war. In the end, though, Hussein should have realized that the USG would probably not appreciate the invasion with the same vigor that they viewed the Iranian invasion. The invasion of Kuwait demonstrated that the greater the bias, the lesser the rationality of the actor. For deterrence to be effective, there are four necessary conditions that must be evident. 1) the commitments must be clearly defined; 2)they must be repeated publicly; 3) they must be defensible and 4) the committed state must give every indication of its intention to defend them by force if necessary. At issue is the question of the USG meeting each of the four criteria with respect to Iraq. During the Iran-Iraq war the commitments of the USG were defined. The USG had an interest in seeing Iran defeated and possibly the reinstatement of the erstwhile Shah. The commitments were not exactly declared publicly, however. At the time of the war, the USG was officially still neutral. It was not until the Iran-Contra debacle and the Iraqgate scandal that the US public was informed of the USGs commitments. The knowledge of the public in this case is, however, immaterial. Hussein knew as did the USG where the allegiances were. As for the third and fourth condition, once again the USG made it clear where they stood repeatedly to Hussein. The problem arises during the Bush administration. It is abundantly clear that not one of the conditions were met adequately. The lack of these necessary conditions is the dominant reason that the deterrent breakdown of the invasion of Kuwait is partly the fault of the United States. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE During the Reagan administration the Reagan Doctrine was placed at the forefront of Reagans goals while in office. What he attempted to do was eliminate Communism from the face of the Earth. Also intended was to intervene in countries where the threat of communist takeovers was possible. In the case of Iraq, the USG had an opportunity to create a schism between the Soviet Union and Iraq in 1980 that was hard to resist. Until 1980, the Soviets had been supplying Iraq with arms and arms technology but the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR had cooled relations between Iraq and the Soviets. The White House realized that this was an opportune moment to move. In 1972, the Soviet Union supplied 95% of Iraqs weapons but by 1979 that share fell to 79%. Iraq also soundly condemned Soviet activities in Somalia along with the rest of the Arab Middle East. The Baathist regime lead by Hussein was also responsible for the purgation of 21 alleged communist soldiers in the Iraqi army-hardly a favorable position towards communism. The Iraqi publication al-Thawra also accused the Soviet Union of attempting to convert the Arab states to communism. At this stage of Iraqi coldness toward the Soviet Union, Iraq also launched an offensive campaign towards their neighbor to the northwest Iran. At the time of the invasion the USG, still recovering from the hostage crisis in Tehrain, was looking for more stability in Iran. After the fall of the Shahs regime, the Ayatollah Khomeini, known sympathizer with terrorists, hardly presented the model of stability in the Middle East that the USG so desperately wanted. With the advent of the Iran-Iraq War, the USG had the opportunity to align itself with a more stable power, stable being a very relative term in its use here. Furthermore, after the Camp David accords, Egypt had effectively removed itself from its role as the Middle Easts dominant nation. At the time of the war, however, the USG was not publicly allied with Iraq, nor was Iraq publicly aligning itself with the USG as Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat proclaimed in 1980. He described Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein as two faced-behind closed doors he is with the United States while in public he attacks it. Nonetheless, the USG undertook actions that would hopefully help Iraq defeat the hated regime of the Ayatollah. As the old adage goes and as Bruce Jentelson sets out in his book With Friends Like These, the enemy of my enemy is my friend. This is exactly the policy that the USG undertook during the Reagan years. In the infancy of Saddams reign, Iraq was taken off the state terrorism list made by the USG, he was also supplied with military assistance for use in defeating Iran. Vice-President Bush also successfully petitioned Eximbank president William Draper for the largest extension of short-term and long-term credits towards Iraq in the banks history. These totaled $484 million in long-term loans and $200 million in short-term loans. The USG also approved licenses for 241 dual-use exports that were obviously destined for weapons use in the last two years of the Reagan administration alone. Granted, this was purely an alliance of convenience for the USG. The Iraqis were not exactly prime candidates to fall into the USGs sphere of influence as the model state of optimal behavior for a country but, at the time, it was the best option available. UNDERSTANDING MISUNDERSTANDINGS If during the Iran-Iraq War, the USG was on the side of Iraq, even covertly, Saddam could expect a similar reaction by the USG in response to the invasion of Kuwait. However, this was not the case. Hussein did not take into account the goals and aims of the USG at the time of the invasion of Iran as contrasted with the invasion of Kuwait. These were two starkly different undertakings in the USGs eyes. Saddam, for whatever errant reason, did not realize this. Once again, though, the fault is not entirely owned by Hussein. The USG under Bush sent mixed signals to Hussein that would make it difficult to interpret the USGs response should Hussein undertake the invasion of Kuwait. The seemingly irrational act of invading Kuwait is then the fault of an unmotivated bias by Hussein. It was altogether possible that he did not expect the USG to react to the invasion of Kuwait. One of the more blatant examples of the Bush administration bungling their foreign policy directives was seen with issuing of National Security Directive (NSD) 26. (It is seen as bungled with the help of 20/20 hindsight, that is.) It stated that the USG should continue their status quo relationship with Iraq. Even though Iraq was no longer at war with a sworn enemy of the USG by 1989 the USG determined that any sudden shift in policy towards Iraq may result in unwanted behavior. Iraq, at this time, was in a basement of fear. The USG response then was an attempt at rehabilitation in an effort to soothe the potential savage beast. Once again, it should be stated that the blame for the Gulf War should not be placed solely on either Husseins or Bushs shoulders. At the time of NSD 26, Iraq was getting their act together. As reported by Don Oberdorfer in the Washington Post, NSD 26 was written partly in response to Iraq being ready to play a more constructive international role. Furthermore, Iraq had, for all outward appearances, slowly begun to change its international image. This kind of behavior should not be punished but should be rewarded at the very least with the status quo. Furthermore, Iraq was beginning to further distance themselves from the Soviet Union; was less hostile amid the Arab-Israeli peace process; began to expel known terrorists; and (this is vitally important) opened a new market for US agricultural interests. Perhaps the USG experienced a motivated bias here, as well. As George states in Bridging the Gap, a country will more readily accept an idea of a countrys aims if those aims are in tune with their beliefs. It is likewise easy to be skeptical of new aims and directions undertaken by the country observed if those directions are inimical to what the observing country wants to see. PREDICTING THE ACTIONS OF HUSSEIN The running joke around 1990 was a crude play on Husseins name: So Damn Insane. Perhaps a more accurate portrayal using a similar play on words should have been: So Damn Irrational. As Hussein climbed up the basement of fears steps and into view of a window of opportunity, his rationality lessened each day it seemed. When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the USG made it perfectly clear what their position was. The USG would tolerate no such action. How Hussein could have underestimated the credibility and resolve of Bushs statements with respect to the invasion of Kuwait only solidifies the notion that Hussein was increasingly irrational. By dictate of Bush and his administration and later by the UN Security Council, Hussein should have acquiesced immediately. Hussein would have done well to save face and pull out of Kuwait then. Almost as soon as Kuwait was invaded, Bush issued Executive Order 12722. Which prohibited trade with Iraqi and blocked the assets of Iraq. The UN Security Council was next to issue a statement condemning the invasion with Resolution 660. The rational leader would not so drastically misinterpret these dictates to mean anything other than the policies that they set out. Once again, though, there is another glaring mistake made by the Bush administration. On July 16, 1990 Hussein sent word that he wanted a meeting with United States Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie. On July 25, that meeting took place and Glaspie let it be known that the USG would take no interest in border disputes between Iraq and its neighbors. Glaspie went so far as to say I have a direct instruction from the president to seek better relations with Iraq. Now, who could misinterpret such a statement? Indeed, Glaspies comments were taken in and two weeks later, Hussein invaded Kuwait. Until this point, the focus has been on both the USGs botched deterrence attempts and on Husseins misperception of the USGs actions. The statements made by Ambassador Glaspie and the continuance of favorable foreign policies towards Iraq may very well have made Hussein believe that he could get away with invading Kuwait. That may be so. Indeed, until Bush (with the assistance of the UN) issued the January 15, 1991 ultimatum to Hussein, the USG never drew a figurative line in the sand that would keep Hussein at bay. For this mistake, the failure to deter Hussein from invading Kuwait is partly the fault of the USG during the Bush administration. But, the failed deterrence rests solely in Husseins hands after the Kuwait invasion. Perhaps the USGs credibility was in fact low, however, Iraq severely miscalculated the resolve of the USG if he believed that they would not counter Husseins action in Kuwait with force. In an interview with the Washington Post, Dennis Ross, head of policy planning at the State Department, offered the following to explain the deterrence breakdown: What I underestimated was his[Husseins] perception of our resolve. He just didnt believe us. He had watched CNNand his concept of the [congressional] debate was that it was a sign of weakness. Debate and dissent meant that we would fall victim the same way we fell victim in Lebanon and the same way we did Vietnam. In this case, coercive diplomacy didnt work because we could not convince him of what it meant to use force. He thought we were going to be hamstrung domestically. The reality of what war meant for him didn't sink in until after the bombing [in January]. Whether or not the USGs threat was indeed credible to Hussein is impossible to guess. What the deterrence failure DOES show, however, is the need to establish that credibility or else all is for naught. CONCLUSION: IMPOSSIBLE MISSION? Some have advanced the theory that Saddam Hussein was simply impossible to deter. This is altogether plausible for several reasons. First, by the time of the Gulf War, Hussein was so convinced that the USGs efforts were words floating in the wind, there was little the USG could do to establish credibility by this time. Furthermore, in nearly all of the rhetoric of Husseins speeches and statements to US officials such as Ambassador Glaspie, he was convinced the US was simply a paper tiger. He went so far as to tell Glaspie that the US is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle. Finally, even if Hussein DID believe every threat thrown his way by the USG, one must look at the nature of Islamic extremism. While he was not a religious leader in the style of, say, Khomeini, he referred to the Gulf War repeatedly as a jihad, or religious crusade. For a nation to take on a formidable opponent and even lose horribly in such a jihad would be the noblest endeavor Husseins countrymen could undertake. If Hussein could not truly be deterred, then perhaps the Bush administration was not actually at fault for carrying on dual-purpose policies with Iraq. Perhaps turning the other way when Hussein gassed Iraqi Kurds in 1989 and then drawing a proverbial line in the sand when Hussein invaded Kuwait one year later did not destroy any credibility that the USG had in Husseins eye. If such was indeed the case and Hussein was uncoercible then there was little that the USG could do to prevent the Gulf War of 1991 except of course to defeat Iraq soundly in order to reestablish their credibility worldwide. If however, Husseins decrees that the US was nothing more than a paper tiger was just rhetoric, he must have believed the USGs threats. But, I believe that may be stretching the case a bit in Husseins favor. This was, after all, a man with extreme motivated and unmotivated biases. And, as has been stated before, the more biased an actor is the less rational their behavior will be. Therefore, it can be inferred that Hussein was acting irrationally in his invasion of Kuwait and VERY irrationally in thinking he could take on the United States Armed Forces and fare favorably. When dealing with such an irrational leader there is little the USG can do in way of deterrent policiesexcept of course to win. And win they did.