IRAQ1.DOC September 5, 1996 DETERRENCE AND COERCION: MISSILES & MISSIONS AT ISSUE: First, whether the U.S. military mission should have explicit political goals. Second, whether the U.S. priority is deterrence of future Iraqi attacks on the Kurds or coercion of Iraq to cease its military action against the them and/or to undo its past action by withdrawing from above the 36th parallel. Third, whether the best way to coerce is via tit-for-tat graduated escalation or by disproportionate bombing attacks that pulverize and thus terrorize. BACKGROUND: In September, 1996, the U.S. launched missile attacks (47 Tomahawk cruise missiles) against Iraqi military targets. Attacks were in response to Iraqi military involvement in inter-Kurdish conflict. (Kurds are a Sunni Muslim, non-Arab people who inhabit northern Iraq, parts of eastern Turkey, eastern Syria, western Iran, and southern republics of the former USSR. They seek local autonomy and regional integration into a future state, Kurdistan.) Tehran supports one subset of the Iraqi Kurdish population, roughly 50% of Kurds there; in support of the other half, Baghdad invaded Erbil Iraq, a Kurdish city and continues to control it with military forces that remain nearby. MISSILES, MESSAGES, & MISSIONS: Tomahawk cruise missiles cost $1.3 million, have a payload of 1,000 pounds, have a sub-sonic speed of 760 miles/hour, has a range of up to 1,500 miles, can fly at low levels--100 to 300 feet--can be fired as an anti-ship or as a land-attack weapon, flies at low altitudes, has low heat emissions and thus is difficult to detect by infrared devices or by radar. Forty-seven Tomahawks merely constitute a Hallmark type greeting card. "When you care to send the very best." Relative to 297 cruise missiles fired during Desert Shield/Storm, the 47 cruise missiles of September 1996 have minor effect on Iraqi installations. Raging phrase of the sixties by Marshall Mcluhan: The medium is the message. The Clinton Administration seems to be saying that: The missile is the message. But missiles dont send messages: people send messages. Yet missiles do need missions: If the mission is to compel Saddam to pullout of the City of Erbil, in the Kurdish region in northern Iraq, then the missile strikes in southern Iraq are a failure. Iraqi troops still control Erbil from nearby locations. If the mission is to compel a withdrawal, then the target package has to include troop concentrations, defense installations, as well as command and control facilities in the north. If the U.S. wants Iraq out of the City of Erbil, then cruise missile attacks in the south seems off the mark. DETERRENCE: Deterrence divides into two parts. Deterrence by threat operates on another actors motivations and intentions; it is a process of inducing an adversary not to take an action by making the risk of doing so worth less than the expected gains of doing so. In order to raise the expected costs to be higher than the expected benefits, there must be a credible threat of punishment in the event of non-compliance. Deterrence by denial operates on an actors capabilities; it is a process of denying another party the ability to take an action by altering the relative capabilities between the parties. The aim is to make it difficult for an adversary to take an undesired action. The cruise missile strikes against Iraqi defense installations is raising the cost of future Iraqi military action and is deterrence by denial. Extending the no-flight-zone in southern Iraq from the suburbs of Baghdad to the northern frontier with Kuwait is deterrence by denial. Extension of no-fly zone to 33rd parallel in the south implies that the top priority is to deter by denial the Gulf states from Iraq assault rather than defend the Kurds in the south. If, as Secretary of Defense William Perry stated, the U.S. wants to deter future Iraqi aggression, attack also seems off the mark. Costs to Saddam Hussein were insufficient to cause a complete military withdrawal. And consider remarks by President Clinton: Reckless acts have consequences. We do not want that [another Iraqi assault on the Kurds] to happen again. President claims that the message sent was that Saddam has to learn that he has to pay a price for aggression. The Presidents statements imply a deterrent not a coercive intent. If deterrence is the U.S. goal vis a vis Iraq, should the deterrent goal be made explicit. If coercion is the primary aim, should coercive demand be made explicit. Should Washington demand that Iraqi ground combat forces withdraw from the no-flight-zone above the 36th parallel or not. On the one hand, explicit demands provide a standard to judge Iraqi compliance. On the other hand, explicit demands drag the U.S. into the inter-Kurdish dispute in the north, commit American prestige to the goal of ousting Iraq by military force in the event of non-compliance, and open the door to an alignment between Iran and the USG. COERCION: Coercion also divides into two parts. Coercion is a process of using a threat to induce a party either to take an action or to undo an action already taken. U.S. bombing of defense installations in Iraq have little coercive potential. As one moves from deterrence to coercion, requirements for securing compliance increase. Because it is more difficult to coerce than to deter, a coercer has to be prepared to make more credible threats and to use more force than in the case of deterrence. USG: CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY & GRADUATED ESCALATION USG prefers to be ambiguous about what Iraq needs to do. But such ambiguity leaves open the door to criticism about the fit between military measures and political goals, between cruise missile attacks and political objectives, between deterrence and coercion. USG also prefers to escalate gradually in order to control the risks, minimize collateral damage, and hold the Coalition together. The alternative is to se overwhelming force early without pauses to find out whether the other side gets the message. INTERESTS: INTRINSIC & STRATEGIC: Regarding the idea that the U.S. and its allies may deploy ground combat forces to protect the Kurds, that notion is not in the cards. The Kurds are like the Bosnian Muslims: They both are of American strategic interests: What the USA vows to protect, let no dictator challenge. If Washington allows challenges to its authority, the glue that holds the international system together becomes unstuck.