472not23.txt DETERRENCE in the ISRAEL-SYRIA CONFLICT THE PROBABILITY THAT SYRIA WILL GO TO WAR -- INCREASING CONSIDERABLY (Analysis by Ze'ev Maoz, "Ha'aretz", Aug 18, 1996, p.B3) [ MAOZ WAS A STUDENT OF RTS IN JERUSALEM AND IN ANN ARBOR.] AS THE FREEZE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA CONTINUES, THERE IS AN INCREASING CHANCE THAT SYRIA WILL BE MOTIVATED TO INITIATE A WAR -- THE CASUALTIES OF WHICH, ON THE ISRAELI SIDE, WILL BE CIVILIANS ON THE HOME FRONT -- IN ORDER TO "THAW" IT. ACCORDING TO THE IDF AND THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT, THERE IS A LOW PROBABILITY OF SUCH A WAR. In contrast to the Palestinian track, where the Netanyahu government has adopted the taking avowed policy of honoring agreements, there has been a 180-degree reversal on the Syrian track. The current government's positions, both official and unofficial, give expression to a maximum retreat from the understandings reached during the Israeli-Syrian negotiations under the Rabin and Peres governments -- the extension of UN Security Council Resolution #242 to the Golan Heights; the principle of "land for peace" or, in Syrian parlance, "total peace for total withdrawal," and; the principle of mutual, but not necessarily symmetrical, security arrangements. In the negotiations conducted by previous governments, the Syrians were given to understand that the principle of withdrawal to the international border was acceptable to Israel; thus, the territorial dispute between the parties was centered on the gap between the international border and the 1967 border. Since no agreement was ever reached -- even on the level of an agreement of principles to anchor (in writing) the common basis for the negotiations -- the Netanyahu government is entitled to view itself as free from any commitments made by previous governments. From the standpoint of public opinion, Netanyahu can assume that this policy expresses the will of most of the people, since various polls indicate that the majority opposes a comprehensive withdrawal from the Golan Heights. At the same time, the Syrians view themselves as cheated. Israel, according to their understanding, has backed away from significant commitments made in the negotiations, and we have thus (from the Syrian perspective) returned to the situation which existed before the Madrid Conference. More than it was designed to form a new basis for negotiations, the barren "Lebanon First" initiative was an attempt to place the blame for the suspension of negotiations on Syria's shoulders. Here, Netanyahu can score himself another public relations success -- but public relations are one thing, and policy is something else. The Netanyahu government's position on the Syrian issue is a legitimate position in terms of international procedure. Assad, who refused to reach a consensus document of principles with Israel, can only complain to himself about the retreat of the current Israeli government from the positions of previous governments. Still, the new state of affairs created on the Syrian track requires political and strategic analysis, as well as a look at preparations for new dangers. The main significance of the political reversal on the Syrian track is the considerable increase in the probability of a war against other Arab elements as well. Therefore, as long as the Netanyahu government continues its current policy -- whose practical meaning is "peace for peace" -- it must prepare the IDF and Israel's citizenry for war in the not-too-distant future. First, it is worth presenting the counter-analysis. There are many within the IDF and the political establishment who believe that, despite the anticipated (and perhaps desirable) stalemate in the negotiations with Syria, there is a low probability of war in the near future. This assessment is based on two main components: the geo-strategic situation and the balance of military forces. Geographically, the IDF sits only 60 km. from Damascus. This fact deters Syrian military adventurism. Moreover, the political conditions on the pan-Arab scene make it difficult to forge a common pan-Arab front. In the event of such a war, Syria will be able to rely upon only itself. Syria's potential allies are neutralized militarily (Iraq) and politically (Egypt and Jordan). Even the chance of an economic front providing international support for Syria, if it attacks Israel, is fairly slim. Saudi Arabia is profoundly connected to the United States, and it is difficult to assume that the Saudis would risk American assistance to come to Syria's aid with an oil boycott. Given the economic conditions prevailing today, an oil boycott could work to the detriment of the Saudis and the Gulf states. Iran has neither the practical option to transfer sufficient military forces for the purpose of aiding the Syrians, nor the ability (for now) to launch missiles on Israel. This combination of the geo-political and inter-Arab factors greatly complicates Syria's ability to start a war. Since the mid-1980s, Israel's predicament -- with respect to the Syrian- Israeli and Arab-Israeli balances of force -- has significantly improved. The enlarged strategic gap stems, inter alia, from the collapse of the Soviet Union, from the Russian demand that the Syrians cover their debts, from Syria's need to pay hard currency for the procurement of any and all weapons systems from Russia, and (mainly) from the absence of any Syrian ability to acquire Western weapons. The Syrian military is encountering difficulty in both converting outdated weapons systems into new systems and obtaining spare parts for existing systems. As for intelligence, the chance of being surprised is now much smaller than in 1973, since the greatest attention -- in this era of peace with Egypt and Jordan -- is being directed at Syria, and any change in Syria's deployment would set off alarm bells in Israel. The military risks to Syria, derived from a war conducted under such conditions, immeasurably outweigh the expected gains. In the past, despite extremist anti-Israel rhetoric, Syrian conduct on the ground has usually been cautious, expressing a consideration based on an assessment of the risks and chances involved. Syria obviously has irritation and attrition options in Lebanon, which would make life in northern Israel unbearable. But even here, the new government is confronting the Syrians with new risks; even in this case, the probability of Israel responding directly against the Syrian military in the Lebanese Beka'a Valley is higher than in the past. Even with regard to Lebanon, past experience shows that the Syrians well-know how not to rock the boat beyond the necessary minimum to pressure Israel -- and how to stop rocking it as soon as the risks outweigh expected benefits. The main risks of a war against Syria, according to this conception, stem from two factors -- judgmental errors by the Syrian political and military leadership, and a loss of control over the situation in Lebanon. As long as Assad is aware of the risks, it is not likely that war will erupt. The problem is that such an analysis assumes wars are initiated to be won. But the longer that the freeze in negotiations continues, the more Syria may be motivated to initiate a war to "thaw" it -- even if such a war ends in a draw, or even a Syrian military defeat. The main objectives of such a war will be political (vis-a-vis Israel, the United States and the Arab world), psychological (vis-a-vis public opinion and the political system in Israel) and military (mainly for the sake of achieving some limited, or even symbolic, military accomplishment). Does this sound familiar? Just as Anwar Sadat determined the military objectives of the Yom Kippur War based on his political needs, Assad can define his military aims based on the political need of resurrecting the negotiations. And therefore, analyzing the possibility of war under current circumstances must focus on Syria's motivation, no less -- and perhaps even more -- than on considerations of military profit and loss. In a situation where the chances of an agreement (on terms that will satisfy Syria) have considerably decreased, Assad faces two inter-Arab scenarios, each creating incentives for war. According to the first scenario, the peace process on the Palestinian track continues in one form or another, and the Arab world continues its reconciliation with Israel. In this situation, there is a significant risk of perpetuating Israeli rule on the Golan Heights. A Syrian attack on Israel -- as preventive medicine -- would stand the Arab world on the horns of a difficult dilemma. In the best case, Syria would be likely to receive military or economic support from some Arab countries; in the worst case, Syria would win Arab political support, at least in the form of pressuring the United States to actively intervene toward moving the negotiations forward. According to the second scenario, there would be a radical change in Israel's relations with Arab countries due to a stalemate on the Palestinian track and Jordanian disappointment with the fruits of peace. Here as well, a war would likely restore Syria to its position as a leader in the peace process -- thereby bringing the Palestinians, and even the Jordanians, to fall in behind the Syrian position. In both scenarios, an inability to ignite the process through a military initiative could exacerbate Syria's political condition. Militarily, preparedness for war can be based on two possibilities -- defining limited goals (and, therefore, a limited war), or taking high risks (with the intention of striking Israel's home front). A limited war assumes that Syria has a monopoly on the war's opening and concluding terms. As long as Israel holds the Golan Heights, the option of a pre- emptive Israeli strike is not politically possible. Further, transferring the war to Syrian territory would create severe political problems and increase the chance of military intervention by other Arab countries. As in previous wars, an Arab initiative for a ceasefire will always win A second possibility stems from the fact that Syrian frustration over the political situation might increase to the point where Syria is willing to bear risks and make sacrifices. The only area in which Syria has the capability of causing genuine damage to Israel -- if not militarily, then certainly psychologically -- is an attack on the home front. The risk to Syria is obviously a massive Israeli response against parallel targets in Syria. The level of risk to Syria does not depend on Israeli ability, but on the Syrian readiness to take casualties in order to achieve political results. The level of risk -- not acceptable when there are political alternatives -- could be acceptable in a situation in which Syria feels that its back is against the wall or that time is working against it. Indeed, there is no certainty that conditions for war -- from Syria's perspective -- will ripen in the near future. It could be that the balance of risks and chances will bring Assad to the conclusion that as bad as the political and territorial status quo is for him, a war would lead to even worse consequences. However, the main claim is that as long as the political stalemate continues, Syria's motivation to resort to military measures -- and its willingness to take the risk -- will increase. The military problem from Syria's outlook could be redefined as how to reduce military damage, or how to make a symbolic achievement in a military confrontation, and not how to win a war; or worse yet: the level of readiness to take casualties in exchange for spilling Israeli blood and striking at Israel's national morale through an attack on the home front, and not the reduction of the number of Syrian casualties in the war. The Netanyahu government is entitled to change the previous government's policy on the Syrian track, even if there is no public declaration that indeed this is the case. However, it is obligated to prepare for the possible consequences of this turning. It must be said openly that such a war -- like the Yom Kippur War -- will not develop because Syria wants to destroy Israel, but because the Syrian political option has failed. The concept of "peace with the Golan" is a pipedream, which the Syrians will not buy. Therefore, the choice is "peace or the Golan". If Israel chooses to keep the Golan Heights under its sovereignty, the government must publicly say to the nation that it is very likely that we will have to defend this sovereignty by force. And it is possible that the principal casualties -- this time -- will be citizens, on the home front. Even if the government is unable to broadcast such a message to the nation, from a political standpoint, it is obligated to make this clear to the security establishment, and give it the tools to cope with the rise in the likelihood of war, and especially with the new threats which stem from the increase in Syria's ability to attack the home front. [The writer is the Director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.] >From analysis@ISRAEL-INFO.GOV.IL Thu Aug 22 10:29:14 1996 Date: Thu, 22 Aug 1996 16:12:00 +0200 From: IIS News Analysis Reply-To: ASK@ISRAEL-INFO.GOV.IL To: Multiple recipients of list ISRAEL-MIDEAST Subject: opeds: How to Say "Probability" in Syrian-"Ha'aretz", Aug 22, 1996 -------------------------------------------------------- HOW TO SAY "PROBABILITY" IN SYRIAN (Analysis by Zvi Barel, "Ha'aretz", Aug 22, 1996, p.B3) ASSAD'S SYRIA HAS NEVER GONE TO WAR AGAINST US ON ITS OWN, AND THERE IS NOT MUCH CHANCE OF AN ARAB COALITION AGAINST ISRAEL BEING FORMED NOW. >From at least one perspective, the preoccupation with Syria is amusing -- it enjoys complete freedom of action to combine scenarios of Assad's possible behavior. This Syrian enigma offers almost no information, and all attempts to analyze it can only be theoretical. Consequently, as long as the theory (or any other theory) goes unrefuted, it remains valid. Professor Ze'ev Maoz, Director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, offered his scenario here; according to Maoz, there is a probability -- and under certain circumstances, a high probability -- of war with Syria. Maoz bases this scenario on three basic assumptions. The first is wars are not necessarily initiate to be won. "The longer that the freeze in negotiations continues, the more Syria may be motivated to initiate a war to thaw it," Maoz writes. Maoz believes that, since the definition of victory is vague, it can be assumed that Assad will declare victory if he rescues the negotiations from their stalemate by military means. If so, would it not be worth proving, at the outset, that Assad is even interested in thawing the frozen negotiations? Or, in other words, that he has already considered and examined the profit-and-loss equation, and reached the conclusion that impasse and time are working against him -- to the point of being prepared to sacrifice Damascus for the Golan Heights? The two other assumptions are built on two contradictory scenarios. According to one, the normalization in Israel's relations with the Palestinians and other Arab countries will progress in such a way that Israel will be able to perpetuate its control over the Golan Heights. Thus, only a Syrian-initiated war against Israel will likely renew the negotiations, or at least cause Arab countries to press the United States into pressuring Israel. The opposite scenario, advanced by Maoz, suggests that the peace process will become stuck in such a way as to drag the Palestinians and the Jordanians into lining up behind Syria -- which would become the leader of the Arab world, and almost be obliged to begin a war against Israel in order to preserve its new status as a political leader. These two scenarios are possible, just as every theoretical scenario is possible in the Middle East. But relying on such scenarios means accepting the fundamental assumption that the formation of an Arab coalition against Israel is still possible. This assumption is not only crucial, but one must go to great lengths in order to prove it -- since Assad's Syria has never gone to war against Israel on its own. Assad has always taken the trouble to surround himself with a few allies, always fighting as part of a team. It is Israel that was mistaken, under the Labor government, in thinking that Assad was isolated due to the peace process, and that he would thus make the effort to join. Assad proved that, even when the process prospered -- with the Palestinians, Jordan, Qatar, Oman, Tunisia and Morocco embracing Israel -- he was not isolated. At the time, he issued his historic declaration on Syria's strategic decision to cling to the peace option, which obviously did not prevent him from again trying to organize Arab ranks and arrange summit conferences (with Mubarak's encouraging assistance). As such, the conclusion that an isolated Assad will initiate a war, is very improbable. If Assad always takes the trouble not to be isolated -- something which he has apparently succeeded in doing -- can it be assumed that he will succeed in forming a coalition that would agree to go into battle against Israel? Such a scenario has already existed several times in the past, and an Arab coalition was even formed against an Arab country -- Iraq. Why couldn't Israel be the next target? In order for such a prediction to be realized, there would have to be a very strong common denominator, intense motivation and a tangible, almost total Israeli threat to each country in this an Arab coalition. But such determination has lost its momentum -- after the Camp David Accords with Egypt, and then following the peace agreements with the Palestinians and the Jordanians. Even if the process becomes completely stuck, the peace option has already been etched in the region's historic memory. The war option, therefore, has lost its exclusivity. While the conception of the Arab countries still includes a tangible Israeli threat against them -- a nuclear threat -- this is precisely the sort of threat that will deter them from again embarking on a war. Another serious doubt is the degree to which Assad would be prepared to take a risk, alone, in order to record some kind of symbolic achievement -- and to what degree a symbolic Syrian accomplishment would be sufficient to get the peace process moving. For the sake of argument, it can be assumed that Assad has no idea how Israeli psychology works. It can be said that this lack of understanding will cause him to think that Israel, especially the Likud's Israel, might be prepared to conduct negotiations with him after coming under military attack. But it cannot be claimed that Assad does not understand the balance of forces or the vast damage he will bring upon himself should he initiate such an attack. This consideration cannot be lost even on someone seeking to go to war not to win, but to achieve something symbolic, be that what it may. On the other hand, it is plausible that Assad would want to reshuffle the deck on the peace process. It can also be guessed that, in his mind, a limited war with Israel might likely contribute to this end. But he will first have to explain to himself how Egypt did not dismantle its partnership with Israel in the wake of the Lebanon War -- which Israel initiated, and which even the Americans condemned. How did this war and Israel's other operations in Lebanon not lead to the dismantling of Israel's new partnerships with Arab nations. As long as Assad cannot find an explanation for this, it would be illogical to think that he believes the situation would be any different this time. If so, would it be correct to assume that there will be no more wars with Syria? This assumption, and the opposite conclusion, are equally precise. War with Syria could erupt -- but not because the peace process is stuck, or because the IDF does not withdraw from Hebron, or because Jordan does not receive the economic benefits it had expected. If it does erupt, it will apparently start in some small village in southern Lebanon, where a Katyusha will be fired at Kiryat Shmona or Nahariya. It will be a war whose instigator will be difficult to identify Israel, Hizbullah or Syria. If Syria joins this war, it will be because Israel is threatening an achievement that Syria has already effected -- control of Lebanon. moonpatrol% Date: Sun, 11 Aug 1996 10:48:56 +0200 From: IIS News Analysis Reply to: ASK@israel-info.gov.il To: Multiple recipients of list ISRAEL-MIDEAST Subject: opeds: Syria Most Advanced in Chemical Weapons-"Ma'ariv", Aug 8, 1996 SYRIA -- MOST ADVANCED IN ARAB WORLD IN CHEMICAL WEAPONS (Article by London correspondent, "Ma'ariv", Aug 8, 1996, p. A7) JANE'S SENTINEL, WHICH WILL BE PUBLISHED THIS WEEKEND, STATES THAT SYRIA HAS THOUSANDS OF NERVE GAS BOMBS AND WARHEADS. DAMASCUS VIEWS CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING STRATEGIC BALANCE WITH ISRAEL -- BUT IT IS STILL FAR FROM ACHIEVING SUCH A BALANCE. SYRIAN BOMBERS CAN CARRY OUT SERIOUS ATTACKS AGAINST TARGETS SUCH AS TEL AVIV. BY USING ITS MISSILES, SYRIA CAN ATTACK TARGETS IN MOST OF ISRAEL'S TERRITORY. FROM A QUALITATIVE STANDPOINT, SYRIA'S STRATEGIC WEAPONS ARE GREATLY INFERIOR TO THOSE OF ISRAEL. THE SYRIANS MAY DEVELOP CRUISE MISSILE CAPABLE OF CARRYING NON-CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS AS WELL. In recent years, Syria has made considerable improvements in its military forces -- both in ground forces and in air defense, and in developing surface-to-surface missiles. At the same time, it is still very far from "strategic parity" with Israel -- both from a quantitative and a qualitative standpoint. This is according to Jane's Sentinel, which will be published this weekend. Syria invests a great deal in developing and procuring weapons of mass destruction, but from a qualitative standpoint, its strategic weapons are greatly inferior to those of Israel, writes Jane's Sentinel. The Syrian air force is capable of delivering a deadly blow to Israel, and there is no doubt that the air force's structure shows that its objectives go far beyond defensive goals. Syria's inventory of fighter and attack aircraft can enable it to pin down the Israel air defense, so that Syrian bombers can carry out serious attacks on targets such as Tel Aviv. Attacks such as these, will have destructive results, especially if the Syrians use non-conventional weapons. But, Jane's Sentinel notes, such an attack against Israel with non-conventional weapons would be executed at a "very high price for Syria." Experts estimate that Syria has the most advanced program in the Arab world for the production of chemical weapons. Since the Lebanon War, Jane's Sentinel notes, the Syrians have seen the development of chemical weapons as a way to obtain a balance with Israel's military strength. It seems that production takes place at three sites: one near Damascus, the second near Hama, and the third center is near Safira village in the Aleppo area. In 1985, it seems that the Syrians began to manufacture quantities of chemical warheads, including Sarin nerve gas, for use with Scud-B and Scud-C missiles. Apparently, the Syrians have thousands of bombs with nerve gas which were produced to be carried by Sukhoi-22/20, MiG-23 and Sukhoi-24 planes. In the 1970's, Syria obtained the Soviet plan for type VX chemical warheads, which could be adapted to Scud missiles. If Syria is successful in production, it is liable to have at its disposal a supply of 884mm. warheads, which contain 975 kg. of chemical material. Syria has a large quantity of ballistic missiles and there have been reports that they are also manufacturing both a Syrian type of Scud-C missiles and M-9 missiles based on the Chinese model, missiles of longer range than the Scud and with a greater degree of precision. The production of these missiles takes place in underground factories near Aleppo and Hama, and the Syrians are being assisted by Iran, North Korea and China. Experts claim that missiles of longer range will not improve Syria's strength to attack important targets within Israel because the Syrians already have missiles capable of hitting targets in most of Israeli territory, including Dimona. The advantage of long-range missiles is that they [the Syrians] will be able to set them up in regions which are easier to defend. There are also reports that the Syrians are developing cruise missiles, which will be able to carry conventional and non-conventional warheads. Experts believe that some of the Syrian Frog-7 missiles are already fitted with chemical warheads. International experts believe that the Syrians are working to obtain the infrastructure and necessary know-how to produce nuclear weapons, even though the Syrian government insists that purchases are for civilian needs. Jane's Sentinel noted that there is no evidence that the Syrians have made any significant progress in the development of nuclear weapons. American and Israeli experts maintain that at the two Syrian centers for the development of biological weapons, they are capable of manufacturing bolotin, risin, and anthrax. The following is a list of Syrian strategic weapons: TYPE QUANTITY ======================== ================== SS-21 Maximum range: 120 km. Warhead weight: 480 kg. 36 SS-1 "Scud-B" Maximum range: 300 km. Warhead weight: 985 kg. 200 (estimate) "Scud-C" Maximum range: 500 km. Warhead weight: 500 kg. 60 (estimate) M-11 Maximum range: 290 km. Warhead weight: 800 kg. Unknown M-9 Maximum range: 600 km. Warhead weight: 950 kg. On order (according to reports) The Frog-7 is among other surface-to-surface missiles at the Syrians' disposal. >From analysis@ISRAEL-INFO.GOV.IL Thu Aug 22 10:29:40 1996 Date: Thu, 22 Aug 1996 16:12:27 +0200 From: IIS News Analysis Reply-To: ASK@ISRAEL-INFO.GOV.IL To: Multiple recipients of list ISRAEL-MIDEAST Subject: opeds: Between the Missile and the Katyusha-"Yediot", Aug 22, 1996. ====================================================== BETWEEN THE MISSILE AND THE KATYUSHA (Commentary by Danny Leshem, "Yediot Aharonot", Aug 22, 1996, p. B3) LAST YEAR THE SYRIAN CHIEF-OF-STAFF ALSO SPOKE OF A MILITARY OPTION, AND IN PREVIOUS YEARS, AS WELL, THE SYRIANS HAVE HELD MISSILE TEST FIRINGS -- BUT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO IGNORE THE TIMING OF SEVERAL AGRESSIVE SYRIAN STEPS -- REASONS FOR CONCERN. In and of itself, the Syrian test firing of the Scud-C missile is not a reason for concern. Generally, these kinds of tests are held at the end of the annual training exercises carried out by Syrian ground to ground missile brigades, as required by the Soviet doctrine adopted by this army. That being said, it is clear that its timing is likely to be determined by political needs with respect to Israel, and perhaps to the United States as well. The unexplained movement of Syrian military forces in Lebanon, whose purpose the American government checked, at the request of Israel (which recieved a reassuring message that there was no offensive intent), is likely to serve these same needs. The visit by the Syrian Prime Minister to Iran, must also be added. The visit, which was intended to express identification and support for Teheran against American efforts to isolate it, is also likely to be inteneded to, among other things, broadcast to the United States that if it wants to prevent the additional strengthening of Syrian ties to Iran, it had better exert pressure on Israel in the political arena. A valid cause for concern is the fact that Syrian Chief-of-Staff Shi'habi again recently warned Israel that, from the point of view of Damascus, the military option still exists. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the threat of a military option was not absent before this (last year Shihabi also said that, "by its actions, Israel is causing the constant danger of another war"), and in the past also, it was forbidden to rely too much on the "window of opportunity" which, to a large extent, was an illusion. The truth is that Shihabi's statements are an accurate reflection of Syrian policy towards Israel. Most of the time, it is intended to create an atmosphere of ongoing tension which is likely, in certain circumstances, to bring about a deterioration of the situation to war between Israel and Syria, in one place or another. Of course, Syria does not have to carry out the military option of a direct attack against Israel, whose heavy toll to both sides is well known. It is enough for it to encourage the escalation of the indirect war in Israel in southern Lebanon. And in this respect, the information -- full of threat - - on the long range rockets that have reached Hizbullah's hands, have a special implication. Should the initial information prove to be true, an even more serious implication will become apparent -- it will serve as evidence of Syria's willlingness to allow Hizbullah to acquire and use weapons, whose use will definitely cause a very severe escalation, the precise extent of which will be difficult to assess from the start. Especially now, when Syria is hurling accusations at Israel about its "war- like" policies, it is important to recall that it is the Syrians who turned the Be'ka valley in Lebanon into a training center and transit point for Islamic terrorist groups and others who are hostile to the existing regimes of many Arab states, the west, and Israel. The Washington Post recently revealed that Saudi intelligence has video tapes which show Saudi extremists being trained at Hizbullah bases in the Be'ka Valley, and as will be recalled, there was also evidence apparently linking Hizbullah to the attack in Daharan. It is also worthwhile to pay attention to the fact that, on exactly the same day that the Syrian Prime Minister arrived in Iran for an anti-American solidarity visit, the Iranian newspapers published the statement of the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, warning the United States that, "if its forces in the Gulf make even the slightest mistake there, our forces will ignite the region, which will bring about the certain death of the United States." This is the kind of agression and terrorism which Syria encourages, and all industrialized states had better realize this as soon as possible. ------------------ SYRIA: SELECTED ARTICLES FROM THE HEBREW PRESS ============================================== August 21, 1996 HA'ARETZ, (p.A1) -- Analysis by Ze'ev Schiff -- The reciprocal threats between Israel and Syria are an example of the deterioration in the war of words that has been going on for several weeks, and in which Israel is playing a major role. Even though the actions which the sides have taken recently -- such as missile testing -- are unrelated, they are perceived by the other side as a threat, without taking into account that the same assessment is being developed by the other side. To a large degree, Israel was the first to have used a threatening tone. Government spokespersons' warnings were initially aimed at Hizbullah, but it was explained very quickly, in no uncertain terms, that should a confrontation occur in which IDF soldiers and northern communities are attacked, those who are aiding Hizbullah will also be attacked. Afterwards, it was said explicitly that the intention was to the Syrian army encamped in Lebanon's Beka Valley, under whose protection Hizbullah organizes its training and its professional meetings with Iranian instructors. Afterwards, remarks -- which had already been made -- were published by Hizbullah's secretary, according to which the organization possesses new weapons: Katyushas with a 40 km. range. Even though the Chief-of-Staff stated that there is no certainty that these Katyushas came from Iran, there were those among us who again hastened to threaten that should Hizbullah use them, the Syrians will not be absolved -- they will be attacked. The Scud-C missile experiment which was allowed to be publicized in Israel yesterday, again led to a threat. The government's "Lebanon First" proposal was accompanied by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's threatening tone ("If no recourse is found to resolve this dispute, we will go to an escalation which will certainly be very painful for the other side") during his visit to southern Lebanon on Monday. At times, the impression is created that the new administration in Israel is still in the midst of an election campaign and forgets that it is operating as a government. Such threats have a great deal of significance and influence on the other side. When they realize that the Syrian side is taking these warnings as threats, there are those among us who hasten to calm the air and explain that our intentions are only for peace -- Heaven forbid the opposite. The Syrians too, are not free from responsibility for the deterioration, even though its leaders have not made any direct military threats to Israel recently -- except for the interview with Syrian Chief-of-Staff Hikmat Shi'habi, who said that Syria will not be deterred from acting in other (military) ways, if it is pushed to this. It is possible that the Scud-C experiment which was publicized yesterday, was rushed and not held in accordance with a previous timetable. It is not the first time that such an experiment has been held, and Israel already knows that Syria is continuing to equip itself with these missiles, including via self-manufacture. Egypt is also improving the previous Scud to the level of the Scud-C, both in range and accuracy, with the help of North Korea. It is clear that yesterday's Arrow-2 interception experiment in Israel is unrelated to the Scud experiment in Syria. The military significance is the same: both sides possess the capability -- which they did not have in the past -- to attack each other at greater ranges, both population centers and strategic targets. A warlike escalation will hurt both sides. The recent verbal deterioration proves that if Syria and Israel were to build an arms control system, including a "hot line" between them, it would be possible to prevent both misunderstandings of this kind, as well unnecessary escalation. YEDIOT AHRONOT, (p.A4) -- Interview with Dr. Yossi Olmert, by Alex Fishman: * How would you define the tensions which have been created between Israel and Syria? Dr. Olmert: In my opinion, this is artificial tension, which clearly serves Syria's interest in strengthening its position as the principal opponent of the Netanyahu government, in order to score points in the Arab world. There are no signs of real tension in the on the ground. The Syrians are experts in creating a warlike atmosphere without backing on the ground. They have done this many times in the past. * Is this also the background to the operational firing of the Scud-C? Dr. Olmert: You must not forget that their arming themselves with surface- to-surface missiles began before the Gulf War. But the need for missiles was strengthened in the wake of the same war, when they discovered what seemed like Israel's inability to cope with missiles. The firing which was publicized yesterday is not exceptional in comparison to similar firing in previous years. * How, therefore, would you explain what the Defence Minister defined as reports on "irregular Syrian movements" in Lebanon? Dr. Olmert: Apparently, the Syrians have a feeling that there may be a change in Israeli policy in Lebanon, which led them to carry out several irregular movements by the Syrian military there. But the Syrian deployment in Lebanon is -- in any case -- defensive, and I do not propose that anybody get overly excited by these movements. * How can we understand the statements in the Syrian press about an Israeli attack? Dr. Olmert: Such statements are not exceptional for this regime, even though there have not been any like them since the peace process. But from Assad's point-of-view, the message which he is thus sending is not a warlike message, but a signal to both the Americans and Arab countries, that he has a problem with Israel. Maybe an initiative for the resumption of the talks between Israel and Syria will emerge from these artificial tensions. YEDIOT AHRONOT, (p.A5) -- Article by Gabi Bron and Alex Fishman -- The Prime Minister took the trouble three times yesterday to repeat his reassuring words, at the meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and afterwards: "We are not threatening the Syrians, and I am making it known here that our steps are toward peace with Syria." According to the Prime Minister, "The campaign of fear regarding the Syrian missiles exists mainly in the press, but we do not see significant indications, or a change in the basic situation." In Netanyahu's opinion, "There is no new strategic situation here regarding Syria's capability vis-a-vis Israel. Syria has had surface-to-surface missile capability for years. It is trying to go from the procurement of Scud-C missiles to self-manufacture, and the experiments now being conducted on the missile must be viewed in this context." It is known that the military tension between Israel and Syria is not the result of the Scud-C missile experiment of three weeks ago, which the Syrians carry out annually. The tension began following irregular movements by Syrian units in Lebanon. Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai said yesterday that Lebanese sources have told Israel about exceptional Syrian military movements in Lebanon. The Minister added that these actions bore little threat to Israel, and that the alert was due to the fact that irregular movements were conducted there. Security sources emphasized that the escalation between Syria and Israel was verbal only, and that -- contrary to reports in the Syrian press -- there are no Israeli preparations to attack Syria. The Prime Minister told the members of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee yesterday that apparently, Syria has no interest in bringing about a relaxation in Lebanon and adopting the "Lebanon First" proposal. According to him, Syria is interested in conducting an indirect war via Hizbullah, and -- at the same time -- continue the peace talks. "Until now, we have not received an answer to the proposal to resume the talks," the Prime Minister said, "but I hope that they will be resumed. The Syrians want a commitment from us that we will adopt positions which were sent to them by the previous government, but we are obligated only to written agreements." ---------------- WARNING OF WAR BEFORE ITS TIME (Commentary by Ephraim Kam, "Ma'ariv", Aug 29, 1996, p. B2) INSTEAD OF BEGINNING A MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL, A POSSIBILITY WHICH IS NOT PARTICULARLY PROBABLE, ASSAD IS LIKELY TO CHOOSE THE WAY WHICH IS FAMILIAR TO HIM: NOT PEACE AND NOT WAR. THE FOURTH ARTICLE ON THE PROBABILITY OF WAR WITH SYRIA. On one issue there is no need for doubt: The positions of the Netanyahu government regarding the peace process, specifically in relation to the Syrian track, must bring the Syrian leadership to a reevaluation of its policies towards Israel. However, the political process with Syria is still not completely frozen and the Israeli government is trying to find ways to renew it. However, what the Syrians have learned up until now regarding the intentions of the Netanyahu government must make it clear to them, that sooner or later, they will have to form a policy based upon the premise that negotiations with Israel is headed for a dead end. It is also clear that, regarding the Syrian conclusions, what will be will be, and the first rate implications will become known to us. And it is very possible that for a long period we will be feeling our way in the dark regarding the Syrian intentions of the bare facts, especially if the Syrians reach the juncture of deciding between peace and war. Therefore the head of the Jaffe Center of Strategic Studies, my friend Professor Ze'ev Maoz, did well when he asked that attention be paid to the possible changes in Syrian positions. Maoz's principle claim ("Ha'aretz" 18.08.96) is that the significance of the freeze on the Syrian track is a marked increase in the probability of war with Syria. The claim itself is not new. About two years ago Yitzhak Rabin led a campaign to emphasize the hidden dangers in a failure of the negotiations with Syria and claimed that in the absence of a peace agreement with them, Syria will go to war against us within 3-7 years. And it is clear that there are many practical repercussions to the estimate of the dangers of war. Adoption of the assessment that without peace with Syria we will find ourselves in war with them within a few years, requires acceptance of one of two extreme conclusions: first, to soften our position and to reach a peace agreement with Syria, even at a price of painful concessions; this was Rabin's claim. And the other, change the order of priorities and prepare for war in the not too distance future; this is Maoz's proposal. The central question is, of course, if an estimate can be made that a continued freeze in the peace process will lead Syria to war within a number of years. Maoz's answer is positive because he puts considerable weight on motivation: A freeze in negotiations will greatly increase Syrian motivation to adopt a military course, with the aim to thaw it. Indeed, it is correct that in conditions of advancement towards peace the Syrian motivation to go to war is far less than when the process is stalled. But the motivation for war does not represent everything. It is one of several main considerations - and definitely not the decisive one. It is a fact that from 1974-1991 a complete freeze in our relations with the Syrians prevailed and they did not try to thaw it through a military course because they were partial towards considerations favoring a military balance and geo-strategic situation. It is not by chance that only in 1991 did Syria decide to be part of the peace process. This decision is a direct result of the gradual and continual process in which several pillars of the Syrian defense perceptions, collapsed: The collapse of the Soviet strategic support, whose significance is also the loss of the powerful safety net in the event of military distress; the loss of the chance for Arab military participation in a war; and the destabilization of an anticipated erosion of the qualitative gap with respect to Israel, the attempt which to narrow contributed to an economic crisis in Syria during the last decade. All these reasons as well as others, convinced the Syrians to refrain from any military course whatsoever against us - and even to abstain for years to threaten such a course - because of the dangers which far outweighed the chances. Professor Maoz said the following regarding this: It is correct, however, that the Syrians are likely to go to war in the name of a thaw in the freeze even if they assess that war will end in a stalemate or even in their military defeat - as Sadat did in 1973 when he adapted his military objectives to his political needs. But that claim is not convincing enough. A country does not go to war if it estimates that it will be defeated. Furthermore, the Sadat comparison is not valid. Sadat did not go to war under the assumption that he will be defeated. He defined limited military objectives for himself, with the assumption that their achievement will facilitate a change political process. And in the process Sadat had strategic advantages that are not found today in the hands of the Syrians: Syria and subsequently Iraq, participated in the war at that time; the Soviet Union stood by its side; and the chance that the United States would use this process to spur the political process seemed higher then than today. What will Assad do if the freeze continues? On one hand, there is no real chance that he will agree to a political arrangement which will not return the Golan to him. On the other hand, the path to war is fraught with serious dangers and also the chances are not brilliant: Assad does not have enough security that the United States will want to use the results of a war to change the coming political order closer to his terms. He does not have enough of a foundation to expect that war will debilitate Israel and speed up its acceptance of his conditions for an arrangement. Perhaps the opposite will be true: war will strengthen Israel's determination not to leave the Golan. And it is also doubtful whether Syria will drag the whole Arab world along, a majority of whom opposes an Israeli-Arab war. But a third route exists: not war and not peace. This is the method adopted by Assad between 1974 to 1991, and it is possible that it will be the most reasonable way, in his view, for the future as well. It is not a passive way: This way will make it possible to extract from us a higher price in Lebanon; to disrupt the conciliation process between us and the Arabs; to try and drive a wedge between us and the United States; and thus to lay the groundwork for the renewal of future negotiations with more promising conditions - perhaps after the next elections in Israel. These statements are not intended to claim that Syria has no military option, or to negate the possibility that halting the peace process will lead, ultimately, to war. But the connection between them is neither automatic nor necessary. What will increase the probability of war is the change in the totality of factors. And the behavior of the Syrians in the last generation has taught, that among the factors which they consider of primary importance is their concept of balance of strategic and military power. Whoever claims that the probability of war with Syria has increased - must first point to the factors that are liable to change the strategic and military reading of the map in their view. All this does not affect the commitment for caution. No one has a monopoly on the future or immunity from mistaken analyses whose price is liable to be very high. The failures of many countries in the assessment of the dangers of war requires the defense network and intelligence community to exercise extra awareness, lest the above assumptions are in error and the Syrian balancing system differs. And this is especially the case when the political circumstances are changing. If the signs collected herald war, it is necessary not only to stick to these assumptions but also to test the signs with most openness. The writer is the Deputy Director of the Jaffe Center for Strategic Research. A NEW BALANCE OF TERROR (Analysis by Reuven Pedhatzur, "Ha'aretz", Aug 15, 1996, p. B1) The timing of the publication, at the end of last week, of the annual review, Jane's Sentinel, which deals with the Syrian military, aroused great interest in its findings. Only two weeks ago, Syrian Chief-of-Staff Hikhmat Shihabi warned that if the Netanyahu government does not implement the Oslo Agreement, there will be no way to avoid war between the two countries. "The Syrian military is now operating in a state of supreme readiness," Shihabi declared, "it will be ready to conduct war after war on the Palestine issue." A study of the data in Jane's on the Syrian military reveals that -- apparently -- the Syrian Chief-of-Staff's can, indeed, make good on his warning -- with impressive military strength. Syria has approximately 4,500 tanks, about 4,000 APC's, and more than 4,000 artillery pieces. The Syrian air force has -- according to Jane's -- 511 combat fighter planes and approximately 120 combat helicopters. That is, the Syrians have more weapons systems than does the IDF in all categories. However, an analysis of this data makes it clear that in practice, the qualitative gap in Israel's favor still holds. The reason for this is that most of the Syrian military's equipment is relatively out-dated. At a time when the IDF has -- since the Gulf War -- invested more than $10 billion in equipping itself, and has absorbed, among other things, advanced American tanks and combat helicopters, the Syrians have invested only about $2 billion in military procurement. The weapons systems which the Syrian military has absorbed originate in the Eastern Bloc, and the more advanced of these are of a lower quality than their Western counterparts. Of all of Syria's combat planes, only around 11% may be considered advanced (MiG-29's and Sukhoi-27's), compared to a larger proportion of the Israel Air Force's combat planes. Therefore, the conclusions of the research carried out by the Jane's staff -- according to which, "the Syrian air force is capable of dealing deadly blows to Israel," -- is devoid of real meaning in the strategic context. This is so, because if the the clear price of an air-strike at targets in the Israeli rear by Syrian combat planes, is that most of them will be shot down by the Israeli Air Force, it is doubtful if Syrian policy-makers would dare to launch them at Tel Aviv. The key to understanding the development of Syrian strategic thought does not lie in the Syrian order of battle especially, but in the lessons of the Lebanese war. The success of the Israeli Air Force in destroying -- in June 1982 -- Syria's surface-to-air-missile network, and in downing 90 Syrian planes without losing a single plane, is what has led the policy- makers in Damascus to recognize the necessity of changing Syria's strategic goals. But if the lessons of the Lebanese war did not lead to the realization of the need for a complete policy change, the break-up of the Soviet Union reshuffled Hafez el-Assad's strategic cards. Following the loss of the strategic support which the Soviet Union had provided him, and his continuing economic difficulties, the Syrian President has been obliged to abandon the dream of "strategic parity" with Israel and to adopt a new formula: "strategic deterrence" vis-a-vis Israel. In order to achieve the ability to deter the IDF, the Syrians have stressed the massive procurement of weapons of mass destruction, which is supposed to balance Israel's air superiority. The Syrians have more than 300 ballistic missiles, including SCUD-C's, whose range is more than 500 km. Syria has even developed the ability to manufacture this kind of missile independently. The missiles are manufactured in underground installations which were built with the aid of North Korea, China, and Iran. According to Jane's, the Syrians are also now developing a cruise missile with a range of several hundred kilometers, whose low cost would enable them to acquire a large quantity of them. Chemical weapons, too, are an important additional component in the new deterrence equations. Jane's estimates that Syria has developed the most advanced chemical weapons program in the Arab world. Syrian chemical weapons production began in the 1980's, and since 1985 they have begun to manufacture chemical warheads for their ballistic missiles. In the near future, the cruise missiles will also be equipped with chemical warheads. The combination of missiles with chemical weapons is enabling the Syrians to fashion a new strategic formula, in the framework of which, the answer to the Israeli Air Force's ability to attack targets in the Syrian rear is the collection of a very high price from Israel through a chemical weapons attack at any target they choose. The ballistic missiles which they have enable the Syrians to cover all of Israel's territory, while the IDF lacks the ability to intercept them. However, in addition to the defensive and deterrent character of the array of weapons of mass destruction which Syria has established, there is also a hidden offensive component. This can find expression in the opening stages of a war which has been initiated by the Syrians. A barrage of dozens of ballistic and cruise missiles -- which would be directed at civilian and strategic targets in the Israeli rear -- would be liable to exact a very steep price. Thus, the Syrians have succeeded -- despite their relative inferiority in the conventional weapons field -- in producing a balance of deterrence vis- a-vis Israel. The significance of such a balance is that -- in the future -- the IDF will be obliged to be satisfied with operational plans based on the attainment of only limited objectives in the event of war with Syria. The array of weapons of mass destruction in Syria's hands is, therefore, the key to the formation of a new balance of terror between it and Israel. For both sides, it is now clear that a general war will exact a price from them, which it is doubtful if it will justify the achievement of its objectives. Centipede% -------- 20 September 96 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu criticized Egypt and Syria on Thursday during talks with U.S. Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross, HA'ARETZ reported. Netanyahu requested that the U.S. forward a firm message to the Syrians following recent troop movements and threats to use the military option. The Prime Minister said Syrian President Hafez el-Assad's blatant threats and troop movements are inconsistent with the strategic choice to pursue peace. In a similar vein, he said recent Egyptian statements "cross all boundaries." Netanyahu was responding to large Egyptian military exercises simulating a crossing of the Suez Canal, and statements by Egypt's defense minister that the army is training for a war with a neighboring state. Ross agreed with Netanyahu and noted that choosing peace means settling disagreements at the negotiating table. The Prime Minister reiterated Israel's desire to renew negotiations with Syria. Ross and Netanyahu's aides continued discussions to formulate a proposal to renew the talks. ------------------------------ October 29, 1996 American satellites have detected in recent weeks unusual movement of Syrian units which operate ground-to-ground Scud missiles, HA'ARETZ reported. The U.S. is reportedly concerned by the movements and the pressure they might bring to bear on Israel. HA'ARETZ quoted an officer in the IDF Intelligence Branch as saying that there is no change in the Syrian deployment, and that the movements of the past few days are part of the Syrian army's regular exercises. The source noted that the Intelligence Branch has included the risk of war with Syria in its working assumption. The Intelligence Branch is conducting daily analyses of Syrian military movements and monitoring statements in the Syrian media. Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the Syrian army is planning a large exercise in the coming days, and that the IDF would respond with measures to increase alertness without causing a deterioration in the situation.