472not22.txt	, 	REVISED!		October 30, 1996

At issue in the Klare book ROGUE STATES and NUCLEAR OUTLAWS. New York:
Hill and Wang, 1995, is the nature of U.S. post-Cold War national security
strategy. He argues that the Pentagon has manufactured a rogue state
threat with the decline of the Soviet threat. Klares theme is that the
policy of containment against the USSR shifted to containment of rogue
states in order to justify approximate levels of defense spending as
during Cold War days. He assumes that the Pentagon magnifies the rogue
state threat for its own bureaucratic purposes. Klare calls this policy of
deliberate overestimation of threat part of a rogue state doctrine. An
alternative policy he suggests is rogue state marginalization--that is,
diminish the perceived importance of rogue states, thereby denying them
the ability to serve as role models for other states that seek to emulate
their defiance. At the same time, Klare favors a policy of holding out
increased rewards like economic assistance, trade, and investments, in the
event that these states change their ways. The Klare book focuses on the
American experience in the Gulf War against Iraq as a premise for all
future relations with potential rogue states.  Klare identifies nations
under scrutiny by the Pentagon as current or potential rogue states:
Egypt, India, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Libya, North and South Korea, Pakistan,
Syria, Taiwan, and Turkey, (p. 24).

Rogue states or nuclear outlaws are mavericks equipped with modern weapons
and hegemonic ambitions. They are third world powers seeking to acquire
nuclear, biological, and chemical armaments. William Webster, former
Director of Central Intelligence, anticipated that by the year 2000, at
least 15 states will either have produced or have the capacity to produce
their own ballistic missiles. And even a larger number, about 20, would be
able to produce chemical weapons and could place them on ballistic
missiles. In early 1990, Pentagon officials began to substitute the threat
of third world proliferation for the Soviet threat in their statements on
global security. Third world nations with first world weapons (p. 22)
constituted a first class threat (page 42).

[In the Cold War era, proliferation was a concern of left wing academics.
In the post-Cold War era, proliferation became a concern of the right, and
the doubters like Klare find themselves on the left doubting that
proliferation was a concern!]  

Ronald Reagan named Cuba, Iran, Libya, Nicaragua, and North Korea as
members of a confederation of terrorist states (p. 26). By omitting Iraq
and Syria, those omissions suggested that the United States wanted to keep
open the possibility of negotiations with them. Rogue, outlaw, renegade,
and maverick became part of the new demonology for describing third world
states with which the United States was in confrontation.

A rogue state menace filled in the threat blank identified by Senator Sam
Nunn (D-GA). From the perspective of the United States, rogue states
military capabilities resembled the members of the former Warsaw Pact
countries. If United States forces were reconfigured to conduct a
continuing series of engagements against rising third world countries,
singly or in pairs, that would require maintenance of a force of about
three quarters of that maintained during the Cold War. The Powell plan to
configure American military forces fit in with the Powell doctrine of
rejecting Incrementalism in favor of the use of decisive force. Powell
anticipated fighting two major regional conflicts simultaneously while
taking part in peacekeeping or low-intensity warfare. The invasion of
Kuwait began the end of Cold War containment and the beginning of third
world power projection (p. 34). While some officials were convinced that
Iraq was a rogue states, others took the position that Iraq could be a
quasi-ally. 

In the early 1980s, a growing number of military officers began to see
Iraq as a threat to the United States, but other government agencies
tended to view Iraq as an opportunity of membership in the pro-Western
camp. But because Baghdad was a long-time ally against the Soviet Union in
the Cold War, the White House tilted towards Iraq  (p. 37). Iraqi leaders
saw a White House leaning in their favor and a State Department and
Pentagon opposed. From the point of view of planning for war, the Defense
Departments views were on the rise; from the perspective of planning for
peace, the White House and the State Department seemed to be in control. 

Once the Gulf War began on August 2, 1990, there was consensus within the
bureaucracy about the threat from Iraq. From then on, rogue imagery
dominated, and Saddam became a demon. President Bush compared Saddam with
Hitler.

In the American Ambassador to Baghdad (April Glaspie) meeting with Saddam
on July 25, 1990, the Ambassador told him that she was under direct
instruction from the President to seek better relations with Iraq and that
the United States had no opinion on inter-Arab disagreements, including
the border dispute with Kuwait. [Because Saddam did not want to see a
deterrent threat, he paid more attention to the White House and the State
Department than to the Pentagon. Indeed, their views were communicated to
Baghdad on a regular basis, while the planning documents of the Pentagon
were secret.]

Civilians at the White House and at the State Department had a motivated
bias to perceive Iraq as a potential ally. Military officials at the
Pentagon had a motivated bias to perceive Iraq as an adversary. In terms
of threat perception, the Pentagon tended to overestimate the Iraqi
threat, while the White House and State Department tended to underestimate
that threat. 

[From a balance of power perspective, Iraq bordered on hostile states like
Iran, Syria, and Turkey. They posed a threat to Baghdad.] [Pro-Iraqi
officials at the White House and State Department were inclined to follow
a balance of power approach rather than a policy to contain Iraq, while
Pentagon officials tended towards a containment approach, and prepared for
a worst-case scenario of war.] 

ASSESSING THE ENEMY: [PERCEPTION, CAPABILITY, INTENTION]

Threat assessment: A first step is the assessment of military
capabilities. [Psychological threat perception as opposed to military
threat assessment includes motivated and unmotivated biases. In addition,
military threat assessment focuses too much on capabilities and not enough
on perceived stakes, misperceptions, and intentions, which are harder to
discover than capabilities.] Klare pays too much attention to capabilities
and not enough on perceptions. 

44: Klare asserts without evidence that predictions of massive battles
prior to the outbreak of the air and ground war were for the purpose of
justifying the deployment of an outsized American force in the Gulf.

45: Regarding threat perception, the United States barely felt threatened
when Iraq attacked Iran in 1980. But the United States perceived a great
threat when Iran began to win the Gulf War against Iraq. [WHY?] [RT TO
DISCUSS HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE PRE-BRIEF FOR RONALD REAGAN DURING
CAMPAIGN 80. SEE White House NOTEBOOKS.]

46: From 1982-1988, United States aided Iraq via overt and covert
channels.

46: And the United States ignored Iraqs development and use of Chemical
armaments as well as development of ballistic missiles. [Because of the
motivated bias of desiring Iraq to ally with Washington, there was a
systematic discounting of the threat from Baghdad. 

48: American war planners knew that Iraq possessed ballistic missiles
capable of striking cities and terrorizing civilian populations but
believed that Baghdad lacked the capability to launch precision attacks
against defense installations of Coalition forces. 

[There was an unmotivated bias that distorted the perception of American
defense planners. They inferred on the basis of prior warfare that
imprecise weapons incapable of striking military forces could not affect
the outcome of a war. But the Iraqi use of Scud ballistic missiles to
attack Israel and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War almost changed the
course of the war. Were Israel to have entered the fighting to answer
Iraqi missile assaults, the Coalition of  Western powers and moderate Arab
states may not have been sustained. The bias at the Pentagon was to
de-emphasize the danger of terror attacks in a similar way that Pape pays
less attention to the threat to civilians and more to the threat to
military installations, Klare takes a similar  position.

49: Klare details the Iraqi acquisition of weapons of mass destruction but
does not see that such acquisition seems to confirm the Pentagons threat
assessment based upon Iraqi capabilities.

52: Graduated escalation in Vietnam versus the Powell Doctrine of decisive
force. The Powell doctrine assumed a war of power projection under the
principle of decisive force. Klare accused the Bush Administration of
fighting a military war against Iraq in the Gulf and a political war
against the foes of Pentagon spending at home. (Page 40)   

109-110: Two wars or one and a half wars; Bush Administration versus
Clinton Administration. Relate to threat perception. Republicans more
concerned with rogue states threats than Democrats.

126: In place of containment of the former Soviet Union, Clinton
Administration wanted enlargement of community of democracies and
containment of rogue states. 

128: During the North Korea nuclear crisis of May-June 1994, the press
used the term rogue regime regularly. The Korean crisis crystallized the
equation of being an enemy with pursuit of weapons of mass destruction in
violation of and hidden from international nonproliferation institutions.

Chapter Five, 130: Rogue states are third world powers whit a large
military establishment, a substantial supply of modern weapons, and a
desire for weapons of mass destruction--nuclear, biological, and chemical
armaments. 

131: By the year 2000, at least 15 developing nations will have the
capability to build ballistic missiles. And 8 either have or are near to
acquiring nuclear weapons.

132-132: Iraqs of the future include at the top of the list North Korea,
followed by four other countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. But only
one possesses the military capability of pre-Desert Storm Iraq: North
Korea. 

PROSPECTIVE ROGUE STATES: pp. 149-161

132: But these rogue states are not enough to justify a post Cold War
defense budget at near Cold War levels. Thus, Pentagon has another
category candidate regimes, including China, Egypt, India, Pakistan, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey--emerging regional powers with hegemonic
ambitions and an interest in acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. 

136-141: North Korea; 142: Iran; 144: Iraq; 146: Libya; 148: Syria;
Argentina and Brazil also included as potential rogue states--Iraqs of the
future.

Chapter Six: Washingtons war against proliferation.

Advanced Proliferators: China, India, Israel.

Intermediate Proliferators: Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, North Korea,
Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan.

Struggling Proliferators: Egypt, Iran, Libya, and Syria.

Strategies for nonproliferation: military preemption. 

[RT favors preemptive strikes against Libya, North Korea, lifting
sanctions against Cuba, and making Syria behavior in Arab-Israel peace
process a consideration in whether to lift or maintain economic sanctions
against Damascus.]

203: Current United States proliferation policy is to preserve a world
that no longer exists, i.e., where weapons of mass destruction are the
exclusive prerogative of the major powers and no other nations.

Chapter Seven: Beyond the rogue states: military doctrine in a world of
chaos

204: Containment provided guidance during he Cold War as a rogue states
doctrine does in the mid-1990s. 

206: Irrespective of the leadership at the White House, the Pentagon will
seek to preserve a rogue state doctrine. 

213: Two war posture is dictated by a rogue state doctrine. 

219 ff.: Alternative strategic posture: rogue state marginalization

American national security policy magnifies the rogue states threat by
devoting excessive attention to a few nations. The policy puts these
states on notice that may be targets of future United States military
action. This threat perception is an incentive for them to build up their
defenses and accelerate their quest for weapons of mass destruction, thus
posing an even greater threat to the United States. 

219: United States identification of nations as rogue states causes them
to act accordingly. Saddam is less willing to comply when he is identified
as an outlaw. 219-220: Rogue state marginalization would diminish the
perceived importance of nations now considered rogue nations. There is a
need to lower the international medias interest in these states. Thus,
eliminate inflammatory rhetoric. Hold out the promise of increased trade,
assistance, and investment, if they agree to cooperate in a peaceful
manner.

220: The message sent is that the states now considered rogue nations have
little to gain from resistance, and that they would be better off if they
joined the family of nations. 

Here is an excerpt regarding bureaucratic politics of policy towards Iraq
from RTs chapter on Iraq in the ROGUE REGIMES manuscript.

Two approaches surfaced within the Carter, Reagan, and Bush
administrations regarding policy towards Iraq. The Arab-Israel First
school of thought suggested continuation of a policy of containment of
Iraq, thereby tilting towards both Israel and Egypt. The Gulf First school
advocated accommodation with either Iraq or Iran, for the sake of
containing the Soviet Union. These proponents of their respective views
engaged in bureaucratic warfare over Iraqi policy-making.
 
Bureaucratic advocates of a priority for the Arab-Israel zone in American
Middle East policy perceived Iraq as a threat to Israel and a competitor
of Egypt. Baghdad was a leader of the rejectionist front against Israel, a
rival of Egypt over leadership within the Arab world. Hence, this school
sought to contain Iraq within its own borders. Because successive regimes
in Baghdad had made a cottage industry of being anti-Israel and
anti-American, it was simple to  justify a continuation of a containment
policy to the American people. But Iraq as an enemy of Israel, and thus an
adversary of the United States, was an easier sale on Capitol Hill than
within the bureaucracy. 

On the one hand, politicians on the Hill were sensitive to ethnic interest
group pressure and ideals regarding the Arab-Israel zone; they favored
containment of Iraq. On the other hand, national security professionals at
the departments of State and Defense emphasized American interests in the
Cold War and Gulf oil; consequently, they wanted accommodation with Iraq.
The bureaucrats reasoned that Iraqi setbacks in the 1980-1988 war against
Iran required Washington to tilt towards Baghdad so that neither Tehran
nor Moscow would reign supreme in the Gulf area.

With its Cold War orientation, the Gulf First school split into two
groups: One focused on Iran, the other on Iraq. Both shared an antipathy
towards the former Soviet Union. This anti-Soviet attitude was a common
lens through which to perceive the Middle East. The Iran camp saw Tehran
as the key to preventing a Soviet invasion of the Arab Gulf. Although Iran
was anti-American, the USSRs long border with Iran made it a gateway
through which the Soviet Union could make inroads into the Arab Gulf. By
contrast, Iraq does not border the former USSR. It shares borders with
Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. The Iran faction in the American
bureaucracy thus favored an approach that allowed for a tilt towards
Tehran, e.g., as in the arms-for-hostages scheme. Because the main goal of
the Iran camp was to prevent Tehran from joining the Soviet bloc, that
Cold War purpose was an overarching rationale for American policy in the
Middle East.

The Iraq camp of the Gulf First school was motivated less by the USSR and
more by the Arab-Israel conflict. It had a desire to diminish the threat
to Israel and to secure economic profits for American corporations and
farmers. This faction assumed that Saddam could be appeased, i.e., bought
off with American-origin dual-use equipment and Midwestern wheat. A
satisfied Saddam then would be less belligerent towards Israel and would
serve as a bulwark in the conflict with Iran. 

Regarding the peace process, the aims of the Iraq camp of American
bureaucrats was to enhance diplomatic, military, and economic ties with
Baghdad. They wanted to bring the PLO into direct negotiations with
Israel. But because of the Iraqi threat to Israel, this camp sought to
deny Baghdad sophisticated American-origin military equipment while
providing it with the capability to quell domestic unrest and deter Iran.
And regarding economic motivations, Iraq sought the assistance of
congressional allies when lobbying the United States national security
bureaucracy in order to gain American technology.

There was less domestic political  opposition to engage Baghdad than
Tehran because Iraq had not seized Americans and held them hostage, while
Iran had done so; indeed, the profit motive from the prospective sale of
grain and dual-use technology provided incentives for accommodation with
Iraq. But American business interests had to contend with the influence of
an ethnic lobby--the pro-Israel community. Led by the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the community explicitly favored dual
containment of Iraq and Iran. AIPAC believed that Israel was threatened by
both nations. Thus, it worked to retain Iraq on the State Departments list
of nations that sponsor international terrorism. The Department of State
Coordinator for Counterterrorism,  1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism,
Washington: April 1996. 

The following states appeared on the State Department terrorist list for
1995: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. AIPAC was
willing to lobby against Iraq even while Iran gained military advantages
in their 1980-1988 war. The pro-Israel community would have Washington
sacrifice Baghdad as an American ally against Moscow and against Tehran.
Not only was counterterrorism an incentive for that community, it also was
concerned with Iraqs military capabilities. As a result, AIPAC opposed
transfers of dual-use equipment to Iraq because such arms would weaken
Israels deterrent capability. 

Despite AIPACs policy of dual containment, the Government of Israel
favored arms transfers to Iran, which culminated in the Iran-hostage
fiasco.  Arming Iran was consistent with the balance of power approach of
the Reagan-Bush era, which is one reason why Israels arms for Iran policy
received a receptive hearing in Washington. But AIPAC was not alone in
seeking to influence American policy towards Iraq. Indeed, profits
prevailed over domestic politics in the formulation of Washington policy
towards Baghdad.