472NOT18.DOC					September 8, 1996

Richard Haass, Intervention, Washington D.C.: Carnegie, 1994

Note: Interpret Haass In Relation To Congressional Debate Over Whether To
Send American Combat Troops To Bosnia To Implement A Peace Accord Among
The Parties.

Goal To Provide Guidelines For Use Of Force In Post-Cold War Era, Which
Promises To Be A Messy One. Duopolies Easier To Manage Than Multipolar
Systems. Cold War Rules Of The Road Limited Use Of Force. But An Age Of
Deregulation Characterizes Post-Cold War.

The Debate Over Intervention: When, Where, How To Intervene?

George Bush Suggested A Case By Case Analysis To Decide. Interests May Not
Be An Absolute Guide For When To Use Force. Bushs Five Requirements: Where
Stakes Warrant; Where And When Force Can Be Effective; Where Application
Can Be Limited In Scope And Time; Where Potential Benefits Justify
Potential Costs; Multilateral Support Desirable But Not Essential; Clear
And Achievable Mission, Criteria For Withdrawal Once Mission Is Complete.

What Are American Interests?  Prior To Invasion Of South Korea By North
Korea, Little Consensus In USA Over Whether Souths Independence Was A
Vital Interest Of The USA.

Historical Debate: Just War Theory Regarding Worthy Causes For Which To
Fight.

Humanitarian Intervention: Outside Powers Have The Right To Intervene For
Worthy Causes Constrained By United Nations Charter, Art 2 (2,7).

Weinbergers Six Conditions That Must Be Met Before Force Should Be Used:
Three Relate To Whether: Vital Interests Of U.S. Or An Ally; Congressional
Or Popular Support; Force As A Last Resort. Three Relate To How Force
Should Be Used. Force Only If U.S. Prepared To Win; Defined Objectives;
Reassessment Of Force Use To Adjust As Conditions Change.

Powells Six Questions: Is The Political Objective Important, Clearly
Defined, And Understood? Have All Other Non-Violent Options Been Tried And
Failed? Cost? Gains And Risks? After Force, Then What? Most Important:
Determine Beforehand That Use Of Military Force Is Matched To Political
Objectives. Powell Opposed To Keeping Involvement Limited. Force Should Be
Used In An Overwhelming Manner To Accomplish Its Mission. U.S. Should Be
The Meanest Dog In Town.

Aspins Critique Re: Force As Last Resort; Force For Clear Purposes, Basis
For Withdrawal; Force Used In Overwhelming Way. Aspin: All Or Nothing
School Would Curtail Use Of Force. Favors Limited Objectives School. Aspin
Discussed Compellent Force, E.G., Strike At One Place Like Capital City Of
An Adversary To Influence Decision-Making In Another Place Like A
Battlefield.
 
Warren Christophers Four Criteria: Clearly Articulated Objectives,
Probable Success; Likelihood Of Popular And Congressional Support, Clear
Exit Strategy. These Argued Against Use Of U.S. Force In Bosnia. 

Madeline Albrights Five Questions Before U.S. Would Support United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations: Real Threat To International Peace And Security;
Clear Objectives With Defined Scope; Cease-Fire In Place; Agreement Among
Parties To A United Nations Presence; Financial Resources In Place To
Accomplish The Mission; End Point To United Nations Participation.

Bill Clinton: By May 1994, Criteria Grew To 8 If U.S. Asked To Vote; 14 If
U.S. Asked To Participate; 17 If Us. Participation Likely To Involve
Combat.

Peacekeeping Takes Place Under Chapter Vi Of The Charter Which Addresses
Pacific Settlement Of Disputes. Chapter Vii Involves Enforcement Actions.

Peacemaking: Between Peacekeeping And War-Fighting. All Parties In The
Dispute Have Not Agreed To Pacific Settlement Of Disputes Via
Peacekeeping. 

Nation-Building: Intervention To re-create A Failed State.

Humanitarian Assistance: 

Indirect Use Of Force: Nixon And Reagan Doctrines.

Intervention: Whether And How To Intervene Are Two Sides Of The Same Coin.

Whether To Intervene:

Interests Are Only A Guide. Only One Case (Gulf War) In 12 Studied Here
Involved A Vital USA Interest.

Tolerance For Costs Reflects Interests At Stake. 

Purpose Of Intervention Must Be Clear.

Adversarys Response Must Be Anticipated.

Neither Victory Nor An Exit Date Should Be Prerequisites.

Popular And Congressional Support Desirable But Not Necessary.

Deterrence Not Cost Free And Not Always An Option.

Adversary Not The Only Audience.

Affecting Internal Politics By Force Is Difficult.

Media Should Not Determine Policy.

How To Intervene:

Sooner Better Than Later.

Too Much Force Better Than Too Little.

Relevant Force Matters.

Decisive Early Use Of Force Preferable To Gradualism.

	Incrementalism May Be Necessary For Domestic Political 	Purposes.

New Technologies Increase Options But Are Rarely Sufficient.

Air Power Useful But No Panacea.

Imposed Humanitarian Interventions Offer A Way Out And In.

	Failed States And Civil Wars Where No Defined Adversary

	Geographical Zones Or Safe Havens

	Mission Creep

Some Purposes For Use Of Force May Be Mutually Exclusive.

	May Not Be Possible Both To Use Humanitarian Forces And Compel An
Adversary. Is Intervenor A Referee Or Antagonist?

Successes: Grenada, Panama, The Philippines, Gulf Shipping

Mixed: Libya, Gulf War, Gulf War Aftermath

Failures: Iran Rescue; Lebanon, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Haiti [Sic]