472NOT15.DOC September 8, 1996 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTS SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD TOWER COMMISSION REPORT, Part III The arms transfer to Iran. Stage One: NSC staff seeks a new look at United States policy on Iran. McFarlane fails in efforts to have the interagency process validate his notion that there were Iranian moderates who could be strengthened with United States assistance. NSC staff tries a second time to get interagency validation--this time with a Special National Intelligence Estimate. Israelis provide a vehicle: Iran wanted United States origin Tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missiles (TOW), and Israel had them. Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act, Hughes-Ryan Amendment, prohibits covert operations by the Central Intelligence Agency unless and until the President finds such operations important to the national security of the United States. NSC staff manages the arms sale and diversion of funds to the Contras. Part IV: what was wrong. Flawed Process 1. Contradictory policies arms sales to Iran contradicted official policy. 2. Flawed Decision-making process Full review before President inadequate. Operation not vetted at lower levels. Process too informal. Congress never notified. Weak Legal Basis for Action Arms Export Control Act: unlawful to export arms without a license and congressional notification for sales over $14 million. Hughes-Ryan Amendment regarding Presidential finding of a national security interest and Congressional notification of covert actions. National Security Act specifies advance or timely notification to Congress for conduct of covert operations. SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES ON IRAN CONTRA Covert Action in a Democratic Society Executive Order 12333 Reagan refers to covert action as special activities planned and executed without United States role being acknowledged. Plausible deniability is a key aspect of covert actions. INTERAGENCY PROCEDURES TO AUTHORIZE COVERT ACTIONS Interagency review, NSC directive from President, review of the expenditure by a congressional committee by consensus. Hughes-Ryan Act of 1974 after efforts to destabilize Allende of Chile: Required that President personally approve all covert actions as important to national security. POWERS OF CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 1936 Curtiss-Wright Case: Congress by statute had delegated to President the power to prohibit the sale of arms to countries in an area of South America, if the President thought that the prohibition would promote peace. At issue was the power of the President where Congress had expressly authorized the President to act. NSC staffer argued that the Congress only had power of the purse in Iran-Contra. As long as public monies are not spent, Congress has no role in restraining the President. North contended that Professor John Norton Moore told him that Bolan did not apply to the NSC staff. RULE OF LAW Use of Donated funds to Evade Congress Power of the Purse Section 501 of the National Security Act requires that Congress be notified of all covert actions except if President decides to do so in a timely manner after the operation. Breckinridge: Covert Action/Special Activities