472NOT07.txt					September 21, 1995

FOURTH WAVE CRITIQUE OF DETERRENCE THEORY

1. How Do Signs Labeled, "No Trespassing" And "Beware Of Dogs" Relate To
Commitments In International Security Affairs?

2. What Are The National Security Counterparts To Watchtowers And Heavy
Barbed Wire?

3. When The U.S. Sent A Light Marine Division Instead Of A Heavy Army
Division, What Did Washington Mean To Signal, And What Did Hanoi Perceive?

4. What Explains Insensitivity To Signals?

5. Why Are Brinkmanship Challenges Initiated In The Absence Of Evidence
That The Adversary Lacked Either The Capability Or The Resolve To Defend A
Commitment?

6.  Are Would Be Challengers More Inner-Directed Or Outer-Directed, And So
What For Deterrence And Coercion?

7. Contrast Capability And Resolve Versus Defensive Avoidance, Wishful
Thinking, And Biased Estimates Associated With It In Deterrence Failures.

8. Explain How And Why Countries Go To War Despite Adverse Estimates Of
The Military Balance.

9. Do Challengers Pay More Attention To Their Own Strategic And Domestic
Situations Than To The Interests And Capabilities Of Their Adversaries?

10. Distinguish Intrinsic From Strategic Interests And State How They
Relate To Credibility Of Commitments And Deterrence Failure.

11. Were Lesser Commitments The Only Ones Safe To Defend During The Cold
War's Nuclear Age?

12. Show How The Munich Analogy Is A Cognitive Bias That Distorts Threat
Perception.

13. Distinguish Among Deterrence, Spiral, And Security Dilemmas Regarding
Threats And Assurances.

14. Define Structural, Perceived, Imperialist, And Deadlock Dilemmas.

15. If Challengers Focus Internally And Defenders Interpret Challengers
Consistent With The Defenders' Expectations, What Is The Likelihood Of
Deterrence Failure?