472NOT6.DOC					September 8. 1996
DETERRENCE AND COERCION

Deterrence is a process where a defender seeks to get a potential
initiator not to take an action. Coercion seeks to get a defender either
to take an action or to undo prior actions. Regarding three-way
interactions, assurance tries to get a second actor to continue or not do
something, e.g., to your friend, while inducement is a process of getting
the third party to take or stop taking some action. To deter or assure
involves continuation of existing behavior. To induce or compel concerns
behavioral change. Second wavers Blechman and Kaplan rank order these from
least to most difficult: assure, deter, compel, induce. It is easier to
reinforce than to modify. 

Second wave deterrence theorists like Schelling use Chicken as an analogue
for situations in which the first choice of both is to stand firm, but
each prefers retreat to avoid a mutually disastrous confrontation. Both
seek to prevail by making the other believe it is standing firm.

Because each side decides whether to stand firm by examining its own
payoffs and estimating the likelihood the other will retreat, bargainers
calculate Critical Risk. CR is a ratio of one's own payoffs compared with
the credibility that the other side will stand firm. If the defender's CR
is higher than the initiator's credibility of challenging deterrence, the
initiator should refrain from challenging the defender. If the defender's
CR is lower than the initiator's credibility, deterrence is likely to
fail. Applied to coercion, if the CR of the initiator is greater than the
credibility of the defender, it should do or undo.

Techniques for establishing credibility and commitment to a no-retreat
position include relinquishing options, burning bridges, feigning anger,
severing communication links, pretending irrationality, faking
drunkenness, loss of control over militant factions of an organization,
throwing steering wheels out of car windows, backing into a corner. But
committing oneself to stand firm only works if the adversary can retreat.

Third wave theorists like George and Smoke acknowledge the need to have
credibility and commitment, but add controllability and calculability of
risk as factors to explain failures of deterrence and coercion. Failure
can also occur if the initiator can design around the commitment, launch
limited probes, and weaken the status quo without raising tensions to a
flash point. 	Fourth wave theorists add that failed deterrence and
coercion may result from misperception: Over-estimation or
under-estimation of threat are communication problems that make it
difficult for deterrence and coercion to be effective.