UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN RACKHAM GRADUATE SCHOOL A REVIEW OF IRANIAN-US RELATIONS DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AFFAIRS BY TIMOTHY J. NEBOYSKEY 05 DECEMBER 1996 INTRODUCTION The Islamic Republic of Iran. The very name of this young, Islamic-Iranian polity connotes stereotypical images within the psyche of most Americans over thirty. Some of these stereotypical images range from the overthrow of the Shahs regime, the hostage crisis at the US embassy in Tehran, the unfathomable hold (from an American perspective) of Ayatollah Khomeini over the Iranian masses, and the enflamed crowds chanting death to America outside the gates to the US embassy compound. Recently, the Islamic Republic has generated trite images within the West of pervasive Islamic fanaticism, anti-Western and intransigent leaders, the sponsorship of global terrorism, rigid and clerically-imposed cultural norms, and through some American eyes, a challenge to the international communitys status quo. Most of the West and especially the US, regards this perceived Iranian challenge or threat to the established status quo very seriously and generally are quite alarmed at recent Iranian initiatives. Most notably, the West loathes the ambition of Irans leaders to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs); especially the popular perception that Iran is determined to develop and stockpile, nuclear weapons. It is primarily through Irans suspected ties to terrorist sponsorship and through its ambition to acquire weapons of mass destruction, that the Islamic Republic has earned the distinction of being labeled as a rogue state. Irans rogue-state status, has earned it the exclusivity of the pariah club of rogue states; which entitles Iran to severe scrutiny by Western intelligence services, harsh and elongated trade embargoes and continuous negative portrayals by the Western media. In relation to the US government, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been earmarked for especially severe scrutiny during the Clinton administration. The Islamic Republic has not ever engendered itself cordial relations vis-`-vis the US since its inception, but one can surmise particularly harsh diplomatic protocol toward Iran since 1993. And, quite expectedly, Iran has reciprocated US initiatives with countermeasures of its own. In addition, some officials of the Clinton Administration and other branches of the US government have identified Iran as constituting the most ominous threat to world stability and security. Once again, Irans perceived sponsorship of global terrorism and its suspected nuclear weapons ambitions are cited as reasons for vilifying Iran. Yet, are these demonic perceptions and portrayals of Iran accurate? Can one assuredly surmise that Iran is intent on destabilizing, disrupting and overturning the global status quo as we understand it today (that is, without access to the actual ambitions, deeds and words of Irans leaders, or viable Western intelligence information)? Or, are there other forces at play that necessitate that Islamic Iran be conceptualized in a demonic, negative and villainous way to meet some hidden agenda? This paper will attempt to answer the previous questions, in the context of why Iran is currently portrayed as a rogue state. However, my main objective will be to answer the question Why are Iranian-US relations characterized by conflict and non-cooperation?, from the Iranian perspective; rather than focusing primarily upon US and Western accusations of suspected Iranian roguish actions and behavior. Yet, if roguish acts and behaviors are discovered that are directly attributable to the Iranian government, then Iran should be chastised by the international community and prepare itself to suffer the appropriate consequences. My aim for focusing upon the Iranian perspective is philological: I hope to be able to pull away the chador that shrouds the Iranian modus vivendi from our Western senses, in an attempt to better understand the world according to Islamic/Iranian perspectives; and be able to highlight some official Iranian motivations (both unmotivated/motivated biases) in relation to past/present circumstances. Also, foreign affairs analysts, pundits and policy makers very often categorize foreign policy decisions in neat, teleological little boxes, without first exhaustively researching the possible cultural and psychological sources contained within the decision-making process(es). Iranian perceptions of the West do exist, whether they are accurate or not is not my motivation to determine within the context of this paper. My motivation is simply to describe the essence of these perceptions in an attempt to better understand them, and to argue the fact that these perceptions are: (1) Not readily altered or neutralized (unless, a concerted effort is made); (2) The product of the entirety of Iranian-US historical relations; and (3) These perceptions tend to be actualized or exasperated (especially negative perceptions) when a concerted effort is made to engage in non-cooperative diplomatic relations, or conflict with Iran, by the US. Some academics claim that one is never able to transgress ones own social enculturation; but, I surmise that one can surely gain in ample cognizance of other cultures through exhaustive data collection, examination and analysis of the attributes that comprise the particular culture. Initially, I will provide my theoretical basis and orientation of the paper, in order to conceptualize the main arguments herein. Subsequently, I outline some of the cultural, economic, historical, religious and sociopolitical factors that have helped to shape the current situation in Iran. The attributes of Islam, both in a religious and sociopolitical sense are highlighted as the main impetus for facilitating the creation of an Islamic-Iranian state. Later, the current cultural and sociopolitical situation in Iran is noted, in an attempt to discover the base elements that motivate Irans foreign policy and relations with the outside world; and to discern where potential disputes between Iran and the West (primarily the US) may occur. Finally, the areas where the vital interests of Iran and the US are incongruous is presented, in order to determine the causal factors behind current US-Iranian negative, non-cooperative relations. THEORETICAL BASIS AND ORIENTATION The major actions, perceptions and policies that divide Iran and the US, derive from a myriad of cultural, geostrategic, historical, psychological and sociopolitical sources. Erroneous and exaggerated perceptions of the other, are the product of experience-based, unmotivated biases that have deep historical roots in the psyche of each nation. Unmotivated biases are a major causal factor in threat misperceptions, miscalculation of another states intent and they often contribute to the non-usage of informational indices during decision-making processes. These unmotivated biases help to explain the causal stimuli which contribute to Iranian perceptions that the US is an Orientalist, hegemonic and militaristic power bent on undermining the sovereignty of Iran. And, unmotivated biases help to conceptualize some of Americas stereotypical views toward the Islamic Republic (and Iranians) in general; whereby Iranians are often characterized as being Islamic fundamentalists, religious fanatics, terroristic, and as being motivated and oriented toward the harm of Americans globally. Orientalism, which is outlined briefly in the text of the paper, is an Eastern and Third World theoretical concept, which posits Western culture is essentially condescending, racist and primarily egoistic vis-`-vis the Third World; and this air of a priori superiority, is an elemental basis to the colonialism, neo-colonialism and quasi-colonialism which has often and currently plagues Western-Third World relations. In the specific case of Iranian perceptions, views and relational aspects with the West, the unmotivated biases contained within the concept of Orientalism were instrumental in perception development toward the West; which includes the following conclusions: (1) The West, and particularly the US were oppressing Iran economically, militarily and politically (prior to the Islamic Revolution); (2) The oppressive system (as developed, implemented and sustained by the West) needed replacement; and (3) The motivated bias that indigenous ideology (e.g., Islam) would help to neutralize the endemic problems of Iran, greatly contributed to the mobilizing aspects of the Islamic revolution. Some Iranians were also impelled by motivated biases to seek an alternative ideology to the ancien regimes systematic modus operandi (Western-directed capitalism and secularism); therefore, Iranian revolutionaries began to posit that by instituting an alternative ideology (Islam) to capitalism and communism into everyday Iranian practices, Iranians would be much better able to neutralize their own fundamental problems. Yet, the actual application of Islamic ideology to fundamental problem solving and life-principle development was, and still is relatively infantile in its actualization and application worldwide (at the national/state and international level of sociopolitical affairs). The Iranian revolutionary coalition was motivated by the bias of replacing the corrupt, harsh and Western-directed Pahlavi regime with their own theoretical benevolent system; but, without actually knowing whether their theoretical Islamic system could work. Subsequently, this particular motivated bias led to the exasperation of the fundamental problems that plague Irans economy, and domestic sociopolitical situation today. After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, some Iranian leaders saw the urgent need to reassess Irans domestic and foreign policies. Acting out of a perceived window of opportunity, President Rafsanjani and his pragmatic bloc sought to develop more amenable relations with Irans neighbors and the international community. The objective of Rafsanjanis pragmatism was to revitalize the economy, to develop more cooperative regional and global relations for Iran (economic, military and political), and to ensure the security of Irans vital interests. Yet, Rafsanjanis last two pragmatic policies (improved foreign relations and the security of its vital interests) often began to clash with the intrinsic and strategic interests of the US within the region. Ironically, both Iran and the US genuinely share similar vital interests within the Iranian geopolitical sphere, namely: (1) The intrinsic interest of ensuring the safety of their citizens within the region; (2) The assurance of continued oil production levels to meet global demand; and (3) The security and safe passage of oil, while in transit from Persian Gulf sites. However, in Irans case, the viability of their oil industry is arguably an intrinsic interest for them; while the price, production levels and security of oil products is essentially a strategic interest for the US. When President Clinton began to direct US-Iranian affairs, Rafsanjanis window of opportunity was transformed into a situation whereby his perception became one of subsequent operation from a basement of fear (vis-`-vis the US); due primarily to Clintons policies toward Iran. Significantly, the prevalent and pervasive nature of perceptions in the US, of Iran, as being a rogue state that sponsors global terrorism, and also seeks weapons of mass destruction, substantiates the anxious atmosphere in which Iranian foreign policy vis-`-vis the US is being made. In order to change Iranian roguish behavior, US officials are apparently motivated by the bias that coercive actions will alter negative Iranian activities. The Clinton Administration has implemented a policy of containment and economic/trade sanctions against Iran, in an attempt to change Iranian behavior. Also, the US has essentially established a permanent role for itself in the Iranian geopolitical sphere, in an attempt to maintain and ensure the security of its vital interests (intrinsicUS personnel, and strategicthe status quo of the Persian Gulf oil economy/Iranian containment). It is primarily the clash of Iranian and US vital interests that occurs within the Iranian geopolitical sphere that precipitates the conflictory relations between both states; and without a careful, honest and protracted effort on the part of both states to alleviate their differences (through diplomatic negotiations), the potential for increased hostility between both will remain high. Yet, theoretical concepts (motivated and unmotivated biases, coercive diplomacy, etc.,) are a means to categorize observable behavioral patterns; and are therefore, susceptible to the classification of behavioral patterns that belie more expedient recognition and cognizance. Thus, in matters as important as foreign policy development, international peace and security affairs, and the safeguarding of vital interests worldwidethe tools of genuine/cooperative diplomacy, information collection, the specific case-study of foreign nations and states, and the analysis of intent and capabilities of foreign states all are indispensable means to determine the potentialities of states within the global community. ISLAM: VEHICLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY Within Iran, and most of the Third World, the perception exists that the Western, modern world utilizes the economic potential, natural resources and productive capacity of the Third World primarily for its own advantage. This neo or quasi-colonialism generates obvious hostility, resentment and subversion within the Third World; which has sometimes led to open rebellion against the prevailing world order or status quo. Although not as exacting, pervasive and plunderous as previous colonialisms, this perception of Third World, quasi-colonialism does indeed connote imperial-client state relations as constituting its core relational element. In the case of Iran, hostility and rebellion were not just merely aimed at the West, but also included any oppressive system that may have found manifestations also within the East (as represented by the former Communist Bloc, and led by the USSR). Pre-revolutionary Iran, despite the fact that it was recognized as constituting a Third World nation, found itself securely locked within the Western sphere of influence (as represented by the US); but its cultural, historical, religious and sociopolitical foundations directed the country toward a more autonomous and sovereign orientation. The domestic and foreign policies of the Pahlavi dynasty clearly paralleled US expectations, but the sociopolitical aspirations of the Iranian people were being inadequately and woefully underrepresented. While the US was monitoring the potential for indigenous populations to mobilize and overthrow their regimes through popular rebellions, US analysts and officials failed to properly calculate the focus, locus and motivation for potential uprisings. US intelligence agents either failed to notice or misinterpreted the potential for popular rebellion in Iran from a distinctly alternative source: namely religious/spiritual motivations. The Pahlavi regime was seen as foreign (Westernized), harsh, illegitimate and most importantly religiously hypocritical in the eyes of most Iranians, which further contributed to its lack of sociopolitical popularity and support. When, (from the perspective of the revolutionary coalition) the regime became too oppressive and the opportunity for revolution was possible, the call to open revolt was met enthusiastically. What US officials failed to comprehend, observe or understand is the fact that Islam, as a cultural, religious and political system was a viable alternative to Western and Eastern organizing principles. Thus, it appears that while US analysts and officials were strategizing to forestall possible uprisings in Iran, they failed to develop a nationally-specific, operational contingency-plan, and instead relied upon more universally applicable pre-planning and thinking (indicative of Western-derived, unmotivated biases). In defense of US analysts and officials, religious-oriented revolutions (especially within the Muslim world) could not have been viewed as constituting a high degree of probability in occurring. Yet, therein may lie the ultimate reason why a revolution constituting religious overtones was overlooked: because it constituted such a low-degree of probability. However, US analysts and officials should not be granted universal clemency for their failure to prepare for an Iranian uprising, since obvious signs of discontent could be found within moderately powerful sociopolitical groups. The land reforms of the 1960s marginalized the erstwhile rural sociopolitical elites, and therefore they could have been categorized as being malcontents. University students and bazaar merchants, became increasingly disenchanted with the opportunities available to them during the Pahlavi years. In Qom, the theocratic center of Islam in Iran, increasingly rebellious clerics were propagating the evil, hypocritical and illegitimate aspects of the Pahlavi dynasty. Therefore, visible signs of Iranian mass discontent were available for the particularly keen observer. US analysts and officials when calculating the potential for successful revolution, probably dismissed it as being improbable; due to the economic, military/security and sociopolitical capabilities of the Pahlavi regime. Given the Cold War conditions during the late 1970s, US analysts and officials probably relied too heavily upon capabilities calculations when pondering potential contingencies, while systematically downplaying the resolution of Iranian revolutionaries to foment a successful revolution. Herein lies a problem that historians, analysts and observers may overlook when evaluating the US failure to adequately prepare for potential Iranian rebellion: Were Iranian beliefs, culture, norms and values comprehensible to most Americans? Was Iranian history, religious practices and sociopolitical orientations widely known and respected by most Americans dealing with Iran in an official capacity? Or, as Edward Said asserts in his book Orientalism: Were Americans predisposed to rely upon their condescending Orientalist perceptions and overestimate the relative strengths of the regime vis-`-vis the incapable masses? Saids theory that one is never able to comprehend another culture (especially when based upon Western, condescending biases) is intriguing; but, I contend, that through exhaustive investigation of other cultures, that one can at least develop a strong working knowledge of their predominant norms, idiosyncrasies and values. The Islamic revival that developed within Iran, probably even caught most adherents to Islam by surprise. Not since the Middle Ages, had Islam been central to major world events as it was during the late 1970s. The rise of Muslim clerics in Third World Iran to challenge Western and Eastern hegemony, precipitously inspired the adherents of Islam worldwide. This rise to world prominence of an Islamic state invigorated the Muslim faithful to such a degree, that they began to reassert themselves to Islamic principles with renewed enthusiasm. This temporal manifestation of Islamic revival was seen as an impetus to return to the organizing life principles of Islam, and as a means to develop and reshape the Islamic identity in relation to the modern world. Therefore in direct contrast to the capitalist-secular West and the despotic East, Islamic precepts and principles could now be openly propagated to develop a distinctly Islamic way of life. As time developed, the West and particularly the US began to see the Islamic way of life as a direct threat to its vital interests within the Middle and Near East. While the indigenous populations of the Muslim world viewed Islamic revivalism as a vehicle to facilitate self-identity renewal and cultural rebirth, Western observers perceived Islamic revivalism as the manifestation of extremism, fanaticism and fundamentalism. These misperceptions of cultural intent and motivations, help to explain past miscalculations and misunderstanding by Western observers of Islamic potential in Iran to facilitate cultural and sociopolitical mobilization; and these cultural misperceptions provide the underlying basis for todays misinterpretation of Irans intent, motivations and sociopolitical orientation vis-`-vis the Western world. Ayatollah Khomeini as the supreme leader (both political and spiritual) of the Islamic Republic, set out to devise governing principles based upon the precepts of Islam. The objective was not only to replace the West as the hegemonic master of Iran, but also to create a system of governance based upon Islamic jurisprudence. Khomeini and his inner circle developed a system of Islamic jurisprudence which derived its administrative policies, laws, sociopolitical norms and economic practices from the interpretation of Islamic divine law (as contained within the Koran and the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed). Khomeini ordered an Assembly of Experts to draft a constitution which directly incorporated Islamic divine law into its main body. This rule of the just jurist was theoretically developed to counteract the millennia of oppression heaped upon the oppressed world by its oppressors. An Islamic republic founded upon the precepts of Islam was theoretically feasible, since the Koran and the Prophet Mohammeds teachings contain ample examples of how to conduct economic, jurisprudent and sociopolitical practices in every day life; but in reality, theoretical Islamic practices proved difficult to enact both domestically and internationally. Revolutionary objectives, models and rhetoric often lead to sobering consequences. Yet, in the West and particularly the US, the Islamic Republic was greeted with alarm. Irrespective of the fact that Iran probably could not achieve its hyperbolic revolutionary aims, goals and objectives; from the Western perspective, the Islamic Republic was a de jure reality that needed to be dealt with. While the Iranian psyche and self-image were revitalized through the manifestation of an independent, Islamic-Iran, Americans perceived the Islamic Republic as a challenge to the worlds status quo. Could the Islamic Republic, given the right set of optimal conditions, achieve some of the lofty revolutionary goals it was oriented toward? And was the Islamic Republic the ominous threat to the worlds status quo, that the US perceived it to be, or merely just the expression of an independent course of action? THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC: IDEALS VERSUS REALITY As noted previously, the Islamic Republic developed a system of Islamic jurisprudence that called for idealistic and principled governance. Through the guiding hand of Irans Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic set out to implement a system of governance based primarily upon Khomeinis designs (e.g., the just jurist, Islamic jurisprudence and social justice). For the first time in history, Islamic precepts would be a cornerstone and basis for a modern states raison djtre and subsequent development. There was reason to celebrate in Iran, because the potential for the Muslim world to follow Irans example was both conceivable and plausible. The esteem that Iran could garner in the Muslim world for creating an Islamic polity, granted Iran the inherent potentiality to elevate and further strengthen Irans regional status; if, conditions proved to be optimal for Irans leaders. At least for the foreseeable future, Iran could enjoy the fruits provided by an independent course of action, as derived from the legitimacy of a sovereign state within the global community. On the domestic front, Iranian sociopolitics ran into the same difficulties that most victorious revolutionary mobilizations often contend with: how to divide the spoils of victory? For the militant clerics, some of them assumed roles of political authority within government circles. Obviously, Islamic clerics throughout Iran had to enjoy the elevated status of being at least remotely associated with the Islamic base of power. For a time, the Iranian clerical leadership satisfied the generally populist base of the revolutionary masses, by supporting popular government programs. Yet, for several reasons this clerical-populist coalition was doomed to fractionalize. Principally, the Iranian revolution was carried through by religious-spiritual and sociopolitical sentiments which advocated justice to the oppressed. What was noticeably missing was the social justice aspects of leftist-oriented, popular revolutions that the world had become accustomed to. In essence, Iran had been handed over to conservative, Islamic clerics who had yet to consolidate their power. Also noted above, the Iranian revolution was as much a repudiation of Eastern principles as it was Western ones. Therefore, the elements of socialism and communism which derive from secular-humanist precepts, clearly were not plausible options in a conservative, clerical Iran. Thus, the Islamic Republic, while rhetorically heralding its allegedly third way (as an alternative to capitalism and communism/socialism), discovered that the reality of fully developing a third option was much more difficult than expected. In the context of Iranian sociopolitics the plenipotentiary Supreme Leader and legislative Council of Guardians (upper house) were the backbone of the conservative faction in Iranian politics, while the Majles (lower house) roughly constituted the liberal faction. When the clerical authorities were adequately able to consolidate their power, populist issues such as economic and material redistribution, sociopolitical justice and extension of civil society became less problematic; since the absolute power to enact and overrule legislation resided in the Council of Guardians. And the Council of Guardians, as directed by the Supreme Leader Khomeini, advocated progress in an Islamic sense. This Islamic progress that the clerical leaders espoused called for the welding of religious and political practices, economic justice through equality and cooperation, and the non-alliance of Iran within the international community. In a sense, the clerical leaders were developing an absolutist regime which would insulate and isolate itself from political discourse both domestically and internationally. It should also be noted that the progressive principle of economic justice, was based upon Irans ability to sustain adequate revenues from oil; when oil revenues declined, economic justice was sacrificed for the expediency of economic growth (or more precisely, economic maintenance). Thus, within the Iranian sociopolitical arena the secular-populist principles were increasingly being mitigated by the growing absolute and conservative power-base of the clerical authorities. Generally speaking, power remained centralized within the Supreme Leader and Council of Guardians pinnacle atop the Iranian sociopolitical structure, until Khomeinis death in June of 1989. Also, the fortunes of the ruling pinnacle strongly depended upon the Iranian economys ability to finance an aimed for Islamic way of life. Yet, within Iranian economics the margin for error is narrow. It has already been shown that initial revolutionary-populist goals of formalizing economic justice were sacrificed to economic expediency. The clerical regime did not dismiss the objective of formalizing economic justice because it failed to concur with Islamic precepts, rather the leadership shelved this principle for the sake of rational economics. With Irans economy being disproportionately dependent upon oil revenues, the regime had to ensure the economic viability of this industry for the very purpose of national survival. With over 90% of Irans export revenues being derived from oil products, it is therefore obvious to conclude that the viability of Irans oil industry constitutes a vital national interest. The initial attempt to implement economic justice, the decline in oil prices globally, The Iran-Iraq War, US-imposed trade embargoes and the lack of oil industry investment all have negatively impacted the Iranian oil industry to some degree. Government attempts to diversify Irans industrial base, proved fruitless without the requisite revenues to finance such a scheme. Worst of all, the isolationist nature of the clerical regime alleviated any attempt to finance badly needed infrastructure repairs, maintenance and development of the oil sector. Without the requisite investment, the oil industry could not possibly meet production quotas for the long-term. Despite some promising gains in the gas industry sector, Irans economy essentially stagnated during the Khomeini years. During the 1990s, economic stagnation led to the current government-implemented subsidies and rationing, for essential household commodities. On the international front, Iran continued to remain isolated and obstinate. The hostage crisis at the US embassy in Tehran, the Iran-Iraq War, the self-imposed non-alignment policy, and the continued prospect of exporting Islamic revolution to the Muslim world all worked to keep the clerical regime isolated from the international community. Although the US had no formal containment policy of Iran prior to 1993, the US systematically and unofficially worked to keep Iran in a permanent state of isolation. The lack of formal diplomatic relations with Iran, the trade embargo of 1984, and the informal UN-US leaning toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War all ensured that Iran had few international options to seek for alliance or support. Thus, Khomeinis Iran apparently began to feel the psychological pressures associated with international isolation. The clerical leadership was partly to blame for this dilemma; due to its previous headlong thrust toward Islamic jurisprudence, economics and sociopolitical norms without exhaustively studying its rational application to modern state governance. Also, the West and particularly the US should likewise shoulder some of the blame for the Iranian isolationist dilemma; due to past interventions in Iranian affairs, the seemingly inability to allow Islamic Iran a modicum of an independent course of action, and the intransigent policy of continuously working against Irans economic interests. In sum, Khomeinis Islamic Republic was supposed to usurp Western and Eastern oppressors and replace them with a more benevolent Islamic jurisprudent governance. Instead, intractable conservatism, over-centralization and self-reliance isolated the regime both domestically and internationally. This isolation negatively impacted both Irans economy and its foreign relations. In effect, Iran was ripe for more accountable, open and pragmatic leadership. ENTER CLINTON: THE REVIVAL OF NEO-ORIENTALISM With the arrival of the Clinton Administration to the White House in early 1993, any hopes for Iranian-US rapprochement were subsequently extinguished. Despite Rafsanjanis pragmatic approach toward the economy, foreign policy and governance the US was unwilling to develop a more amenable, long-term relationship with Iran. While Iran was conceding to US moves and policies that affected Iran, the US ultimately downplayed any positive gestures generated in Tehran; and instead, preferred to focus primarily on suspected Iranian threatening behaviors (e.g., the alleged sponsorship of global terrorism and seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction). Meanwhile, Tehran became frustrated in its attempt to normalize its status both regionally and globally and began to see its raison djtre as being primarily one of defying the perceived hegemonic encroachment of the US into the Iranian sphere of influence. While the US sees its increased role in Central Asian, Middle East and Near East affairs as a matter of ensuring the maintenance of these regions status quo; Tehran perceives US moves as constituting: (1) Policies directed at neutralizing Iranian authority, influence and power within its geopolitical sphere; (2) A scheme designed to challenge, counter and in effect destroy the vital interests of Iran (e.g., the Iranian oil industry, military and security arrangements, and sociopolitical stability); and (3) A strategy to undermine the sovereignty, and quite possibly, the independence of Iran; through economic, military and sociopolitical containment. Therefore, while the US prefers to punish Iran for alleged violations of international norms, Iran perceives US actions as deriving from neo-Oriental motivations (e.g., an attempt to reestablish neo and quasi-colonialism). Thus, within the Iranian geopolitical sphere misperceptions, miscalculations and simple Iranian-US intransigence have created conditions whereby it is now safe to conclude (from a Third World perspective), that the international community is now in the throes of Cold War II. The fact that both the US and Iran are clearly divided culturally, economically, historically, ideologically, militarily and politically predetermines that these two states will remain strategically at odds for the foreseeable future (barring a miracle); and more ominously, their repeated attempts to formalize alliances in opposition to each other does not bode well for future rapprochement (and somewhat justifies the argument that Cold War II is upon us). On the economic front, Rafsanjanis pragmatic bloc was advocating liberalization of the regimes overall modus operandi, in an attempt to spur economic growth. Rafsanjanis repudiation of Khomeinis Islamic extremism and fanaticism, isolationism and mismanagement of the economy was motivated by the rationale that Iran severely needed foreign investment to revitalize its economy; and in order to develop the requisite conditions for foreign investment, Iran needed to normalize its relations with the international community. Therefore, Rafsanjani initiated a campaign on all fronts to improve Irans economic, military-security and political status both regionally and globally. In result, Rafsanjanis moves did pay some modest dividends in Irans vital oil and gas sectors. Yet, not only did Iran need major investments to modernize its oil industry, Iran also required higher production levels, prices and revenues if the industry was to remain viable. However, in order for Iran to increase its production and price levels, it would first require approval from OPEC. Some acquiescence to Iranian needs was forthcoming, but overall, OPEC leaders were satisfied with maintaining the status quo of the global oil economy; rather than attempting to upset the balance of order through the implementation of Iranian oil policy proposals. Although increased production levels and prices would have proved more optimal for Iran, the modest increases allowed by OPEC at least gave Iran a foundational footing in which to both modernize and develop its oil industry for future growth. However, subsequent US containment and sanctions would rob Iran of the precious foreign investment and revenues that were necessary to ensure the success of Irans new economic/oil policy. Within the realm of Persian Gulf security-military issues, the security of oil producers and their products is clearly vital to both the US and Iranian strategic interests. Yet, in Irans case, oil industry security can be classified also as an intrinsic interest. With an increased US presence within the Iranian geopolitical sphere, Iran perceives its vital interests as being under a direct threat from the US (via economic, military and political means). With a limited probability of US-Iranian economic, military and political rapprochement, Iran believes it has no choice but to mobilize its resources in an attempt to fortify its geostrategic position. Irans defense policy is based upon Irans status as being a major regional power, within its geopolitical sphere. The defense of Irans territorial integrity, and the security of oil production sites and oil-product transportation are primary missions contained within Irans defense policy. In conjunction with Rafsanjanis pragmatic domestic and foreign policies, Iran attempted to develop a GCC-Iranian collective security formula; but, the US preempted the process with political maneuvering and security commitments of its own. Fearing US-sponsored isolation and encirclement, Iran began to proactively seek allies, arms and military-related technology to counteract US maneuvers. As a result, Irans military posture within its geopolitical sphere has grown steadily during Clintons presidency; but, comparatively speaking Irans defense capabilities still lag behind most of its neighbors. Thus, without both Iran and the US seeking cooperation to maintain their mutual interests within the Iranian geopolitical sphere, they appear headed toward an unavoidable future confrontation. In its bid to gain dominance within the Iranian geopolitical sphere, US officials repeatedly cite Iranian intentions to destabilize the region (through alleged state-sponsored terrorism and the ambition to acquire WMDs). US government officials have steadfastly asserted that the Iranian state devises terrorist acts itself, and also foments terrorist activities globally through its client organizations (e.g., Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad). Moreover, despite the lack of corroborating evidence, US officials berate Irans nuclear-development program as being motivated by ambitions to stockpile nuclear weapons. The Clinton Administration has cited these alleged negative Iranian behaviors as the impetus for the US governments containment and trade embargo policies directed toward Iran. Officials within the Clinton Administration claim, with or without allied support, that the US essentially possesses the moral platitude to correct negative Iranian behavior for the benefit of mankind. Meanwhile, Iranian officials dismiss US claims that they sponsor terrorism and seek to acquire WMDs. Iranian officials claim that their nuclear development-program is both necessary and peaceful in its orientation. Furthermore, Iran claims that it does not sponsor terrorism, globally in any formand that any form of aid to global terrorist groups is for peaceful/philanthropic purposes only. While Western intelligence organizations and international nuclear regulatory agencies have failed to provide any relevant evidence that Irans nuclear program has anything but peaceful intentions; within the realm of terrorism, Iranian complicity in terroristic acts has led to suspicions of Iranian government complicity in some situations. Yet, the question begs asking: At what level and amongst whom in the Iranian government, does complicity with international terrorism exist? In addition, are US measures against Iran justified, legal and appropriate without corroborating evidence? Clearly, both states have vastly opposing views on these issues, which precipitates further questions pertaining to the negative, and non-cooperative nature of Iranian-US relations. With both the US and Iran at odds over economic, military, peace-security and political issues within the Iranian geopolitical sphere, it becomes clear, that with their intransigent maintenance of antagonistic policies directed toward each other, the potential for future conflict becomes greater. Within the realm of ideology, both states appear to consider their own current political orientations as being appropriate, justified, legitimate and self-righteous (in relation to the entirety of past, historical relations); without outwardly appearing to consider the positive benefits to be derived from applying more cooperative engagement and diplomatic relations. For example, US officials still essentially engage and interact with Iran from an erstwhile cold war perspective; in that, with Iranian non-compliance and non-cooperation with Western/US economics (World Bank/IMF-led capitalism), ideology (secular-humanist democracy), norms (Western sense of justice) and political orientation (UN/US-administered NWO), then Iran must me made to suffer the consequences. Arguably, UN-US policies have been seemingly congruent in regards to Iran, since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 (e.g., UN-US support of Iraq over Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, Clintons dual containment policy of Iran-Iraq, and the recent trade embargoes/sanctions against Iran, et al). As previously noted, when Rafsanjani initiated his pragmatic domestic and foreign policies the US rejected them out of hand. Why? The US could conceivably benefit from a balance of power arrangement in the Iranian geopolitical sphere, that includes Iranian participation; for no other reason than limiting the presence of unnecessary US financial outlays, equipment and personnel within the region. Both Iranian and US vital interests parallel each other on most issues pertinent to oil economics (the security of production and transportation). Furthermore, regional peace, security and political stability are clearly issues that both Iran and the US agree are vital to the maintenance of their vital interests. With such a mutuality of vital interests, why are the US and Iran at such odds in their relations with each other? Many Iranians claim that ideological incongruity is the major issue that divides Iran and the US. Irans attempt to institute and develop an Islamic alternative to Western democracy-capitalism and Eastern communism, is viewed by many Iranians as constituting an unacceptable ideological orientation within a world governed by Pax Americana (US hegemony). From the perspective of some Iranian analysts, Iran is not allowed to develop an Islamic economy, modus operandi and vivendi, and political system within the global community, because these practices do not conform with the US-administered NWO. This Iranian perception that the US has global hegemonic designs, raises fears that the US is attempting to revive quasi-colonial arrangements for Iran. Therefore, based upon these fears, Iran has sought alliances (economic, military and political) that in affect can undermine US designs toward their country. Thus, without a concerted, honest and objective effort by both states to mitigate their differences through diplomatic protocol, the prospects for the deepening of Cold War II (at least within the Iranian geopolitical sphere and in other parts of Asia) appears to be a distinct possibility. In conclusion, my primary objective in compiling this paper is to present Iranian motivations, perceptions and perspectives on why current Iranian and US relations are in such a conflictory, non-cooperative state. I also believe, that by pondering indigenous Iranian perspectives, one is able to more objectively grasp the range of activities that occur between Iran and the US within the Iranian geopolitical sphere. My perspective on the Iranian situation vis-`-vis the US is mixed. Both states attempt to vilify the other, while considering themselves as being politically appropriate, justified, legitimate and self-righteous in their relations with each other. Both states fail in their ability to accept that they both possess mutual vital interests within the Iranian geopolitical sphere; and that with even a modicum of genuine cooperation, both Iran and the US could alleviate some of the differences that divide them. Government officials within both states are subjected to unmotivated biases, which helps to explain why misperceptions and miscalculations occur in regards to: (1) Perception of the others intent; and (2) The subsequent development of each states respective foreign policy, in relation to perceptions of each other. In addition, these same government officials are further subjected to motivated biases; which helps to explain the causal stimuli behind each states overestimation of potential threats, diplomatic non-cooperation, and evil intentions being attached to the actions/policies of the other. Yet, these psychological-behavioral theories fail to explain why both states have genuinely failed in their attempts to accept, or better comprehend the others position on the issues that separate them. For all intense and purposes, the Islamic Revolution was a means to invoke a more democratic, benevolent and responsible government for the Iranian people. The West had long been hegemonic master of Iran, with few Iranian citizens enjoying the fruits of this colonial relationship. In an attempt to create a state based upon Islamic norms, laws and policies, Ayatollah Khomeini developed a system of Islamic jurisprudence to govern Iran. However, in practice, Islamic principles proved difficult to enact both domestically and internationally. While Khomeini and his adherents did succeed in usurping power from the Shah, the subsequent governance of Iran through Islamic jurisprudent principles proved more difficult. Clerical conservatism, over-centralization of authority and domestic/international isolation served to undermine the effectiveness of state governance. Furthermore, political factionalism and isolation hampered economic development. By 1990, Iran was stagnating economically, socially and politically. Yet, in essence, despite Irans inability to precipitate any major challenge to the worlds status quo, US officials still considered Iran a major threat to its vital interests; due primarily to: (1) Irans proximity to and position within the global oil economy; and (2) Irans Islamic ideology, which is perceived by some US officials as being incongruent with Western ideology (capitalism and secular-humanist democracy). After Khomeinis death, the arrival of Rafsanjanis pragmatism, the Kuwait crisis and Bushs call for a NWO the door opened ever slightly for Iranian-US rapprochement. Yet, the potential for rapprochement subsequently came to naught, due in part to Clintons idealistic approach to Iran. Motivated by the biased principle of altering Iranian behavior to reflect international norms, the Clinton Administration has quarantined Iran through a policy based upon containment and economic/trade sanctions. While White House officials perceive their Iranian foreign policy as being commensurate with past US actions, the UN Charter and international norms; Iranian officials are apt to classify US actions/policies as constituting global hegemony (Pax Americana), quasi-colonialism and an attempt to destabilize Iran. Remaining loyal to their negative perceptions, stereotypes and categorizations of each other, both Iran and the US have attempted to fortify their positions within the Iranian geopolitical sphere. Both states have sought to strengthen their position within the regional oil economy, to find new allies for security-military purposes, and to expand their military capabilities within the Iranian geopolitical sphere. Thus, one may conclude that given the above mentioned conditions, and the persistent, intransigent stance that each maintains toward the other, that the Iranian geopolitical sphere is a primary theater of Cold War II. Does Iran deserve to be classified as a rogue state? From an American perspectivethe answer is yes. Since, many US officials perceive Iran as exhibiting the essential behavioral traits that constitute classification as a rogue state. Should the US closely monitor Iran? Again, the answer is yes. Iranians have been linked to terrorist acts around the globe, and Iran admits to aiding some terrorist groups (albeit for philanthropic purposes). Yet, the question remains: at what level within the Iranian government does complicity exist for the sponsorship of terrorism? Should Iran be categorized as constituting a threat to world peace; and as a result, be so isolated by US administered containment and economic sanction policies? The answer to this question is subjective. So far, the IAEA has concluded that Irans nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only. Irans military buildup and rearmament programs appear to be for defensive purposes, and are arguably a consequence of US economic, military and political maneuvers directed toward Iran. At a time when Iran was desperate for investments toward and revenues from its oil industry, US measures severely hurt Irans drive to modernize this vital industrial sector. Are there behind-the-scene strategic maneuverings, that negatively impact the already precarious nature of Iranian-US relations? Logically, information relevant to safeguarding the vital interests of both Iran and the US is classified; but, by reviewing the recent activities and policies of both states, one can peace together a plausible sketch of both states strategic objectives. Given the unquestionable importance that both states attach to global oil politics, one can surmise that the answer to the behind-the-scenes question is yes. In addition, given the incongruence of ideological and political orientations of both states, one can further speculate that Iran and the US both are perilously incongruous in their basic ability to engage in genuine cooperation, diplomacy and negotiations in a bid to resolve their differences. Therefore, given their vast differences in global oil politics, ideology and political orientations, Iran and the US find cooperation in other areas (e.g., cultural, military-security and social interactions) even less plausible; due primarily to their inability to cooperate on safeguarding their principal vital interests within the Iranian geopolitical sphere. While Iranians perceive Islam as an ideological vehicle to pursue an independent course of action, many Americans conversely perceive it as threat to the global status quo. In effect, Iranian officials see US allegations leveled against them (terrorism and nuclear weapons ambitions) as a means by which the US can implement its policies to the detriment of Iran. Thus, Iranians can also justifiably characterize American actions toward them in a negative light. Clearly, both states currently obviate any possibility at reducing tensions between them, by not considering the mutuality of interests that they both share in the Iranian geopolitical sphere. At present, both the US and Iran appear hopelessly headed for increased antagonism, without a dramatic turn of events. Therefore, a dire need for diplomacy appears feasible to help mitigate potential conflict. Both states must accept the position that they both share mutual vital interests in the region. Through diplomatic protocol, both states must work at alleviating mutual mistrust, misperceptions and miscalculations. 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