The Islamic Republic of Iran enjoys rogue state status along with Cuba,
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. Logically, the pariah club of
rogue states is contingent upon who is compiling the listed members and
for what purpose. Therefore, expediency, sociopolitical considerations and
time, can and do periodically cause changes of the listed members. Michael
Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995),
pp. 136-150.
  The Clinton administrations dual containment policy of Iran and Iraq,
the investment embargo of Iran in 1995, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
of 1996, and a recently leaked $20 million covert plan to moderate the
current Iranian regime, are just four examples of recent negative US
foreign policy initiatives toward Iran. Ironically, whatever expedient
objectives that US officials harbored by advocating a covert action plan
to moderate the Iranian government, was seriously undermined through its
publication. Thus, not only was the plan sapped of its potential success
through its publication, clear illegality, and from its gratuitous nature;
but also, the plan was preposterous, in that it allows Iran precious
propaganda points throughout the international community. Steven
Aftergood, Covert Action Against Iran: I Hate to Say Ayatollah So, Secrecy
& Government Bulletin, 55 (January
1996/http://www.awpi.com/IntelWeb/US/S-GB/055.html): 1. 
  Iran appears to have strengthened its resolve to gain economic, military
and political allies, in an effort to rearm after years of stagnation and
the Iran-Iraq War; and to increase its regional military presence. For
example, during August of 1996, a $4.5 billion deal was signed between
China and Iran covering an extensive array of logistics, military and
weapon production provisions, and other strategic cooperation concerning
military/security affairs. In comparison, Beijing and Tehran concluded
military cooperation agreements worth only a reported $3-3.5 billion,
during 1990-1995. MehrdAd IrAni, The Iran-PRC Connection: Military Buildup
at the Price of Social and Economic Problems, in Focus on Iran 3:10
(October 1996/http://www.coe.uncc.edu/~fsheikhb/focus1.html): 1.
  During the 36th annual AIPAC conference held in Washington, D.C. (May
1995), Israeli, US and AIPAC officials (including President Clinton and
then PM Rabin) underlined the urgent need to contain Iran. Their rationale
for containment centered upon: (1) Irans alleged export of radical Islamic
fundamentalism; (2) Irans apparent nuclear (weapons) ambitions; and (3)
Irans alleged financing/sponsorship of global terrorism. From the
conference proceedings, Iran was categorized as constituting the principle
threat to both regional and global peace and security. William Millward,
Containing Iran, in Canadian Security Intelligence Service: Commentary, 63
(November 1995/http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/comment/com63e.html): 3-4. 
  Edward Saids book, Orientalism, outlines his theory on Western
condescending perceptions of otherness (primarily towards Eastern
populations), when merchants/officials of Western nations engaged and
interacted with Eastern populations. Said theorizes that Western
perceptions of the inferior Orient, in relation to their more advanced and
civilized Occident necessarily determines the epistemological and
methodological approach of Orientalists. From this Western unmotivated
bias, Said further concludes that gaining the truth about the culture of
others is an impossibility. Saeed Rahnema and Sohrab Behdad, Introduction:
Crisis of an Islamic State, in Iran After the Revolution: Crisis of an
Islamic State, ed. Saeed Rahnema and Sohrab Behdad (London: I.B. Tauris,
1995), pp. 2-4. 
  I tend to disagree with Robert Jervis questioning of the
cultural-unmotivated bias association. I counter, that a given
environment, human experience and cognitive capabilities all are shaped to
some degree by enculturation processes. Robert Jervis, Introduction:
Approach and Assumptions, in Psychology and Deterrence, eds. Robert
Jervis, Richard Lebow and Janice Stein (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1985), p. 4. 
  Saeed Rahnema and Sohrab Behdad, Introduction: Crisis of an Islamic
State, in Iran After the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State, pp. 3-8. 
  In high school textbooks, The Islamic Republic has contrasted the
Western theory of modernization with the dependency theory of
underdevelopment. These textbooks essentially describe the dependency
theory as constituting the relationship experienced by a given colony to
its central, imperial power. As colonial or client states, most of the
Third World experienced the inverse of  Western capitalism, the
development of civil society and the accumulation of wealth; therefore,
the subjugation these colonies experienced at the hands of the West, was
institutionalized into dependency upon imperial powers for economic and
sociopolitical progress. In Irans case, Western colonialism was forced
upon Iran in an effort to acquire cheap raw materials and consumer
markets; in order to sustain the Western capitalist system. Sussan
Siavoshi, Regime Legitimacy and High-school Textbooks, in Iran After the
Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State, p. 207. 
  For a comprehensive analysis and appraisal of the ideological
orientation of Khomeinis Iran, see: Syed Quddus, Ayatollah Khomeini:
Towards Islamic World Order, (Zaildar Park, Pakistan: Progressive
Publishers, 1994).
  Robert Jervis, Perceiving and Coping With Threat, in Psychology and
Deterrence, pp. 24-27.
  The Iranian revolutionary coalition that coalesced in the 1970s, and
spearheaded the mass mobilization that toppled the Pahlavi regime,
consisted predominantly of militant Muslim scholars and clerics, bazaari
merchants and university students. Ahmad Ashraf, From the White Revolution
to the Islamic Revolution, in Iran After the Revolution: Crisis of an
Islamic State, p. 39. 
  Jack Snyder, Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914, in Psychology
and Deterrence, pp. 160-161.
  In the early 1990s, President Rafsanjanis pragmatic bloc or coalition
sought to: (1) Orient Irans foreign policy on a path of economic openness,
both regionally and globally (which was aimed primarily at the developed
West); (2) Move Iran away from the self-imposed isolation of the Khomeini
years; (3) Downplay the regional and global animosity created by the
Khomeini regime toward the infidel (e.g., those regimes who associated
with the West, to the detriment of Islam); (4) More closely associate Iran
with the anti-Iraq bloc; (5) Exemplify that Iran was a mature and reliable
pillar of stability for global issues/concerns within the Middle and Near
East regions; and (6) Vastly improve Irans relations with its neighbors in
the Iranian geopolitical sphere (I define the Iranian geopolitical sphere
as constituting: The nexus where the Middle East and Near East abut, and
is congruous with the territory of IranTo include the southern Caucasus,
Central Asia and the Persian Gulf). During July of 1990, Irans National
Security Council issued a decree which invariably respected the
sovereignty of Irans neighbors. This respect for neighbors decree was
intended to: (1) Help stabilize the Gulf environment in the wake of Iraqs
actions toward Kuwait; (2) Alleviate any fears of potential Iranian
expansion in the Gulf; and (3) Support the exiled Kuwaiti government and
oppose Iraqs annexation. Kaveh Afrasiabi, After Khomeini: New Directions
in Irans Foreign Policy, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), pp.
1-2; 85-87. 
  While President Rafsanjani was calling for a common Gulf Home to help
formalize his collective security formula for the Persian Gulf region, the
US and other Gulf states had their own objectives. The US major strategic
interests in the Persian Gulf center upon maintaining the status quo in
Gulf-oil economics (e.g., Current OPEC price and production policies, the
safe and secure passage of oil through the Gulf, and regional military and
sociopolitical stability through an increased US role). To ensure the
maintenance of Gulf-oil economics to the advantage of US strategic
interests, the US began to: (1) Heavily increase arms sales to its allies
in the Gulf; (2) Increase and perpetuate its own military and political
presence in the Gulf; and (3) To marginalize Irans foreign policy
objectives (e.g., Gulf region collective security). The US continued to
emphasize the threat that Iran posed to Gulf stability, while
simultaneously emphasizing its own capability to ensure Gulf stability
(through economic, military and political means). Ibid., pp. 105-108. Also
see, Nader Entessar, Realpolitik and Transformation of Irans Foreign
Policy: Coping With the Iran Syndrome, in Islam, Iran and World Stability,
ed. Hamid Zanganeh (New York: St. Martins Press, 1994), pp. 154-156.     
  The current Foreign Minister of Iran, Ali Akbar Velayati has noted,
...The United States has continually acted rashly against my country for
no other reason than to assert its so called idealism and its muscle and
without first steps from the US (for example lifting the trade bans) my
country and I refuse to negotiate with such an oppressive country. The
other role that I could play in this exercise (depending on the political
climate) is to continue rebuilding ties with Iraq so that together we may
reassert the values of Islam. Foreign Minister of Iran, Ali Akbar
Velayati,
(http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/W96ps353S2/Velayati.AliAkbar), p.
2. Also see Robert Jervis, Perceiving and Coping With Threat, in
Psychology and Deterrence, pp. 18-33. 
  U.S., Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Iran: What You Need to Know About U.S. Economic Sanctions,
(gopher://una.hh.lib.umich.edu:70/00/ebb/fac/iran.fac), pp. 1-2. Also see
U.S., Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism, (April
1996/http://nsi.org/Library/Terrorism/terror95.html): 3; 22-24.
  Robert Jervis, Perceiving and Coping With Threat, in Psychology and
Deterrence, pp. 24-27. Also see Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 85-87. 
  U.S., Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Iran: What You Need to Know About U.S. Economic Sanctions,
(gopher://una.hh.lib.umich.edu:70/00/ebb/fac/iran.fac); U.S., Department
of State, Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism, 1995 Patterns of
Global Terrorism, (April
1996/http://nsi.org./Library/Terrorism/terror95.html); Also see, The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, Text of a Letter From the President
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate, (18 November
1994/http://docs.whitehouse.gov/white-house-publications/1994/11/1994-11-18-letter-on-regulations-in-regard-to-iran.text).
  Robert Pape, A Theory of Military Coercion, 25 July 1991, pp. 13-15
(Mimeographed)
  Cyrus Bina contends that Pax Americana (US-directed global hegemony) has
replaced Pax Britannia, as the principle imperial progenitor in the world
today. Elements of Pax Americana include global dominance through
economic, military and political controls. Bina asserts that the Vietnam
War and Iranian revolution (successful challenges to, and unseating of US
hegemony) are examples of the growing global decomposition of Pax
Americana. Cyrus Bina, Farewell to the Pax Americana: Iran, Political
Islam, and the Passing of the Old Order, in Islam, Iran and World
Stability, pp. 60-63.
  During October of 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini reportedly denigrated the US,
USSR, Britain and China for plundering the natural wealth of Iran and
plotting against its national struggle. Syed Quddus, Ayatollah Khomeini:
Towards Islamic World Order, p. 32.
  Persia, which Iran was previously known as, was ruled for roughly 2500
years by various forms of monarchial rule. Ibid., pp. 74-75. 
  During the 1950s and 1960s, the US strongly advocated elements of land
reform (primarily redistribution to peasants) within its foreign aid
programs to Third World countries. Some US officials believed that land
reform measures would: (1) Placate any potential peasant discontent within
the affected countries; (2) Alleviate the potential for mass/peasant
uprisings; and (3) Thus, would conceivably preempt the Communist Bloc from
opportunistically expanding its influence into countries overwhelmed by
social justice revolts. In the specific case of Iran, this policy was
inappropriate; because: (1) Iranian peasantry were conservative in a
Western and Iranian context; (2) The peasants were relatively satisfied
with their lives, and therefore indicated no revolutionary proclivities;
and (3) Iranian peasants were relatively speaking, not involved in
sociopolitical affairs to a high degree. Ahmad Ashraf, From the White
Revolution to the Islamic Revolution, in Iran After the Revolution: Crisis
of an Islamic State, pp. 22-23. 
  During the rule of nationalist Mohammed Mosaddeq (1951-53), he attempted
to nationalize the Iranian oil industry. This precipitated a 1953,
CIA-backed coup that returned Mohammed Reza Shah (1941-79) back to power.
Fatemeh E. Moghadam, State, Political Stability and Property Rights, in
Iran After the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State, p. 48. Syed Quddus
claims that the Shah hypocritically went on pilgrimages to holy shrines
and put on a religious appearance aiming at deceit. He succeeded in
deluding many, including unfortunately the Ulema or at least in
diminishing their suspicion of him. Syed Quddus, Ayatollah Khomeini:
Towards Islamic World Order, p. 44. 
  According to Ahmad Ashraf, a revolutionary coalition consisting of
militant ulema (Muslim scholars), bazaari merchants, clerics and
university students coalesced in the 1970s. This sociopolitical grouping
would later spearhead the more widely pervasive, mass revolution during
1979. Ahmad Ashraf, From the White Revolution to the Islamic Revolution,
in Iran After the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State, p. 39.   
  Cyrus Bina argues that, ...todays Islam is presenting itself as a third
ideological alternative to either capitalism or so-called communism. Cyrus
Bina, Farewell to the Pax Americana: Iran, Political Islam, and the
Passing of the Old Order, in Islam, Iran and World Stability, p. 41.
  The Shahs land-reform program of the 1960s-70s, altered the rural
sociopolitical structure; by: (1) Ceding property rights and property from
wealthy landowners; and (2) Granting property rights and property to
peasants. Although the major aims of the land-reform program were to
appease the US (Kennedy, et al.) and to placate the peasants; the program
unintentionally created a new class of revolutionaries: the erstwhile
content and prosperous landowners. Ahmad Ashraf, From the White Revolution
to the Islamic Revolution, in Iran After the Revolution: Crisis of an
Islamic State, pp. 26-31.  
  Ibid., p. 39.
  During the early 1960s, Ayatollah Khomeini was part of Islamic-studies
circle in Qom, that numbered just over 100 in membership. Opposition to
the domestic and foreign policies of the Pahlavi regime was strongly
encouraged during these sessions. Over a decade later during the 1970s,
the number of Islamic-studies students had swelled to almost 5000
students. Syed Quddus, Ayatollah Khomeini: Towards an Islamic World Order,
pp. 36-49.
  The precepts of Orientalism also elicit that: (1) Imperial authority
must control, dominate and govern the said treasure(s) of a given colony;
and (2) Due to the indigenous populations inability to rule and govern
itself; it then, must also be ruled by the imperial authority. Saeed
Rahnema and Sohrab Behdad, Introduction: Crisis in an Islamic State, in
Iran After the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State, pp. 3-5.  
  Syed Quddus asserts, The Islamic Revolution is considered beyond any
shadow of doubt as one of the most significant events in the history of
Islam particularly in the 20th century, because the political and military
influence of Islam has had a declining trend since the fall of Spain late
in the 15th century. Syed Quddus, Ayatollah Khomeini: Towards Islamic
World Order, p. 9. 
  Islamic revivalism can be seen from many perspectives and includes a
wide array of organizing principles; to include: (1) The liberation of the
self and community, from a purely Islamic perspective; (2) A return to
traditional norms, values and precepts of Islam (as advocated by the
Koran, the Prophet Mohammed and the Imam leadership); (3) The Muslim world
could now be formed, molded and directed according to the precepts of
Islam; and (4) Islam could now upstage Western and Eastern influences, and
organize the affairs of the Muslim world according to the precepts
contained within Islam. While Western experts interpreted rising oil
revenues as the tonic for the impoverished Muslim world (the modernization
theory), many Muslims saw Islam as their renewed vehicle for liberation.
Saeed Rahnema and Sohrab Behdad, Introduction: Crisis of an Islamic State,
in Iran After the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State, pp. 6-8. Also,
for a synopsis of the main precepts of Islam, The Quran [Koran], the
Prophet Mohammed and the five Pillars of Islam see, Welcome to Islamic
Horizons, (http://www.optisol.com/imenu.htm#Quran).   
  Hasan Turabi notes that Western observers mistakenly label Islamic
revivalism as fundamentalism, by comparing it to the reactionary,
dogmatic, religious movement (Christian fundamentalists) prevalent in the
West. Turabi further claims, Unfortunately, they [the West] know very
little about it because Orientalist literature is about history, not about
the current history of the Islamic world. Hasan Turabi, Islamic
Fundamentalism in the Sunna and Shia World, in MSANEWS, (May,
1996/http://www.mynet.net/~msanews/MSANEWS/199605/19960516.5html): 7.
  Saeed Rahnema and Sohrab Behdad, Introduction: Crisis of an Islamic
State, in Iran After the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State, pp. 8-10.
  Ibid., pp. 8-14.
  The rule of the just jurist (or one supreme religious-political leader),
was implemented as a means to counter the oppressive economic, military
and sociopolitical policies of Western quasi-colonialism. The Khomeini
regime was seen as an embodiment of the former, while the Pahlavi regime
was indicative of the latter. Sussan Siavoshi, Regime Legitimacy and
High-school Textbooks, in Iran After the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic
State, pp. 211-213.
  The Islamic Constitution institutionalized the role of the just jurist
(also known as Imam, or supreme leader), with powers ironically
reminiscent of those enjoyed by party secretaries (supreme leaders) in
China today, and the former Communist Bloc. As Supreme Leader of the
Islamic Republic, the duties of the just jurist include: (1) Appointments
of jurisprudents to the Council of Guardians (12 each); (2) Appointments
to supreme judicial authority and  armed forces; (3) Designating the chief
commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; and (4) Other
overarching duties that grant the Supreme Leader essentially autocratic
authority, to make the final decision on issues of major national
importance. Syed Quddus, Ayatollah Khomeini: Towards Islamic World Order,
p. 18.  
  While Iran was celebrating its Islamic revolution and pondering its
export potential, the US was becoming increasingly wary of Khomeinis
objectives. During 1980, Khomeini made the following remarks, The great
satan [the US] which is afraid that the Islamic Revolution of Iran will be
exported to other Muslim and non-Muslim countries, and as a result, its
vicious hands will be curtailed from dominated countries, while it gained
nothing from economic sanctions and military intervention, has turned to
another trick to damage the image of the Islamic Revolution before the
Muslim people of the world so that Muslims will be thrown upon each other
and then it can continue its despotism and plundering in Islamic
countries. Ibid., p. 191.
  The implementation of economic liberalization (through the decontrolling
of prices and privatization of erstwhile nationalized enterprises),
exchange-rate reform and conservative interpretations of Islamic
jurisprudence, are just a few examples of how the populist platform was
increasingly overturned by the more conservative Council of Guardians.
Saeed Rahnema and Sohrab Behdad, Introduction: Crisis of an Islamic State,
in Iran After the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State, pp. 13-15.  
  During 1980-82, Khomeini engineered a cultural revolution to assist the
Islamic Republic in meeting its sociocultural objectives. Government
bodies, the educational system (at primary, secondary and university
levels), cultural and media forms (literature and cinema), and Islamic
religious practices all were reviewed to determine if they concurred with
the precepts of Islam. Syed Quddus, Ayatollah Khomeini: Towards Islamic
World Order, pp. 113-122; 143-147.  
  From 1980-1992, all of the major populist reforms passed by the Majles
(e.g., land redistribution, foreign trade nationalization and a more
socially progressive labor law) were overruled by the Council of Guardians
as being incompatible with Islamic precepts. Saeed Rahnema and Sohrab
Behdad, Introduction: Crisis of an Islamic State, in Iran After the
Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State, p. 13. 
  Subsequently, Khomeinis power politics ensured that absolute power would
be monopolized by his office (Imam/Supreme Leader/just jurist), and the
Council of Guardians. Citing the credo no group or party could propagate
social, economic or political ideas that were shrouded in Islamic terms,
but were constructed on a non-Islamic substructure or foundation, the
clerical-conservative coalition attempted to devise immutable economic,
and sociopolitical Islamic norms for Iran. Obviously, this led to
factionalizing within the inner circle itself, since it was essentially
subjective to determine what actually constituted immutable Islamic norms.
Ali Rahnema and Farhad Nomani, Competing Shii Subsystems in Contemporary
Iran, in Iran After the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State, pp. 87-89.
  In relation to past British, US and USSR interference in Iranian
internal affairs (e.g., The 1946 Azerbaijan conflict, the interference in
Iranian oil politics during 1949-53, and the CIA-backed 1953 coup),
Iranian officials adopted a non-alignment foreign policy toward the major
world powers. This non-alignment policy entailed: (1) The negation of
domination and oppression; (2) The defense of Irans territorial integrity;
(3) The striving for Muslim unity worldwide; (4) Non-alignment with
colonial powers; and (5) Support for liberation movements, and peaceful
co-existence with non-belligerent states. Sussan Siavoshi, Regime
Legitimacy and High-school Textbooks, in Iran After the Revolution: Crisis
of an Islamic State, pp. 210-211. 
  As oil revenues declined, the initial intentions of the Clerical regime
to support economic equality and justice, gave way to more expeditious
aims (e.g., ensuring the solvency of the oil industry, by adopting a more
free-market orientation). Sohrab Behdad, The Post-Revolutionary Economic
Crisis, in Iran After the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State, pp.
100-105.
  Cyrus Bina claims that in many ways, the Islamic Republic paralleled its
predecessor. For example, Bina cites centralized control over the
sociopolitical arena, the inclusion of only minute, intimately connected
factions to the political center, and the overarching role of the state in
political reproduction and ideological renewal as specific cases, whereby
both regimes engaged in similar types of governance. Cyrus Bina, Farewell
to the Pax Americana: Iran, Political Islam, and the Passing of the Old
Order, in Islam, Iran and World Stability, p. 52.  
  U.S., Government, CIA Publications, Iran,
(1995/http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/95fact/ir.html): 4.
  Saeed Rahnema, Continuity and Change in Industrial Policy, in Iran After
the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State, pp. 145-147.
  Robin Wright posits, Like the Soviet Union, Iran literally can no longer
afford its ideology. Wright cites the underlying causes for Iran being
unable to afford its ideology as being: (1) A severe decline in
petrodollar income (todays oil revenues are 33% of pre-revolutionary
revenues); and (2) The fact that Iran must significantly modernize its oil
industry; otherwise, Iran faces the prospect of declining production, and
the likelihood of having to actually import oil products in the future.
Robin Wright, Dateline Tehran: A Revolution Implodes, Foreign Policy
96:103 (Summer 1996): 162.   
  In a New York Times article dated 8 March 1996, Douglas Jehl reports
that rice and cooking oil were recently added to bread and heating fuel
(as Iranian household necessities slated for government subsidies). Jehl
also notes that the annual Iranian inflation rate hovers near 50%, and
that approximately 25% of oil revenues are earmarked for foreign debt
repayments. Irans Economic Plight Casts a Pall on Todays Election, New
York Times, 8 March 1996, p. A3. For a more comprehensive analysis of
Irans economic problems during the last 17 years, see: Sohrab Behdad, The
Post-Revolutionary Economic Crisis, in Iran After the Revolution: Crisis
of an Islamic State.
  Robin Wright, Dateline Tehran: A Revolution Implodes, Foreign Policy
96:103 (Summer 1996): 161.
  Raymond Tanter notes that in 1984, then US Secretary of State George
Schultz called for sanctions to be implemented against Iran for sponsoring
international terrorism. Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes, University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1 September 1996, p. 14.  
  With modest cooperation during the Kuwait/Gulf War crisis and the
release of hostages in Lebanon, it appeared that some degree of
rapprochement was possible between Tehran and Washington. President
Rafsanjanis drive for improved Iranian-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
relations, to reintegrate Iran into the global economy, to facilitate
improved political ties with the international community, and to repudiate
the excessive extremism and negativism of the Khomeini years concluded in
his Persian Gulf declaration. During 1989 Rafsanjani declared, We [Iran]
are in no way in favor of seeing the Persian Gulf return to that condition
and we ourselves are never willing, not even independently, to act as the
guardian of others, not only for the forces of darkness (estekbar), but
also not even for ourselves. After the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War,
Iran acquiesced to the presence of US troops in the region (as a means to
neutralize Husseins ambitions). In conjunction with the positive moves
emanating from Tehran, President Bushs New World Order (NWO) declaration
on 29 January 1991, appeared to confirm that improved relations between
Iran and the US were in the offing. However, subsequent events would prove
the potential for a thaw was illusory. Siamack Shojai, Iran in Global
Perspective,; Nader Entessar, Realpolitik and Transformation of Irans
Foreign Policy: Coping With the Iran Syndrome, in Islam, Iran and World
Stability, pp. 134-137; 151-155. Also see, Kaveh Afrasiabi, After
Khomeini: New Directions in Irans Foreign Policy, pp. 101-105.  
  While many liberal minds worldwide perceived Bushs call for a NWO as a
potential opportunity toward global progress, many in the Third World
viewed it as the reaffirmation of Pax Americana. Many foreign policy
analysts in Iran and elsewhere, saw the dramatic US victory in Iraq as an
American green light to pursue: (1) US global hegemony through Pax
Americana (or NWO); (2) Essentially US formulated, enacted and managed
policies within the Gulf (that would often be closely aligned with UN
mandates); and (3) A US-backed Gulf policy that centers upon the
marginalization of Iran within the Persian Gulf region. Cyrus Bina,
Farewell to the Pax Americana: Iran, Political Islam, and The Passing of
the Old Order,; Nader Entessar, Realpolitik and Transformation of Irans
Foreign Policy: Coping With the Iran Syndrome, in Islam, Iran and World
Stability, pp. 41-47; 147-150.
  I prefer to call the latest round of cold war hostilities involving the
US as Cold War II, because it involves most of the same characteristics,
players and qualities of the previous cold war. Kaveh Afrasiabi views the
current US policy of containment of Iran and Iraq as a replacement of the
former US containment policies aimed at the Communist Bloc. Afrasiabi also
argues that the US unipolar strategy has roughly divided the world into
Western and anti-Western blocs. Therefore, according to Afrasiabi, Cold
War II is a competition for the mind and soul of the Third World; with the
praxis of battle being waged primarily over economic, military and
political issues. Unlike the previous cold war, Cold War II should not be
overwhelmingly geopolitical in orientation and scope; in other words, the
Western and anti-Western  blocs engaged in competition will not
necessarily be abutting each other geographically, ideologically,
militarily and politically. The two principle opposing blocs are the West
(as led by the US), and the East (as led by China and Iran); but,
according to Afrasiabi, the client and peripheral allies of these blocs
will probably associate and disassociate themselves from each bloc
according to particular circumstances, needs and motivations (e.g.,
Russian appears to be an exemplary paradigm, of a state that should fit
neatly into the previous case scenario). Kaveh Afrasiabi, After Khomeini:
New Directions in Irans Foreign Policy, pp. 179-185. 
  On 12 January 1990, President Rafsanjani noted that foreign investment
or borrowing in production projects would not be detrimental to the
economy. Rafsanjanis economic program also included stronger cooperation
and ties with the World Bank and the IMF. Domestically, Rafsanjanis
economic program liberalized exchange rate mechanisms, industrial and
labor policies, and attempted to reduce some aspects of his predecessors
social safety net. Sohrab Behdad, The Post-Revolutionary Economic Crisis,;
Saeed Rahnema, Continuity and Change in Industrial Policy, in Iran After
the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State, pp. 115-123; 137-147.  
  Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, The Oil Sector After the Revolution, in Iran
After the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State, pp. 150-158.
  From an Iranian perspective, Saudi Arabia had assumed the role or guise
as de facto leaders of OPEC. Therefore, many Iranian economists, OPEC
representatives and politicians were cognizant of the fact that OPEC
policy would thus, not be overtly detrimental to Riyadhs economic/oil
interests. Furthermore, since Saudi Arabia has subsequently become a
substantive ally of the US (in oil/economic and military-security
matters), Tehran has additional reasons to suspect conspiratorial aims in
current OPEC policies. Thus, Iran fears the presence of a covert US-Saudi
Arabian plot to undermine its oil/economic objectives within OPEC. Ibid.,
pp. 165-170.
  Ironically, US containment and embargo (sanctions) policies directed
toward Iran, may subsequently also undermine US strategic interests within
the Gulf region and globally. For the Western and US economies to function
smoothly, abundant and inexpensive oil products are both necessary and
hold a key role as a vital energy source. However, with US containment and
embargo policies in place, a key oil producer (Iran) is unable to: (1)
Adequately modernize its oil industry; and (2) Increase its production
capacity. These two factors may serve to decrease future oil supplies, and
thus, significantly increase oil prices by the year 2005. Seyed Hosseini,
The Strategic Significance of Irans Oil and Gas Output in the Twenty-First
Century, Oxford Energy Seminar, 7 September 1995.
(http://netiran.com/press/economy-domestic/html/000000XXDE0119.html), pp.
1-4.  
  Iranian defense officials cite the presence of the US Navys battle fleet
in the region, the Gulf states/US alliance (economic, military and
political) directed against Iran, and the US directed Middle East peace
process as relevant examples of US conspiratorial aims directed against
Iran. Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Mohsen Rezai, summarizes his
perception of the threat by noting, at present, the Westerners are in the
process of settling the problem of the Arabs and Israel; then they will
try to incite a number of the Arab countries, and Israel, against us.
James Moore, An Assessment of the Iranian Military Rearmament Program,
Comparative Strategy 13 (October 1994): 371-373.  
  Ibid., pp. 372-373. Also see Hooshang Amirahmadi, Iran and the Persian
Gulf: Strategic Issues and Outlook, in Islam, Iran and World Stability,
pp. 106-112.
  Ibid., (Moore) pp. 371-376. Vice President Hassan Habibi of Iran, noted
after talks held between China and Iran (January 1996) that, the common
outlook of the two countries in relation to many regional and
international topics is a good reason why the two countries could further
expand their relations. Furthermore, China has committed itself to support
Irans regional military buildup (e.g., an improved missile defense system,
an increased Iranian troop presence and the development of a Revolutionary
Guard rapid reaction force), in an attempt to counter US hegemonic moves
within the Iranian geopolitical sphere. MehrdAd IrAni, The Iran-PRC
Connection: Military Buildup at the Price of Social and Economic Problems,
in Focus on Iran 3:10 (October
1996/http://www.coe.uncc.edu/~fsheikhb/focus1.html):1-4.  
  By comparing Irans military capabilities with its regional neighbors
(e.g., Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Syria), James Moore concluded
that Iran is not the most dominant military power in the region. Moore
utilized the following methodologies in his comparative analysis: (1)
Defense expenditures; (2) Per capita defense expenditures; (3) Burden
ratios (defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP/GNP); (4) Force ratios
(the percentage of armed forces to a given population); (5) Theoretical
combat capabilities (ratio of population to economy); and (6) The US Air
Forces, Weapons Effectiveness Indices/Weighted Unit Values (WEI/WEV).
Moore concluded: (1) Iran is not the most militarized regional society;
(2) In absolute/relative terms, Saudi Arabia devotes more economic wealth
to the military than Iran (only Egypt rated lower than Iran); (3) Iran
rates disfavorably in comparison to its neighbors in conventional force
capabilities; and (4) Irans current rearmament program will not catapult
it into the first tier of regional military powers in the near future.
Ibid., (Moore) pp. 376-381.   
  U.S., Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Terrorism, 1995
Patterns of Global Terrorism, (April
1996/http://nsi.org/Library/Terrorism/terror95.html): 3; 22-24; The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, Text of a Letter From the President
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate, (18 November
1994/http://docs.whitehouse.gov/white-house-publications/1994/11/1994-11-18-letter-on-regulations-in-regard-to-iran.text).
When questioned about a possible Iranian connection to the Dhahran, Saudi
Arabia bombing (that killed 19 Americans in June of 1996), US Secretary of
Defense William Perry quipped, possibly. ... We know that Iran is very
active in international terrorism, some of it directed against the United
States ... so, yes, they are the leading candidate. ... October Surprises,
New York Times, 15 August 1996, p. A27.
  During May of 1995, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher noted,
Based upon a wide variety of data, we know that since the mid-1980s, Iran
has had an organized structure dedicated to acquiring and developing
nuclear weapons. ... Iran is pursuing the classic route to nuclear weapons
which has been followed by almost all states that have recently sought a
nuclear capability. Yet, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
after extensive and exhaustive inspection of Irans nuclear facilities has
determined that Irans nuclear program is consistent with peaceful
purposes. David Albright, An Iranian Bomb? The Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 51:4 (July/August 1995): 21-25.  
  Ibid., pp. 24-26; Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1 September 1996, pp. 5-8. According to AIPAC, GATT
Article XXI permits the US the international legal right to ... protect
our vital national security interests ... Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act
(H.R. 3107) Questions and Answers, in Hot Legislative Issues, (5 June
1996/http://www.aipac.org/iran/iranqa.htm), pp. 4-5.
  The Foreign Minister of Iran, Ali Akbar Velayati has recently noted,
President Rafsanjani and I share the desire to be closer to the West,
though we are still wary of many Western actions and are very angry with
the United States (which my country is in the process of suing) for its
anti-Iranian covert action fund and its trade and investment bans which
are based on erroneous assumptions of my countrys involvement in
terrorism. In regard to the Middle East, I firmly believe that there
should be no nuclear weapons as our region is so volatile that nuclear
weapons in the area could destroy the whole world. It is for this reason
that my country and I are so angry at Israels continued reluctance to sign
the Non-Proliferation treaty. Foreign Minister of Iran, Ali Akbar
Velayati,
(http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/W96ps353S2/Velayati.AliAkbar), p.
1; James Moore, An Assessment of the Iranian Military Rearmament Program,
Comparative Strategy 15 (October 1995): 382-383. Also see Tehran Says U.S.
and Israel Seek to Make Iran a Scapegoat, New York Times, 23 May 1996, p.
A13.   
  As a direct result from the murder investigation of former Iranian Prime
Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar, in Paris during 1991, the French prosecutors
report reveals evidence of Iranian government complicity in the
assassination. The prosecutors report claims, Iranian intelligence
services effectively took part in carrying out this criminal conspiracy.
Since the Islamic Revolution, more than 60 Iranian dissidents have been
assassinated worldwide. Thomas Sancton, Terrorism: The Tehran Connection.
An Exclusive Look at how Iran Hunts Down its Opponents Abroad, TIME
Domestic 143:12 (21 March
1994/http://pathfinder.com/@@WJuw0AUAmzzihA@x/time/magazine/domestic/1994/940321/940321.terrorism.html):
1-2. After the death of Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader Fathi al-Shaqaqi
during 1995, Ayatollah  Ali Khamenei submitted the following eulogy, And
it was at that time when a group of zealous, earnest, pious and
intellectual youthsheaded by our dear martyr, Dr Fathi al-Shaqaqiinspired
by the Islamic revolution of Iran and with hearts full of love and
devotion for the late great Imam Khomeyni [sic], raised the banner of the
Islamic struggle, and in spite of the weak-willed, black-hearted
mercenaries, and in spite of the usurping regime, and in spite of America
and its lackeys, in Arab lands, infused new blood in the depressed veins
of the Palestinian jihad and dealt blows to the enemy who, simple-mindedly
and optimistically, thought the justice-seeking struggles were over. What
Khamenei obviously overlooked was the fact that Shaqaqi was implicated in
former Egyptian President Anwar Sadats assassination, and he also is
credited with founding the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (in the West, these
two situations are universally condemned as constituting terrorism).
Parveez Syed, Iranian Leaders Comment on Shaqaqi Murder, in Global Media
Monitoring, (1 November
1995/http://www.ethic.com/ig/campaign/palest22.txt), pp. 2-5. 
  Nader Mousavizadeh, TRB From Washington: Nemesis, The New Republic, (3
June 1996/http://www.enews.com/magazines/tnr/archive/06/trb060396.html).
Kaveh Afrasiabi asserts that: (1) Iran has filled the vacuum vacated by
the erstwhile Soviet threat; (2) The US is dutifully practicing
unipolarism in the Iranian geopolitical sphere; (3) UN Security Council
(UNSC) Resolution 661 (6 August 1990), established the precedent for the
right of collective self-defense; and (4) The UN Charter Chapter VII,
grants the UN Security Council the authority to determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression ...
make recommendation, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Article 41 and 42, to maintain and restore international peace and
security. Thus, by being a permanent member of the UNSC, the US has
economic, legal and political leverage to implement its policies against
Iran via UN structures. Kaveh Afrasiabi, After Khomeini: New Directions in
Irans Foreign Policy, pp. 164-168.   
  Ibid., (Afrasiabi) pp. 160-168.
  William Millward contends, ... Irans role in the international arena is
the alleged threat it represents as a competitor and ideological
alternative to the prevailing world system. In this frame of reference
Irans is thought to be one of the few regimes since the collapse of the
former Soviet Union that has the ideological resources to challenge the
Western approach to the world, characterized by our own brands of
capitalism, human rights and democracy. William Millward, Containing Iran,
in Canadian Security Intelligence Service: Commentary, 63 (November 1995):
10. 
  Cyrus Bina asserts that US global hegemony is achieved through: (1) US
managed universal currency (US dollar); (2) Global economic development
and supremacy, via the policies of the World Bank/IMF (global institutions
that follow US economic policy/modernization paradigm); (3) International
political institutions (e.g., the UN, GATT, G-7, et al); (4) Military
power and intervention rights (UN Charter provisions, UNSC, NATO, etc.,);
and (5) By reproducing American culture, economics and society around the
globe (global hegemony). Cyrus Bina, Farewell to the Pax Americana: Iran,
Political Islam, and the Passing of the Old Order, in Islam, Iran and
World Stability, pp. 43-48.    
  Ibid., pp. 59-63. 
  In response to perceived hegemonic designs upon the Iranian geopolitical
sphere by the US, Iran has sought alliances with China, North Korea,
India, Pakistan, Syria and even Iraq and Turkey as counterweights. MehrdAd
IrAni, The Iran-PRC Connection: Military Buildup at the Price of Social
and Economic Problems, in Focus on Iran 3:10 (October 1996): 2-4. During
May of 1995, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati quipped, [Iran
and Iraq] should broaden their mutual relations. Foreign Minister of Iran,
Ali Akbar Velayati,
(http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/W96ps353S2/Velayati.AliAkbar), p.
2.