Syria: A Case Study of Decision Making Mechanisms Introduction The realm of international politics is often shaped by regional conflicts and conflagrations. In the post Cold War era, few regional scenarios have presented the significance in impact as the Arab-Israeli conflict. The history of this regional conflict began even before the creation of the Jewish state in 1948 and its implications on world politics linger to the present. One aspect of the Middle East conflict has been the intractable riddle of the Syrian-Israeli relationship. This particular bellicose relationship is rooted in religion, regional hegemony, and ideals. It has been stated that the greatest wars are waged as a result of conflicting ideals. Thus, the Syrian-Israeli brushfire has become a conflict of epic proportions. At the root of the belligerence is the muddled issue of the Golan Heights and the security dilemma. The balance of interests, the clash of ideals, and the individual decision making mechanisms of leaders has created a seemingly, unsolvable puzzle. These issues will be viewed in an attempt to dissect the scenario and to analyze the recent developments in this perplexing relationship. The History For the purpose of this case study, the history of the Syrian-Israeli relationship begins shortly before the Six Day War of 1967. The Six Day War was the culmination of events that occurred in 1964. "An Israeli project to divert water from the Sea of Galilee along an aqueduct to the Negev Desert led Syria to call for joint Arab action against the Israeli effort."1 This fomented an Arab conference in which the heads of state formed the Arab League. In January of 1964, the Arab League met. The main developments of this conference were: an agreement to support a Syrian initiative to divert water from the Jordan River to diminish the impact of the Israeli water diversion program and to formally establish the Palestinian Liberation Organization.2 As tensions mounted and regional hegemons disappeared, Syria began to provide Yassir Arafat, and his Fatah organization, with arms and training. The Fatah organization was rooted in terrorism and used the Syrian military aid to perform raids and terrorist acts against Israel; often from the Golan Heights. Israel retaliated through the use of counterstrikes, in the hopes of deterring the Syria backed Fatah. The Israeli strategy failed and left the government paralyzed. With the inability of the Israeli government to create an effective strategy, Arab nations began to ally themselves with one another; the key alliance was one that united Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. On 1 June 1967, in the face of impending danger, the Israeli government fell. The rebirth of the government was like that of a phoenix; it rose with greater strength and stronger leadership under Moshe Dayan. On 5 June 1967, amidst all of the hazards in the region, Israel launched a pre-emptive strike against her neighbors. In less than a weeks time, Israel had managed to gain the upper hand against all of her neighbors. "Having achieved its military objectives, Israel accepted the UN cease-fire at 6:30 p.m. June 10, the sixth day of the war."3 As a result of the war, Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. This was the turning point in Arab-Israeli relations. "Before the war the key issues were quite simple: the final settlement of Israel's borders and the ultimate disposition of the Arab refugees. After the war several new issues emerged. Among these were the terms by which the Sinai Peninsula would be returned to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria; the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the status of Jerusalem. . . ."4 Another result of the war was the growing involvement of the world in the region. This culminated in the declaration of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The implementation of this resolution also poses interesting questions for the future. The results of the war resonate as the key sources for the current conflict. The lingering effects of the war in 1967 predominate the recent events in the Syria scenario. In 1991, Syria and Israel engaged in peace talks to resolve the seemingly eternal conflict over the Golan Heights and security. The future of the Syrian-Israeli relationship seemed to be hopeful; agreements were reached, in principle, that peace would have to be negotiated in conjunction for land. Hope loomed on the horizon for the potential resolution of the Golan dispute. However, much of this hope dissipated with the death of Yitzhak Rabin, the vanguard in the search for a just and lasting peace. With his death and eventual defeat of the Labor party in the Israeli elections, the peace talks came to a standstill. The new Likud led government abrogated the concessions made by the preceding administration and returned to the hard line stance of Likud party politics. Seemingly at an impasse, the peace process deteriorated further with the discovery of Syrian military movements in southern Lebanon, near the Golan Heights; the Syrian government began military exercises in the region. This annual occurrence, in conjunction with the stalled peace talks, alarmed the international realm. The timing of the military exercises only exacerbated the problem at hand. That is the current scenario of the Syrian-Israeli relationship. The Critical Question The critical questions involved with the recent events in Syria are as follows: Why did Syria come to the bargaining table after years of non-cooperation? In addition, Why did Syria choose to commence military exercises at such a volatile period in their relations with Israel? These questions will be answered through the collaboration of theories and facts; interests and decision making processes; intentions and perceptions. Theoretical Orientation The analysis of any scenario in the study of international politics must first begin with the understanding of the core concepts and theories involved. These concepts will serve as the framework under which the discussion will proceed. The essential concepts involved in this particular case study of Syria will include rationality in decision making, balance of interests, swaggering, brinkmanship, sovereignty, as well as, psychological theories of decision making. Rationality is a core concept in understanding and explaining the behavior of actors in the international realm and interpreting their behavior as a manifestation of their decision making processes and mechanisms. Rationality, in itself, is not defined as a constant term. Rationality is defined as a spectrum or "rheostat" in which comprehensive rationality and irrationality serve as the bookends. Comprehensive rationality is a decision making schema in which the actor is aware of all information relevant to the scenario and conducts a flawless cost-benefit analysis to determine an action or reaction. As aspects of cognitive decision making invade the sanctum of rationality; actors begin to descend down the "rheostat" and enter bounded rationality. This concept incorporates the human element and the real life constraints on time and resources into the decision making mechanism. As it is both improbable and impractical to gather and consider all of the information associated with a particular scenario, decision makers become aware of only a portion of the information and base their actions on the limited information available; actors encounter obstacles to rational thinking in the form of value complexity and uncertainty, as well as a host of others.5 The term rationality thus encompasses concepts ranging from comprehensive rationality to irrationality, including bounded rationality and aspects of cognitive decision making. These cognitive decision making mechanisms include motivated and unmotivated biases, fears, misperceptions, miscalculations, and heuristics. The balance of interests is a calculation that is unique to each individual scenario. The full comprehension of this balance can only be reached with the understanding of interests. Interests are divided into two categories: intrinsic and strategic interests. An intrinsic interest is defined as a tangible object, whether it be land or other resources. A strategic interest is a more abstract term which encompasses more intangible needs and wants, i.e. credibility, leadership, values, and ideals. The interests of each state and the significance of the interests are compared to those of the adversary to determine the balance of these interests. This balance often shapes the resolve of an actor. Swaggering is a category for the different uses of force. "Swaggering is in part a residual category, the deployment of military power for purposes other than defense, deterrence, or compellence. Force is not aimed directly at dissuading another state from attacking, at repelling attacks, nor at compelling it to do something specific. . . . . Swaggering almost always involves the peaceful use of force and is expressed usually in one of two ways: displaying one's military might at military exercises and national demonstrations and buying or building the era's most prestigious weapons."6 Simply, swaggering is a passive use of force. Swaggering is a tool for actors, not the aim. The manner in which this tool is implemented are limited; however, the aims for swaggering are nearly limitless. It (swaggering) aims to enhance the national pride of a people or to satisfy the personal ambitions of its ruler. A state or statesman swaggers in order to look and feel more powerful and important, to be taken seriously by others in the councils of international decision making, to enhance the nation's image in the eyes of others. If its image is enhanced, the nation's defense, deterrent, and compellent capabilities may also be enhanced; but swaggering is not undertaken solely or even primarily for these specific purposes. Swaggering is pursued because it offers to bring prestige "on the cheap."7 The motivations behind a leader or state's decision to engage in swaggering are numerous; however, the constant is that a political goal is reached at a low cost. Brinkmanship is often considered another passive use of force. Brinkmanship is defined as "confrontations in which states challenge important commitments of adversaries in the expectation that the adversaries will back down . . . ."8 It is similar to the concept of swaggering in that they are both passive uses of force; however, they differ in that conventional interpretations of brinkmanship asserts that an initiator intends to threaten another actor as to come to the brink of a conflict. Although brinkmanship, by definition, intentionally creates a crisis situation, "Brinkmanship succeeds only if the initiator achieves his goals without provoking war."9 The goal for brinkmanship is to achieve a particular goal without engaging the adversary in combat. The motivation behind the use of this strategy are as numerous as those for the use of swaggering. These include the anticipation of a "dramatic shift in the balance of power."10 Another motivation for the utilization of this strategy may come from the weakness of a state's political system. In the case of the Arab-Israel Conflict of 1967, "domestic political instability or the frangibility of the state itself appeared instrumental in convincing leaders of the advantages of provoking confrontation."11 "The political weakness of the leaders as distinct from instability of the political system as a whole provided another incentive for brinkmanship. . . . . A fourth incentive for brinkmanship is associated with intra-elite competition for power."12 These motivational factors for the uses of brinkmanship are essential to analyzing the Syrian-Israeli conflict from multiple perspectives. The irony of brinkmanship is that it is often used in the face of impending danger. "Most brinkmanship challenges were initiated without any good evidence that the adversary in question lacked the resolve to defend its commitment. Available indications most often pointed to the opposite conclusion since the commitments at stake appeared to have met the four conditions normally associated with successful deterrence: they were clearly defined; their existence was communicated to possible adversaries; the states making them possessed the means to defend them; and they made reasonable efforts to demonstrate their resolve to do so."13 In essence, most cases of brinkmanship occur in situations that would seem inclined to result in conflict. An apparent paradox in that the success of brinkmanship lies solely in the criterion that war does not occur. Another theoretical facet of this paper will address the Syrian scenario in regard to various aspects of the psychology of decision making. One concept associated with the psychology or schema of actors is the endowment effect. The endowment effect "enhances the pain of giving up your assets."14 The losses incurred by an actor tend to be vivid and the perceived losses are feared more than they are actually worth. The disproportionate concern for losses forces the actor to stray from comprehensive rationality. The endowment effect ties into the schema of the "basement of fear." Quite simply, an actor fears an internal or external threat and thus fails to comply to another, potentially more painful, threat. Regardless of the significance of a threat, the perceived fear of another overwhelms the actor and forces the actor to behave irrationally. This situation often leads to failed strategy due to misperceptions of threat and the psychology of fear. A final concept involved in the theoretical discussion of Syria will be sovereignty and its implications on international law and justice. Sovereignty in itself is divided into two distinct categories: internal and external. "The former denotes the highest original, as opposed to derived, power within a territorial jurisdiction. This power is not subject to the executive, legislative, or judicial jurisdiction of a foreign power or any foreign law other than public international law. The external aspect of sovereignty underlines the independence and equality of all states."15 This concept is inexorably linked to the discussion of the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights and the UN response to the continued occupation. Balance of Interests The interests involved in the case of the Syrian dispute with Israel are as diverse as they are complex. They include the ever-changing concepts of sovereignty, international stability, peace, and international law and justice. They also include the intrinsic interests; the need for land. These conflicting interests and the historically conflicting actors intertwine to form the backdrop for Syrian scenario. Israel Since the creation of Israel in 1948, Israel has been searching for peace with her neighbors. However, Israel has found nothing resembling peace in her brief history as a state. "Israel's repeated military campaigns since 1948 never succeeded in getting her further away from the state of war with her neighbors."16 "Israel for its part has always sought peace with Syria. The reason is simple--The main goal of all Israeli governments is to secure the future existence of the State of Israel, and peace between Israel and its neighbors constitutes an important strategic asset to the security and future of the Jewish state."17 The main interests of Israel have been the ever-elusive peace and national security; national security has been and will remain a universally desired interest. "Few people would deny that security, whether individual, national, or international, ranks prominently among the problems facing humanity. National security is particularly central because states dominate many of the conditions that determine the security at the other two levels, and states seem unable to coexist with each other in harmony."18 By their very nature, the two interests are intertwined. The main obstacle for the attainment of these interests is the lack of trust that the Israeli government harbors towards Syria. The lack of faith in Syria stems from three principle reasons: 1. Constant Syrian aggression toward all its neighbors, headed by Israel. 2. Syrian refusal to recognize the sovereignty of its neighbors as the fundamental principle of the "Greater Syria" concept, which includes Israel and Jordan to the Gulf of Aqaba in the Red Sea. 3. The Nature of the Syrian regime and those at its head.19 The lack of trust has led to an Israeli attitude that requires guaranteed peace, via safeguards, as the foundation for negotiations. "In direct talks with the Syrian delegation, and through the mediation of top-level US officials, the Israeli government has made its position extremely clear. The peace with Syria cannot be in name alone, it must have a secure foundation . . . . These four pillars are recognized borders, security arrangements, peaceful relations, and phased implementation."20 These stipulations include the reduction of Syrian forces, the establishment of demilitarized zones, the creation of early warning stations, and the use of effective monitoring (vis-a- vis a multinational Force of Observers).21 The lack of trust and the subsequent policy choices have made it difficult to attain the very interests most desired by Israel. The United States The United States, as the world's pre-eminent power, has a vested interest in all regions of the world and in all matters. The future of USG concerns was outlined by Peter Tarnoff: "It has become routine to observe that the critical issues of the 21st Century will be 'global' in the sense that all citizens of all countries will feel themselves concerned. In this category, we hear most about disease (especially AIDS), famine, the environment, immigration, drug trafficking, and nuclear proliferation."22 A more recent outline of USG interests was given by Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau: Let me be more specific about our interests in the Middle East. They include: --first and foremost, achieving a just, comprehensive, secure and durable Arab-Israeli peace --helping maintain the security and well being of Israel --preventing regional conflicts and supporting friendly nations --ensuring the free flow of oil from the Gulf upon which we and other industrial nations depend for our economic security --enhance business opportunities for our companies and jobs for our citizens --suppressing terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction --containing rogue regimes in Iran, Iraq, and Libya . . . advancing respect for human rights, the rule of law and open, participatory societies, --and preserving the deep cultural ties we have to the origins of Western civilization and the birthplace of the great monotheistic religious. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. All of these give our nation a concrete and lasting stake in the Middle East.23 It is important to note the mention of drug trafficking as a key interest for the future of foreign policy, a practice to which Syria has been linked. It is also important not to neglect the constants in USG' interests. In regard to the Syrian scenario, many of these interests apply. As has always been the case, the USG has been steadfast in their commitment to the state of Israel. As a central ally, the United States offers its extended deterrence umbrella to protect the interests of Israel. They also maintain a desire to see a peaceful and lasting conclusion to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the seemingly, intractable feud between Israel and Syria. "We have long felt that peace between Israel and Syria is essential for closing the circle of peace and producing a comprehensive settlement. We are committed to working toward this goal."24 Although this has been one of the goals of the USG, it has been slow in coming to fruition, in part due to an inability of US foreign policy or an unwillingness to use it. "The United States has the economic and political leverage to force Israeli concessions but has not yet used it."25 This is an example of the USG's failure to implement strategy. Another interest of the USG is the commitment to fight terrorism. "The United States has made clear to the Syrians on numerous occasions that their support for international terrorist groups is a serious impediment to our bilateral relationship."26 In an effort to fight the spread of terrorism, the USG has included Syria on a "list of countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism." They are mentioned in broad terms on the 1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism. It is this categorization of Syria that has led to the labeling of Syria as a Rogue state.27 Syria, although not directly linked to terrorist activities since 1986, have remained on the list of terrorist states due to their continued practice of providing a safe haven and support for several terrorist groups.28 The placement of Syria on this list has led to sanctions and other consequences. "The basic features of these sanctions are: prohibition of US economic assistance and military sales, controls on dual use equipment which could support terrorism or military activities, and prohibitions on US Government support for multilateral economic assistance."29 Sanctions have also been levied against Syria based on the Export Administration Act of 1979, the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Control Act of 1989, the Anti- Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and the Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations. These sanctions include restrictions on financial transactions and contributions made by and on the behalf of the Syrian government.30 The continued non-compliance represents a failure of USG strategy on Syria. Syria Since the Six Day War of 1967, the Syrian government has been yearning for the return of the Golan Heights. Along with this intrinsic interest, Syria is linked to the dispute with Israel over several other enduring interests. "Syria's regional relations are influenced by its desire to regain the Golan Heights from Israel, its hatred of the rival Ba'ath regime in Iraq, its desire to keep Lebanon under its influence and control, and its support for an independent, Syrian-influenced, Palestinian state."31 The core issue still remains the return of the Golan Heights to Syria and a return to sovereignty. On 22 November 1967, the UN Security Council unveiled Resolution 242. This resolution called for the eventual return of the Golan Heights and a return to security and sovereignty. (The UNSC) affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle Ease which should include the application of both the following principles: --Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; --Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of violence.32 The issues of both internal and external sovereignty serve as uncompromisable interests for the Syrian government. "The erosion of national sovereignty is extremely damaging to nations in the developing world where sovereignty is an extremely important and sensitive matter."33 They feel the need to regain control of the Golan both physically and politically. In addition, they feel that the external sovereignty, equal treatment of nations under international laws, is being violated by the lack of UN response to the continued Israeli occupation; the "paper tiger" declarations made by the UN on their behalf have not satisfied Syria's contention of partiality in international adjudication.34 "Through the UN Security Council, the major powers exert disproportionate influence over international law."35 The Syrian desire to gain both internal and external sovereignty serve as major motivation for their actions in the Middle East. Another significant interest within the decision making calculus of the Syrian government is that of self interest of the leader. As with all leaders, Assad's interests include that of the state as well as that of his desire to stay in power. The interest of the leader of the state often has a significant impact on the actions and reactions of the national as a whole. In addition, Assad has also publicly announced that his goals for Syria include that of changing the global perception of Syria. "Hafez al Assad wants the outside world to view his country as a 20th century secular republic."36 They have attempted to shape public opinion of Syria away from that of a rogue to that of the forced actor. In regard to the Golan Heights, Syria has continued to frame the conflict as a nation fighting for autocracy rather than terrorist activities. Assad's desire to reinvent the image of Syria is also a significant interest for Syria. In addition to these more abstract interests, Syria yearns for the same tangible assets of every country. They desire more international aid to improve their standards of living. Syria has a vested interest in changing international economic policies which constrain her economy. As with every nation, Syria desires wealth and the power associated with it. Implications The major implications of these interests is that the attainment of one goal or interest by one state may by nature infringe upon the other state's ability to either attain or maintain its interests. The ideal example is the balance of interests in regard to Israel and Syria; security and sovereignty; the Golan Heights. To Israel, the lesson from the 1967 War and numerous terrorist attacks is the significance of the Golan Heights as a strategic point of attack. The Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights ensures the Jewish state will not be attacked from a high ground post. This in essence upgrades the level of security for the state, her people, and her ideals. To the Syrian government, the issue of sovereignty is violated by the continued Israeli presence in the Golan. The terrorist acts being committed in the Golan Heights are categorized as freedom fighting. "Syria condemns terror and will continue to condemn it at every opportunity, but what Israel defines as terror is national struggle against occupation. National struggle is a legitimate right of nations, as is written in the UN Charter. The Israeli occupation of the territories and collective punishment which Israel imposes on the citizenry is terror."37 The Syrian interest of sovereignty is restricted by the Israeli need for security. This conflict of interests resonates throughout the Syrian-Israeli conflict. Syrian Perspective The recent Syrian actions in regard to the Middle East peace talks must be analyzed under the framework of multiple theoretical backdrops. The recent history of the Syrian- Israeli relationship will be viewed as a result of various decision making processes. Decision Making The Syria case can be viewed in terms of rational and irrational decision making processes. A critical event in the shaping of Syrian foreign policy was the demise of the Soviet Union. "During the Cold War, Syria received billions of dollars worth of aid from the Soviet Union in return for allowing the Soviet navy to use its Mediterranean ports. . . . . during the 1980's 95 percent of Syria's arms imports came from the former USSR. . . . . If the Assad regime once aspired to destroy Israel with military force, the demise of Syria's super power arms dealer now makes such a goal clearly unrealistic; a peaceful solution has thus become more appealing."38 This may explain the less cooperative tone of Syrian foreign policy prior to 1991. This may also hold the key to explaining the Syrian efforts to negotiate in 1991. "The Soviet Union's demise in late 1991 pushed Syria to forge new ties with the West . . . ."39 Under this theoretical backdrop, Syria's decision to come to the peace talks seems quite rational and quite timely. Another set of facts may also derive a different explanation of Syria's new cooperative facade, still viewing Syrian decision making mechanisms as fairly rational. The fall of the Soviet Union not only meant the ceasing of military aid, it also meant the loss of a major market. Syria relied on the Soviet Union not only to supply sophisticated weaponry, but also to consume Syrian exports. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Fall 1993 report on Syria shows a widening trade deficit, the main reason for which "is the estimated 54 percent reduction in non-oil, largely private-sector exports previously directed at the markets of the former Soviet Union." The break-up of the Soviet Union, then, has clearly undermined the whole foundation of Syria's foreign policy. . . . Syria now "desires a [foreign policy] realignment," presumably one involving some degree of rapprochement with the US.40 The economic repercussion of the demise of the USSR may have left Syria with no alternative but to seek cooperation with the West and "move toward economic self sufficiency, as well as a slow transition to a more market based system."41 The intrinsic interest of wealth led Assad to the negotiations, a derivative of a rational decision making mechanisms. An alternative perspective may be the most overlooked, yet most simplistic interpretation of Syria's new, friendly foreign policy. According to UN Security Council Resolution 242, the fulfillment of Syria's most treasured interest, the return of the Golan Heights, can only be reached through the application of both principles outlined: a cease to the occupation of the Golan and a secured peace. After exhausting other measures and incurring US sanctions, negotiations may have seemed to be the most likely to attain their goals. As consistent with rational decision making theories, the Syrian government sought the optimum outcome; negotiations. Under the conditions of rational decision making theory, these factors may all played a part in Syria's decision to negotiate in 1991. Endowment Effect Another enduring concept applicable to the explanation of Syrian foreign policy is the endowment effect. As defined, the endowment effect is a phenomenon that enhances the pain of loss. In the Syrian scenario, the lost assets were the Golan Heights and sovereignty; both of which are listed as Syrian interests. According to the endowment effect, the loss of these assets has led to the intensifying of their desire to regain the Golan. This may offer another explanation to Syria's decision to engage in negotiations with Israel. Alternative Theory of Brinkmanship The study of brinkmanship has primarily revolved around the concept of teetering on the verge of conflict. The classic scenario is that of an initiator challenging a defender's resolve by heightening the potential for conflict. The desired goal is to achieve a certain aim without resorting to war; the intended outcome is never war. An alternate, and logical, theory of brinkmanship can be derived by looking at the antithesis of the classic definition of brinkmanship as such: an initiator attempts to attain a particular aim by teetering on the verge of cooperation with a defender. The success of the alternative brinkmanship strategy is dependent on the fact that cooperation never occurs, yet the aim is reached. In 1991, Syria decided to engage Israel in negotiations to establish a resolution to the Golan/security conundrum. As stated above in the interest analysis, an enumerated interest of the Syrian government is to change the global perspective of Syria as a non-cooperative rogue state. By entering into the peace talks, they began to radiate a different public image. "Hafez al Assad reiterated his commitment to the achievement of a peace deal with Israel based on UN resolutions."42 Syria's professed commitment to the peace talks, primarily, in conjunction with UN resolutions, by definition, diminishes their identification as a rogue state. On the eve of the Israeli elections, Assad announced that he would not expect progress until after the elections.43 Quite simply, Assad stalled. Slowly, the peace talks became mired in scheduling difficulties and other obstacles. "The US Secretary of State, Mr. Warren Christopher, left the Syrian capital, Damascus, after failing to have scheduled talks with President Hafez al Assad."44 To further slow the peace talks, the change of power from the Labor party to the Likud party ensured a slowing of the peace process. Benjamin Netanyahu stated repeatedly that the security of Israel could not be risked; the Golan Heights could not be returned. The hard line approach of the Likud government led to a standstill in the peace talks. Even prior to the standstill, the Syrian press attempted to force Israel to shoulder the blame for the languor of the peace process. "Syria's official press accused Israel today of trying to block progress in peace talks . . . ."45 The pre- emptive attempts to force Israel to assume blame for the inactivity of the peace process allowed Syria to place more of the burden on Israel after the change in government. Once the standstill seemed fixed, the Syrian government returned to its conventional foreign policy. The government of Syria engaged in military exercises in southern Lebanon, near the Golan Heights. In this scenario, they were able to make ground in changing their international perception. Simultaneously, they deflected much of the blame onto Israel. A recent media analysis showed that the US media has framed the Israeli government and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as being hardline in the past six months while leaving Syria and Assad out of the critical eye.46 Even public sentiment in the US changed from one of pure pro-Israeli attitudes to one of concern over Netanyahu's more radical approach. Syria came to the verge of cooperation in an attempt to change perception, and never engaged in full cooperation. This explanation is highly speculative; however, the correlative relationship between the different factors builds an adequate circumstantial case. This alternative application of the brinkmanship concept offers yet another explanation of Syrian actions and decision making processes. Swaggering Swaggering as a concept cannot and does not explain the Syrian move toward negotiations in 1991; however, it can be an effective explanatory tool in dissecting the recent Syrian military exercises. As defined by Robert Art, by definition, the military exercises near the Golan Heights can be classified as a use of swaggering. "Swaggering almost always involves only the peaceful use of force and is usually expressed in one of two ways: displaying one's might at military exercises . . . ."47 At the time, Syria was in the midst of a peace process that had come to a standstill. As discussed in the theoretical orientation, swaggering may be selected as a foreign policy strategy in an effort "to be taken more seriously by others in the councils of international decision making, to enhance the nation's image in the eyes of others. If its image is enhanced, the nation's defense, deterrent and compellent capabilities may also be enhanced."48 The military exercises may have been an attempt to compel the Likud led government to re-engage in constructive negotiations on the resolution of the Syrian-Israeli conflict. If this explanation is valid, the failure of US strategy has been temporary. Classical Theory of Brinkmanship The classic application of brinkmanship theory explains the re-emergence of Syria's rogue regime mentality. At a time of potential peace, Syria reverted back to her bellicose persona of pre-1991 diplomacy. The military exercises, although routine in nature, garnered much attention and created new levels of tension and concern. The precise timing of the exercises tends to lend credibility to the assertion that their commencement was a component of strategy and not a product of routine. The standstill in the peace talks, the assassination of Rabin, and the change in government had already been established as obstacles to peace. The military exercises only served to fuel speculation and distrust. The heightened level of tension and mistrust did not yield a war and thus two premises of classic brinkmanship have been located in this scenario. The missing component is the primary aim behind the use of brinkmanship. This may be found in the analysis of Syria's interests. Assad presently dominates the regional diplomatic dynamics simply because everybody is desperate to get his support for the peace process--not because of Syria's military or economic performance or potential. He is being honored by leaders from all over the world, and Syria enjoys a flow of foreign aid aimed to "smooth" the road to peace. The moment a decision is reached, Syria and Assad will be relegated to their natural role in the regional dynamics.49 The current unresolved state of affairs allows Syria to fulfill multiple goals. The centrality of Syria to unlocking the standstill in the peace process has led to the lending of aid to Syria. This increased wealth which, as for all countries, is an intrinsic interest. Furthermore, the temporary enhancement of Syria's position in the realm of both regional and international politics represents the attainment of strategic goals. The increase in the relative importance of Syria help to serve the needs of both the nation and the leader. It stabilizes their control over the region and state, respectively. The resolution of the Syrian-Israeli conflict would yield the return of Syria to a position of relative anonymity. The classic application offers a strong explanation for the Syrian behavior of the recent past. Basements of Fear There are two potential explanations that relate the concept of the basement of fear with Syrian foreign policy. The first takes an inner-directedness approach by questioning the internal power base of Assad. "Assad's inaction, however, stems from far more than a lack of desire to negotiate with the Israelis or a refusal to be pressured by Western nations. . . . the domestic repercussions of a peace with Israel may pose a political risk to his regime."50 As with many regimes built on a foundation of coup d'etats and military support, the current regime must be aware of the potential implications of foreign policy on its power base. "The great domestic challenges that Assad would face if he negotiated peace with the Israelis stem primarily from the fact that the army is the central pillar of support for the regime. As Raymond Hinnesbusch has described, the army plays the dual roles of 'leading force' and 'regime shield.'"51 The actions of the Syrian regime must accommodate the needs and interests of the military. In addition, he needs to incorporate the needs and wishes of his religious faction in Syria. Assad, along with the military, are members of the Alawis, a religious minority in Syria that has controlled the majority.52 Another aspect of Assad's control over Syria is rooted in his credibility. Although the Ba'ath Party he leads is not adhered to a specific, concrete party line, it has been built on the pattern of anti-Western and anti-Israeli rhetoric. Throughout the course of the Assad regime, he has been critical of the Israeli government and the Egyptian and Jordanian governments; for their peace negotiations.53 The abandonment of his "platform" of rhetoric would weaken his credibility within his own state. Another aspect of rhetoric lies in that the resolution of the Syrian-Israeli conflict will mean the loss of Assad's most viable target. The void created by the lack of Israel as a target for rhetoric will only enhance the public's perception of the Ba'ath Party's lack of a platform. In addition, it will be difficult to prove that the ancient, intractable conflict has come to a just and fair end so suddenly.54 The most significant obstacle in the path of peace is the Israeli demand for a reduction of military forces as a component for a just and fair peace. This requirement would force Assad to "strike a dagger into the heart" of his power base. The acquiescence to the current Israeli demands may be beneficial to the state but would surely weaken if not topple Assad's power base.55 Under these circumstances, the perceived threat from the outside, in the form of sanctions, and the benefits of regaining the Golan Heights are outweighed by the fears of the loss of power. Assad's descendency into the "basement of fear" explains the inner directedness of his foreign policy and its implications for peace; no fair and just peace can be reached. A second application of the "basement of fear" schema can be used to offer an alternative explanation for the inability of Syria and Israel to foment a just and lasting peace. This scenario monitors the recent actions of Syria as a result of outer directedness, a symptom of the "basement of fear." The rift between the Syrian regime and the Iraqi regime are well documented, as stated in the interests portion of this case study. On the other hand, the Syrian government has maintained good relations with Iran. "In September 1990, President Assad made his first official visit to Iran in 17 years, meeting with the Iranian president and concluding a bilateral agreement for increased political and economic cooperation. The continued friendly relations were reflected in the visit of Syrian Vice President Abdul Khaddam to Iran in June 1995."56 With these relationships in mind, it is necessary to consider the different scenarios that would result from peace and conflict. In the case of regional peace, Israel and Iraq will assume the roles of regional hegemons due to their advanced technology and wealth. If the Middle East returns to a state of conflict, the two powers that will emerge will be Iran and Egypt.57 In conjunction with the relations that Syria has maintained, a peaceful situation would leave Syria in a lose-lose situation. The poor relations between Syria and both Iraq and Israel would leave Syria in the cold. In a conflict ridden Middle East, the strong connection with Iran will provide Syria with both a forum for action and an opportunity to rise in the power structure. These predictions would favor the creation of a region in conflict, not peace. This offers yet another explanation for Syria's aversion to cooperation in the Middle East and their return to a more hostile position. This explanation views "basements of fear" as it relates to outer directedness. This may explain the failure of US diplomacy, sanctions, and interest attainment in creating a just and lasting peace. Conclusion The study of Syria as an actor in the international realm serves as a fairly comprehensive application of decision making mechanisms. The various decision making processes that provide insight into the Syrian-Israeli conflict are: rational decision making theory, cognitive decision making theory, swaggering, brinkmanship, and fears. The varying explanations they provide are essential to the analysis of US policy failures in regard to Syria. The constant theme in several explanations is that the government of Syria benefits from the non-existence of peace. A state of conflict maintains Assad's power base while simultaneously maintaining the state's ability to remain in a relatively high position of power. Brinkmanship and swaggering are both viewed as cost-effective options which may allow for future concessions on Israel's behalf and maintain a level of tension in the region. In addition, the conflict of interests and interpretation of actions has led to the growing rift between Israel and Syria. The core interest of Israel cannot be attained without restricting the ability of Syria to attain their core interest. Although these barriers would be enough to explain the relative ineffectiveness of the US in the Syrian-Israeli conflict, the US policy failures can be found in their inability to adapt to the decision making mechanism of Syria. If the brinkmanship hypothesis is the true nature of the conflict, the US needs to follow a policy of assurance and not sanctions; as mentioned by Jervis. If the source of the conflict rises from the a balance of interests view point, the USG must create and enforce legislation that would alter the decision making calculus of Syria. The current sanctions on Syria are of little impact. The recent sanctions placed on Syria are vague and low in the degree to which they effect Syria and the citizens of Syria. When faced with the various factors that make Syria a non- cooperative actor, the US sanctions do little to alter behavior; they mirror the effects of a containment policy. The implications for future policy is divided into two approaches, dependent on the assumptions that are made about Syria as an actor in the realm of international politics. First, if the assumption is that the USG is genuine in their interest to create a long and just peace and Syria is rational, the USG needs to make the sanctions more stringent. The sanctions must be painful enough as to change the decision making calculus of Syria. If the core assumptions are such that Syria is irrational and in the "basement of fear," the USG must dismantle their system of sanctions on Syria and adopt a policy of assurance. The failure to change and adapt foreign policy to suit the decision making mechanisms of Syria will yield the same failures faced by today's ill conceived strategy. 1The Middle East. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1994. 26. 2Ibid, 26. 3Ibid, 28. 4Ibid, 29. 5Alexander L. George provides uncertainty and value complexity, in regard to information, as the key obstacles in the calculation of options in decision making. George, Alexander L. "Adapting to Constraints on Rational Decisionmaking." In Internation al Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, 451-471. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992. 6Robert J. Art offers four categories for the uses of force. He classifies all uses of force as either deterrence, defense, compellence, and swaggering. Art, Robert J. "The Four Functions of Force." In International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, 137. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992. 7Ibid, 137. 8Lebow, Richard N. "The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?" In Psychology & Deterrence, ed Robert Jervis, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, 180. The Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 1985. 9Lebow, Richard N. "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War." In Psychology & Deterrence, ed Robert Jervis, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, 119. The JohnsHopkins Press: Baltimore, 1985. 10Lebow. "The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?" 180. 11Ibid, 181. 12Ibid, 181. 13Ibid, 182. 14Tanter, Raymond. "Prospect Theory: Choosing to Cooperate." Class Notes, 472Not11.Doc. University of Michigan, 8 Sept. 1996. Available: http://www.umich.edu/~rtanter 15"Ruth Lapidoth is Bessie and Michael Greenblatt Professor of International Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Dr. Lapidoth is also a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Lapidoth, Ruth." "Redefining Authority: The Past, Present, a nd Future of Sovereignty." The Harvard International Review (Summer 1995): 9. 16"Munther Haddadin is the Chief Negotiator on Water, Energy, and the Environment for the Heshemite Kingdom of Jordan." Haddadin, Munther J. "Learning to Share: Divided Sovereignty Over Water Resources." The Harvard International Review (Summer 1995 ): 22. 17Chaim Schacham is the Israeli Consul for Press and Information to the Midwest. Schacham, Chaim. "The Israel-Syria Negotiations-What Are We Trying to Achieve?" Midwest Jewish Week (March 1995): 1. Available: http://www.israelemb.org/chicago/syria.htm 18The assertion is made that the concept of national security is the constant, universal interest that predominates in the post-Cold War era. Buzan, Barry. People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Er a. Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, 1991. 1. 19"What is the Origin of Israel's Total lack of Faith in Syria?" Peace with the Golan (On Line). Available: http://www.golan.org.il/syria.html#1 20Schacham, 1. 21Ibid, 2. 22Peter Tarnoff was the President of the Council on Foreign Relations. Tarnoff, Peter. "An End to Foreign Policy." The Harvard International Review (Summer 1992): 5. 23As Assistant Secretary of State, he delivered a speech on the USG's position in regard to the Middle East. Pelletreau, Robert H. "U.S. Policy Toward the Middle East: Steering a Steady Course." speech before the Chautauqua Institution (On Line): Ne w York, 21 Aug. 1996. 2.Available: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/960821.html 24Ibid, 6. 25"Talking Points: Middle East Peace Process." Available: http://cni.mynet.net/mepptp.html 26Ambassador Wilcox is the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and provides testimony justifying the categorization of Syria as a rogue nation, a nation in support of terrorism. He includes an outline of the measures the USG has taken in its attempts to d eter the Syrian government. Wilcox, Philip C., Jr. "Syrian Support for Terrorism." testimony before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives (On Line): Washington, DC, 25 July 1996. 1. Available: http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/960725.html 27Klare, Michael. Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995. 148. 28"1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism." The US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (April 1996): 31. (On Line) Available: http://nsi.org/Library/Terrorism?terror95.html 29Wilcox, 2. 30"Terrorism: What You Need To Know About US Sanctions." US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control: 2. (On Line) Available: http://www.ustreas.gov/treasury/services/fac/fac.html 31"Syria: International Relationships." 1. (On Line) Available: http://www.dreamscape.com/tony/syri0008.htm 32"U.N. Security Council Resolution 242." U.N. Security Council (22 Nov 1967): 1. (On Line) Available: http://www.usis-israel.org.il/publish/peace/242.htm 33Aziz, Tariq. "Laws of the Jungle: Power Over Principle in International Law." The Harvard International Review (Summer 1995): 31-32. 34This in response to the various UN declarations condemning Israel: "Under other provisions of the resolution on the Syrian Golan, adopted by a vote of 66 in favor to 2 against (Israel, United States), with 79 abstentions, the Assembly determined once more that the continued occupation of that area and its defacto annexation constituted a stumbling-block in the way of achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East." "Press Release: GA/9023." UN General Assembly (4 Dec 1995): 1. (On Line) Available: http://www.un.org/plewbcgi/idoc.pl?615+unix+_free_user_+www.un.org..80+un+un+pr+pr ++resolution%26adj%26242 35Aziz, 31. 36"What Exactly Does Assad Want?" Link 2 Link (March 1996): 1. (On Line) Available: http://link2lik.co.il/link45/cover4.htm 37"Syria: National Struggle Legitimate." Peace with the Golan (16 March 1996): 1. (On Line) Available: http://www.golan.org.il/media75.html 38Hartman, Harris. "Last of a Breed: Syria Examines Its Role in the New Middle East." The Harvard International Review (Spring 1994): 45. 39"Syria: Recent Developments." 1. (On Line) Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/syria.html 40Hartman, 45. 41"Syria: Recent Developments." 1. (On Line) 42"Syrian Press Blasts Israel." SRA Corp (15 Jan 96): 1. (On Line) Available: http://projects.sra.com/nametag/demo1/doc/sub15/D35.html 43Brennock, Mark. "Assad Expects No Moves Before Israeli Election." The Irish Times : 1. (On Line) Available: http://194.125.58.5/irish-times/paper/0214/for7.html 44Cusack, Jim. "US Peace Envoy Due Back in Syria Today After 'Snub.'" The Irish Times: 1. (On Line) Available: http://www.irish-times.com/irish-times/paper/0424/fro2.html 45"Syrian Press Blasts Israel," 1. (On Line) 46"Facts You Should Know." The Camera (December 1996): 5. 47Art, 137. 48Ibid, 137. 49Bodansky, Yossef. "Syria's Strategic Posture." Freeman Center (Feb 1996): 3. (On Line) Available: http://www.freeman.org/feb96/bodansky.htm 50Singer, Jordy. "Under Pressure: Syrian Participation in the Peace Process." The Harvard International Review (Fall 1995): 58. 51Ibid, 58. 52Ibbi, 58. 53Ibid, 58-9. 54Ibid, 88. 55Ibid, 88. 56"Syria: International Relations," 1. 57Bodansky, 3.