INTRODUCTION
	Few scenarios in the arena of national security affairs seem to
garner as much attention as current United States government (USG) efforts
to contain Saddam Hussein's Iraq.  Currently, the Clinton administration
applies what it calls a policy of "dual-containment" -- of Iraq and the
other "regional threat", Iran.  This policy is a departure from that of
past US administrations, namely the Reagan and Bush administrations, which
pursued a "balance of power" policy in order to maintain security in the
oil-rich region.  
	Balance of power strategy attempts to maintain a balance between
two competing regional powers (in this case Iraq and Iran).  Balancing is
maintained by giving support, sometimes overt while other times tacit, to
one side or the other in an attempt to secure the "balancer's" (USG)
interests and maintain the international order of things.1
	The Clinton administration's dual containment approach seeks to
deal with each of these "regional threats" on an individual basis.  On one
hand, the USG has employed specific sanctions and laws in an effort to
keep Iran at bay.  Similarly, when dealing with Iraq, the current US
administration has continued to vigorously support the UN sanctions
leveled against Iraq after the end of Operation Desert Storm.
Additionally, the USG has, on a number of occasions, taken more severe
steps vis-a-vis Iraq:  two separate cruise missile attacks (1993 & 1996)
as well as the occasional deployment of US ground troops aimed to deter
renewed Iraqi aggression against its neighbors to the south.
	The critical question that this work will endeavor to answer is:
Why does the USG continue with such punitive measures (sanctions, missile
attacks & troop deployments) in order to contain Iraq despite eroding
international and regional support for such actions?
	In order to facilitate an evaluation of the current USG policy
toward Iraq, it is necessary to set forth theoretical parameters in which
to study the situation.  This work will focus on two theoretical concepts
or orientations:  Prospect Theory, Bounded Rationality Theory and
Misperception Theory (as articulated by Arthur Stein).
	In addition to the concepts mentioned above, this work relies on
the theoretical concepts as discussed throughout the course of Political
Science 672.  A theoretical glossary is provided at the end of this in
order to clarify concepts not elaborated upon in the text of this paper.
	Once a theoretical framework is established, this work will then
articulate the situational reality as it is perceived by the two actors
(Iraq and the United States).  This will involve a discussion of each
actors interests in the situation, what each view as the threat, and any
biases which may influence the decision making process of each nation
(when such biases may be determinable).
	With an understanding of the reality of the situation, as it is
perceived by each actor, this paper will then review the use of deterrence
and coercive diplomacy in USG efforts to contain Iraq.  Specifically,
deterrent and coercive measures that were employed from 1990 through 1996
will be considered.  
	Armed with historical evidence, this work will then move on to
discuss the theoretical implications of USG policies.  This will be
accomplished by applying the theoretical models articulated in the
theoretical orientation portion of this paper.	Finally, USG policies
vis-a-vis Iraq will be reconsidered and recommended changes to will be
proposed.  

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION
	When evaluating a given nations policies from a theoretical
standpoint, it is necessary to examine the policy by using a number of
different theoretical concepts.   Much like a physician uses a number of
devices to determine exactly what it is that ails his patient, scholars
evaluating policy must use different theories.  Just as a CAT-scan
provides a different picture of a patient than does an X-ray or an MRI,
different theories of political behavior provide the scholar with a
different picture of a given policy.  The tools this work will utilize in
order to obtain an accurate assessment of USG policy vis-a-vis Iraq are
Prospect Theory, Bounded Rationality Theory, and Misperception Theory.
PROSPECT THEORY
	Prospect Theory provides a useful tool with which to examine the
Iraq case.  Taking the expected utility function2 one step further,
Prospect Theory introduces psychological variables into decision
processes.  Such variables provide evidence for the failure of an
otherwise analytical, and therefore rational, decision making process.  
	Reference points are critical to Prospect Theory in that courses
of action are determined with them [reference points] in mind.  Reference
points provide the decision maker with the strategic consideration in his
decision calculus.  Due to this, according to Prospect theorists, decision
makers weigh perceived losses more heavily than they do gains.  This,
then, places inordinate value on the reference point and causes the
decision maker to accept great risks in his efforts to avoid any loss in
relation to the reference point.  Conversely, the decision maker is much
less likely to take risks in an attempt to achieve relative gains.3
	The basement of fear provides Prospect theorists with ample fodder
for their argument, as it relates to national security decision making.
An actor who perceives an internally or externally generated fear of loss
may be motivated to engage in dangerous policies, in an effort to prevent
such loss.  This eventuality may even come about despite a clearly
articulated deterrent policy.4
BOUNDED RATIONALITY THEORY
	The second tool this work will utilize in its evaluation of USG
policy theorizes that rational decision making processes may fail due to a
number of factors.  In Bounded Rationality Theory, the perceived ability
to control and calculate risk, limitations on information processing due
to cognitive constraints, and bureaucratic politics all come into play to
derail an otherwise rational decision making process.5
	Internal biases, information deprivation or overload, and the
trappings of group-think are all examples of the cognitive process at
work.  If, in a bureaucracy, for example, one member fails to provide
vital information to the decision maker, the lack of information could
lead to a failure of the decision making process.  Likewise, an overload
of information could create a situation when valuable information is
discarded or not even considered, thereby influencing the outcome of the
process.  
	Often, biases are created regarding significant events, by
analyzing them in a cognitive manner.  This can result in misperceptions
that, in turn, act as obstacles to rational decision-making.  Bounded
Rationality theorists, therefore, see misperceptions as the most
significant factor that can lead to policy failure.
MISPERCEPTION THEORY
	Arthur Stein proposes to take misperceptions a further step and
develop a comprehensive theory with which to evaluate national security
decision making.  
	Misperception may well be a common occurrence in international
relations and may often affect an actors expectation of the probable
outcome.  But the assumption that misperception affects an actors choice
and thus changes a games outcome does not always hold, for an actors
course of action depends only sometimes on its correct assessment of the
other actors preferences.  In other words, misperception is often
irrelevant to the cause and escalation of crisis and war.6

	Good forecasting in international affairs logically requires
accurate assessments of intentions as well as capabilities.  While
decision making in an uncertain world can involve divergent forecasts,
self-encouragement, and even miscalculation, none of these
characteristics, Stein contends, necessarily reflect misperception.
Misperception is not the inaccurate forecast of the future but an
inaccurate assessment of the present.7
	Misperception matters only when the involved actors are dependent
on one another.  It matters only in situations involving cooperation and
conflict, not conflict alone.8
	Systemic constraints or a leaders own cognitive processes may
limit the choice to that of conflict.  In this case, the actors assessment
of the others preferences are inconsequential, no matter how accurate it
may be, because his course of action has already been determined by other
factors.
	Misperception theory therefore concludes that misperception can
only affect the choice of an actor whose decision is contingent on the
actions of another.  Two somewhat simplistic contingent strategies emerge
from this conclusion:  An actor may be a reciprocator (cooperation
strategy) or a opportunist (defection strategy).  In either case, an
accurate assessment of the other actors preferences are necessary in order
to arrive at the desired outcome.  
	Stein further critiques past theorists, stating, The...emphasis
that misperception leads to otherwise avoidable conflict is accurate but
presumes a world in which full knowledge would generate cooperation.9 The
misperceived actor must either be a tit-for-tat reciprocator or he must
have a dominant strategy in order that the misperception would cause
conflict.  Even if misperception does cause otherwise avoidable conflict,
there is no guarantee for cooperation and/or harmony if absolute knowledge
is the case.
	Before we move on to discuss the situation, some key terms and
concepts require explanation if we are to effectively evaluate current USG
policy toward Iraq.  As stated earlier, a theoretical index is provided at
the end of this paper to help clarify any concepts not directly discussed
in this portion of the text. 
	Of primary concern to all sides in international affairs are a
given nations interests.  Interests are sub-divided into two groups:
strategic and intrinsic interests.  Strategic interests tend to be lofty
goals or somewhat intangible characteristics that a nation believes are
vital to its national interest.  Examples of strategic interests are:
prestige, leadership, or nationally held ideals (such as democracy, human
rights, or even a free markets economy10).
	Intrinsic interests, on he other hand, are generally much more
tangible in nature.  A prime example of US intrinsic interests in the
Mid-East is oil.  Oil was one of the interests articulated by President
George Bush as well as Secretary of State James Baker as being at stake
when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.  Other examples of intrinsic interests
are territory, natural mineral deposits and various other resources.
	Rationality is another concept that plays an important role in any
analysis of national decision making.  Actors are often characterized as
rational or irrational.  These labels are too constrictive however.  When
discussing the rationality of decision makers, a useful tool is the
rheostat of rationality.  As an actor is rarely completely irrational, he
may be defined in terms of his relative position on the rheostat.  If one
is higher on the rheostat, his decision making process is more rational in
nature.  Likewise, the more irrational an actor is determined to be, the
lower we would find him on the rheostat.  
	The rationality of decision makers is affected by a number of
factors which directly affect the outcome of their decision making
processes.  The nature of the process itself has a significant impact on
an actors level of rationality.  If an actor engages in a more analytical
form of decision making, his rationality would be considered much higher
than if he utilized a cognitive process for decision making.  Cognitive
decision making is less rational because the decision maker may ignore or
disregard available information or he may incorporate inherent biases,
both of which would adversely influence to outcome of the process.
	When we discuss an actor who is acting out of his basement of
fear, we are referring to an actor who is motivated by fears and needs
(internal or external).  An actor who is in the basement may pursue a
potentially disastrous course of action regardless of evidence that should
lead him to another, more rational option.  In this sense, actors who
dwell in basements are generally less rational in nature. 

RATIONALITY OF THE ACTORS
	Rationality is perhaps the most difficult thing to determine about
ones adversary.  Often, in situations of potential conflict one actor may
engage in Brinkmanship -- the rationality of irrational behavior.  What
factors come into play that determine an actors level of rationality?
	An actors ability to act in a rational manner may be effected by a
number of variables.  Past experiences oft times form biases that force an
actor to frame a situation in a certain way.  Information availability
plays an important role in the rational decision making process as well.
A lack of or even an overabundance of information can cause an actor to be
insensitive to or ignorant of critical facts that bear on the case.
Misperceptions arise as a result of these variables, potentially effecting
the outcome of situations of conflict and/or cooperation.
BIASES AT WORK
	Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz clearly articulated a bias
maintained by his government when he characterized future USG actions
vis-a-vis Iraq:
	...American policies are constantly changing... the present [US]
administration, for reasons related to its weakness and hesitancy or...
short-sighted domestic calculations, will persist in intransigent
positions.11
	Evidence of USG biases in their perception of Iraq is somewhat
easier to uncover.  President George Bush characterized Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein as a madman more than once during the Gulf War Crisis.
Bush also likened Hussein to Hitler.  While such descriptions were
volleyed in the heat of political crisis, they have served to solidify the
general perception of the man.  Additionally, Richard Haass, former Bush
administration National Security Council staff member, referred to the
Iraqi leader, demonstrating a USG bias as to Husseins inclinations:
	If the past holds, now is the time Saddam will press his
advantage.  He is not one to see limits.  Rather, this serial prober will
see what more he can get away with against the Kurds, what more he can do
to split Turkey from the coalition, what more he can say to France and
Russia to get them to dilute sanctions.  In the process, he is likely to
underestimate the United States.12

	Additionally, USG bias toward Iraq and how it should best be dealt
with is provided by US Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Pelletreau.
Experience has shown that a firm and unified stance by the United States
and others in the international community is the only way to bring about
compliance.13
UNITARY ACTORS
	Another important characteristic to consider when evaluating the
relative rationality of decision makers is whether or not they may be
considered to be Unitary Actors.  Put quite simply, a unitary actor is,
generally speaking, alone in the decision making process.  The more actors
that take part in the decision making process, the less unitary the
decision maker is considered.
	From all available evidence, Iraqs Saddam Hussein is most
certainly a unitary actor.  The media is replete with accounts of Iraqi
cabinet members being summarily executed by the President himself when
they dissent from his opinion or policy decision.  This alone does not
define a unitary actor, however.  Again, from all press accounts, there is
nary a decision made within the government of Iraq that has not been
directed by or at least influenced by Hussein.  Such is the nature of a
dictatorship.
	The USG, however, is quite another case.  The nature of a
democracy is, of course, participatory government.  This precipitates a
rather significant number of actors who may influence the outcome of the
decision making process.  Whether they are elected representatives,
appointed officials, paid political lobbyists or ordinary citizens, a vast
number of interests are expressed throughout the course of US national
security decision making.  
	Some would accept this description as a good illustration of what
a unitary actor is not.  Given the effectiveness of the US democracy,
however, decision making is not so disjointed or smothered that the
rationality of the process is significantly affected.  Certainly,
bureaucratic politics tend to muddy the waters and may indeed lead to
misperceptions and even a failure in the decision making process.
Considered together, due to the nature of his control of the Iraqi
government, Saddam Hussein would have to be considered more of a unitary
actor than President Clinton or the USG.  
		 
PERCEPTION AS REALITY
	Often, in the course of analyzing international conflict,
arguments ensue in regard to what really happened or what really is the
case.  In this sense, scholars attempt to define the reality of a given
situation using objective criteria.  Reality, however, is not so easily
defined.  The simple fact of the matter is that objective reality is not
the breeding place for conflict, peoples perceptions of reality is.
Fears, even if ill-founded, are real fears... Hopes, even if unrealistic,
may cause war.  Facts, even if established, may do nothing to solve the
problem.14 It is, therefore, necessary to understand the reality of the
current conflict between Iraq and the United States from each actors
perspective.  
THE IRAQI REALITY
	Access to primary sources of Iraqi policies, decisions and/or
positions is limited, to say the least.  Therefore, any understanding of
Iraqi perceptions is inherently difficult.  Some information is available
and will, therefore, allow us to attempt to define the Iraqi reality.
IRAQS INTERESTS
	Saddam Hussein clearly articulated Iraqi national interests in
July 1990 when he held discussions with US Ambassador April Glaspie.  In
the course of these talks, Hussein stated quite clearly that Iraq desired
possession of the entire Shatt al Arab (a key waterway that empties into
the Persian Gulf) as well as control of the whole of Iraq.  Using the term
whole,  Hussein was intentionally including Kuwait, which Iraq officially
viewed as one of its provinces.15 Subsequent to this statement (and
Operation Desert Storm), Iraq backed down from its claim to Kuwait -- in
accordance with UN Security Council resolutions demanding its recognition
of the sovereignty of Kuwait.
	Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz further articulated Iraqi
national interests in an article he wrote in the Mideast Mirror in 1994.
Aziz stated:
	The aim of Iraqi diplomacy at the present time is to clarify facts
to the... Security Council... and the international community..., and to
remove the technical and legal pretexts which the US uses to cover the
ulterior motives of its political stance [in support of UN sanctions
against Iraq].16
	
In this context, Aziz identifies the lifting of the US supported sanctions
imposed by the United Nations as one of his countrys vital national
interest, as the Iraqi government believes the sanctions are a tool aimed
to bring about the fall of Saddam Hussein.
THE THREAT TO IRAQ
	Deputy Prime Minister Aziz also articulates Iraqs perception of
the threat against them in the Mideast Mirror article.  Aziz links the
perceived [by Iraq] US goal of a politically, militarily and economically
weak Arab world with that of Israel.  He contends that the strong Jewish
lobby in the US has worked to create a US policy that is directly in line
with that of Israels.  Aziz then takes his reasoning one step further and
states that [the enfeeblement of Iraq] is the essential goals of both
parties [the US and Israel]...17
	One may postulate that, in addition to the US/Israeli threat, Iraq
believes there are significant domestic aspects to the threat that they
perceive.  In such an estimation, one would naturally point to Iraqs
historic mistreatment of its indigenous ethnic minorities (Shiite Muslims
in the south and Kurds in the north).  The majority of Iraqs population,
and its government, are Sunni Muslims.  Yet, despite evidence of
mistreatment and horrific crimes against Iraqs own people, one may not
conclude that such a domestic threat is actually perceived by the Iraqi
government as evidence as such is not to be found.
	Further evidence of Iraqs perception of an external threat to
their security was evident in comments made in the Iraqi government
newspaper, al-Jumhouriya.  The daily publication characterized the UN
Special Commission that was overseeing the disarmament of Iraq as spies,
agents of Washington and London, working to topple the government of
Saddam Hussein.  This was the justification for the Iraqi government
denying access to numerous weapons production sites.18
THE US REALITY
	Determining the USG view of the reality of the current conflict
with Iraq is facilitated by a wealth of information.  Think tanks,
journals and official government sources of information are easily
accessible and therefore create the problem of information overload --
quite different than the scarcity of information on the Iraqi side.	
USG INTERESTS
	The USG, it seems, takes every opportunity to repeat its vital
national interests in the Mid-East in general and Iraq in particular.  A
veritable laundry list of US strategic and intrinsic interests is
available for anyone to evaluate, including Saddam Hussein.
	A key strategic interest of the USG is its role as the world
leader.  Both Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton have taken great
pains to remind the world that the use will not back away from this role.
Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau stated it aptly:
	Tempting as it is, we do not have the option of picking up our
marbles and going home. We have a major interest not just in preventing
the outbreak of conflict and promoting the peaceful resolution of
disputes, but also in changing the conduct and limiting the means of
potential war-makers, and in isolating extremists who foment
destabilization and conflict. This can only be achieved through active and
sustained political engagement, backed by American military power, and
through support from our friends and allies.19
  
	The notion of America as world leader is then more narrowly
focused on the Mid-East:  
	Only America can wear the mantle of leadership, not just in
combatting enemies and threats, but in building a world that reflects our
ideals and promotes our interests. Only the United States can play the
role of honest broker to bring the Israelis and Arabs together. And only
America can forge the coalition which defeated Saddam Hussein and which
now contains Iraq's and Iran's ambitions.20
	
	Pelletreau specified US vital interests in the Mid-East as
follows:

	-- first and foremost, achieving a just, comprehensive, secure and
durable Arab-Israeli peace
     -- helping maintain the security and well-being of Israel
     -- preventing regional conflicts and supporting friendly nations 
     -- ensuring the free flow of oil from the Gulf upon which we and the
other industrial nations depend for our economic security 
     -- enhancing business opportunities for our companies and jobs for
our citizens
     -- suppressing terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass
destruction 
     -- containing rogue regimes in Iran, Iraq and Libya...advancing
respect for human rights, the rule of law and open, participatory
societies,
     --and preserving the deep cultural ties we have to the origins of
Western civilization and the birthplace of the great monotheistic
religious. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 
	All of these give our nation a concrete and lasting stake in the
Middle East.21

	The above list encompasses both strategic and intrinsic US
interests in the Mid-East.  Among the strategic interests are concerns for
human rights, the rule of law and participatory societies.  Examples of US
intrinsic interests are the free flow of oil and regional access to US
businesses.
THE THREAT TO THE US
	According to US officials, Iraq remains a threat to international
peace and stability, even five years after the Gulf War. Instability in
the Middle East carries unique dangers. It can threaten the security of
close friends such as Israel, Egypt, and other states in the region. It
can threaten our NATO partners in Europe. It can threaten our ability to
protect vital oil supplies from the Gulf. It can bring new outbreaks of
terrorism to our shores. And it can ignite a race to acquire weapons of
mass destruction.22 Iraq, to the United States, is the perfect example of
the potential for such instability.

USG STRATEGY EMPLOYED 
	Discussion of deterrence and coercive diplomacy will be confined
to the time period from July 1990 through September 1996.  It was in
August 1990 that Iraq invaded Kuwait -- the act that precipitated the
ongoing conflict between the US and Iraq.  Since that time, multiple
actions took place which will provide us the context in which our analysis
can take place.  

DETERRENCE STRATEGY EMPLOYED BY THE USG
PRE-AUG 1990
	On July 25, 1990, US Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie met with
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.  At the behest of US Secretary of State
James Baker and President George Bush, Glaspie directly questioned Hussein
as to Iraqs intentions vis-a-vis Kuwait, given the recent massing of Iraqi
military forces along the Iraq-Kuwait border.
	What followed is widely considered as a virtual invitation, extend
to Hussein from Bush (via Glaspie), to invade Kuwait.  At the outset,
Glaspie seemed to convey Washingtons concern over the troop concentrations
and directly asked Hussein: Why are your troops massed so very close to
Kuwaits borders?  Hussein went on to explain Iraqs position; regarding the
Shatt al Arab as vital to Iraq and Kuwait as a province of Iraq.  Hussein
also clearly conveyed his intention to resolve the dispute by force in a
matter of days if Kuwait did not agree to the Iraqi position.  When asked
by Hussein what the opinion of the United States was on this matter,
Glaspie responded:
	We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your
dispute with Kuwait.  Secretary Baker has directed me to emphasize the
instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is
not associated with America.23

	Such was the invitation extended.  This action, or lack thereof,
is an example of failed deterrence.  Clearly, US vital interests were at
stake.  Whether Glaspie was forced to take the wrap for this debacle is
still unclear.
DESERT SHIELD
	Only days later, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait, ushering in the next
phase of Iraqi-US conflict.  RESOLUTION 660 (as well as subsequent
resolutions) adopted by the Security Council at its 2932nd meeting, on 2
August 1990, failed to persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.   RESOLUTION
678 (1990), the final effort at a peaceful resolution the situation,
stated:  Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of
Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements,..., the
foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement
resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to
restore international peace and security in the area.24
	In the interim between resolutions 660 and 678, a massive build-up
of military force (composed of Western and Mid-East militaries) took
place.  Yet, this effort (known as Operation Desert Shield) went unheeded
as well.  Eventually, the amassed coalition forces began offensive
operations, signaling the end to deterrent efforts to rectify the invasion
of Kuwait.
POST-DESERT STORM
	Following the forced expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in
February 1991, specific deterrent policies were put in to effect.  No-Fly
zones were established, above the 37th and below the 32nd parallels.
These zones were established in order to deter renewed Iraqi troop and/or
military aircraft movements outside the given parameters.
  
COERCIVE STRATEGY EMPLOYED BY THE USG
DESERT STORM
	Operation Desert Storm is an example of brute force -- in this
case it was used to expel the Iraqi military from Kuwait.  In this sense,
it is the diplomacy of violence.  The bargaining chips cease to be
political concessions, instead they become military forces, equipment,
other material, and, in some cases, a nations civilian population.  The
inherent capability to do harm, coupled with the willingness to do such
harm (while accepting potential costly losses to ones own resources),
transplants ideologies and interests for a relative calculation of
acceptable losses to men and material.  The power to hurt, though it can
usually accomplish nothing directly, is potentially more versatile than a
straightforward capacity for forcible accomplishment.25
	Coalition forces arrayed against Husseins army of occupation
clearly had the inherent capability to force Iraq out of Kuwait.  Despite
this overwhelming display, Iraq did not immediately capitulate and
offensive operations soon ensued -- albeit with a rather predictable
outcome.
UN SANCTIONS
	Our policy on Iraq remains firm: Iraq must fulfill all obligations
established under UN Security Council
resolutions passed after the invasion. No relaxation of the sanctions will
be possible until Iraq complies
fully.26
	UN Security Council Resolutions 661, 687 and 986 are the primary
instruments which characterize current USG efforts to coerce Iraq.
Resolution 661 laid out initial measures (primarily economic) that all UN
member states were called upon in order to force Iraq to evacuate
Kuwait.27
	In addition to provisions for the repatriation of Kuwaiti
prisoners and the payment for damages resulting from the armed conflict,
UNSC Resolution 687 further reinforced economic sanction levied against
Iraq in Resolution 661.  687 went on to establish a program of review, to
be conducted at 60 day intervals, in order to determine the extent of
Iraqs compliance with the requirements of the resolution (and all previous
resolutions pertaining to Iraqs invasion of Kuwait.28
	In 1995, a carrot was offered to Iraq.  UNSC Resolution 986,
acknowledging the extreme hardships that the Iraqi people were enduring as
a result of the sanctions discussed above, provided an opportunity for the
Iraqis to sell some of their oil reserves; the profits from which would be
used to supply goods and services badly needed by the people.  Although
the carrot was offered, it has yet to be given to Iraq because the oil
sale was contingent on Iraqi compliance with all previous resolutions.29
	By 1996, Iraq seemed to be moving quite close to securing
permission for the oil sale.  However, in September 1996, Iraq violated
various UNSC resolutions when it moved military forces into restricted
areas in the northern part of the country.  Ostensibly acting upon the
request of one of the two Kurdish factions, Iraq occupied the town of
Irbil.  The town was virtually leveled and most of the inhabitants fled.
The Clinton administration responded quickly.	
DESERT STRIKE
	Earlier today I ordered American forces to strike Iraq. Our
missiles sent the following message to Saddam Hussein: When you abuse your
own people or threaten your neighbors you must pay a price... 
	Our objectives are limited, but clear: to make Saddam pay a price
for the latest act of brutality, reducing his ability to threaten his
neighbors and America's interests. First we are extending the no-fly zone
in southern Iraq. This will deny Saddam control of Iraqi air space from
the Kuwaiti border to the southern suburbs of Baghdad, and significantly
restrict Iraq's ability to conduct offensive operations in the region.
Second, to protect the safety of our aircraft enforcing this no-fly zone,
our Cruise missiles struck Saddam's air defense capabilities in southern
Iraq.30
	
	Operation Desert Strike consisted of more than 40 cruise missiles,
launched primarily against air defense targets south of Baghdad in two
different strikes.  The location of the targets seem puzzling when
considered in the context of what it was that precipitated the attack.
The Kurds are in the north, as were the Iraqi forces that violated
movement restrictions.  
	The targets, themselves, are somewhat curious.  The air defense
sites attacked, although they posed some danger to allied pilots
patrolling the no-fly zones, were able to be quickly replaced or repaired.
In fact, about the same time that President Clinton was claiming success,
the Iraqis were moving to rebuild their air defense structure.
	President Clinton took this particular action a step further:  he
expanded the no-fly zones in the north as well as the south. The larger
no-fly zone in Southern Iraq will make it easier for the U.S. and
coalition partners to
contain Saddam Hussein's aggression, claimed a Defense Department press
release.31
POLICIES RECONSIDERED
	Detailed above is a brief history of six cases in which the USG
employed either a deterrent strategy (three cases) or a coercive strategy
(also three cases) when dealing with Iraq in a crisis situation.  At this
time, it is appropriate to discuss the effectiveness of deterrent or
coercive policy in terms of its support of stated US national interests in
the Mid-East.
	First, let us consider the deterrent strategies.  We will begin
with the Pre-August 1990 situation, followed by Operation Desert Shield
and finally Post-Desert Storm operations.  
	First, the meeting between Amb. Glaspie and President Hussein
seems rather straightforward.  By her very statement, Glaspie seems to
convey American indifference to Husseins impending invasion of Kuwait.
Although she did attempt to convey American concern in her opening
statement, it is her final statement (and Husseins subsequent reaction)
that is most revealing.  There seemed to be little opportunity for
misinterpretation when she stated ...the Kuwait issue is not associated
with America.  This is a case of a failure to deter Iraqi aggression.
	Although Operation Desert Shield is listed under the deterrence
heading, one could also interpret US actions at that time as coercive in
intent as well.  The US goal for Desert Shield was to deter further Iraqi
aggression against its neighbors.   Desert Shield, when considered along
with the various UNSC resolutions calling for Iraqi withdrawal from
Kuwait, might also be considered as a coercive strategy.  However, since
no statement identifying it as such is available, we will evaluate it
according to its stated purpose.  Although Iraqi forces did enter Saudi
Arabian territory at one point, Desert Shield served well to protect Iraqs
southern neighbor. Therefore it is an example of a successful deterrent
action.
	The final deterrent action considered, Post-Desert Storm
operations (namely the enforcement of the no-fly zones),  must be a
qualified failure.  Despite years of success in enforcing the no-fly zone,
Iraqs incursion into the Kurdish territory violated numerous UNSC
resolutions.  The forces patrolling the no-fly zone (also known as the
no-drive zone), failed to prevent the Iraqi action.  
	The first coercive policy considered is Operation Desert Storm.
By all accounts, this action was an unqualified success.  Today, one can
often hear Desert Storm characterized as a failure because Saddam Hussein
is still in power.  His removal as the leader of Iraq was not, however,
one of the criteria for success.  The purpose of Desert Storm was the
expulsion of Iraqi forces from the territory of Kuwait.  That was
accomplished -- a success.
	UN sanctions represent the second coercive policy evaluated by
this work.  Starting with UNSC Resolution 661 (1990) and ending with UNSC
Resolution 986 (1995), the USG was potentially the biggest champion of the
continued imposition of sanctions and restrictions levied against Iraq.
The jury is still out on this case.  Required to comply with all
provisions of the resolutions, Iraq has not yet fully complied.  Until
Husseins government does comply, Resolution 986 (Oil for money) will not
go into effect.  Though even the USG was beginning to lean toward
approving the oil sale, Iraq scuttled all chances when they invaded the
Kurdish town of Irbil.
	Although President Clinton quickly declared Operation Desert
Strike (cruise missile attacks in response to the invasion of Irbil) a
success, it receives a failing grade here.  The strikes, ostensibly in
response for action in the north of Iraq, actually hit targets (air
defense sites) south of Baghdad.  The Clinton administration claimed that
the cruise missile attack sent the following message to Hussein: When you
abuse your own people or threaten your neighbors you must pay a price.33
Yet the price to Hussein was virtually nothing.  Within days, the Iraqi
military had either replaced or repaired most of the equipment.  The only
gain for the USG in this case was the extending of the no-fly zones.  This
too was of minimal importance as allied pilots were experiencing very
little opposition from the Iraqis... usually, they were just illuminated
by their radar.  This case also receives a failing grade.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY
	Prospect Theory, Bounded Rationality Theory, and Misperception
Theory, as articulated previously in this work, provide us with three
different microscopes with which to analyze USG policy vis-a-vis Iraq.
All three theories incorporate variables that may potentially lead to
failures in national security decision making.
	
	Prospect Theory seems uniquely tailored for rogue states like
Iraq.  Saddam Hussein may indeed be the classic decision maker who dwells
in his own basement of fear.  Confronted with a domestic situation that
seems to worsen every day, a military force that requires continual
pacification in order to prevent a coup, and an outside world that often
seems to be cornering him, Hussein may indeed be motivated by his fears
(be they perceived or real).
	Bounded Rationality Theory, on the other hand, seems more
applicable to a decision maker who is not considered a unitary actor, like
the USG.  Given the influential role of elected and appointed official in
the USG, as well as the considerable political weight thrown around by
lobbyists, bureaucratic politics as a constraint on rational decision
making seems right at home with the USG.  With its self-defined role as
the world leader and its vast intelligence assets, the USG may well
perceive that it has the ability (to some extent) to calculate and control
the risks inherent in national security decision making.
	Finally, Misperception Theory also seems tailor-made for our
analysis.  Its focus on the role of misperceptions in situations that
involve cooperation and conflict is quite appropriate to the ongoing
crisis with the USG and Iraq.  Misperception Theory, however, may not so
readily fit to this situation.  This theory relies on the notion that
misperceptions can only effect the outcome of a potential crisis situation
if an actors decision is contingent on the actions of the other.  If
Saddam is in his basement, his decisions may not be contingent on the
actions of the USG and, therefore, Misperception Theorys applicability
breaks down. 
CONCLUSION
	Considering the cases articulated above, what do these separate
theories provide us within our analysis?  Do any or all of them provide a
clear picture as to the reasons for the success or failure of the strategy
employed?  Of the cases evaluated, three were considered failures, two
successes and one was undetermined.
	It is the contention of this work that, although each of the
theories articulated shed a certain amount of light on our subject and
allow us to examine more completely the reasons for policy failure,
Prospect Theory is perhaps the most crucial to our evaluation.  Not only
does Saddam Hussein fit nicely into the prospect theory mold, but Prospect
Theory adequate provides an explanation for the failures identified above.
	Ambassador Glaspies debacle, when viewed through the Prospect
Prism, represents one of Husseins externally generated fears that suddenly
vanished in front of him.  Thus, his choice was made that much easier.
	In the case of the incursion into Irbil, Prospect Theory would
have had the USG on its toes.  If the USG had considered Hussein to be a
decision maker motivated by his fears, who is loss averse, they could have
been more vigilant -- knowing that, at some time, he would strike again
somewhere.  As for the cruise missile attack, it  inflicted so little
damage that the risk Hussein took was insignificant to say the least.
	So then, given that Prospect Theory provides the USG with a useful
tool in order to view it adversary, Iraq, what recommended policy changes
are in order?
	Understanding that Hussein, a unitary actor, is motivated by his
fears and needs, the USG policy vis-a-vis Iraq should be founded on three
critical actions.  First, the USG should exert its considerable leadership
and strengthen its ties with its coalition partners in the region.  With
close Arab ties, some of Husseins fears may subside.  Secondly, the USG
should assure Hussein of its intention to normalize relations with Iraq
and support the lifting of the sanctions (once Iraq complies).  Finally,
the USG should maintain a ready military, capable of responding in a time
of crisis and at the same time remain committed to use military force (or
shows of force) as a last resort in order to maintain peaceful relations.